F.I.F.A. – Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2012-2013) – controversie di lavoro – ———- F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber (2012-2013) – labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 15 March 2013, in the following composition: Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman Joaquim Evangelista (Portugal), member Carlos Soto (Chile), member Mario Gallavotti (Italy), member Zola Majavu (South Africa), member on the claim presented by the player Player B, from country R as Claimant against the club Club V, from country U as Respondent regarding an employment-related dispute between the parties

F.I.F.A. - Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2012-2013) - controversie di lavoro - ---------- F.I.F.A. - Dispute Resolution Chamber (2012-2013) - labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 15 March 2013, in the following composition: Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman Joaquim Evangelista (Portugal), member Carlos Soto (Chile), member Mario Gallavotti (Italy), member Zola Majavu (South Africa), member on the claim presented by the player Player B, from country R as Claimant against the club Club V, from country U as Respondent regarding an employment-related dispute between the parties I. Facts of the case 1. On 14 July 2010, Player B, from country R (hereinafter: the Claimant), born in November 1977, and Club V, from country U (hereinafter: the Respondent), entered into an employment contract valid from that date until 30 June 2012 (hereinafter: the contract). In addition to the contract, the parties signed on the same date an appendix specifying the financial conditions of the labour relationship between them (hereinafter: the appendix). 2. According to the appendix, the Respondent agreed, inter alia: (i) to pay to the Claimant during the 2010/2011 and 2011/2012 seasons a net monthly salary of, respectively, USD 9,000 and USD 10,000; (ii) to provide the Claimant with an apartment and pay on his behalf the rent for an amount of USD 400; and (iii) to provide the Claimant with food, however, without specifying the value of the relevant allowance. 3. According to clause 3.5.5 of the contract, the Respondent may “decrease unilaterally any payment to the Player or to terminate the present Contract if the Player does not fulfil or improperly or incompletely fulfils the provisions of the present Contract relating to his obligations not subject to any additional remuneration, as well as in case of the team’s relegation”. 4. Clause 4.4 established inter alia that “if the Player fails to arrive to the Club in time or leaves the Club without permission, the matter of his salary payment should be settled in accordance with the current country U legislature and any Contract provisions referring to payments should be suspended for the period of his absence”. 5. Clause 6.5.1 of the contract established that the Respondent may terminate the contract “in case of Player’s unauthorised leaving the Club or evasion by any other way from his duties under the present Contract without reasonable excuses”. 6. Clause 6.7 of the contract established that “If the Club is not interested in the Player, the Contract could be terminated by the Club at any time unilaterally without any compensation payments to the Player and he is given a status of free agent afterwards”. 7. In accordance with clause 7.2 of the contract, in case the termination of the contract was initiated by the Respondent, the Claimant is “not entitled to receive any payments and remunerations provided for by the present Contract”. 8. Clause 7.6 of the contract determined that the parties to the contract accept the exclusive jurisdiction of the Football Federation of country U. 9. On 10 February 2012, after allegedly putting the Respondent on default, the Claimant terminated the contract in writing by invoking breach of contract by the Respondent. 10. On 16 February 2012, the Claimant lodged a claim before FIFA against the Respondent for breach of contract and requested the payment of an aggregate amount of USD 74,660 plus 5% interest, as follows: • USD 31,200 for salaries and accommodation due between 1 December 2011 and 10 February 2012; • USD 1,860 as reimbursement for food expenses within the season 2011/2012, calculated on the basis of an amount of USD 60 per day; • USD 41,600 as compensation for the remaining salaries and accommodation between 1 March 2012 and 30 June 2012. In addition, the Claimant requested the amount of EUR 3,720 for procedural costs incurred as well as the application of sporting sanctions against the Respondent. 11. In this respect, the Claimant reports that in June 2011, the Respondent had failed to fulfil its contractual obligations and obstructed his access to training. In this context, on 27 July 2011, he notified the Respondent that it was in breach of contract for failure to make the payment of the salary instalments for June and July 2011, as well as the payment of the rental allowance since April 2011. 