F.I.F.A. – Commissione per lo Status dei Calciatori (2012-2013) – controversie agenti di calciatori – ———- F.I.F.A. – Players’ Status Committee (2012-2013) – players’ and match agents disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 19 March 2013, by Geoff Thompson (England) Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee, on the claim presented by the Players’ Agent Player’s Agent K, from country G as Claimant against the club Club S, from country I as Respondent concerning a claim for commission

F.I.F.A. - Commissione per lo Status dei Calciatori (2012-2013) – controversie agenti di calciatori – ---------- F.I.F.A. - Players' Status Committee (2012-2013) – players’ and match agents disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 19 March 2013, by Geoff Thompson (England) Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee, on the claim presented by the Players’ Agent Player’s Agent K, from country G as Claimant against the club Club S, from country I as Respondent concerning a claim for commission I. Facts of the case 1. By means of a document dated 7 July 2009, Club S from country I informed the players’ agent licensed by the country G Football Association Player’s Agent K (hereinafter: the Claimant) of the following (hereinafter: the statement): “Sehr geehrter Herr Player’s Agent K, Hiermit moechten wir als Club S folgende Spieler einladen 1 Player M / 2 Player N / 3 Player O und der Manager Herr Mr L. Jeder Spieler erhalten (..) Jahres Vertrag 140000 Euro - 30000 Vermittlungsgebuer fuer Manager - Wohnung - praemier (..)” Translated: “Dear Mr Player’s Agent K, hereby we Club S would like to invite the following players: 1 Player M / 2 Player N / 3 Player O and the Manager Mr L. Every player receives (..) year contract. 140000 Euro - 30000 commission for manager - apartment - bonus (..)” 2. On 12 October 2009, the Claimant lodged a claim with FIFA against the Respondent requesting from the latter the payment of EUR 30,000 as commission in accordance with the statement. 3. In this respect, the Claimant alleged that the Respondent had signed an employment contract with the Player O (hereinafter: the player) using his services but had then failed to pay the commission fee due. 4. In its response dated 13 June 2010, the Respondent rejected the Claimant’s claim in its entirety. 5. In this respect, the Respondent argued that the person who had signed the statement on its behalf, i.e. Mr P (hereinafter: Mr P) “had not legal position in this club” and, therefore, was not “entitled to sign a letter with the club’s letterhead”. In addition, the club specified that, according to its statutes, “binding documents and negotiable papers shall be valid with signature of managing director or chairman of the board of directors” Hence, the club deemed not having “undertaken any commitment before Player’s Agent K.” 6. By correspondence dated 15 November 2010, the Claimant rejected the aforementioned allegations of the Respondent and stressed that the latter had appointed Mr P “to a position of responsibility for sports which is why Mr P could and was allowed to act on behalf of the respondent.” 7. In addition, the Claimant alleged that it had been the Respondent who had contacted him in order to obtain the players Player M, Player N and Player O. 8. In its subsequent statement to FIFA, the Respondent reiterated the content of its previous submission and provided FIFA with the copy of several of its internal regulations as documentary evidence. 9. In addition, the Respondent stressed that the statement did not constitute a representation agreement and was “just a submission of bid nothing else.” As to that, the Respondent further specified that Mr P had “only negotiated with the claimant about the amount of transfer and it is only mere suggestion, my client [i.e. the Respondent] disapprove the intention to entering into a contract with the claimant in any way.” 10. Finally, the Respondent argued that the Claimant had not represented the player neither. 11. By correspondence dated 23 May 2011, sent after the investigation had already been closed by FIFA, the Claimant reiterated the content of his previous submission and additionally maintained not having been aware of any “restrictions on signatory authorisation” in connection with Mr P. Furthermore, the Claimant held that the Respondent by “allowing Mr P the possibility of using the letterhead of the respondent (..) must concede the conclusion that Mr P was authorised to make the declarations given on the letterhead.” 12. Finally, the Claimant alleged that the contact between the Respondent and the player had taken place exclusively through him. 13. In reply thereto, on 10 September 2012, the Respondent insisted on not having had any contractual relationship with the Claimant and added that player’s employment contract was concluded without the intervention of the latter. As to that, the Respondent stressed in particular that the relevant contract was concluded “under new consideration and the terms of the concluded contract was totally different”. 