F.I.F.A. – Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2011-2012) – contributo di solidarietà – ———- F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber (2011-2012) – solidarity contribution – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 1 February 2012 in the following composition: Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman David Mayebi (Cameroon), member Essa M. Saleh Al-Housani (United Arab Emirates), member on the claim presented by the club, Club S, from country N as Claimant against the club, Club T, from country F as Respondent regarding a solidarity contribution dispute related to the transfer of the player B

F.I.F.A. - Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2011-2012) - contributo di solidarietà – ---------- F.I.F.A. - Dispute Resolution Chamber (2011-2012) - solidarity contribution – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 1 February 2012 in the following composition: Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman David Mayebi (Cameroon), member Essa M. Saleh Al-Housani (United Arab Emirates), member on the claim presented by the club, Club S, from country N as Claimant against the club, Club T, from country F as Respondent regarding a solidarity contribution dispute related to the transfer of the player B I. Facts of the case 1. According to the Football Association of country N, the player B (hereinafter: the player), born in May 1982, was registered with Club S, from country N (hereinafter: the Claimant) as from “before the age of twelve” until 22 July 2004. 2. According to the Football Association of country N, the sporting season in country N follows the calendar year. 3. The country F Football Federation confirmed that the player was registered with its affiliated club, Club T (hereinafter: the Respondent) on 23 July 2008. 4. On 23 June 2009, the Claimant lodged a claim in front of FIFA against the Respondent, claiming its relevant share of solidarity contribution in connection with the transfer of the player B from Club W, from country U (hereinafter: Club W) to the Respondent. 5. In this respect, the Claimant argued that the player B was part of a “cash plus player” deal. In particular, the Claimant held that the Respondent and Club W had agreed on a transfer agreement, based on which the player J (hereinafter: the player) was transferred from the Respondent to Club W for an alleged transfer compensation of EUR 8,000,000 and that, within the same transfer, the player B was transferred from Club W to the Respondent. Therefore, and taking into account the alleged “cash plus player” nature of the agreement, the Claimant held that the overall value of the transfer amounted to EUR 12,000,000. 6. As to the value of the player B, the Claimant held that in the absence of a valid transfer agreement, the value had to be set at the discretion of FIFA. According to the Claimant, such value should be set at least at an amount of EUR 4,000,000. The Claimant claimed a proportion of 4.5% of this amount. 7. Finally, the Claimant argued that, based on art. 2 of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber, country N law should apply and that consequently, interest at a rate of 12.75% should apply as from 1 July 2008, and that interest at a rate of 10% should apply as from 1 January 2009, respectively. 8. Overall, the Claimant therefore requested that FIFA should establish the value of the player B “in the Player B/Player J deal” and that the Respondent should pay the relevant solidarity contribution, including interest at a rate of 12.75% for 2008 and 10.00% for 2009, or at least 5% as from when solidarity contribution was due. In addition, the Claimant requested that disciplinary measures should be imposed on the Respondent “in the event that [the Respondent] fails to comply with the decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber”. 9. In its arguments, the Claimant also stated that “the media and official channels of [Club W]” referred to the transfer as a “cash plus player deal”, and that the players were transferred at the same time. Moreover, the Claimant argued that the player B was a talented player and he could have been “easy to sell”. Therefore, the Claimant stated that it was unlikely for such a player to be given away for free to an international competitor. In support of this, the Claimant provided a printout of the webpage of Club W in which it was stated that “[The player J] joins Club W with [the player B] moving the other way in a cash plus player deal.” as well as printouts of media internet pages also mentioning a “cash plus player” transfer. 10. Furthermore, the Claimant argued that the “formal arrangement” made between the Respondent and Club W concerning the player J had to be seen as pro forma only. Since this agreement did not reflect the reality, it had to be acknowledged that the player B had a value. The opposite conclusion would, according to the Claimant, make it easy for clubs to circumvent their obligation to pay solidarity contribution. 