12. According to the Claimant, the Respondent answered by letter sent on 1 August 2011, referring to clause 6.7 of the contract and asserting that after the end of the preceding season it was no longer interested in the Claimant’s services. 13. In addition, in the same letter, the Respondent argued that, on the basis of clause 3.5.5 of the contract, the Claimant’s claim for the salaries of June and July 2011 was unfounded. Further, the Respondent made reference to an alleged unauthorized absence from work by the Claimant and to clauses 6.5.1 and 7.2 of the contract. The Claimant enclosed a copy of the relevant correspondence. 14. In continuation, the Claimant states afterwards the normal execution of the contract continued until December 2011, when the Respondent again stopped paying salary as well as the rental allowance. 15. In this context, by letter dated 11 January 2012, the Claimant notified the Respondent that it was again in breach of the contract, because (i) it did not pay to the Claimant salaries and rental allowance since December 2011, and (ii) it prevented the Claimant from training with the Respondent’s teams. In addition, the Claimant stressed in his letter that he wanted to continue executing the contract until its end and demanded that the Respondent complied with its obligations. 16. On 23 January 2012, the Claimant addressed another letter to the Respondent reiterating his position that the latter was in breach of the contract and requesting it to comply with its contractual obligations immediately. Thereafter, by letter dated 10 February 2012, the Claimant terminated the contract by invoking the serious breach of contract committed by the Respondent. 17. According to the Claimant, contrary to the allegations of the Respondent contained in its letter sent of 1 August 2011 (cf. point I.12 and 13 above), he was only absent from the team when his access to trainings was forbidden by the Respondent itself. The Claimant sustains that evidence of this was the fact that the Respondent eventually decided to continue the execution of the contract, paying salaries and allowing him to participate to the trainings. Furthermore, the Claimant stresses that he never failed to meet his contractual obligations. 18. Furthermore, the Claimant states that despite the Respondent’s failure to meet its financial obligations, he continued to comply with his contractual obligations until 10 January 2012, when he was allegedly denied access to training (both to the first and the second teams) and told that “he should better leave country U.” 19. Finally, the Claimant claims that the Respondent never demonstrated any intention of resolving the matter and that, as a result, he had no option other than to terminate the contract with just cause. The Claimant further informed that he had left country U on 10 February 2012. 20. Regarding jurisdiction, the Claimant affirms that he contacted the Football Federation of country U (hereinafter: the country U Football Federation) and the Football Premier League Association by fax in order to enquire about the existence of a dispute resolution chamber at national level. However, he alleges not having obtained any answer. In addition, the Claimant reports that he contacted the All-country U Association of Football Players to request clarification about said issue and that such organization confirmed that he could lodge his claim before FIFA. 21. The Respondent presented its position and challenges the competence of the Dispute Resolution Chamber of FIFA to decide on the present dispute on the basis that allegedly there are deciding bodies under the auspices of the country U Football Federation which would presumably be competent. According to the Respondent, the Control and Disciplinary Committee and the Appeal Committee of the country U Football Federation “play the role of arbitration courts and are competent to settle any disputes between the country U Football Federation, affiliated members thereof and other persons engaged and working in football industry”. The Respondent claims that, therefore, the Disciplinary Committee would be the first instance body and the Appeals Committee, the appellate body. 22. Upon request to provide with documentary evidence to prove that the country U Football Federation would be competent, the Respondent submitted only excerpts of the relevant national regulations. In the documentation submitted there is no reference to the date of entry into force of the relevant regulations. Equally, there is no reference to the composition of the Disciplinary Committee. Finally, the supporting documentation submitted by the Respondent establishes the possibility to appeal the decisions of the country U Football Federation Appeals Committee to the Court of Arbitration for Sport; however, no information is provided in relation to the conditions under which an appeal to the Appeals Committee of a decision by the Disciplinary Committee is possible. 