F.I.F.A. – Commissione per lo Status dei Calciatori (2014-2015) – controversie tra società – ———- F.I.F.A. – Players’ Status Committee (2014-2015) – club vs. club disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 23 September 2014, by Geoff Thompson (England) Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee, on the claim presented by the club, Club D, from country C as Claimant against the club, Club G, from country I as Respondent regarding a contractual dispute between the parties relating to the player P.

F.I.F.A. - Commissione per lo Status dei Calciatori (2014-2015) – controversie tra società – ---------- F.I.F.A. - Players' Status Committee (2014-2015) – club vs. club disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 23 September 2014, by Geoff Thompson (England) Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee, on the claim presented by the club, Club D, from country C as Claimant against the club, Club G, from country I as Respondent regarding a contractual dispute between the parties relating to the player P. I. Facts of the case 1. On 29 May 2011, Club D (hereinafter: the Claimant), the country C company company X (hereinafter: company X), the Club G and Football Club (hereinafter: the Respondent) and the player P (hereinafter: the player) concluded a transfer agreement entitled “Compraventa” (hereinafter: the contract) for the definitive transfer of the player from the Claimant to the Respondent for a total compensation of USD 3,000,000, to be split between company X and the Club B, from country A. 2. On 30 May 2011, the Claimant, company X and the Respondent concluded an agreement entitled “Mandato” (hereinafter: the agreement), by means of which they agreed about the payment terms for the transfer of the player and according to which company X was entitled to receive from the Respondent a total compensation of USD 360,000, payable as soon as the player was registered with the Respondent. 3. Additionally, the agreement stipulated in point 4 that any party breaching the agreement would be obliged to pay to the party fulfilling the agreement a penalty in the amount of USD 100,000. 4. On 5 October 2012, the Claimant lodged a claim with FIFA against the Respondent for having allegedly failed to respect their contractual obligations. 5. In this respect, the Claimant claimed that, although the player was transferred to the Respondent, the latter had failed to pay the amount of USD 360,000 agreed in the agreement. 6. Furthermore, the Claimant alleged that, according to point four of the agreement, it should also be entitled to receive an additional amount of USD 100,000 as penalty, since the Respondent had not fulfilled its obligation towards the Claimant. 7. Consequently, the Claimant requested from the Respondent the total amount of USD 460,000, plus interest at the rate of 5% per annum over the amount of USD 360,000 as from 10 July 2011. 8. On 3 May 2013, FIFA informed the Claimant that it could not intervene in the present dispute, since it appeared that the agreement in question had been signed by company X, i.e. a company. 9. On 22 May 2013, the Claimant filed an appeal at CAS, which was withdrawn on 29 May 2013 and consequently a termination order (hereinafter: the termination order) was issued by CAS on 10 June 2013. 10. On 6 June 2013, after having withdrawn its appeal at CAS, the Claimant reiterated its claim lodged with FIFA and, first of all, explained that Cruzado was created in order to manage the sporting and commercial rights of the Claimant in line with the requirements established by country C law and in full agreement with the Football Federation of country C. In support of its allegations, the Claimant provided a document entitled “Certificado” which was issued by the Football Federation of country C, confirming the aforementioned. 11. In view of the above, the Claimant amended its original request by claiming from the Respondent an additional amount of USD 200,000 for “daños y perjuicios”. 12. Consequently, the Claimant requested from the Respondent the amount of USD 460,000 based on the agreement, plus an additional amount of USD 200,000 for “daños y perjuicios”. 13. In its response dated 2 July 2013 and 15 October 2013, the Respondent rejected the Claimant’s claim and argued, first of all, that FIFA should not be competent to hear the present dispute since the termination order issued by CAS was “final and binding” and had “brought the relevant proceedings to a close”. 14. In this respect, the Respondent stated “that FIFA had already rejected on 3rd May 2013 by means of a pronouncement that had become final and binding due to the relevant appeal having been terminated by CAS” and was therefore of the opinion that FIFA should “declare the request for reconsideration and further submissions file by the Claimant on 5th June 2013 inadmissible”. 15. Consequently, the Respondent requested FIFA to reject the claim for lack of jurisdiction. 16. Notwithstanding the above, the Respondent replied to the substance of the matter and argued that the claim should be rejected since the Claimant “was not a party to the contract that was concluded on 30th May 2011 [i.e. the agreement] between Club G [i.e. the Respondent] and the commercial entity company X, which had entered into said agreement ‘in its own name and as administrator of the economic and financial interests of the Club D [i.e. the Claimant]’”. 17. Furthermore, the Respondent argued that the agreement “is not a transfer agreement but a mandate conferred by Club G [i.e. the Respondent] on the commercial entity company X for the latter to act on behalf of the earlier in a separate transaction relating to some payment due to a third part (…)”. 18. On 6 December 2013, in response to the comments submitted by the Respondent, the Claimant rejected the former club’s conclusion, reiterating its request of USD 460,000 on the basis of the agreement signed by the parties. In particular, the Claimant emphasised that the principle of res judicata would only apply in case a proceeding had been terminated by a decision, but not in case it had been terminated by a termination order. 19. Furthermore, with regard to the Respondent’s allegation that the Claimant was not a party of the agreement, the latter club alleged that since the player had been registered with the Claimant, it is obvious that it was a party of the agreement and therefore involved in the transfer in question. In this respect and as evidence of its allegations, the Claimant further stated that according to the Transfer Matching System (TMS), the player had been transferred from the Claimant to the Respondent and that the latter had accepted to pay a total amount of USD 3,000,000. 20. On 20 January 2014, the Respondent reiterated its previous statement arguing that “all agreements at the basis of the request in hand were concluded between Club G [i.e. the Respondent] and the commercial entity Club D” and was therefore of the opinion, that the Claimant “shall not be entitled to successfully derive rights on the basis of contract(s), the sole beneficiary of which was a third party”. II. Considerations of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee 1. First of all, the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee (hereinafter also simply referred to as: the Single Judge) analysed whether he was competent to deal with the matter in hand. In this respect, he referred to art. 21 of the 2012 and 2008 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber. Consequently, and since the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 5 October 2012, the Single Judge concluded that the 2008 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules) is applicable to the present matter. 