F.I.F.A. – Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2012-2013) – controversie di lavoro – ———- F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber (2012-2013) – labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 15 March 2013, in the following composition: Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman Joaquim Evangelista (Portugal), member Carlos Soto (Chile), member Mario Gallavotti (Italy), member Zola Majavu (South Africa), member on the claim presented by the player, Player D, from country A as Claimant against the club, Club C, from country R as Respondent regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties

F.I.F.A. - Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2012-2013) - controversie di lavoro - ---------- F.I.F.A. - Dispute Resolution Chamber (2012-2013) - labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 15 March 2013, in the following composition: Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman Joaquim Evangelista (Portugal), member Carlos Soto (Chile), member Mario Gallavotti (Italy), member Zola Majavu (South Africa), member on the claim presented by the player, Player D, from country A as Claimant against the club, Club C, from country R as Respondent regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties I. Facts of the case 1. On 13 January 2009, Club C, from country R (hereinafter: the Respondent) and Club P, from country U (hereinafter: Club P) concluded a loan agreement for the loan of the player D (hereinafter: the Claimant), from Club P to the Respondent as from 13 January 2009 until 31 December 2009. 2. Furthermore, the loan agreement foresaw the option to transfer the Claimant on a definitive basis, if the option would be exercised by the Respondent prior to 31 December 2009. 3. Equally on 13 January 2009, the Respondent and the Claimant entered into an employment contract (hereinafter: the contract) valid as from 1 January 2009 until 31 December 2011. 4. Art. 5.1 of the contract established that, between 1 January 2009 and 31 December 2009, the player would be paid the total net amount of EUR 168,000, payable in 12 monthly net instalments of EUR 14,000 each. Equally, said article provided that, should the Respondent opt for the continuation of the employment relationship with the Claimant and should it decide to exercise the option in relation to the definitive transfer of the Claimant, the Respondent would pay the player the following net amounts: - Between 1 January 2010 and 31 December 2010: EUR 180,000; - Between 1 January 2011 and 31 December 2011: EUR 192,000. 5. Art. 5.2 of the contract stipulated that the player was entitled to EUR 10,000 should the Respondent win the country R Cup. 6. Art. 11.3 of the contract stipulated: “Until 31 [December] 2009, [the Respondent] will be entitled to unilaterally rescind the present contract without payment of any compensation or may decide on its continuation in accordance with the conditions mentioned in article 5.1 of the contract.” 7. Art. 12.1 of the contract stipulated that any dispute should be solved by amicable settlement, and if the parties did not come to an agreement, the disputes should be submitted to organs with jurisdictional attributions of the country R Football Federation, the Professional Football League and/or the judicial competent bodies of Club C, in accordance with country R legislation. 8. On 14 January 2010, the Claimant lodged a claim against the Respondent in front of FIFA indicating that, on 11 June 2009, the Respondent had terminated the contract as from 1 July 2009 on the basis of art. 11.3 of the contract. 9. The Claimant deems that art. 11.3 is clearly disproportionate, abusive and illegal as it contravenes basic principles of law, also emphasising that the article is not reciprocal since art. 7.1 lit. n) established that should the Claimant unilaterally terminate the contract he would have to compensate the Respondent with EUR 5,000,000. The Claimant further asserts that art. 11.3 was inserted in the contract without his knowledge and added that the Respondent acted in bad faith since the contract was drafted in the country R language only, a language the Claimant does not speak. 10. Furthermore, the Claimant stated that upon the date of termination, the Claimant had neither received his salaries for April, May and June 2009 (EUR 42,000) nor the bonus in the amount of EUR 10,000 for winning the country R Cup. 11. On account of the above, and while stressing that the parties had signed a contract for 3 years, the Claimant requested to be awarded with the following amounts: -EUR 52,000 as outstanding remuneration; -EUR 456,000 for the remaining value of the contract (EUR 84,000 for the period July-December 2009, EUR 180,000 for the year 2010 and EUR 192,000 for the year 2011). 12. Equally, the Claimant requested indemnity damages, due to sporting loss in regard to the specificity of sport, equivalent to at least six months of his average salary, all costs of the proceedings and an “additional 5% annual interest on the amount due to the player from the date in which the breach occurred.” 13. On 1 April 2010, the Claimant reverted to FIFA indicating that it had received a notification of the Dispute Resolution Committee of the country R Professional Football League that he was summoned to attend a hearing on 12 April 2010. 