23. In continuation, the Respondent states that, on 3 September 2012, the Disciplinary Committee body was extinguished and replaced with the Dispute Resolution Chamber Football of country U, which allegedly took over the cases pending before the former jurisdictional body of the country U Football Federation, submitting an extract of the decision of the Executive Committee of the country U Football Federation, dated 3 September 2012, which created the Dispute Resolution Chamber of the country U Football Federation “to commence its activities on September 04, 2012”. Finally, according to article 1 of the Regulations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber of the country U Football Federation, said body is exclusively competent to settle disputes between clubs and players related to employment related disputes. 24. Due to the fact that the Respondent also provided only with excerpts of the relevant regulations, there is no reference to the date of entry into force of the relevant regulations as well as no information available as to the composition of the Dispute Resolution Chamber of the country U Football Federation or the number of players and clubs representatives. In addition, there is no information regarding any appeal procedure of the decisions rendered by the Dispute Resolution Chamber of the country U Football Federation. 25. Regarding the substance of the matter, the Respondent claims that during the execution of the contract, the Claimant committed repeated breaches, including missing training sessions but did not provide any evidence to support its arguments. Moreover, the Respondent states that the Claimant was convicted by a civil court for an episode of disorderly behaviour and disturbance and was ordered to pay a fine. The Respondent sustains, therefore, that the reason why the Claimant terminated the contract was because he knew that the Respondent was going to do so, based on the aforementioned events. 26. Finally, the Respondent sustains that, according to clause 4.4 of the contract, it was not obliged to pay any remuneration to the Claimant when the latter was absent without authorization, a conduct attributed to the Claimant by the Respondent. 27. The Claimant presented his replica, stating that, upon the submission of his claim to FIFA, there were only two bodies at national level in country U: the Control and Disciplinary Committee of the country U Football Federation and the corresponding Appeal Committee. In this regard, the Claimant sustains that the Control and Disciplinary Committee only exerted a disciplinary control and had no competence over other matters. In addition, according to the Claimant, none of the bodies complied with the FIFA standards for national dispute resolution bodies. 28. In what concerns the Respondent’s alleged breach of contract, the Claimant essentially reaffirms his original statements. 29. Regarding the conviction by a civil court, the Claimant states that such conviction was not at all related to the execution of the contract and that the Respondent did not present any evidence that he breached the contract as a result. 30. Despite having been invited to do so, the Respondent did not present any further comments. 31. On 25 September 2012, the Claimant informed FIFA that he did not enter into any new labour relationship between February 2012 and the original expiry date of the contract, i.e. 30 June 2012. II. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter referred to as the DRC or the Chamber) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the matter at stake. In this respect, the Chamber referred to art. 21 par. 1 and 2 of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber. The present matter was submitted to FIFA on 16 February 2012, after 1 July 2008. Consequently, the Chamber concluded that the 2008 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules) are applicable to the matter at hand. 2. With regard to the competence of the Dispute Resolution Chamber, art. 3 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules states that the Dispute Resolution Chamber shall examine its jurisdiction in the light of art. 22 to 24 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2010). In accordance with art. 24 par. 1 in combination with art. 22 lit. b) of the aforementioned Regulations, the Dispute Resolution Chamber would, in principle, be competent to deal with the matter at stake, which concerns an employment-related dispute with an international dimension between a country R player and a country U club. 3. However, the Chamber acknowledged that the Respondent contested the competence of FIFA’s deciding bodies on the basis of art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players by arguing that there are deciding bodies under the auspices of the Football Federation of country U, namely the Control and Disciplinary Committee, that according to the Respondent was later replaced with the country U Football Federation Dispute Resolution Chamber, and the Appeal Committee of the country U Football Federation. The Chamber noted that according to the Respondent said bodies act as arbitration courts and are competent to settle any disputes between the country U Football Federation, affiliated members thereof and other persons engaged and working in football industry. 