F.I.F.A. – Commissione per lo Status dei Calciatori (2011-2012) – controversie agenti di calciatori – ———- F.I.F.A. – Players’ Status Committee (2011-2012) – players’ and match agents disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 24 April 2012, by Geoff Thompson (England) Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee, on the claim presented by the Players’ Agent J, as “Claimant” against the club M, as “Respondent” regarding a claim for commission.

F.I.F.A. - Commissione per lo Status dei Calciatori (2011-2012) – controversie agenti di calciatori – ---------- F.I.F.A. - Players' Status Committee (2011-2012) – players’ and match agents disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 24 April 2012, by Geoff Thompson (England) Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee, on the claim presented by the Players’ Agent J, as “Claimant” against the club M, as “Respondent” regarding a claim for commission. I. Facts of the case 1. On 7 January 2006, the players’ agent J licensed by the Football Federation A (hereinafter: the Claimant), and the country T club, M (hereinafter: the Respondent), concluded an agreement (hereinafter: the agreement) regarding the transfer of the player H (hereinafter: the player) that was valid from 1 January 2006 until 31 June 2010. 2. According to the agreement, the Claimant was entitled to receive from the Respondent, as remuneration “for the work he has accomplished”, EUR 100,000 until 30 January 2006, EUR 100,000 until 30 January 2007 and EUR 100,000 until 30 January 2008. In this respect, it was specified that “the players agent J - and company S” was one of the parties to the agreement and that the Respondent was “represented by sportsdirector of the club Mr T”. 3. On 16 July 2008, the Claimant lodged a claim with FIFA against the Respondent requesting from the latter the payment of EUR 200,000, corresponding to the second and third instalments payable under the agreement, plus 5% interest as from “the due date of each payment”. In this respect, the Claimant referred to the agreement and explained that the Respondent “has not fulfilled its liability until now (..)”. 4. In its reply to the claim dated 3 March 2011, the Respondent rejected the Claimant’s claim in its entirety. In this respect, the Respondent argued that the Claimant’s “claim has no legal basis” and that the latter “has no legal title against club M” because the agreement only bore the name of the company of the Claimant and not his. Consequently, the Respondent deemed that it had “no contractual relationship” with the Claimant and that the latter “cannot open a case before FIFA on his own behalf.” In this connection, the Respondent also mentioned that the invoices sent by the Claimant were “signed, stamped and sended by company S”. 5. Furthermore, the Respondent maintained that it had no legally binding relationship with the Claimant because the agreement had not been signed by any of its authorized representatives and there was “no name and club’s seal” on it. 6. Moreover, the Respondent argued that the agreement should be declared null and void because it did not comply with the requirements included in art. 19 of FIFA’s Players’ Agents Regulations and claimed that because it had been concluded by a company, the Claimant had violated FIFA’s rules and regulations and therefore, FIFA should not “pay attention to this invalid document”. 7. Finally, the Respondent pointed out that the Claimant “has no any legal ground” since the player’s contract had not been co-signed by him. 8. By correspondence dated 11 April 2011, the Claimant provided FIFA with his position with regard to the Respondent’s allegations. 9. In this respect, first and foremost, the Claimant stressed that the agreement had been concluded by him and not by his company. 10. Secondly, the Claimant argued that “in international practice (..) documents related to player transfer transactions are frequently concluded by club representatives (..) who are club officials which do not fulfil the requirements of authorized signatures lists” and that those contracts “are completely accepted and contract obligations are fulfilled by the clubs”. Besides, the Claimant mentioned that Mr T [i.e. the person who signed the agreement on behalf of the Respondent] was “representing the club in the capacity of sportive director” and maintained that the Respondent had already used the same defence, i.e. that a contract had not been signed by one of its legal representative, in previous cases brought in from of FIFA. Furthermore, the Claimant argued that he had had no reason to doubt that Mr T had been duly authorized to sign the agreement on the Respondent’s behalf and provided FIFA with the statement of the latter in which his position was confirmed. In the said statement Mr T also confirmed that the work of the Claimant had actually led to the conclusion of an employment contract between the player and the Respondent. In addition, the Claimant pointed out that Mr T had also signed the player’s employment contract. 