14. On 22 June 2011, the Respondent replied to the claim lodged against it firstly arguing that the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber (DRC) is not competent to adjudicate on the present matter. The Respondent referred to art. 12.1 of the contract and holds that the player and club opted out of their free will to submit any dispute to the competent judicial bodies of the country R Football Federation, the country R Professional Football League “and/or of Club C” and added that the wording of the relevant clause clearly excludes jurisdiction of any other judicial body. 15. As to the substance, the Respondent stressed that it merely concluded a loan agreement with Club P, hence, the salaries indicated for the years 2010 and 2011 were only applicable in the event of the permanent transfer of the player. Also, the parties had agreed on art. 11.3 whereby the Claimant expressly agreed that the Respondent had the right to rescind from the contract without any financial consequences until 31 December 2009. The Respondent pointed out that art. 11.3 was never secretly inserted in the contract and that the Claimant fully understood what he had signed since he was assisted by three licensed player agents and one lawyer. 16. The Respondent further indicated that the Claimant did not show the expected professionalism from the beginning and that, as a consequence, he was only fielded 168 minutes during the 2008/2009 season. From the middle of April 2009, the behaviour of the Claimant could no longer be ignored and therefore the Respondent opened disciplinary proceedings which resulted in a decision dated 3 August 2009 of the club’s Board of Administration, by means of which the Claimant was sanctioned with a penalty of 25% of his “contractual rights due for the 2008-2009 competition season”. In view of the foregoing and also taking into account the continuing misbehaviour of the Claimant, the Respondent informed Club P on 10 June 2009 that it would not exercise the option for the definitive transfer of the Claimant . 17. As to the termination notification dated 11 June 2009, the Respondent outlined that the notification was sent because Club P had immediately indicated to the Respondent it was interested to get the Claimant back, something that was also the will of the Claimant at the time. Therefore, the Respondent and Club P officially rescinded the loan agreement. 18. The Respondent states that in light of the above, it requested the country R Professional Football League DRC to take a decision to ascertain the “discontinuance of contractual relations between the parties as the provisions of art. 11.3 of the [employment contract]”. The country R Professional Football League DRC consequently declared that the Claimant was free of contract as from 1 July 2009 and, thereafter, on 18 May 2011, the country R Professional Football League DRC also ratified the decision of the club’s Board of Administration dated 3 August 2009. 19. The Respondent also stated that the validity of art. 11.3 cannot be challenged by the Claimant and not be denied by the DRC, due to the principle of res iudicata; the country R Professional Football League DRC already determined that art. 11.3 of the contract is valid and the relevant decision became final and binding. 20. As to the alleged outstanding salaries, the Respondent states that the Claimant has the burden of proof that he should be entitled to receive any amount at all from the Respondent and that, in any case, from such amount, EUR 26,000 should be deducted in accordance with the decision of the club’s Board of Administration. 21. Having been requested by FIFA to provide the documentary evidence that the country R Professional Football League DRC fulfils the requirements of art. 22 b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, the Respondent submitted a translation of art. 26 of the 2009 Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players approved by the country R Football Federation Executive Committee, which, inter alia, stipulates that cases involving clubs that participate in the First League National Championship and their players shall be determined exclusively by the judicial bodies of the country R Professional Football League according to the annual agreement between the country R Football Federation and the country R Professional Football League. Furthermore, it is stated that the country R Professional Football League DRC and the country R Professional Football League Review Commission are formed of five members, two of them acting as chairman and deputy chairman, respectively. Moreover, the Respondent submitted a letter of the country R Professional Football League outlining that its DRC complied with art. 22 b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players as well as an agreement concluded between the country R Football Federation and the country R Professional Football League by means of which the said bodies defined their relations. 22. In addition, the Respondent stressed that the FIFA National Dispute Resolution Chamber Standard Regulations may only serve as a guideline and its content does not contain absolute binding parameters for arbitration tribunals. 23. Finally, and as to the right to be heard during the proceedings in front of the country R Professional Football League DRC, the Respondent indicated that, on 19 April 2010, the lawyer of the Claimant was duly provided by the country R Professional Football League DRC with a copy of the relevant file and duly notified that a hearing was scheduled on 1 June 2010. However, the Claimant failed to show up. Furthermore, the decision was duly notified to the parties and none of the parties appealed the decision. 24. In his replica, the Claimant indicated that the country R Professional Football League DRC does not comply with art. 22 b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players; it did not respond to correspondence sent by the Claimant, it sent notifications in the country R language only, it asked the Claimant to attend hearings on impossible dates with unreasonable short time limits, it ignored the willingness of the Claimant and his representative to conduct the proceedings in a normal way and ignored standard and fundamental principles of arbitration proceedings. The Claimant stressed that he was willing to attend a hearing, however, after a while the country R Professional Football League DRC stopped communicating with him, even though he had sent several requests. Only at a later stage, the Claimant found out that the country R Professional Football League DRC already took a decision on 1 June 2010 without giving the Claimant the chance to defend himself regarding the contract termination. 