4. In this regard, the Chamber acknowledged that the Claimant contested the competence of the deciding bodies of the country U Football Federation and insisted on the fact that FIFA has jurisdiction to deal with the present matter. 5. Taking into account the above, the Chamber emphasised that in accordance with art. 22 lit. b) of the 2012 edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players it is competent to deal with a matter such as the one at hand, unless an independent arbitration tribunal, guaranteeing fair proceedings and respecting the principle of equal representation of players and clubs, has been established at national level within the framework of the association and/or a collective bargaining agreement. With regard to the standards to be imposed on an independent arbitration tribunal guaranteeing fair proceedings, the Chamber referred to the FIFA Circular no. 1010 dated 20 December 2005. In this regard, the members of the Chamber further referred to the principles contained in the FIFA National Dispute Resolution Chamber (NDRC) Standard Regulations, which came into force on 1 January 2008. 6. Having said this, the members of the Chamber turned to clause 7.6 of the contract, according to which the parties accepted the exclusive jurisdiction of the country U Football Federation. Hence, it refers to a national dispute resolution chamber in the sense of art. 22 lit. b) of the NDRC Regulations. 7. Notwithstanding the above, the DRC referred to the principle of equal representation of players and clubs and underlined that this principle was one of the very fundamental elements to be fulfilled, in order for a national dispute resolution chamber to be recognised as such. Indeed, this prerequisite is mentioned in the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, in the Circular no. 1010 as well as in art. 3 par. 1 of the NDRC Regulations, which illustrates the aforementioned principle as follows: “The NDRC shall be composed of the following members, who shall serve a four-year renewable mandate: a) a chairman and a deputy chairman chosen by consensus by the player and club representatives (…); b) between three and ten player representatives who are elected or appointed either on proposal of the players’ associations affiliated to FIFPro, or, where no such associations exist, on the basis of a selection process agreed by FIFA and FIFPro; c) between three and ten club representatives (…).” In this respect, the FIFA Circular no. 1010 states the following: “The parties must have equal influence over the appointment of arbitrators. This means for example that every party shall have the right to appoint an arbitrator and the two appointed arbitrators appoint the chairman of the arbitration tribunal (…). Where arbitrators are to be selected from a predetermined list, every interest group that is represented must be able to exercise equal influence over the compilation of the arbitrator list.” 8. In view of the above, the Chamber went on to examine the documentation presented by the Respondent and acknowledged that the following rules appear, to a greater or lesser extent, to govern the country U Football Federation national dispute resolution system: arts. 48 and 51 of the country U Football Federation Statute; arts. 5, 6 and 58 of the country U Football Federation Disciplinary Rules; arts. 1 and 3 of the Regulations on the Premier League Disciplinary Committee; the decision by the country U Football Federation Executive Committee dated 3 September 2012 No 8 on the creation and main principles of operation of the country U Football Federation Dispute Resolution Chamber; and art. 1 of the Regulation of the Dispute Resolution Chamber of the country U Football Federation. 9. In this regard, the Chamber highlighted the fact that the Respondent provided only with excerpts from the relevant rules and regulations, thus neither the composition of the national deciding bodies nor the appeal procedures could be determined. 10. On account of the above, the DRC was eager to point out that an assessment of whether the national bodies in the country U Football Federation complied with the minimum procedural standards was not possible. In particular, it could not be established whether the equal representation of clubs and players was ensured in any of the national deciding bodies. 11. At this point, the members of the DRC made reference to art. 12, par. 3 of the Procedural Rules, according to which any party claiming a right on the basis of an alleged fact shall carry the respective burden of proof. The application of the said principle in the present matter led the members of the Dispute Resolution Chamber to conclude that it was up to the Respondent to prove that the national dispute resolution chamber complied with the minimum procedural standards and, hence was competent. 