14. Finally, the Respondent provided FIFA with a copy of the relevant employment contract by means of which the player was entitled to receive from the latter, as salary, the total amount of currency of country I 3.000.000.000. In the relevant document the Claimant was not mentioned. II. Considerations of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee 1. First of all, the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee analysed which procedural rules are applicable to the matter at hand. In this respect, he referred to art. 21 par. 2 and 3 of the Rules governing the procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules; edition 2008). The present matter was submitted to FIFA on 21 October 2009, thus after 1 July 2008. Therefore, the Single Judge concluded that the 2008 edition of the Procedural Rules is applicable to the matter at hand. 2. Subsequently, the Single Judge analysed which edition of the FIFA Players’ Agent Regulations should be applicable. In this respect, he confirmed that in accordance with art. 39 par. 1 and 4 of the 2008 edition of the Players’ Agents Regulations, considering that the present claim was lodged on 12 October 2009, the current edition of the Players’ Agents Regulations (edition 2008; hereinafter: the Regulations) is applicable to the matter at hand. 3. With regard to his competence, the Single Judge pointed out that in accordance with the provisions set out by the Regulations, FIFA has jurisdiction on matters relating to licensed players’ agents, i.e. on those individuals who hold a valid players’ agent licence issued by the relevant member Association. 4. The Single Judge continued his deliberations by indicating that the present matter concerns a dispute between a players’ agent licensed by the country G Football Association and a country I club, regarding an allegedly outstanding commission. 5. As a consequence, the Single Judge is the competent body to decide on the present matter which has an international dimension (cf. art. 30 par. 2 of the Regulations). 6. His competence and the applicable regulations having been established and entering into the substance of the matter, the Single Judge started his analysis by acknowledging the facts of the case and the arguments of the parties as well as the documents contained in the file. In doing so and first of all, the Single Judge acknowledged that, on 7 July 2009, Mr P (hereinafter: Mr P) had signed a document (hereinafter: the statement) on behalf of the Respondent, by means of which the Respondent had informed the Claimant of its intention to invite several players, including Player O (hereinafter: the player) and one manager. In the same correspondence, Mr P had specified that “Every player receives (..) year contract. 140000 Euro - 30000 commission for manager - apartment - bonus (..)”. 7. Furthermore, the Single Judge noted that, later on, the Respondent had concluded an employment contract with the player (hereinafter: the employment contract), which provided for the latter to receive currency of country I 3.000.000.000 as remuneration. 8. In continuation, the Single Judge took note that, in his claim to FIFA, the Claimant had requested from the Respondent the payment of EUR 30,000 as commission on the basis of the statement alleging that his work had led to the conclusion of the employment contract. 9. Likewise, the Single Judge acknowledged that, for his part, the Respondent had contested being bound by the statement, maintaining that the person who had signed the relevant document on its behalf had no authorisation to do so. 10. Finally, the Single Judge remarked that, in addition to the aforementioned, the Respondent had also contested the Claimant’s entitlement to receive any commission at all, alleging that the latter had not been involved in the conclusion of the employment contract. 11. In view of the above, the Single Judge reasoned that the first question to be addressed in the present dispute was whether the content of the statement was binding upon the parties. 12. In this regard and to begin with, the Single Judge observed that it was undisputed that the person who had signed the statement on the Respondent’s behalf, i.e. Mr P, had been employed by the latter. Furthermore, the Single Judge took note that it was also undisputed that the document in question had been drafted on the letterhead of the Respondent. 13. In addition, the Single Judge observed that, in order to support its allegation with regard to Mr P’s lack of entitlement to sign a document such as the statement on its behalf, the Respondent had provided FIFA with a copy of its internal regulations. Furthermore and in the same context, the Single Judge acknowledged that, for his part, the Claimant had insisted on having had no reason to doubt that Mr P had been duly authorized to sign the statement on the Respondent’s behalf. 14. With those considerations in mind, the Single Judge recalled that, as a general rule and in accordance with his well-established jurisprudence, the internal proxy of one of a party to a business relationship can only have a legal effect on the validity of a contract if the other party involved was previously duly informed of its content. 15. In this connection, the Single Judge noted that the Respondent had not provided any evidence indicating that the Claimant had been informed of the content of its internal regulations. Consequently and also bearing in mind the wording of art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules, which stipulates that the burden of proof has to be carried by the party claiming a right on the basis of an alleged fact, the Single Judge concluded that it could safely be assumed that, at the time the statement was signed, the Claimant had no knowledge of the Respondent’s internal regulations. 16. Bearing in mind the aforementioned and considering that the statement had been signed by one of the Respondent’s employee as well as taking into account that the latter document had been drafted on its letterhead, the Single Judge came to the conclusion that the Claimant could in good faith assume that this person was duly authorized to act and sign on the Respondent’s behalf. 