F.I.F.A. – Commissione per lo Status dei Calciatori (2015-2016) – controversie allenatori – ———- F.I.F.A. – Players’ Status Committee (2015-2016) – coach disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 26 August 2014, by Mr Geoff Thompson (England), Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee, on the claim presented by the coach Coach K, from country S as “Claimant” against the club Club I, from country T as “Respondent” regarding an employment-related contractual dispute arisen between the parties.

F.I.F.A. - Commissione per lo Status dei Calciatori (2015-2016) – controversie allenatori – ---------- F.I.F.A. - Players' Status Committee (2015-2016) – coach disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 26 August 2014, by Mr Geoff Thompson (England), Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee, on the claim presented by the coach Coach K, from country S as “Claimant” against the club Club I, from country T as “Respondent” regarding an employment-related contractual dispute arisen between the parties. I. Facts of the case 1. On 1 January 2013, the coach from country S, Coach K (hereinafter: the Claimant) and the club from country T, Club I (hereinafter: the Respondent) signed a one-year employment contract (hereinafter: the contract) valid until the end of 2013. 2. Article 4.1 of the contract provided that the coach would be entitled to a monthly salary of USD 4,000. 3. Article 6.3 of the contract provided that “Any disputes between the Parties that may arise from the performance of this Contract of Employment shall be considered in the manner defined by the Labour Law of the country T”, while article 6.4 stipulated that “For any other issues not regulated by this Labour Law, the Parties shall adhere by the laws of the country T regulating the employment”. 4. Article 6.6 of the contract provided that “This Contract of Employment can be terminated for the reasons defined by the applicable labour legislation”. 5. On 18 October 2013, the Claimant lodged a claim with FIFA against the Respondent, claiming that the latter had unilaterally terminated the Employment Contract without justified reason by means of a letter dated 17 June 2013. The relevant termination letter sent by the Respondent to the Claimant reads as follows: “Dear Coach K, Club I thank you for your cooperation and the work done as the head coach of our team. In this regard, no satisfactory results, this resulted in a defeat in the last match against Club R from country T. The club by President X has decided to terminate your contract with the team Club I. Club thanks you for your cooperation and wishes you success as a coach”. 6. The Claimant is of the opinion that the Respondent did not have a just cause to terminate the contract and consequently requested FIFA to condemn the Respondent to pay him, as compensation for the termination of the contract by the club without just cause, the amount of USD 28,000 representing seven monthly salaries for the period from June 2013 to December 2013. 7. On 27 November 2013, the Respondent provided its answer to the claim and rejected the Claimant’s allegations. In this respect and first of all, the Respondent argued that although it had asked the Claimant, at the time the contract was signed, to provide “documents confirming his work experience (work book) […] showing his professional education, a license for coaching activities, passport”, the latter had failed to submit said documentation. Consequently, and since “this requirement derives from Article 32 of the Labour Code of the country T”, the contract was terminated with just cause as per article 6.6 of the contract. 8. In view of this, the Respondent deemed that the Claimant’s claim should be rejected “as fault to termination of a contract fully lies on Coach K, who ignored the requirements of current labor legislation”. 9. Furthermore, the Respondent argued that the present dispute did not fall under the jurisdiction of FIFA, since the country T has “independent courts” fully competent to deal with such disputes. 10. Upon FIFA’s request, the Claimant stated that he had remained unemployed during the period running from June 2013 until December 2013. II. Considerations of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee 1. First of all, the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee (hereinafter: the Single Judge) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the case at hand. In this respect, the Chamber took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 18 October 2013. Consequently, the 2012 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules) is applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 of the Procedural Rules). 2. Subsequently, the Single Judge referred to art. 3 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed that in accordance with art. 23 par. 1 and 3 in combination with art. 22 lit. c) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2012) he shall adjudicate on employment-related disputes between a coach and a club or an association that have an international dimension. 3. As a consequence, the Single Judge would, in principle, be competent to decide on the present employment-related dispute which involves a coach from country S and a club in country T. 4. However, the Single Judge acknowledged that the Respondent had contested the competence of FIFA’s deciding bodies, arguing that the country T has “independent courts” fully competent to deal with such disputes. 