12. Therefore, the members of the DRC wished to stress that although the contract at the basis of the present dispute have included an arbitration clause in favour of the national dispute resolution chamber, the Respondent was unable to prove that, in fact, the national deciding bodies within the country U Football Federation meet the minimum procedural standards for independent arbitration tribunals as laid down in art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, in FIFA Circular no. 1010 as well as in the FIFA National Dispute Resolution Chamber (NDRC) Standard Regulations. 13. Furthermore, for the sake of good order, the DRC emphasised that in any case, in accordance with the extract of the decision of the Executive Committee of the country U Football Federation dated 3 September 2012 provided by the Respondent, the Dispute Resolution Chamber of the country U Football Federation commenced its activities on 4 September 2012 and thus, it did not exist on the date the claim was lodged, i.e. 16 February 2012. 14. In view of all the above, the Chamber established that the Respondent’s objection to the competence of FIFA to deal with the present matter has to be rejected and that the Dispute Resolution Chamber is competent, on the basis of art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, to consider the present matter as to the substance. 15. Subsequently, the DRC analysed which edition of the regulations should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, it confirmed that in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2012 and 2010), and considering that the present claim was lodged on 16 February 2012, the 2010 edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: the Regulations) is applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance. 16. The competence of the Dispute Resolution Chamber and the applicable regulations having been established, the Chamber entered into the substance of the matter. The members of the Chamber started by acknowledging the facts of the case, as well as the documentation contained in the file. The DRC further acknowledged that on 14 July 2010 the parties to the dispute had signed an employment contract, valid as from that date to 30 June 2012, and an appendix specifying the financial conditions of the relevant labour relationship. 17. Equally, the Dispute Resolution Chamber observed that according to the appendix, the club agreed, inter alia: (i) to pay to the Claimant during the 2010/2011 and 2011/2012 seasons a net monthly salary of, respectively, USD 9,000 and USD 10,000; (ii) to provide the Claimant with an apartment and pay on his behalf the rent for an amount of USD 400; and (iii) to provide the Claimant with food, however, without specifying the value of the relevant allowance. 18. In continuation, the Dispute Resolution Chamber noted that on 16 February 2012 the Claimant lodged a claim against the Respondent for breach of contract and requested the payment of an aggregate amount of USD 74,660 plus 5% interest, made up of: (i) USD 31,200 for salaries and accommodation due between 1 December 2011 and 10 February 2012; (ii) USD 1,860 as reimbursement for food expenses within the season 2011/2012, calculated on the basis of an estimated amount of USD 60 per day; and (iii) USD 41,600 as compensation for the salaries as well as rental allowance corresponding to the remaining term of the contract, i.e. between 1 March 2012 and 30 June 2012. In addition, the player requested the amount of EUR 3,720 for procedural costs incurred. 19. Further, the DRC observed that the Claimant, on 11 January 2012, that is prior to lodging his petition before FIFA, while stressing that he intended to fulfil his obligations under the contract until its expiration, had put the Respondent in default regarding salaries and accommodation allowance outstanding since December 2011 as well as requested the Respondent to cease to prevent him from training with the club’s teams. Also, the Chamber noted that a reminder of the correspondence of 11 January 2012 was sent by the Claimant on 23 February 2012 and, thereafter, in the absence of a response from the Respondent, by letter dated 10 February 2012, the Claimant went on to terminate the contract, in the Claimant’s view, with just cause, by invoking the serious breach committed by the Respondent. 20. In addition, the DRC took note of the fact that a similar situation had happened in July 2011, whereby the Claimant, on 27 July 2011, had sent to the Respondent correspondence along the same lines as the abovementioned correspondence of 11 January 2012, however, in relation to the period April-July 2011. 21. Having said this, the DRC turned his attention to the arguments of the Respondent and, in particular, took note that, according to the Respondent, during the execution of the contract, the Claimant committed repeated breaches, including missing training sessions, which in accordance with clause 4.4 of the contract entitle the Respondent to stop to pay any remuneration to the Claimant (cf. point I.4). 