2. Furthermore, the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee analysed which edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, he referred, on the one hand, to art. 26 par. 1 of the 2012 and 2010 edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players and, on the other hand, to the fact that the present claim was lodged with FIFA on 5 October 2012. In view of this, the Single Judge concluded that the 2010 edition of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: the Regulations) is applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance. 3. Subsequently, the Single Judge confirmed that, on the basis of art. 3 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules in connection with art. 23 par. 1 and 3 as well as art. 22 f) of the 2012 edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, he would, in principle, be the competent body decide on the present litigation between two clubs affiliated to different associations. 4. However and prior to deliberating on the substance of the matter, the Single Judge acknowledged of the formal objection of the Respondent which contested the competence of FIFA’s deciding bodies due to res judicata arguing that the matter had already been decided at CAS. The Single Judge also observed that CAS had issued a termination order since the Claimant decided to withdraw its appeal. 5. In this respect, the Single Judge deemed it appropriate to briefly recall that, in virtue of the principle of res judicata, a deciding body is not in a position to deal with the substance of a dispute, in the event that a deciding body has already dealt with the matter, by passing a final and binding decision. In other words, the Single Judge recalled that, in line with the foregoing consideration, the parties cannot lodge a claim, the substance of which has already been decided. 6. In continuation, the Single Judge underlined that the principle of res judicata can be opposed to a second decision if cumulatively and necessarily the parties to the disputes and the object of the matter in dispute are identical. 7. Bearing in mind the foregoing and since the Claimant had withdrawn its appeal at CAS and the latter had issued a termination order without even entering into the substance of the matter, the Single Judge concluded that he was competent to take a decision in the present dispute. 8. His competence and the applicable regulations having been established, the Single Judge entered into the substance of the matter. In this respect, the Single Judge acknowledged that, by means of the agreement concluded between the Claimant, company X and the Respondent, the company company X was entitled to receive from the Respondent a total compensation of USD 360,000, payable as soon as the player was registered with the Respondent. Equally, the agreement stipulated in point 4 that any party breaching the agreement would be obliged to pay to the party fulfilling the agreement a penalty in the amount of USD 100,000. 9. Equally, the Single Judge recalled the Respondent’s statement of defense which stated that the Claimant was not a party to the agreement between the Respondent and company X. 10. In continuation, the Single Judge wished to highlight that the agreement signed by the Respondent, the Claimant and the company company X clearly provided that the amount fixed in the agreement must have been paid by the Respondent to the company company X. In this regard, the Single Judge was keen to emphasise that article 3 of said agreement clearly stated that the compensation was to be paid by the Respondent to the company company X and not to the Claimant itself. 11. Having stated the aforementioned, and in line with the reasoning of the Players’ Status Committee in previous and almost identical matters, the Single Judge considered that the Claimant is not entitled to receive any compensation as the agreement clearly stipulated that the compensation was payable directly to the company company X, and not to the Respondent. In other words, the Single Judge held that the company company X could have been entitled to the compensation fixed in the agreement but not the Respondent. 12. In view of all of the above, the Single Judge decided in his deliberation in the present matter that the claim of the Claimant is rejected. 13. Finally, the Single Judge referred to art. 25 par. 2 of the Regulations in combination with art. 18 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules, according to which, in proceedings before the Players’ Status Committee, costs in the maximum amount of currency of country H 25,000 are levied. The relevant provision further states that the costs are to be borne in consideration of the parties’ degree of success in the proceedings and are normally to be paid by the unsuccessful party. 14. In respect of the above and taking into account that the claim of the Claimant has been rejected, the Sconcluded that the latter has to bear the entire costs of the current proceedings before FIFA. Furthermore and according to Annexe A of the Procedural Rules, the costs of the proceedings are to be levied on the basis of the amount in dispute. On that basis, the Bureau held that the amount to be taken into consideration in the present proceedings was USD 460,000. Consequently, the Single Juddge concluded that the maximum amount of costs of the proceedings corresponds to currency of country H 5,000. 15. In conclusion, and in view of the circumstances of the present matter, the Bureau determined the costs of the current proceedings to the amount of currency of country H 5,000. Consequently, the Single Judge decided that the amount of currency of country H 5,000 has to be paid by the Claimant in order to cover the costs of the present procedure. ***** III. Decision of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee 1. The claim of the Claimant, Club D, is admissible. 2. The claim of the Claimant, Club D, is rejected. 3. The final costs of the proceedings in the amount of currency of country H 5,000 are to be paid by the Claimant to FIFA. Given that the Claimant, C, has already paid the amount of currency of country H 5,000 as advance of costs at the start of the present proceedings, no additional amount has to be paid by the Claimant. ***** Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy): According to article 67 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives). The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following: Court of Arbitration for Sport Avenue de Beaumont 2 1012 Lausanne - Switzerland Tel: +41 21 613 50 00 Fax: +41 21 613 50 01 e-mail: info@tas-cas.org www.tas-cas.org For the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee Jérôme Valcke Secretary General Encl. CAS Directives