F.I.F.A. – Commissione per lo Status dei Calciatori (2012-2013) – controversie agenti di calciatori – ———- F.I.F.A. – Players’ Status Committee (2012-2013) – players’ and match agents disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 25 September 2012, by Chuck Blazer (USA) Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee, on a claim presented by the Players’ agent Players agent M, from country E as “Claimant” against the player Player V, from country S as “Respondent” regarding a contractual dispute between the parties.

F.I.F.A. - Commissione per lo Status dei Calciatori (2012-2013) – controversie agenti di calciatori – ---------- F.I.F.A. - Players' Status Committee (2012-2013) – players’ and match agents disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 25 September 2012, by Chuck Blazer (USA) Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee, on a claim presented by the Players’ agent Players agent M, from country E as “Claimant” against the player Player V, from country S as “Respondent” regarding a contractual dispute between the parties. I. Facts of the case 1. On 5 October 2010, the players’ agent M (hereinafter: the Claimant) licensed by The country E Football Association and the country S player V (hereinafter: the Respondent) concluded a two-year exclusive “Standard Representation Agreement” (hereinafter: the agreement). 2. For the services rendered by the Claimant to the Respondent and according to Article 6 (A) of the agreement, the Respondent agreed to pay the Claimant “a commission of 10% of the annual gross guaranteed salary (signing on fees and basic salary from time to time) payable to the Player [i.e. the Respondent] and arising from any contract with any club negotiated by the Agent [i.e. the Claimant] (or by the player himself [i.e. the Respondent] during the Term). The payment shall be made by way of a lump sum payment at the start of the Player’s playing contract in respect of the period from the date of signing until the 30th June and thereafter on 1 July of each year of the Playing Contract during the Term”. 3. Moreover, Article 6 (D) of the agreement specified that “if the Player [i.e. the Respondent] makes a written request pursuant to Clause 9 (F) of this Agreement and concludes a professional playing contract without utilising the services of the Authorised Agent [i.e. the Claimant] he shall still be obliged to make the payment referred to in clause 6(A) hereof”. 4. In this context, Article 9 (F) of the agreement provided that “where permitted by this Representation Contact, if he [i.e. the Respondent] makes a written request to a club that the club deal with someone other than the authorised agent [i.e. the Claimant], including with the player himself, in relation to a transaction or contract negotiation […] he [i.e. the Respondent] shall provide the authorised agent [i.e. the Claimant] with a copy of the written request”. 5. On 7 March 2011, the Claimant lodged a claim in front of FIFA against the Respondent explaining that the latter had broken the agreement on two occasions when he was transferred from Club L, from country P to the Club B, from country S (hereinafter: Club B) on a loan basis and when he had signed “a permanent deal” with the latter club. 6. In this respect, the Claimant explained that despite his attempts to enter in contact with both clubs and with the Respondent himself to warn them that the latter was represented by him, he had not received any response and the parties had concluded an employment contract with the Respondent without involving him. Although the Claimant did not know the exact annual gross income of the Respondent since he had allegedly been excluded from the negotiations leading to the conclusion of the relevant employment contract, he claimed from the Respondent an amount representing 10% of his total salary with Club B. 7. On 16 May 2011, the Respondent rejected the entire claim, stating, in essence, that he had not signed any contract with any other clubs since the agreement’s signature and that the “loan agreement from Club F to Club B signed on 27 August 2010” had taken place “before the signature of the representation agreement between players agent M [i.e. the Claimant] and myself”. Furthermore, the Respondent argued that the Claimant “was not active at all” and had not offered him any option for a final transfer to another club. Therefore, the Respondent explained that he had decided to terminate the agreement on 8 February 2011 by means of a letter of termination he had sent to the Claimant. 8. Finally, the Respondent claimed that between the date of the agreement’s signature, i.e. on 5 October 2010, and the termination of the agreement on 8 February 2011, he had not signed any contract with any other clubs. 9. In a subsequent undated correspondence, the Claimant reiterated his claim and stressed again that the Respondent had signed an employment contract during the period from 5 October 2010 to 8 February 2011. In support of his allegations, the Claimant submitted a press article apparently confirming that the player had signed in January 2011 with Club B. Furthermore, the Claimant deemed that the agreement had not been terminated under the terms of the agreement and, consequently, believed that it was still valid until 6 October 2012. 