11. In continuation, the Claimant deemed that the absence of his signature on the employment contract had no “influence on the action” and stressed that, by means of an email dated 25 March 2008, the Respondent had acknowledged owing him the amount in dispute. As to that, the Claimant provided FIFA with a copy of the relevant email as well as its alleged enclosure, i.e. an undated and unsigned document, written on the letterhead of the club, by means of which the latter offered “to whom it may concern” to pay the amount of EUR 310,000 in three instalments relating to “the manager fees which have to be paid relating to player H, Mr D and Mr Z”. 12. Finally, the Claimant held that the agreement was perfectly valid. 13. In its last submission to FIFA, the Respondent maintained its position. Additionally, the Respondent explained that Mr T had been “expelled” from the club on 30 October 2007 and that “after losing his job he is acting against our club, thus his unilateral statement cannot be taken serious (..)”. II. Considerations of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee 1. First of all, the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee analysed which procedural rules are applicable to the matter at hand. In this respect, he referred to art. 21 par. 2 and 3 of the Rules governing the procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (edition 2008). The present matter was submitted to FIFA on 16 July 2008, thus after 1 July 2008. Therefore, the Single Judge concluded that the current edition of the Procedural Rules (edition 2008; hereinafter: the Procedural Rules) is applicable to the matter at hand. 2. Subsequently, the Single Judge analysed which edition of the FIFA Players’ Agents Regulations should be applicable. In this respect, he confirmed that in accordance with art. 39 par. 1 and 4 of the 2008 edition of the Players’ Agents Regulations, and considering that the present claim was lodged on 16 July 2008, the current edition of the Players’ Agents Regulations (edition 2008; hereinafter: the Regulations) is applicable to the matter at hand. 3. With regard to his competence, the Single Judge pointed out that in accordance with the provisions set out by the Regulations, FIFA has jurisdiction on matters relating to licensed players’ agents, i.e. on those individuals who hold a valid players’ agent licence issued by the relevant member Association. 4. The Single Judge continued his deliberations by indicating that the present matter concerns a dispute between a players’ agent licensed by the Football Federation A and a club, regarding an allegedly outstanding commission. 5. As a consequence, the Single Judge is the competent body to decide on the present matter which has an international dimension (cf. art. 30 par. 2 of the Regulations). 6. The competence of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee and the applicable regulations having been established and entering into the substance of the matter, the Single Judge started his analysis by acknowledging the facts of the case and the arguments of the parties as well as the documents contained in the file. 7. In doing so and first of all, the Single Judge noted that the Respondent had questioned the entitlement of the Claimant to lodge a claim in front of FIFA arguing that the agreement at the basis of his complaint had been concluded by his company and not by him directly. 8. Bearing in mind the aforementioned, the Single Judge held that the first issue to be addressed in the present dispute was whether the Claimant was indeed entitled to lodge a claim in front of FIFA on his behalf on the basis of the agreement. 9. In this context and after having carefully read the agreement, the Single Judge pointed out that it clearly mentioned the Claimant as one of its party. Besides, the Single Judge emphasized that there was no indication in the relevant document that could suggest that it had been concluded by the company of the Claimant and not by the Claimant himself. Indeed, the Single Judge observed that the Claimant was clearly mentioned in the agreement in person, together with the name of the company which he appears to belong to. Consequently, the Single Judge reasoned that the Claimant had concluded the agreement on his behalf and not as a representative of the company “S”. Hence, the Single Judge determined that the Claimant was entitled to lodge a claim with FIFA on the basis of the agreement and, therefore, rejected the argument submitted by the Respondent in this respect. 10. Having established the aforementioned, the Single Judge recalled that, in its submissions to FIFA, the Respondent had also contested the validity of the agreement alleging that the signature on the document in question did not belong to any of its authorized representatives and that there was “no name and club’s seal” on it. Hence, the Single Judge reasoned that the question of whether the agreement had been validly concluded between the Claimant and the Respondent and was therefore binding upon them had also to be addressed. 