17. Taking into account all the above, the Single Judge held that the Respondent was bound by the content of the statement. 18. Having established the aforementioned, the Single Judge turned his attention to the question of whether the statement entitled the Claimant to receive from the Respondent the payment of EUR 30,000 as commission. 19. In this respect and as a preliminary remark, the Single Judge sought to recall that the activity of players’ agents is a function intended to bring a player and a club or two clubs together, so as to establish a working relationship between the parties concerned (cf. par. 1 of the Definitions of the Regulations as well as art. 1 par. 1 of the Regulations), and that, consequently, the negotiations led by a players’ agent should culminate in the signing of an employment contract between a particular player and a club or to the conclusion of a transfer agreement between two clubs. 20. In continuation, the Single Judge was keen to emphasise that, as clearly established in art. 19 par. 1 of the Regulations, a players’ agent shall be permitted to represent a player or a club only by concluding the relevant written representation contract with that player or club. Furthermore, as stated in art. 19 par. 4 of the Regulations, the representation contract shall explicitly state who is responsible for paying the player’s agent and in what manner. Besides, in accordance with art. 20 par. 5 of the Regulations, a players’ agent who has been contracted by a club shall be remunerated for his services by payment of a lump sum that has been agreed upon in advance. 21. Bearing in mind the aforementioned, the Single Judge referred first of all once again to art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules and stressed that the Claimant had not provided any evidence in support of the allegation that his services had led to the conclusion of the employment contract. Consequently, the Single Judge deemed that it had to be concluded that the employment contract had been concluded without the Claimant’s involvement. 22. Equally, the Single Judge was eager to emphasize that the statement did not include any clear provision related to a commission payable to the Claimant by the Respondent in connection with the conclusion of an employment contract with the player but merely only referred to an amount of EUR 30,000 of commission “for manager”. As to that, the Single Judge further recalled that three different players and one manager named Mr L were mentioned in the statement. 23. In view of all the above, considering that the Claimant had not been involved in the conclusion of the employment contract as well as taking into account that the statement did not provide for the latter to receive a concrete amount of commission from the Respondent in connection with the conclusion of an employment contract between the latter and the player, the Single Judge decided that the claim of the Claimant had to be rejected due to lack of legal basis. 24. Lastly, the Single Judge referred to art. 25 par. 2 of the Regulations in combination with art. 18 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules, according to which in the proceedings before the Players’ Status Committee and the Single Judge, costs in the maximum amount of currency of country H 25,000 are levied. The costs are to be borne in consideration of the parties’ degree of success in the proceedings and are normally to be paid by the unsuccessful party. 25. In this respect, the Single Judge reiterated that the claim of the Claimant is rejected. Therefore, the Single Judge decided that the Claimant has to bear the entire costs of the current proceedings in front of FIFA. 26. Furthermore and according to Annexe A of the Procedural Rules, the costs of the proceedings are to be levied on the basis of the amount in dispute. Consequently and taking into account the total amount at dispute in the present matter is less than currency of country H 50,000, the Single Judge concluded that the maximum amount of costs of the proceedings corresponds to currency of country H 5,000. 27. In conclusion and in view of the numerous submissions that had to be analysed in the present matter but considering that the case at hand was adjudicated by the Single Judge and not by the Players’ Status Committee in corpore, the Single Judge determined the costs of the current proceedings to the amount of currency of country H 4,000. 28. Consequently, the amount of currency of country H 4,000 has to be paid by the Claimant to cover the costs of the present proceedings. III. Decision of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee 1. The claim of the Claimant, Player’s Agent K, is rejected. 2. The final costs of the proceedings in the amount of currency of country H 4,000 are to be paid by the Claimant, Player’s Agent K. Considering that the Claimant, Player’s Agent K, already paid the amount of currency of country H 1,000 as advance of costs, the latter has to pay the remaining amount of currency of country H 3,000 to the following bank account with reference to case nr. XX-XXXX: ** Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy): According to art. 67 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives). The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following: Court of Arbitration for Sport Avenue de Beaumont 2 1012 Lausanne Switzerland Tel: +41 21 613 50 00 Fax: +41 21 613 50 01 e-mail: info@tas-cas.org www.tas-cas.org For the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee Jérôme Valcke Secretary General Encl. CAS directives