22. In this context, the Chamber recalled that according to the legal principle of the burden of proof (cf. art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules), the Respondent shall carry the burden of proof as regards the alleged breaches of the contract by the Claimant as well as in relation to the other arguments put forward by the Respondent in the present matter. 23. In this respect, the Chamber ascertained that the Respondent was unable to prove the alleged contract breaches by the Claimant. 24. In continuation, the Chamber was eager to underline that the Respondent had neither submitted any document nor any explanation attesting that it has paid the outstanding remuneration claimed by the Claimant and has failed to prove that it does not owe these amount for any other justifiable reason. On the contrary, the DRC enlightened the fact that several letters had been addressed by the Claimant to the Respondent in order to solve the matter. Thus, in the absence of the proof of the contrary, the DRC considered that several amounts were outstanding at the time that the Claimant terminated the contract and that the Respondent had the obligation to strictly comply with the terms of the contract and the appendix. 25. Taking into account all the above, the Chamber highlighted that the central issue which must be decided is whether the Claimant did have just cause or not to terminate the contract on 10 February 2012. 26. In this respect, the Dispute Resolution Chamber held that, in accordance with the basic legal principle of pacta sunt servanda, the Respondent must fulfill its obligations as per the contract and the appendix entered into with the Claimant. 27. In addition, the Chamber recalled that the Claimant complained to the Respondent that he was not receiving his salary and rent allowance from December 2011 and that he was not allowed to train with the Respondent’s team, which had in effect not been disputed by the Respondent. The Chamber was also eager to reiterate that, before unilaterally terminating the contract, the Claimant, on 11 and 23 January 2012, tried to find an amicable settlement with the Respondent; however, in vain. 28. Based on the foregoing, the Chamber concluded, that, in line with its well-established jurisprudence, by failing to pay the Claimant inter alia two consecutive monthly salaries and by preventing the Claimant from training with the Respondent’s team, the Respondent breached the contract and the appendix without just cause and, therefore, the Claimant had a just cause to unilaterally terminate the contractual relationship on 10 February 2012. 29. Having established that the Respondent is to be held liable for the early termination of the employment contract with just cause by the Claimant, the Chamber focussed its attention on the consequences of such termination. Taking into consideration art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the Chamber decided that the Claimant is entitled to receive from the Respondent an amount of money as compensation for breach of contract in addition to any outstanding payments on the basis of the relevant contract. 30. As a consequence, the Chamber decided that the Respondent is liable to cancel all outstanding amounts under the contract until the date on which the employment relationship was terminated. First of all, the Chamber referred to the Claimant’s financial claim (cf. point II.18 above). In this respect, the Chamber reiterated that the Respondent had not successfully contested the allegations of the Claimant, according to which he had not received the salary instalments and rental allowance since December 2011. Moreover, the DRC made reference to the Claimant’s financial request regarding the reimbursement of food expenses. 31. In this regard, the members of the Chamber made reference again to the burden of the proof (cf. art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules) and considered that the Respondent had failed to prove having paid the outstanding remuneration until the date of the termination of the contract. 32. Based on the foregoing, the members of the Dispute Resolution Chamber determined that the Claimant was to receive the amount of USD 20,000 as outstanding salaries and USD 800 as due rental allowance corresponding to the months of December 2011 and January 2012. 33. Further, as regards the Claimant’s claim pertaining to food expenses, the Chamber agreed that such claim is to be rejected due to the fact that the contract does not provide for a specific amount of money intended for food expenses and to the failure on the part of the Claimant to advance evidence in support of his financial request in this respect (cf. art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules). 34. In addition, taking into consideration the Claimant’s claim, the Chamber decided to award the Claimant interest at the rate of 5% p.a. as of the date of the claim, i.e. 16 February 2012. 