11. In support of its position, the Claimant referred to a decision taken by the Dispute Resolution Chamber on 12 January 2007 and quoted a paragraph thereof which stated: “Consequently, the deciding authority was of the unanimous opinion that the provisions regarding the solidarity mechanism cannot be circumvented by means of an exchange of players.” 12. Furthermore, the Claimant referred to the specificity of sport and the reasoning behind the solidarity mechanism in order to fundament its claim for solidarity contribution from Club T. 13. In its response, the Respondent rejected the claim lodged against it and argued that no transfer compensation was paid for the player B. 14. The Respondent explained that, after the season 2007/2008, it had to re-balance its finances and therefore let go its best players and engage other, more modest players. In this context, the Respondent allegedly became interested in the player B who was “in difficulty” with his club at the time, i.e. Club W. Since, according to the Respondent, the player B had only played during six games of the season 2007/2008, Club W was willing to transfer him for a very modest sum. 15. Equally, the Respondent explained that Club W had, at the same time, indicated that it was interested in the player J. 16. Therefore, the Respondent and Club W concluded a “pre-contract” on 23 June 2008 regarding the future transfer of the player B, which contained the following provisions: “It is agreed that the registration of the Player B (The Player) shall be transferred from Club W to Club T on the following terms: 1. If the player J (…) signs a contract with Club W prior to the 31st July 2008 then compensation payable by Club T to Club W for the transfer of registration of Player B shall be nil. 2. If the player J (…) doesn’t sign a contract with Club W prior to the 31st July 2008 due to Player J deciding not to sign with Club W then compensation payable by Club T to Club B for the transfer of registration of Player B shall be Euro 600,000 (…). 3. If the player J (…) does not sign a contract with Club W prior to the 31st July 2008 due to the non agreement of Club T to sign Player J for Club W then compensation payable by Club T to Club W for the transfer of registration of Player B shall be Euro 1,000,000 (…).” 17. According to the Respondent, the two clubs then decided, on the same day, to separate the two transfers, and Club W decided to transfer the player B to the Respondent free of payment. 18. In this respect, the Respondent submitted the transfer agreement dated 23 June 2008 concerning the transfer of the player B from Club W to the Respondent which stipulated that “The fee agreed between the parties for the transfer of registration of the above player is nil.” 19. Likewise, the Respondent explained that, “after several weeks of negotiation”, the two clubs agreed on the transfer of the player J from the Respondent to Club W for a compensation of EUR 10,500,000. 20. The relevant transfer agreement, dated 30 June 2008, stipulates that “This agreement constitutes the entire agreement and understanding between Club T and Club W with respect to the subject matter of this agreement […])”. 21. As to the alleged obligation to pay solidarity contribution, the Respondent referred to the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: The Regulations) as well as to the FIFA Commentary on said Regulations. In this respect, the Respondent argued that since, in the case at hand, no transfer compensation was paid, the solidarity mechanism did not apply. In support of this, the Respondent referred to a decision of the DRC, dated 5 December 2008, which stated, inter alia, the following: “One of the essential prerequisites in order to establish as to whether a club involved in the training and education of a player is entitled to receive any solidarity contribution is that at least a compensation, not including training compensation, had been paid for the transfer of a player to his former club, otherwise the calculation becomes unfeasible.” 22. Furthermore, the Respondent invoked the principle of burden of proof, stating that the Claimant had by no means proven that there was any indemnity paid by the Respondent to Club W. Moreover, the Respondent held that only an effective transfer compensation would be relevant, but not an alleged market value of a player. 23. As to the DRC decision quoted by the Claimant, the Respondent held that this decision was not comparable to the matter at hand, since it dealt with a real exchange of players which was proven by the Claimant in the respective case. 24. Subsidiarily, the Respondent argued that the amounts claimed were disproportionate. The Respondent recalled that the player had previously been transferred to Club W for a compensation of EUR 475,000 only, and that the player played a mere total of 142 minutes during the season 2007/2008. The Respondent held that it was impossible that after such a season the player’s transfer value would have increased nine fold (i.e. to an amount of EUR 4,000,000). 25. Equally, the Respondent referred to the pre-contract dated 23 June 2008 which allegedly displayed that in the case of a transfer of the player B against payment, the respective sum had been set at an amount of EUR 600,000, which should (if any payment was due) serve as the basis for the calculation. 