F.I.F.A. – Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2012-2013) – controversie di lavoro – ———- F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber (2012-2013) – labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 28 June 2013, in the following composition: Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman Jon Newman (USA), member Essa M. Saleh Al-Housani (UAE), member on the claim presented by the player, Player R, from country B as Claimant against the club, Club L, from country G as Respondent regarding an employment-related dispute between the parties

F.I.F.A. - Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2012-2013) - controversie di lavoro - ---------- F.I.F.A. - Dispute Resolution Chamber (2012-2013) - labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 28 June 2013, in the following composition: Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman Jon Newman (USA), member Essa M. Saleh Al-Housani (UAE), member on the claim presented by the player, Player R, from country B as Claimant against the club, Club L, from country G as Respondent regarding an employment-related dispute between the parties I. Facts of the case 1. On 8 January 2010, Player R, from country B (hereinafter: player or Claimant), and Club L, from country G (hereinafter: club or Respondent), signed an employment contract valid as from the date of signature until 30 June 2010. 2. According to art. 4 par. 4 of the contract, the player was entitled to receive the total net amount of EUR 147,000, to be paid as follows: - EUR 24,500 on 31 January 2010; - EUR 24,500 on 28 February 2010; - EUR 24,500 on 31 March 2010; - EUR 24,500 on 30 April 2010; - EUR 24,500 on 31 May 2010; - EUR 24,500 on 30 June 2010. 3. Art. 10 of the contract stipulates that “All disputes between the parties are settled by the Appeals Committee for the Resolution of Financial Disputes (PEEOD) at first instance, and the Court of Arbitration of the country G Football Federation at second instance”. 4. On 30 May 2011, the player lodged a claim against the club in front of FIFA claiming that, upon the expiry of the contract, the club had failed to fully comply with its financial obligations, still owing him his last two monthly salaries due on 31 May 2010 and 30 June 2010, respectively. 5. As a result, the player is requesting to be awarded the total net outstanding amount of EUR 49,000, plus 5% interest p.a. ”over the amount claimed”. 6. In its reply, the club maintains it is undisputed that the parties had agreed that “any and all disputes would be exclusively submitted to the Committee for the Resolution of Financial Disputes (PEEOD) at first instance and the Court of Arbitration of the country G Football Federation at second instance”. The club also asserts that the aforementioned country G sport bodies, in their current form, are independent arbitration tribunals guaranteeing fair proceedings and respecting the principle of equal representation of players and clubs. In this respect, the club claims that FIFA has no jurisdiction over the matter at hand and that in accordance with the employment contract signed by the parties, the player was obliged to file his claim before the country G bodies, which should be considered as the only competent bodies to hear the present dispute. 7. Upon request, the country G Football Federation provided FIFA with a copy of the Statutes (edition 2009) and the Procedural Rules of the Dispute Resolution Committees of the country G Football Federation (edition 2009; hereinafter: the Procedural Rules of the country G Football Federation). In particular, the mentioned regulations stated the following: a. with regard to the jurisdiction of the Committee: Art. 41 G. 5. of the Statutes of the country G Football Federation stipulates that the Committee is competent to resolve financial disputes between players and professional clubs. Art. 41 G. 2b. of the Statutes of the country G Football Federation states that the Appeals Arbitration Division of the Court of Arbitration is competent to “resolve at second degree the disputes settled by the Dispute Resolution Committee between player or coaches and Professional Football Clubs (…)”. b. with regard to the composition: According to art. 41 G. 5. of the Statutes of the country G Football Federation and art. 4 of the Procedural Rules of the country G Football Federation, the Committee is composed of five members. In this respect, said article of the Statutes specified the composition as follows: a chairman, which is a “active higher judiciary”, two members appointed by the Board of Directors of the Pan-Hellenic Professional Players Association and two members appointed from the Board of Directors of the Professional Associations. Art. 41 G. 1. of the Statutes of the country G Football Federation stipulates that the Court of Arbitration is composed of three members: the president, which has to be a “supreme active judiciary”, two members, which are “appointed each by each party”. c. with regard to the possibility of an appeal: Art. 53 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules of the country G Football Federation stipulates that “As a last recourse, the decisions of the Committee may be challenged before the Court of Arbitration of the country G Football Federation”. d. with regard to the adoption and enforcement: The Procedural Rules of the country G Football Federation entered into force on 13 June 2009. The Statutes of the country G Football Federation are dated 13 June 2009. 