10. On 14 July 2011, in its final comments, the Respondent reiterated his statement and asked again FIFA to reject the claim. 11. Upon FIFA’s request, the Football Association of country S provided, on 22 July 2011, a copy of the employment contract allegedly concluded between the player and Club B on 13 June 2011 and valid until January 2014, according to which the player was entitled to receive a total salary of EUR 610,000. However, according to the information and documents available on the Transfer Matching System (hereinafter: TMS), the administration of FIFA acknowledged the a content of a different employment contract, concluded between the player and Club B on 11 January 2011 and valid until January 2014, according to which the Respondent was entitled to receive from Club B a total salary of EUR 700,000. II. Considerations of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee 1. First of all, the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee (hereinafter also simply referred to as: the Single Judge) analysed which procedural rules are applicable to the matter at hand. In this respect, and since the claim against the Respondent was lodged with FIFA on 7 March 2011, the Single Judge concluded that the current edition of the Rules governing the procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (edition 2008; hereinafter: the Procedural Rules) is applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 par. 2 and 3 of the Procedural Rules). 2. Subsequently, the Single Judge analysed which edition of the FIFA Players’ Agents Regulations should be applicable. In this respect, he confirmed that in accordance with art. 39 par. 1 and 4 of the 2008 edition of the Players’ Agents Regulations, and considering that the present claim was lodged on 7 March 2011, the current edition of the Players’ Agents Regulations (edition 2008; hereinafter: the Regulations) is applicable to the matter at stake. 3. Furthermore, and with regard to his competence, the Single Judge pointed out that in accordance with art. 30 par. 2 of the Regulations, FIFA is competent to deal with international disputes in connection with the activities of licensed players’ agents, i.e. individuals who hold a valid player’s agent license issued by the relevant member association. In this respect, the Single Judge underlined that the present matter concerned a dispute between a players’ agent licensed by The country E Football Association and a country S player, regarding an alleged outstanding commission. As a consequence, the Single Judge held that he was competent to decide on the present matter which had an international dimension. 4. His competence and the applicable regulations having been established, and entering into the substance of the present matter, the Single Judge started by acknowledging the abovementioned facts and the arguments of the parties as well as the documentation contained in the file. 5. In this respect and first of all, the Single Judge started his analysis of the case by noting that, according to the agreement dated 5 October 2010 the Claimant had submitted in his claim, the latter was entitled to receive from the Respondent a commission of 10% of the Respondent’s basic gross income “from any contract with any club negotiated” for the Respondent by the Claimant. 6. Furthermore, the Single Judge underlined that, on the one hand, the Claimant had argued that the commission was due although he was excluded from the negotiations leading to the conclusion of the employment contract of the Respondent with Club B, whereas, on the other hand, the Respondent had argued that no commission was due because the loan agreement from Club L to Club B signed on 27 August 2010 had taken place before the signature of the representation agreement concluded between the Claimant and the Respondent, i.e. on 5 October 2010, as well as because he had decided to terminate the representation agreement on 8 February 2011 since the Claimant was not offering him any option for a final transfer to another club. 7. On the basis of the aforementioned allegations, the Single Judge turned his attention to the provisions contained in the agreement. In particular, the Single Judge emphasised that Article 6 (D) of the agreement provided that in the event that the Respondent decided not to use the services of the Claimant and would “conclude a professional playing contract without utilising the services of the Authorised Agent [i.e. the Claimant] he shall still be obliged to make the payment referred to in clause 6 (A) hereof”. In other words, Article 6 (D) of the agreement clearly indicated that the parties had agreed that if the Respondent would sign any employment contract with a club on his own or with the assistance of another players’ agent, i.e. without the involvement of the Claimant, he would still be liable to pay to the Claimant the agreed commission as per the agreement. In addition, the Single Judge further emphasised that Article 6 (A) of the agreement provided for an obligation for the Respondent to pay to the Claimant a commission of 10% of the Respondent’s yearly gross salary arising from any contract with any club negotiated by the Claimant. 