11. In this regard, the Single Judge observed that it was undisputed that the sports director of the Respondent at that time, i.e. Mr T, had signed the agreement. Furthermore and as to the Respondent’s allegation that Mr T had not been authorized to act on its behalf, the Single Judge stressed that such assertion had not been accompanied by any documentary evidence. Consequently, in view of the content of art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules, which stipulates that the burden of proof has to be carried by the party claiming a right on the basis of an alleged fact as well as taking into account that the Respondent had not sufficiently demonstrated that the person representing it under the agreement was not empowered to do so, the Single Judge resolved that it had to be assumed that Mr T was indeed entitled to sign a contract on the Respondent’s behalf. Hence, the Single Judge concluded that the agreement had been signed by the Claimant and by the Respondent. 12. Furthermore and for the sake of good order, the Single Judge recalled that, as a general rule and in accordance with his well-established jurisprudence, the internal proxy rule of one party to a contract can only have a legal effect on the validity of the contract itself if the other contracting partner was duly informed of its content. 13. In continuation and as to the fact that the Respondent’s seal had not been affixed on the agreement, the Single Judge pointed out that, as a general rule, such omission has no impact on the validity of a contract as long as the name of the parties entering into the convention in question are mentioned in the relevant document, and provided that it includes their signatures. Therefore, considering that the name of the Claimant and of the Respondent were stated in the agreement and bearing in mind that it had been duly signed by both of them, the Single Judge established that the absence of the Respondent’s seal had no influence on the validity of the agreement. 14. In addition and as to the Respondent’s allegation that the agreement was to be considered as null and void because it did not comply with the requirements of art. 19 of the Regulations, the Single Judge pointed out that the conditions mentioned in the Regulations under art. 19 par. 6 with regard to the obligation to issue four copies of a representation agreement and send one of them to the associations concerned are only for registration purposes. Consequently, the Single Judge underlined that the Regulations do not establish the aforementioned registration as a requirement for the validity of a particular representation agreement and also, do not provide any legal consequences suspending or jeopardising its validity in the event of non-registration. In other words, failure to register a representation contract with a particular association will not lead to the nullity or invalidity of a representation agreement. In this context, the Single Judge was keen to stress that this well-established approach is in line with the jurisprudence of the Players’ Status Committee. 15. On account of all the above, the Single Judge concluded that the agreement had been validly concluded between the Claimant and the Respondent and was therefore valid and binding on them. 16. Having established the aforementioned, the Single Judge reverted to the exact wording of the agreement and underlined that it provided for the Claimant to receive from the Respondent “for the work he has accomplished” EUR 100,000 until 30 January 2006, EUR 100,000 until 30 January 2007 and EUR 100,000 until 30 January 2008. Furthermore, the Single Judge observed that, in his claim to FIFA, the Claimant had requested the payment of EUR 200,000, corresponding to the second and third instalments due as per the agreement arguing that he had never received the amount in question from the Respondent. Besides, the Single Judge took note that, for its part, the Respondent had not denied that the amount in question had not been paid to the Claimant. 17. In view of the above and in accordance with the basic legal principle of pacta sunt servanda, which in essence means that agreements must be respected by the parties in good faith, the Single Judge established that the Respondent has to fulfil its contractual obligations towards the Claimant according to the agreement and consequently, pay him the outstanding amount of EUR 200,000. 18. Additionally and for the sake of good order, the Single Judge recalled that the Respondent had sought to contest the legal basis of the Claimant’s claim arguing that the latter had not co-signed the player’s contract. As to that, the Single Judge was keen to underline that the absence of a players’ agent signature on the player’s contract does not per se prevent the players’ agent from receiving his commission. Furthermore, the Single Judge pointed out that, as stated in the agreement, the Claimant was being remunerated for the work he had accomplished in connection with the conclusion of an employment contract between the Respondent and the player. 