8. Notwithstanding the above, the club also highlighted its serious financial difficulties as the sole reason for the apparent payment delay. It claims to have always acted in good faith but due to its current financial burden, the club was “under restructuring”, with the view of solving its current situation and subsequently reaching an amicable solution with the player, whereby “the claimant would receive any outstanding amounts in instalments according to a feasible payment plan”. 9. FIFA was not informed that the parties reached an amicable settlement. II. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter referred to as the DRC or the Chamber) was eager to emphasize that contrary to the information contained in FIFA’s letter dated 21 June 2013 by means of which the parties were informed of the composition of the Chamber, the member Mr M and the member Mr T refrained from participating in the deliberations in the case at hand, due to the fact that the members have the same nationality as one of the parties in the present proceedings. Thus, the Dispute Resolution Chamber adjudicated the case in presence of three members in accordance with art. 24 par. 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer if Players. 2. Subsequently, the Chamber analysed whether it was competent to deal with the matter at stake. In this respect, the Chamber referred to art. 21 par. 1 and 2 of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (editions 2008 and 2012; hereinafter: Procedural Rules). The present matter was submitted to FIFA on 30 May 2011, thus, after the 2008 edition entered into force on 1 July 2008, but before the 2012 edition came into force. Consequently, the Chamber concluded that the 2008 edition of the Procedural Rules is applicable to the matter at hand. 3. With regard to the competence of the Dispute Resolution Chamber, art. 3 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules states that the Dispute Resolution Chamber shall examine its jurisdiction in the light of art. 22 to 24 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2012). In accordance with art. 24 par. 1 in combination with art. 22 lit. b) of the aforementioned Regulations, the Dispute Resolution Chamber would, in principle, be competent to deal with the matter at stake, which concerns an employment-related dispute with an international dimension between a country B player and a country G club. 4. However, the Chamber acknowledged that the Respondent contested the competence of FIFA’s deciding bodies on the basis of art. 10 of the employment contract according to which “[all] disputes between the parties are settled by the Appeals Committee for the Resolution of Financial Disputes (PEEOD) at first instance, and the Court of Arbitration of the country G Football Federation at second instance”. 5. Taking into account the above, the Chamber emphasised that in accordance with art. 22 lit. b) of the 2012 edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players it is competent to deal with a matter such as the one in hand, unless an independent arbitration tribunal, guaranteeing fair proceedings and respecting the principle of equal representation of players and clubs, has been established at national level within the framework of the association and/or a collective bargaining agreement. With regard to the standards to be imposed on an independent arbitration tribunal guaranteeing fair proceedings, the Chamber referred to the FIFA Circular no. 1010 dated 20 December 2005. In this regard, the members of the Chamber further referred to the principles contained in the FIFA National Dispute Resolution Chamber (NDRC) Standard Regulations, which came into force on 1 January 2008. 6. While analysing whether it was competent to hear the present matter, the Dispute Resolution Chamber turned to art. 10 of the employment contract, on the basis of which the Respondent contested FIFA’s jurisdiction. The Chamber recalled once more that said art. 10 stipulates that “all disputes between the parties are settled by the Committee for the Resolution of Financial Disputes (PEEOD) at first instance, and the Court of Arbitration of the country G Football Federation at second instance”. 7. In this respect and in view of the aforementioned jurisdiction clause, the DRC had primarily to examine, based on the documents provided, whether or not the Committee and the Court of Arbitration of the country G Football Federation meet the minimum procedural standards for independent arbitration tribunals as laid down in art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, in the FIFA Circular no. 1010 as well as in the FIFA NDRC Standard Regulations. 8. In this regard, the DRC, after a careful study of the documents on file, referred to art. 41 G. 5. of the country G Football Federation Statutes and art. 4 of the Procedural Rules of the country G Football Federation, which, in relation to the composition of the Committee, stipulate that the Committee is composed of five members. Furthermore, the relevant article of the Procedural Rules of the country G Football Federation stipulates that the Committee shall be composed of a chairman and a substitute chairman who will be active higher judiciaries; two representatives of the players and two representatives of the clubs. The relevant article of the country G Football Federation Statutes provides that “the Chairman of the Committee and his substitute being active higher judiciaries. In the event that an active judiciary is not able to participate, then a non-active judiciary is appointed. Two (2) members are appointed from the Board of Directors of the country G Professional Players Association (PSAP) and two (2) from the Board of Directors of the Professional Associations.” 