8. In continuation, the Single Judge held that it would have to be established, first of all, whether the representation agreement concluded on 5 October 2010 between the Claimant and the Respondent and terminated by the latter on 8 February 2011 was still binding at the time the Respondent concluded his employment contract with Club B. 9. In this context, the Single Judge acknowledged that two different employment contracts, which were apparently signed between the Respondent and Club B and which contained two different dates of signature and two different amounts of salary, were provided in the present dispute. In this respect, the Single Judge noted that the employment contract sent by the Football Association of country S to FIFA on 22 July 2011 stipulated that the Respondent had signed it on 13 June 2011 and that the total salary of the player would amount to EUR 610,000, whereas, the employment contract available in TMS stated that the Respondent had concluded said contract with Club B on 11 January 2011 and provided for a total salary of EUR 700,000. 10. In order to determine which employment contract should be taken into account in the analysis of the present matter, the Single Judge referred to art. 6 par. 3 of Annexe 3 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2010) which, inter alia, stipulates that within the scope of proceedings pertaining to the application of said regulations, FIFA may use any documentation or evidence generated by or contained in TMS in order to properly assess the issue at stake. In addition, the Single Judge underlined that the use of TMS is now a mandatory step for all international transfers of professional male players within the scope of eleven-a-side football and that, consequently, documents, such as transfer agreements or employment contracts, which are uploaded and matched in TMS are deemed to be valid and binding. 11. Taking into account the above, the Single Judge concluded that the employment contract that should be taken into account in the present matter was the contract that was concluded between the Respondent and Club B on 11 January 2011. Consequently, and considering that the representation agreement was terminated on 8 February 2011 by the Respondent, the latter agreement was still binding at the time the Respondent had concluded a valid employment contract with Club B for the total amount of EUR 700,000, i.e. on 11 January 2011. 12. Having established the aforementioned, the Single Judge went on to underline that the activity of players’ agents is a function intended to bring players and clubs together so as to establish working relations, i.e. the negotiations led by a players’ agent should culminate in the signing of an employment contract between a player and a club. 13. In this context, the Single Judge referred to a letter addressed to all licensed players’ agents in June 1999, whereby the Bureau of the Players’ Status Committee stated that it had discussed at its meeting in country H on 27 August 1998 cases in which players’ agents had requested a commission from players, even though the relevant employment contracts had been concluded between the players and the clubs without the agents’ involvements. In this respect, the Bureau had held that players’ agents’ activities must be causal to the conclusion of employment contracts and that, as a general rule, if an employment contract is signed without the involvement of a particular players’ agent, the player concerned does not owe any commission to the agent. This said, the Single Judge recalled that this legal interpretation of the Bureau of the Players’ Status Committee is still applicable and has since been confirmed by the Players’ Status Committee in its jurisprudence. 14. Notwithstanding the above, and referring again to the afore-mentioned letter, the Single Judge went on to observe that the Bureau had also agreed that players’ agents may, nevertheless, claim commission if they have not been actively involved in a transfer, if a clause to this effect is explicitly and unequivocally stipulated in the relevant representation agreement. 15. With the aforementioned considerations in mind, and reverting to Article 6 (D) of the representation agreement, the Single Judge concluded that the representation agreement concluded between the parties in dispute contained an explicit and unequivocal clause entitling the Claimant to claim his commission following his exclusion from the negotiations between the Respondent and Club B and which had culminated in the signing of the employment contract between the latter and the former on 11 January 2011. 16. Consequently, the Single Judge held that, in accordance with the basic legal principle of pacta sunt servanda, which in essence means that agreements must be respected by the parties in good faith, the Respondent has to fulfill its contractual obligations towards the Claimant. Therefore, and taking into account the claim of the Claimant, the Single Judge decided that the Respondent has to pay to the Claimant the outstanding commission as agreed upon in the pertinent agreement. 