5. In relation to the above, the Single Judge deemed it vital to outline that one of the basic conditions that needs to be met in order to establish that another organ than the Players’ Status Committee or its Single is competent to settle an employment-related dispute between a club and a player of an international dimension, is that the jurisdiction of the relevant national court derives from a clear reference in the employment contract. 6. Therefore, while analysing whether it was competent to hear the present matter, the Single Judge considered that it should, first and foremost, analyse whether the employment contract at the basis of the present dispute contained a clear jurisdiction clause. 7. In this respect, the Single Judge recalled that article 6.3 of the contract stipulates that “Any disputes between the Parties that may arise from the performance of this Contract of Employment shall be considered in the manner defined by the Labour Law of the country T”, while article 6.4 stipulates that “For any other issues not regulated by this Labour Law, the Parties shall adhere by the laws of the country T regulating the employment”. 8. Having examined the relevant provisions, the Single Judge came to the conclusion that articles 6.3 and 6.4 of the contract do not constitute a clear jurisdiction clause in favour of one specific court in country T, but rather appear to constitute clauses of choice of law. 9. On account of all the above, the Single Judge established that the Respondent’s objection towards the competence of FIFA to deal with the present matter has to be rejected, and that he is competent, on the basis of art. 22 lit. c) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, to consider the present matter as to the substance. 10. Subsequently, the Single Judge analysed which edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, he confirmed that in accordance to art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the 2014 edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players and considering that the present claim was lodged with FIFA on 18 October 2013, the 2012 edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: the Regulations) is applicable to the present matter as to the substance. 11. His competence and the applicable regulations having been established, and entering into the substance of the matter, the Single Judge started by acknowledging the above-mentioned facts as well as the arguments and the documentation submitted by the parties. 12. In this respect, the Single Judge duly noted that the present dispute centres around the unilateral termination of the contract by the Respondent on 17 June 2013. Indeed, while the Claimant deems that the Respondent did not have a just cause to terminate the contract, the Respondent, on the other hand, is of the opinion that it was entitled to terminate the contract in accordance with the laws of country T and referring to art. 6.6 of the contract, since the Claimant had allegedly failed to provide “documents confirming his work experience (work book) […] showing his professional education, a license for coaching activities, passport”. 13. In light of the respective positions of the parties, the Single Judge reasoned that he had to establish whether or not the Respondent had a just cause to terminate the contract on 17 June 2013. If the Single Judge would conclude that the Respondent had terminated the contract without just cause, he would also have to determine the consequences thereof. 14. The above-mentioned having been established, the Single Judge referred to the reasons put forward by the Respondent to put an end to the contract in the context of the present proceedings, i.e. the Claimant’s alleged failure to provide certain documentation and the fact that the latter would have deceived the Respondent as to the nature of his qualifications. In this regard, the Single Judge first of all held that such reasons were not put forward in the letter of termination dated 17 June 2013. Indeed, the Respondent rather pointed towards a lack of satisfactory results. 15. The Single Judge held that it has to rely on the reason given to the Claimant at the time of termination of the contract. There is also no evidence of any other reproaches which would have been made to the Claimant at the time of the contract’s termination. In any case, the Single Judge was eager to point out that it is the Respondent’s responsibility to verify a coach’s qualifications prior to hiring him. Furthermore, and with reference to the rule of burden of proof, according to which a party claiming a right on the basis of an alleged fact shall carry the respective burden of proof (cf. art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules), the Single Judge found that the Respondent had by no means proven that the Claimant had deliberately deceived the Respondent when the parties concluded the contract. 16. In view of the above considerations, the Single Judge reverted to the reason put forward by the Respondent for terminating the contract as per the letter dated 17 June 2013, and held that in accordance with the constant and well-established jurisprudence of the Players’ Status Committee, including its Single Judge, lack of a team’s performance cannot, as a general rule, constitute a just cause for terminating an employment contract with a coach. Indeed, the assessment of performance by a coach is a subjective perception which cannot be measured on an objective scale and therefore has to be considered as inadmissible grounds for a termination of the employment relationship. 