26. Since the player B had been registered with the Claimant as from the season of his 12th birthday until the season of his 22nd birthday, the Respondent calculated such amount (i.e. 90% of the 5% of solidarity contribution) at an amount of EUR 27,000. 27. As to the interests claimed by the Claimant, the Respondent rejected the application of country N law and stated that country F law should apply, i.e. an interest rate of 3.79%. 28. In its replica, the Claimant adhered to its claim and argued that the word “compensation” was, according to the “Black Law’s Dictionary” defined as “Remuneration and other benefits received in return for services rendered”. Consequently, the Claimant argued that it was not decisive whether it was able to prove that Club W and the Respondent agreed on an amount for the player B, but whether the transfer of the player B represented a benefit to the Respondent. In addition, the Claimant argued that art. 1 of Annex 5 of the Regulations stipulated that 5% of “any” compensation was to be deducted as solidarity contribution which showed that said article also applied to other forms of compensation than monetary. 29. The Claimant held that a restrictive interpretation of the relevant regulatory provisions would hinder the purpose of the solidarity mechanism, and it would allow clubs involved in transfers to “easily camouflage” the realities of transfers. 30. In this respect, the Claimant again invoked a decision of the DRC, dated 9 January 2009, and quoted, inter alia, the following paragraphs: “[A]s a general principle, any transfer agreement represents a bilateral agreement, which implies a mutual exchange of obligations between the parties involved (…). [T]he sporting qualities of the players have an economic value in the football employment marked.” 31. The Claimant argued that it was more likely than not that the player B was part of a cash plus player deal. It also argued that it could not be demanded that the Claimant should prove that the Respondent’s motivation was to circumvent the solidarity mechanism when “the behaviour of Club T has all the objective characteristics of a classical attempt of circumvention.” 32. As to the value of the player B, the Claimant stated that the low transfer compensation paid by Club W could be explained by the fact that, at the time, the player B had had only three months of contract left with his former club, and that he refused to sign a contract in order to move to a bigger club. Contrary to that, when the player moved from Club W to the Respondent, he would have been under contract for a longer period of time which would increase his market value. 33. Therefore, the Claimant requested FIFA to establish the remaining duration of the player B’s contract with Club W at the time of the transfer, and to establish the market value of the player B. It stated that an estimate of such value at an amount of EUR 4,000,000 was not excessive. 34. In its final comments, the Respondent adhered to its previous statements and emphasised that the transfer of the player B was a very simple transaction (in view of the low market value of the player), whereas the transfer of the player J required important negotiations. Therefore, it was logic, according to Club T, to finalise the transfer of the player B as fast as possible, since Club W had accepted to liberate him. 35. Equally, the Respondent insisted that a compensation which could serve as a basis for the calculation of solidarity contribution, had to be monetary, since the FIFA Regulations refer to an indemnity which is “paid” In this context, the Respondent referred to the country F wording of the Regulations, i.e. “payées", “versées”, “les sommes versées”. 36. Furthermore, the Respondent again held that the Claimant did not prove that the solidarity mechanism should apply, but that it only provided rumours and allegations. In this respect, the Respondent provided various press articles, none of which referred to the transfer in question as a “cash plus player” deal. 37. By means of subsequent correspondence, the Claimant alleged that, based on information revealed in the media, “Club W had agreed to a value of 11 million pounds for Player J” but that, apparently, only currency of country U 8.2 million had in fact been paid. Therefore, the Claimant argued that the difference between the aforementioned amounts, i.e. currency of country U 2.8 million, “is arguably the minimum value set for Player B”. However, in the same submission, the Claimant also held that the value of the player B “must be set at the discretion of FIFA”, and that “The lawyers have estimated the value of Player B to at least 4 million pounds”. 38. The Respondent did not submit any final comments, despite being asked by FIFA to do so. II. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Chamber or the DRC) analysed which procedural rules were applicable to the case at hand. In this respect, it took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 23 June 2009, thus after 1 July 2008. Consequently, the 2008 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules), is applicable to the matter at hand (cf. article 21 par. 2 and 3 of the Procedural Rules). 2. In continuation, the Chamber analysed which regulations were applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, it confirmed that, in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the 2009 and 2010 edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, and considering that the present claim was lodged on 23 June 2009 and that the player was registered with the Respondent on 23 July 2008, the 2008 edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: the Regulations) was applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance. 3. Subsequently, the members of the Chamber referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed that, in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 and 2 in combination with art. 22 lit. d) of the Regulations, the Dispute Resolution Chamber was competent to adjudicate on a dispute relating to training compensation between a country N club and a country F club. 4. In this respect, the Chamber was eager to emphasise that, contrary to the information contained in FIFA’s letter dated 4 August 2011, by means of which the parties were informed of the composition of the Chamber, the member Mr D refrained from participating in the deliberations, due to the fact that he has the same nationality as the Respondent. Equally, and in order to comply with the prerequisite of equal representation of club and player representatives, also the member Mr M refrained from participating in the deliberations. Thus, the Dispute Resolution Chamber adjudicated the case in presence of three members in accordance with art. 24 par. 2 of the Regulations. 5. The competence of the Chamber and the applicable regulations having been established, the Chamber entered into the substance of the matter. The members of the Chamber started by acknowledging the above-mentioned facts and the documentation contained in the file. 6. In this respect, the Chamber took note that the Claimant lodged a claim against the Respondent for the payment of the relevant proportion of solidarity contribution, based on the transfer of the player B from Club W to the Respondent. In particular, the Chamber duly noted that the Claimant alleged that the relevant transfer constituted a “cash plus player deal”, i.e. that the player B was transferred to the Respondent in connection with the transfer of the player J from the Respondent to Club W. 7. Likewise, the Chamber acknowledged that the Claimant held that, in view of the alleged “cash plus player” nature of the transfer of the player B, the relevant transfer value of the player B should be set at the discretion of FIFA, at least at an amount of currency of country U 4 million. The Chamber noted that, thereof, the Claimant claimed a proportion of 4.5%, plus interest at a rate of 12.75% for the year 2008, interest at a rate of 10% for the year 2009 or at least interest at a rate of 5% as from when solidarity contribution was due. 8. The Chamber furthermore noted that the Claimant, in support of its allegation regarding the “cash plus player” nature of the transfer of the player B, referred to media and “official channels” of Club W which, allegedly, referred to the transfer of the player B as a “cash plus player deal”. Equally, the Chamber acknowledged that the Claimant argued that the player B could have easily been sold and that it was unlikely that such a player would be given away for free. Furthermore, the Chamber took due note that the Claimant argued that the agreement concluded between the Respondent and Club W concerning the player J had to be seen as pro forma only and that it therefore did not reflect the reality. 9. The Chamber equally acknowledged that the Claimant referred to a decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber, a paragraph of which stated that “(…) the solidarity mechanism cannot be circumvented by means of an exchange of players.” 10. In continuation, the Chamber took due note that the Respondent rejected the claim lodged against it and explained that initially, the Respondent and Club W had concluded a “pre-contract” regarding the transfers of the player B and player J but that, subsequently, the two clubs decided to separate the said transfers. The Chamber noted that the Respondent submitted the transfer agreement dated 23 June 2008 and related to the transfer of the player B from Club W to the Respondent which stipulated that “The fee agreed between the parties for the transfer of registration of [the player B] is nil.” 11. The Chamber acknowledged that, in view of the above, the Respondent held that the solidarity mechanism did not apply, since no transfer compensation had been paid for the player B. 12. Furthermore, the Chamber noted that the Respondent invoked the principle of burden of proof, stating that the Claimant had not proven that there was any indemnity paid by the Respondent to Club W. 13. In continuation, the Chamber took due note that the Claimant, in reply to the above, argued that the applicable Regulations stipulated that 5% of “any” compensation was to be paid as solidarity contribution, and that this allegedly demonstrated that the relevant provisions were also applicable on other forms of compensation than monetary. 