25. In its duplica, the Respondent reiterated its position in relation to the competence and res iudicata issue. Furthermore, the Respondent reiterated its position as to the substance and added that since the Claimant is carrying the burden of proof, no interest is due. 26. Upon request of FIFA, the Claimant indicated that he signed new employment contracts as follows: - with Club A from 21 July 2009 until 30 June 2010 with a monthly salary of USD 2,500; - with Club O from 1 August 2010 until 30 June 2012 with a monthly salary of EUR 1,500, which contract was terminated before its original expiry date; - with Club H from May 2011 to 31 December 2011 with a monthly gross salary of 1,800,000 currency of country X. II. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter referred to as the DRC or the Chamber) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the matter at stake. In this respect, it took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 14 January 2010. Consequently, the 2008 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules) is applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 of the 2008 and 2012 edition of the Procedural Rules). 2. Subsequently, the members of the Chamber referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed that in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 in combination with art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2012) the Dispute Resolution Chamber shall adjudicate on employment-related disputes between a club and a player that have an international dimension. 3. As a consequence, the Dispute Resolution Chamber would, in principle, be competent to decide on the present litigation which involves an player from country A and a country R club regarding an employment-related dispute. 4. However, the Chamber acknowledged that the Respondent contested the competence of FIFA’s deciding bodies on the basis of art. 12 par. 1 of the employment contract alleging that only the deciding bodies of the country R Football Federation and/or the Professional Football League and/or “of Club C” were competent to deal with the present case. In the Respondent’s view, art. 12 par. 1 clearly excluded the competence of the Dispute Resolution Chamber to adjudicate on the present matter. 5. In particular, the Chamber duly noted that the Respondent had lodged a complaint against the Claimant in front of the RPFL DRC and that said body already rendered a decision declaring the Claimant free of contract as from 1 July 2009 in accordance with art. 11.3 of the contract. Furthermore, the Chamber took note that the Respondent insisted that the country R Professional Football League DRC was competent to take such a decision since it is an arbitration tribunal established in accordance with the requirements contained in art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players. 6. What is more, following such decision of the country R Professional Football League DRC, the Respondent deemed that that the validity of art. 11. 3 of the employment contract could no longer be challenged by the Claimant since the principle of res iudicata applies. 7. In turn, the Chamber observed that the Claimant contested the competence of the country R Professional Football League DRC and insisted that FIFA has jurisdiction to deal with the present matter. 8. Taking into account all the above, the Chamber emphasised that in accordance with art. 22 lit. b) of the 2012 edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players it is competent to deal with a matter such as the one at hand, unless an independent arbitration tribunal, guaranteeing fair proceedings and respecting the principle of equal representation of players and clubs, has been established at national level within the framework of the association and/or a collective bargaining agreement. With regard to the standards to be imposed on an independent arbitration tribunal guaranteeing fair proceedings, the Chamber referred to the FIFA Circular no. 1010 dated 20 December 2005. Equally, the members of the Chamber referred to the principles contained in the FIFA National Dispute Resolution Chamber (NDRC) Standard Regulations, which came into force on 1 January 2008. 9. While analysing whether it was competent to decide on the matter, the Chamber first referred to art. 12.1 of the employment contract, on the basis of which the Respondent contested FIFA’s jurisdiction. Said article stipulates that if the parties are not able to find an amicable agreement, the dispute should be submitted to organs with jurisdictional attributions of the country R Football Federation, the country R Professional Football League and/or the judicial competent bodies of Club C, in accordance with country R legislation. The members of the Chamber outlined that the content of art. 12.1 is rather vague, differs between different unspecified judicial bodies and that it does not explicitly refer to a national dispute resolution chamber or any similar arbitration body in the sense of art. 22 lit. b) of the aforementioned Regulations. In view of the foregoing, the Chamber held that the jurisdiction of the country R Professional Football League DRC does not derive from a clear reference in the employment contract. 