17. Furthermore and for the sake of good order, the Single Judge wished to point out that when deciding a dispute before him, FIFA’s regulations prevail over any national law chosen by the parties. In this regard the Chamber emphasised that the main objective of the FIFA regulations is to create a standard set of rules to which all the actors within the football community are subject to and can rely on. This objective would not be achievable if the Players’ Status Committee, including its Single Judge, would have to apply the national law of a specific party on every dispute brought to it. 18. Consequently, the Single Judge came to the conclusion that the Respondent terminated the contract with the Claimant on 17 June 2013 without just cause. 19. The Single Judge continued its deliberations by examining the consequences of such unilateral termination without just cause by the Respondent. In this respect, the Single Judge held that the Claimant is entitled to receive from the Respondent compensation for breach of contract. 20. The Single Judge first of all took note that the Claimant was requesting the payment of his salary until the end of the contract, i.e. the amount of USD 28,000, representing seven monthly salaries for the period from June 2013 to December 2013. 21. Furthermore, the Single Judge took note that the Claimant had not concluded any employment contract between June 2013 and December 2013. 22. In this context, the Single Judge noted that the parties had not included in the contract a compensation clause which could be applied in casu. Therefore, the amount of compensation due to the Claimant has to be established on the basis of other criteria. 23. The Single Judge reverted to the monthly remuneration due under the contract, i.e. USD 4,000, and that, as from the termination of the contract in June 2013 up until its normal expiry of the contract in December 2013, there were seven months of contract remaining. Therefore, the Single Judge decided that the amount of USD 28,000, i.e. 7x USD 4,000, serves as a basis for the calculation of compensation for breach of contract due to the Claimant. 24. In continuation, the Single Judge recalled that the Claimant did not find new employment between June 2013 and December 2013. Therefore, the Claimant was not in a position to possibly mitigate his damage arising from the termination of the contract by the Respondent without just cause. 25. In conclusion, the Single Judge decided that the Claimant’s claim is fully accepted and that the Respondent as to pay compensation for breach of contract without just cause to the Claimant in the amount of USD 28,000. 26. Lastly, the Single Judge referred to art. 25 par. 2 of the Regulations in combination with art. 18 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules, according to which in the proceedings before the Players’ Status Committee and the Single Judge, costs in the maximum amount of CHF 25,000 are levied. The costs are to be borne in consideration of the parties’ degree of success in the proceedings and are normally to be paid by the unsuccessful party. 27. In this respect, the Single Judge reiterated that the claim of the Claimant is accepted and that the Respondent is the party at fault. Therefore, the Single Judge decided that the Respondent has to bear the entire costs of the current proceedings in front of FIFA. 28. Furthermore and according to Annexe A of the Procedural Rules, the costs of the proceedings are to be levied on the basis of the amount in dispute. Consequently and taking into account that the total amount at dispute in the present matter is below CHF 50,000, the Single Judge concluded that the maximum amount of costs of the proceedings corresponds to CHF 5,000. 29. In conclusion and considering that the matter at hand did not pose in any particular legal or factual complexities and was decided by the Single Judge and not by the Players’ Status in corpore, the Single Judge determined the costs of the current proceedings to the amount of CHF 3,000. 30. Consequently, the amount of CHF 3,000 has to be paid by the Respondent to cover the costs of the present proceedings. III. Decision of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee 1. The claim of the Claimant, Coach K, is admissible. 2. The claim of the Claimant, Coach K, is accepted. 3. The Respondent, Club I, has to pay to the Claimant, Coach K, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision, the amount of USD 28,000 as compensation for breach of contract. 4. If the aforementioned total amount of USD 28,000 is not paid within the aforementioned deadline, an interest rate of 5% per year will apply as of expiry of the fixed time limit and the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to FIFA’s Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision. 5. The final costs of the proceedings in the amount of CHF 3,000 are to be paid by the Respondent, Club I, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision, as follows: 5.1 The amount of CHF 2,000 has to be paid to FIFA to the following bank account with reference to case nr.: UBS Zurich Account number 366.677.01U (FIFA Players’ Status) Clearing number 230 IBAN: CH27 0023 0230 3666 7701U SWIFT: UBSWCHZH80A 5.2 The amount of CHF 1,000 has to be paid directly to the Claimant, Coach K. 6. The Claimant, Coach K, is directed to inform the Respondent, Club I, immediately and directly of the account number to which the remittances under points 3 and 5.2 above are to be made and to notify the Players’ Status Committee of every payment received. ***** Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy): According to article 67 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives). The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following: Court of Arbitration for Sport Avenue de Beaumont 2 1012 Lausanne - Switzerland Tel: +41 21 613 50 00 Fax: +41 21 613 50 01 e-mail: info@tas-cas.org www.tas-cas.org For the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee: Markus Kattner Deputy Secretary General Encl. CAS directives