19. In view of all the above, the Single Judge decided that the Respondent has to pay to the Claimant EUR 200,000 as commission in accordance with the agreement. 20. Finally and taking into account the Claimant’s request for interest as well as his constant practice, the Single Judge decided that the Respondent must pay to the Claimant interest of 5% p.a. on the amount of EUR 200,000 as of the day following the day on which each instalment of EUR 100,000 had fallen due, i.e. as of 31 January 2007 and as of 31 January 2008. 21. As a consequence, the Single Judge concluded his deliberations on the present dispute by deciding that the Claimant’s claim is accepted, and therefore the Respondent must pay to the Claimant the amount of EUR 200,000 as well as default interest at the rate of 5% p.a. on the following partial amounts until the effective date of payment as follows: - on EUR 100,000, 5% p.a. as from 31 January 2007; - on EUR 100,000, 5% p.a. as from 31 January 2008; 22. Lastly, the Single Judge referred to art. 25 par. 2 of the Regulations in combination with art. 18 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules, according to which in the proceedings before the Players’ Status Committee and the Single Judge, costs in the maximum amount of CHF 25,000 are levied. The costs are to be borne in consideration of the parties’ degree of success in the proceedings and are normally to be paid by the unsuccessful party. 23. In this respect, the Single Judge reiterated that the claim of the Claimant is accepted and that the Respondent is the party at fault. Therefore, the Single Judge decided that the Respondent has to bear the entire costs of the current proceedings in front of FIFA. 24. Furthermore and according to Annexe A of the Procedural Rules, the costs of the proceedings are to be levied on the basis of the amount in dispute. Consequently and taking into account the total amount at dispute in the present matter, i.e. the amount of EUR 200,000, the Single Judge concluded that the maximum amount of costs of the proceedings corresponds to CHF 25,000. 25. In conclusion and in view of the numerous submissions that had to be analysed in the present matter as well as considering that a number of factual complexities had to be addressed but taking into account that the present decision was taken by the Single Judge and not by the Players’ Status in corpore, the Single Judge determined the costs of the current proceedings to the amount of CHF 18,000. 26. Consequently, the amount of CHF 18,000 has to be paid by the Respondent to cover the costs of the present proceedings. III. Decision of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee 1. The claim of the Claimant, J, is accepted. 2. The Respondent, Club M, has to pay to the Claimant, J, the amount of EUR 200,000 within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision. 3. Within the same time limit, the Respondent, Club M, has to pay to the Claimant, J, default interest at the rate of 5% p.a. on the following partial amounts until the effective date of payment as follows: - on EUR 100,000, 5% p.a. as from 31 January 2007; - on EUR 100,000, 5% p.a. as from 31 January 2008; 4. If the aforementioned sum plus interest is not paid within the aforementioned deadline, the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to FIFA’s Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision. 5. The final costs of the proceedings in the amount of CHF 18,000 are to be paid by the Respondent, Club M, within 30 days as from the date of notification of the present decision as follows: 5.1. The amount of CHF 13,000 has to be paid to FIFA to the following bank account with reference to case nr.: UBS Zurich Account number 366.677.01U (FIFA Players’ Status) Clearing number 230 IBAN: CH27 0023 0230 3666 7701U SWIFT: UBSWCHZH80A 5.2. The amount of CHF 5,000 has to be paid to the Claimant, J. 6. The Claimant, J, is directed to inform the Respondent, Club M, immediately and directly of the account number to which the remittances under points 2, 3 and 5.2. above are to be made and to notify the Players’ Status Committee of every payment received. Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy): According to art. 63 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives). The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following: Court of Arbitration for Sport Avenue de Beaumont 2 1012 Lausanne Switzerland Tel: +41 21 613 50 00 Fax: +41 21 613 50 01 e-mail: info@tas-cas.org www.tas-cas.org For the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee Jérôme Valcke Secretary General Encl. CAS directives