9. In this context, the Chamber observed that there was no indication in said rules and statutes how the chairman of the Committee is appointed, i.e. it remains unknown who appoints the chairman, whether the chairman is appointed by consensus by the player and club representatives, nor does it become clear who exactly the chairman is. As a result, the Chamber decided that the aforementioned provisions of the rules and statutes of the country G Football Federation are not clear enough to establish without doubt that the aforementioned body respects the principle of equal representation between players and clubs. 10. Likewise, the Chamber referred to art. 41 G. 1. of the country G Football Federation Statutes and noted that the Court of Arbitration is composed of three members, consisting of its President and his substitute who are “supreme active judiciaries” and two members, which are appointed “each by each party”. Equally, the Chamber came to the conclusion that the provisions governing the composition of the Court of Arbitration do not demonstrate how exactly the President and his substitute are appointed. 11. In conclusion, the Chamber decided that the Respondent could not prove that both national bodies, i.e. the Committee and the Court of Arbitration, comply with the minimal procedural standards in order to be recognised as an independent arbitration tribunal, as established in art. 22 lit. b) of the FIFA Regulations as well as in the FIFA Circular no. 1010. In particular, it has not been proven that said bodies respect the principle of equal representation of players and clubs, which is a fundamental principle to meet. Consequently, as established by the DRC on previous occasions, the Chamber considered that neither the Committee nor the Court of Arbitration can be recognised as an independent arbitration tribunal. 12. In view of all the above, the Chamber established that the Respondent’s objection towards the competence of FIFA to deal with the present matter has to be rejected, and that the Dispute Resolution Chamber is competent, on the basis of art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, to consider the present matter as to the substance. 13. In continuation, the Chamber analysed which edition of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, the Chamber confirmed that, in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (editions 2010 and 2012) and considering that the present claim was lodged in front of FIFA on 30 May 2011, the 2010 edition of said Regulations is applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance. 14. The competence of the Dispute Resolution Chamber and the applicable regulations having been established, the Chamber acknowledged that it was undisputed by the parties that they had signed an employment contract on 8 January 2010 valid as of the date of signature until 30 June 2010, in accordance with which the player was entitled to receive, inter alia, the total amount of EUR 147,000, to be paid in six equal monthly installments of EUR 24,500. 15. The members of the Chamber then took note that the Claimant alleged that despite having honoured the contract, the Respondent had failed to fulfil its contractual obligations. According to the Claimant, the Respondent still owed him his last two monthly salaries, totalling EUR 49,000. 16. In this respect, considering the Claimant´s request for outstanding salaries in the amount of EUR 49,000, the Chamber took due note that the Respondent did not present any objections towards the Claimant´s request and as such, had implicitly recognised owing the player said amount. The Respondent had only highlighted its current financial situation as the sole reason for its delay of arrears. 17. In a nutshell, the Chamber noted that the Claimant honoured the contract but the Respondent did not fully comply with its contractual obligations, further emphasising that the Respondent implicitly accepted owing the Claimant the relevant amounts requested. 18. Subsequently and in accordance with the general legal principle of pacta sunt servanda, the Chamber held that the Respondent must fulfil its obligations as per the employment contract concluded with the Claimant and, consequently, pay the outstanding remuneration due to the latter. 19. Finally and for all the above reasons, the Chamber decided to accept the Claimant´s claim and that the Respondent must pay to the Claimant the amount of EUR 49,000 plus 5% interest p.a. on said amount as of 30 May 2011 until the date of effective payment. ***** III. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. The claim of the Claimant, Player R, is admissible. 2. The claim of the Claimant is accepted. 3. The Respondent, Club L, has to pay to the Claimant within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision, the amount of EUR 49,000 plus 5% interest p.a. on said amount as of 30 May 2011 until the date of effective payment. 4. If the aforementioned sum plus interest is not paid within the stated time limit, the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision. 5. The Claimant is directed to inform the Respondent immediately and directly of the account number to which the remittance is to be made and to notify the Dispute Resolution Chamber of every payment received. ***** Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy): According to art. 67 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives). The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following: Court of Arbitration for Sport Avenue de Beaumont 2 1012 Lausanne Switzerland Tel: +41 21 613 50 00 / Fax: +41 21 613 50 01 e-mail: info@tas-cas.org www.tas-cas.org For the Dispute Resolution Chamber: Markus Kattner Deputy Secretary General Encl. CAS directives