17. In light of the above, the Single Judge reached the conclusion that the Claimant should be entitled to receive an amount of commission representing 10% of the basic gross salary that the Respondent had agreed upon with Club B in their employment contact. 18. Having established the above, the Single Judge went on to calculate the exact amount to be paid by the Respondent to the Claimant as remuneration on the basis of the agreement. 19. In this regard, the Single Judge acknowledged the fact that the employment contract concluded between the Respondent and Club B on 11 January 2011 was valid from the date of its signature until January 2014 and stipulated a total gross salary of EUR 700,000. 20. As a consequence of all of the above, the Single Judge concluded his analysis of the present case by deciding that the Claimant’s claim is accepted, and that therefore the Respondent must pay to the Claimant an amount equal to 10% of the total gross basic salary concluded in the employment contract between the Respondent and Club B and that such amount corresponds to EUR 70,000 (i.e. 10% of EUR 700,000). Furthermore, in view of the content of the second sentence of Article 6 (A) of the agreement and taking into account that the Claimant had not received any amount of commission at all, the Single Judge held that it would be fair and reasonable to request the Respondent to pay the entire 10% in one lump sum payment within 30 days as from the date of notification of the present decision. 21. Finally, the Single Judge referred to art. 25 par. 2 of the Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players in combination with art. 18 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules, according to which, in the proceedings before the Players’ Status Committee, including the Single Judge, costs in the maximum amount of currency of country H 25,000 are levied. The relevant provision further states that the costs are to be borne in consideration of the parties’ degree of success in the proceedings. 22. On account of the above and considering that the claim of the Claimant has been fully accepted, the Single Judge concluded that the Respondent has to bear the entire costs of the current proceedings before FIFA. Furthermore and according to Annexe A of the Procedural Rules, the costs of the proceedings are to be levied on the basis of the amount in dispute. On that basis, the Single Judge held that the amount to be taken into consideration in the present proceedings is EUR 70,000. Consequently, the Single Judge concluded that the maximum amount of costs of the proceedings corresponds to currency of country H 10,000. 23. In conclusion, and in view of the circumstances of the present matter and considering that the case at hand did not pose any particular factual difficulty or legal complexity, the Single Judge determined the costs of the current proceedings to the amount of currency of country H 5,000. Consequently, the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee decided that the amount of currency of country H 5,000 has to be paid by the Respondent in order to cover the costs of the present proceedings. III. Decision of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee 1. The claim of the Claimant, players agent M, is accepted. 2. The Respondent, Player S, has to pay to the Claimant, players agent M, the amount of EUR 70,000, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision. 3. If the aforementioned amount is not paid within the aforementioned deadline, an interest rate of 5% per year will apply as of the expiry of the fixed time limit and the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to FIFA’s Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision. 4. The final costs of the proceedings in the amount of currency of country H 5,000 are to be paid by the Respondent, Player S, within 30 days as from the date of notification of the present decision as follows: 4.1 The amount of currency of country H 3,000 has to be paid to FIFA to the following bank account with reference to case nr. XX-XXXXX: 4.2 The amount of currency of country H 2,000 has to be paid directly to the Claimant, players agent M 5. The Claimant, players agent M, is directed to inform the Respondent, Player S, immediately and directly of the account number to which the remittance under points 2 and 4.2 above is to be made and to notify the Players’ Status Committee of every payment received. ** Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy): According to art. 67 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives). The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following: Court of Arbitration for Sport Avenue de Beaumont 2 1012 Lausanne Switzerland Tel: +41 21 613 50 00 Fax: +41 21 613 50 01 e-mail: info@tas-cas.org www.tas-cas.org For the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee Jérôme Valcke Secretary General Encl. CAS Directives