14. Equally, the Chamber noted that the Claimant argued that it could not be demanded that it should prove that the Respondent’s motivation was to circumvent the applicable Regulations, since the behaviour of the Respondent had all the characteristics of an attempt to circumvent the Regulations. In this respect, the Chamber also noted that the Claimant argued that it was more likely than not that the player B was part of a cash plus player deal. 15. Finally, the Chamber took due note that the Respondent, in his comments to the above, insisted that a compensation had to be monetary, in order to serve as a basis for the distribution of solidarity contribution. Equally, the Chamber acknowledged that the Respondent reiterated that the Claimant did not prove that the solidarity mechanism was applicable, and the Chamber also took note of several press articles, none of which made reference to the transfer in question as a “cash plus player” deal. 16. In view of all of the above, the Chamber deemed it to be the underlying issue of the present matter to establish whether the obligation to distribute a proportion of solidarity contribution had arisen out of the transfer of the player B from Club W to the Respondent or not. 17. In this respect, and first of all, the Chamber made reference to art. 21 of the Regulations, according to which any club that has contributed to the education and training of a player shall receive a proportion of the compensation paid to the player’s former club. 18. Consequently, the Chamber went on to examine whether there was any compensation paid in connection with the transfer of the player B. 19. In this context, the Chamber recalled the principle of burden of proof, as established in art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules, according to which a party claiming a right from an alleged fact shall carry the respective burden of proof. 20. Bearing in mind the aforementioned, the Chamber went on to examine the documentation submitted by the parties. In this respect, the Chamber noted that the Respondent and Club W had, apparently, previously concluded a “pre-contract” for the transfers of the players J and B. Equally, the Chamber acknowledged that, subsequently, the Respondent and Club W concluded an agreement for the transfer of the player B, according to which no transfer fee was paid for the transfer of the player B. Likewise, the Chamber noted that the Respondent and Club W had agreed upon a transfer compensation for the transfer of the player J from the Respondent to Club W, but that the relevant agreement made no reference to the transfer of the player B. In particular, the Chamber noted that the agreement concerning the transfer of the player J did not contain any clause stipulating that the transfer of the player B was somehow related to the transfer of the player J, or that the transfer of the player B had had any influence on the calculation of the transfer amount paid for the player J. 21. Consequently, and bearing in mind that the Claimant carried the relevant burden of proof, the Chamber came to the conclusion that there was no evidence that an actual transfer compensation was paid for the player B. 22. In continuation, the Chamber deemed it fit to establish whether there was any other basis for the Claimant’s claim for solidarity contribution. In particular, the Chamber recalled the Claimant’s allegation that the player B was part of the transfer of the player J in the context of a “cash plus player” deal and that the player B was, in this framework, attributed an economic value on which the calculation of solidarity contribution should be based. 23. In this context, the Chamber again recalled the principle of burden of proof, according to which a party claiming a right from an alleged fact shall carry the respective burden of proof. Consequently, the Chamber was of the opinion that it was the Claimant’s burden to provide evidence to support its allegation regarding the “cash plus player” nature of the transfers of the players B and J. 24. Bearing in mind the aforementioned, the Chamber recalled that, according to the documentation submitted by the parties, Club W and the Respondent concluded an agreement for the transfer of the player B which stipulated that no transfer compensation was payable for the player B. 25. Equally, the Chamber recalled that Club W and the Respondent had concluded another agreement for the transfer of the player J, which provided for a transfer compensation, but which made no reference to the transfer of the player B. In this context, the Chamber was also eager to emphasise that the relevant agreement concerning the transfer of the player J explicitly stipulated that “This agreement constitutes the entire agreement and understanding between Club T and Club W with respect to the subject matter of this agreement […])”. 