10. In continuation, the DRC turned its attention to the principle of equal representation of players and clubs and underlined that this principle is one of the very fundamental elements to be fulfilled, in order for a national dispute resolution chamber to be recognised as such. Indeed, this prerequisite is mentioned in the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, in the FIFA Circular no. 1010 as well as in art. 3 par. 1 of the NDRC Regulations, which illustrates the aforementioned principle as follows: “The NDRC shall be composed of the following members, who shall serve a four-year renewable mandate: a) a chairman and a deputy chairman chosen by consensus by the player and club representatives (…); b) between three and ten player representatives who are elected or appointed either on proposal of the players’ associations affiliated to FIFPro, or, where no such associations exist, on the basis of a selection process agreed by FIFA and FIFPro; c) between three and ten club representatives (…).” In this respect, the FIFA Circular no. 1010 states the following: “The parties must have equal influence over the appointment of arbitrators. This means for example that every party shall have the right to appoint an arbitrator and the two appointed arbitrators appoint the chairman of the arbitration tribunal (…). Where arbitrators are to be selected from a predetermined list, every interest group that is represented must be able to exercise equal influence over the compilation of the arbitrator list”. 11. On account of the above, the Chamber went on to examine the documentation presented by the Respondent and noted that the Respondent provided the following documentation: - A translation into English of art. 26 of the 2009 Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players approved by the country R Football Federation Executive Committee; - An agreement concluded between the country R Football Federation and the country R Professional Football League; - A letter of the country R Professional Football League; 12. In this framework, the Chamber stressed that instead of producing the complete set of rules and regulations governing the proceedings of the country R Professional Football League DRC, the Respondent had only presented a translation of art. 26 of the 2009 Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players approved by the country R Football Federation Executive Committee. This is, the members of the Chamber did not have at their disposal the complete version of said Regulations and emphasised that it cannot base their decision on the basis of documentation that is incomplete. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Chamber observed that as to the composition of the country R Professional Football League DRC, art. 26 of said Regulations merely indicated that it is formed of five members, two of them acting as chairman and deputy chairman, respectively. However, no further details are provided as to the composition of the country R Professional Football League DRC, neither in art. 26 nor in the agreement concluded between the country R Football Federation and the country R Professional Football League. 13. Additionally, neither art. 26 of said Regulations nor the agreement concluded between the country R Football Federation and the country R Professional Football League contained any indications as to the manner in which the proceedings in front of the country R Professional Football League DRC are conducted i.e. it was not possible for the Chamber to analyse whether the country R Professional Football League DRC respects the principle of fair proceedings as required by art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players. 14. In conclusion, the Chamber held that the only documentation provided by the Respondent which specifies anything in relation to the composition of the country R Professional Football League DRC as well as in relation to how proceedings in front of the country R Professional Football League DRC are conducted is the letter of the country R Professional Football League itself. However, the Chamber deemed that, for obvious reasons, this letter cannot be considered as objective evidence to establish that the country R Professional Football League DRC is an independent arbitration tribunal, since the country R Professional Football League has evidently an interest in having its DRC established as such. 15. In view of the lack of complete and objective evidence, the Chamber deemed that the Respondent had failed to prove that the country R Professional Football League DRC is indeed an independent arbitration tribunal guaranteeing fair proceedings and respecting the principle of equal representation of players and clubs. 16. What is more, the Chamber duly noted that the Claimant, by lodging his claim in front of FIFA and by not withdrawing it later on, he signalised that he did not recognise the jurisdiction of the national arbitration body in country R. 17. On account of all the above and referring to the principle of the burden of proof contained in art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules, the Chamber established that the Respondent’s objection towards the competence of FIFA to deal with the present matter has to be rejected, and that the Dispute Resolution Chamber is competent, on the basis of art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, to consider the present matter as to the substance. 18. In connection with the above and in relation to the arguments of the Respondent regarding art. 11.3 of the employment contract and the principle of res iudicata, the Chamber determined that whenever a decision is passed by a national body that was not entitled to adjudicate on a specific matter for formal reasons, such decision does not have to be recognized by other competent bodies, in casu the DRC. Therefore, the DRC decided that it is not bound by the decision rendered by the country R Professional Football League DRC. 19. Subsequently, and entering into the substance, the Chamber analysed which edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, the Chamber referred, on the one hand, to art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (editions 2009, 2010 and 2012) and, on the other hand, to the fact that the present claim was lodged on 14 January 2010. The Dispute Resolution Chamber concluded that the 2009 edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: the Regulations) is applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance. 20. The competence of the Chamber and the applicable regulations having been established, the Chamber started by acknowledging the above-mentioned facts as well as the documentation contained in the file. 21. First of all, the members of the Chamber acknowledged that, on 13 January 2009 following the conclusion of a loan agreement between the Respondent and Club P, the Claimant and the Respondent had concluded an employment contract valid as from 1 January 2009. Moreover, the Chamber duly noted that the loan agreement contained an option right for the Respondent to transfer the player on a definitive basis. 