35. In continuation, the Chamber focussed its attention on the calculation of the amount of compensation for breach of contract in the case at stake. In doing so, the members of the Chamber firstly recapitulated that, in accordance with art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the amount of compensation shall be calculated, in particular and unless otherwise provided for in the contract at the basis of the dispute, with due consideration for the law of the country concerned, the specificity of sport and further objective criteria, including, in particular, the remuneration and other benefits due to the Claimant under the existing contract and/or the new contract, the time remaining on the existing contract up to a maximum of five years, and depending on whether the contractual breach falls within the protected period. 36. In application of the relevant provision, the Chamber held that it first of all had to clarify as to whether the pertinent employment contract contains a provision by means of which the parties had beforehand agreed upon an amount of compensation payable by the contractual parties in the event of breach of contract. In this regard, the Chamber established that no such compensation clause was included in the employment contract at the basis of the matter at stake. 37. Bearing in mind the foregoing, the Chamber proceeded with the calculation of the monies payable to the player under the terms of the employment contract until 30 June 2012, taking into account that the player’s remuneration until January 2012 is included in the calculation of the outstanding remuneration (cf. point II.32 above). Consequently, the Chamber concluded that the amount of USD 52,000 (i.e. salary and rental allowance as from February until June 2012) serves as the basis for the final determination of the amount of compensation for breach of contract. 38. In continuation, the Chamber verified as to whether the Claimant had signed an employment contract with another club during the relevant period of time, by means of which he would have been enabled to reduce his loss of income. According to the constant practice of the Dispute Resolution Chamber, such remuneration under a new employment contract shall be taken into account in the calculation of the amount of compensation for breach of contract in connection with the player’s general obligation to mitigate his damages. 39. The Chamber noted that the Claimant had not entered into any new labour relationship between February 2012 and the original expiry date of the contract, i.e. 30 June 2012. 40. Consequently, on account of all of the above-mentioned considerations and the specificities of the case at hand, the Chamber decided that the Respondent must pay the amount of USD 52,000 to the Claimant as compensation for breach of contract. 41. In addition, taking into consideration the Claimant’s claim, the Chamber decided to award the Claimant interest at the rate of 5% p.a. as of the date of the decision on the amount granted as compensation (cf. point II.40 above). 42. Furthermore, the Dispute Resolution Chamber decided to reject the Claimant’s claim pertaining to legal costs in accordance with art. 18 par. 4 of the Procedural Rules and the Chamber’s respective longstanding jurisprudence in this regard. 43. Finally, the Dispute Resolution Chamber concluded its deliberations in the present matter by establishing that any further claims lodged by the Claimant are rejected. III. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. The claim of the Claimant, Player B, is admissible. 2. The claim of the Claimant is partially accepted. 3. The Respondent, Club V, has to pay to the Claimant, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision, outstanding remuneration in the amount of USD 20,800 plus 5% interest p.a. on said amount as of 16 February 2012 until the date of effective payment. 4. The Respondent has to pay to the Claimant, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision, compensation for breach of contract in the amount of USD 52,000 plus 5% interest p.a. on said amount as of 15 March 2013 until the date of effective payment. 5. If the aforementioned amounts plus interest (cf. points 3 and 4) are not paid, the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision. 6. Any further claims lodged by the Claimant are rejected. 7. The Claimant is directed to inform the Respondent immediately and directly of the account number to which the remittance is to be made and to notify the Dispute Resolution Chamber of every payment received. ****** Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy): According to art. 67 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives). The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following: Court of Arbitration for Sport Avenue de Beaumont 2 1012 Lausanne Switzerland Tel: +41 21 613 50 00 Fax: +41 21 613 50 01 e-mail: info@tas-cas.org www.tas-cas.org For the Dispute Resolution Chamber: Jérôme Valcke Secretary General Encl. CAS directives