26. In this context, the Chamber furthermore carefully studied the documentation submitted by the Claimant, in particular, a printout of the web page of Club W, in which it was stated that “[The player J] joins Club W with [the player B] moving the other way in a cash plus player deal.” as well as media printouts with similar contents. In this respect, the Chamber laid emphasis on the fact that the relevant web pages did not pertain to neither the Claimant, nor the Respondent, but to third parties, i.e. to Club W and other media sources. Furthermore, the Chamber noted that the relevant documents did not provide for further and more specific information about the alleged nature of the transfer in question. 27. Overall, therefore, the Chamber was of the opinion that a printout of a web page of a third party, i.e. not of a party to the present proceedings, with a rather vague description of the relevant transfer could not be considered as sufficient evidence in order to corroborate the Claimant’s allegation that the transfer of the player B was linked to the transfer of the player J in a way that an obligation to pay solidarity contribution had arisen out of the transfer of the player B. In this context, the Chamber furthermore recalled the basic principle of burden of proof (cf. art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules), according to which a party deriving a right from an alleged fact shall carry the respective burden of proof. 28. In view of all the above, the Chamber established that the transfers of the players J and B were indeed two separate transfers. Likewise, the Chamber was of the firm opinion that the Claimant had not provided the necessary evidence in order to corroborate its allegation that the player B should be attributed an economic value because he had been part of a “cash plus player” transfer, in connection with the transfer of the player J. 29. Consequently, and in application of art. 21 of the Regulations, the Chamber held that there was no basis for the Claimant’s claim for solidarity contribution, and it therefore decided to reject the Claimant’s claim. 30. In addition, and for the sake of completeness, the Chamber turned its attention to the request of the Claimant that disciplinary measures should be imposed on the Respondent in the event that the Respondent would fail to comply with the relevant decision. In this respect, the Chamber recalled that it is not competent to impose disciplinary measures and that such matters fall, if at all, within the competence of FIFA’s Disciplinary Committee. 31. Lastly, the Chamber referred to art. 18 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules, according to which in the proceedings before the Dispute Resolution Chamber relating to disputes regarding solidarity mechanism costs in the maximum amount of currency of country H 25,000 are levied. The costs are to be borne in consideration of the parties’ degree of success in the proceedings. 32. According to Annex A of the Procedural Rules, the costs of the proceedings are to be levied on the basis of the amount in dispute. 33. As regards the amount in dispute to be taken into consideration, the Chamber recalled that, in its last submission, the Claimant held that the value of the player B “must be set at the discretion of FIFA”, and that “The lawyers have estimated the value of Player B to at least 4 million pounds”, as well as that the Claimant claimed a proportion of 4.5% of the relevant transfer amount of solidarity contribution, i.e. an amount of currency of country U 180,000. Consequently, the Chamber concluded that the maximum amount of costs of the proceedings corresponds to currency of country H 25,000. 34. Considering that the case at hand allowed to be dealt with following a reasonable procedure and that it did not pose particular factual difficulty, the Chamber determined the final amount of costs of the current proceedings to the amount of currency of country H 5,000. 35. In view of the above, the Chamber reiterated that the claim of the Claimant is rejected. Therefore, the Chamber decided that the Claimant had to pay the full amount of currency of country H 5,000. In this respect, the Chamber took into account that the Claimant had already paid the relevant amount of currency of country H 5,000 as advance of costs at the outset of the present proceedings. III. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. The claim of the Claimant, Club S, is rejected. 2. The final amount of costs of the proceedings amounts to currency of country H 5,000, which have already been paid by the Claimant, Club S. ** Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy): According to art. 63 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives). The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following: Court of Arbitration for Sport Avenue de Beaumont 2 1012 Lausanne Switzerland Tel: +41 21 613 50 00 Fax: +41 21 613 50 01 e-mail: info@tas-cas.org www.tas-cas.org For the Dispute Resolution Chamber: Jérôme Valcke Secretary General Enclosed: CAS directives