22. The Chamber further observed that the Claimant lodged a claim in front of FIFA against the Respondent seeking payment of the total amount of EUR 508,000, asserting that the Respondent had terminated the contract without just cause on 11 June 2009 making use of art. 11.3, which article is, in the Claimant’s view, disproportionate, abusive and illegal. 23. In continuation, the Chamber observed that the Respondent insisted on the validity of art. 11 par. 3 arguing that the parties had explicitly agreed upon said article and that the Claimant fully understood what he had signed. 24. The Chamber first wished to emphasise that the possibility that the Claimant might not have understood the content of the document he signed in the country R language does not lead to the conclusion that the document cannot be considered. The Chamber stressed that a party signing a document of legal importance without knowledge of its precise contents, does so on its own responsibility. What is more, the Chamber noted that the Claimant had not been able to prove that art. 11.3 was “secretly” inserted in the employment contract. 25. Having said that, the Chamber was well aware that in view of the parties’ positions it had to examine the validity of art. 11.3 of the contract as to its consent. Art. 11.3 stipulates that “Until 31 [December] 2009, [the Respondent] will be entitled to unilaterally rescind the present contract without payment of any compensation or may decide on its continuation in accordance with the conditions mentioned in article 5.1 of the contract.” In this respect, the Chamber held that it could not recognise said article as it provides for a unilateral termination right without any compensation to the club only. Therefore, the Chamber decided that the Respondent could not legitimately terminate the contract with the Claimant making use of art. 11.3 of the contract. Consequently, the Chamber decided that the Respondent had terminated the contract with the Claimant without just cause on 11 June 2009 (as of July 2009) and that, consequently, the Respondent is to be held liable for the early termination of the employment contact without just cause. 26. Bearing in mind the previous considerations, the Chamber went on to deal with the consequences of the early termination of the employment contract without just cause by the Respondent. 27. First of all, the members of the Chamber concurred that the Respondent must fulfill its obligations as per employment contract up until the date of termination of the contract in accordance with the general legal principle of “pacta sunt servanda”. Consequently, the Chamber decided that the Respondent is liable to pay to the Claimant the remuneration that was outstanding at the time of the termination of the contract i.e. on 1 July 2009. 28. At the time of the termination, the Chamber noted that the salaries for April May and June were outstanding, i.e. the total amount of EUR 42,000. Nevertheless, the Chamber took due note that the Respondent held that an amount of EUR 26,000 should be deducted from the amount of EUR 42,000 in accordance with the sanction imposed on the Claimant by the Administrative Board of the Respondent on 3 August 2009. The Chamber however did not agree with the Respondent for the following reasons: i) the Respondent did not provide any documentary evidence for the alleged misbehaviour of the Claimant; the Chamber is not convinced that the fact that the Claimant was fielded only 168 minutes for the Respondent leads to the conclusion that the Claimant did not show the expected professionalism, and ii) the fine was imposed on - and communicated to - the Claimant when the contract had already been terminated and thus when the Claimant was no longer at the club. In this respect, the Chamber wanted to point out that it was somewhat troubled by the sequence of events that had occurred; first the Respondent failed to pay the Claimant his salary for April and May 2009, then it terminated the contract with the Claimant in June 2009 making use of art. 11 par. 3 of the contract and only then, in August 2009 when the Claimant had already departed, he was sanctioned for his alleged misbehaviour between 24 April 2009 and 25 May 2009. 29. On account of the above, the Chamber decided to disregard the fine imposed by the Respondent’s Administrative Board and, as a result, the Respondent is liable to pay to the Claimant the amount of EUR 42,000, composed of the monthly salaries for April, May and June 2009. 30. Turning its attention to the request of the Claimant to be awarded with the amount of EUR 10,000 following the cup win by the Respondent, the Chamber referred to art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules and noted that the Claimant had not presented any documentary evidence that such event indeed had taken place. On account of the aforesaid, the Chamber decided to reject this part of the Claimant’s claim. 31. In continuation, the Chamber decided that, taking into consideration art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, the Claimant is entitled to receive from the Respondent compensation for breach of contract in addition to any outstanding salaries on the basis of the relevant employment contract. 32. In this context, the Chamber outlined that, in accordance with said provision, the amount of compensation shall be calculated, in particular and unless otherwise provided for in the contract at the basis of the dispute, with due consideration for the law of the country concerned, the specificity of sport and further objective criteria, including, in particular, the remuneration and other benefits due to the Claimant under the existing contract and/or the new contract, the time remaining on the existing contract up to a maximum of five years, and depending on whether the contractual breach falls within the protected period. 33. In application of the relevant provision, the Chamber held that it first of all had to clarify whether the pertinent employment contract contained any clause, by means of which the parties had beforehand agreed upon a compensation payable by the contractual parties in the event of breach of contract. In this regard, the Chamber established that no such compensation clause was included in the employment contract at the basis of the matter at stake. 34. Subsequently, and in order to evaluate the compensation to be paid by the Respondent, the members of the Chamber took into account the remuneration due to the Claimant in accordance with the employment contract as well as the time remaining on the same contract, along with the professional situation of the Claimant after the early termination occurred. In this respect, the Chamber pointed out that the Claimant and the Respondent had divergent positions on the duration of the employment contract; whereas the Claimant asserted that the contract was to run until 31 December 2011, the Respondent stressed that the contract only run until 31 December 2009, since the option right had not been exercised. 35. The Chamber was unanimous in its decision that, as indicated by the Respondent, the duration of the contract to be taken into account is indeed the period as from 1 January 2009 until 31 December 2009, i.e. the period of the loan of the Claimant to the Respondent. The Respondent had clearly not exercised the relevant option in the loan agreement concluded between it and Club P. 36. Taking into account the preceding consideration, at the time of the termination of the employment contract on 1 July 2009, the contract would run for another 6 months. Consequently, the Chamber concluded that the remaining value of the contract as from its early termination by the Respondent until the regular expiry of the contract amounts to EUR 84,000 and that such amount shall serve as the basis for the final determination of the amount of compensation for breach of contract. 37. In continuation, the Chamber remarked that following the early termination of the employment contract at the basis of the present dispute the Claimant had found new employment with the club A, in accordance with which he would be remunerated with a monthly salary of USD 2,500, corresponding to EUR 1,760. Consequently, in accordance with the constant practice of the Dispute Resolution Chamber and the general obligation of the Claimant to mitigate his damages, such remuneration under the new employment contract shall be taken into account in the calculation of the amount of compensation for breach of contract. 38. In view of all of the above, the Chamber decided that the Respondent must pay the amount of EUR 73,440 to the Claimant as compensation for breach of contract without just case, which is considered by the Chamber to be a reasonable and justified amount as compensation. 39. In conclusion, the DRC decided that the Respondent is liable to pay the total amount of EUR 115,440 to the Claimant, consisting of the amount of EUR 42,000 corresponding to the Claimant’s outstanding remuneration at the time of the unilateral termination of the contract without just cause by the Respondent and the amount of EUR 73,440 corresponding to compensation for breach of contract without just cause. 40. As to the interest, the Chamber decided that the Respondent had to pay 5% interest on the amount of EUR 42,000 as from 1 July 2009 and on the amount of EUR 73,440 as from 15 March 2013. 41. The Dispute Resolution Chamber concluded its deliberations in the present matter by establishing that any further claim lodged by the Claimant is rejected. ** III. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. The claim of the Claimant, Player D, is admissible. 2. The claim of the Claimant is partially accepted. 3. The Respondent, Club C, has to pay to the Claimant, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision, outstanding remuneration in the amount of EUR 42,000 plus 5% interest p.a. on said amount as from 1 July 2009 until the date of effective payment. 4. The Respondent has to pay to the Claimant, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision, compensation for breach of contract in the amount of EUR 73,440 plus 5% interest p.a. on said amount as from 15 March 2013 until the date of effective payment. 5. In the event that the amounts due to the Claimant in accordance with the above-mentioned numbers 3. and 4. are not paid by the Respondent within the stated time limits, the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision. 6. Any further claim lodged by the Claimant is rejected. 7. The Claimant is directed to inform the Respondent immediately and directly of the account number to which the remittances are to be made and to notify the Dispute Resolution Chamber of every payment received. Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy): According to art. 67 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives). The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following: Court of Arbitration for Sport Avenue de Beaumont 2 1012 Lausanne Switzerland Tel: +41 21 613 50 00 / Fax: +41 21 613 50 01 e-mail: info@tas-cas.org www.tas-cas.org For the Dispute Resolution Chamber: Markus Kattner Deputy Secretary General Encl. CAS directives