F.I.F.A. – Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2012-2013) – controversie di lavoro – ———- F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber (2012-2013) – labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 28 June 2013, in the following composition: Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman Rinaldo Martorelli (Brazil), member Jon Newman (USA), member Theodoros Giannikos (Greece), member Essa M. Saleh Al-Housani (United Arab Emirates), member on the claim presented by the player, Player M, from country N as Claimant/Counter-Respondent against the club, Club U, from country Q as Respondent/Counter-Claimant regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties

F.I.F.A. - Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2012-2013) - controversie di lavoro - ---------- F.I.F.A. - Dispute Resolution Chamber (2012-2013) - labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 28 June 2013, in the following composition: Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman Rinaldo Martorelli (Brazil), member Jon Newman (USA), member Theodoros Giannikos (Greece), member Essa M. Saleh Al-Housani (United Arab Emirates), member on the claim presented by the player, Player M, from country N as Claimant/Counter-Respondent against the club, Club U, from country Q as Respondent/Counter-Claimant regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties I. Facts of the case 1. The Player M, from country N (hereinafter: player or Claimant/Counter- Respondent) and the Club U, from country Q (hereinafter: club or Respondent/Counter-Claimant) signed an employment contract, bearing no date of signature, valid as from 1 July 2010 until 31 May 2012, which refers to a “Schedule” attached to it as regards the player’s remuneration (hereinafter: contract). 2. According to the “Schedule”, which was signed by and between the parties, the player was entitled to receive inter alia a monthly salary of EUR 91,000 during each of the two seasons as from August until and including May as well as a car and housing. 3. In accordance with the contract, if it is terminated without just cause or mutual agreement, the club or the player shall be entitled to receive from the other party in breach a compensation “for an all amount”. 4. Furthermore, according to clause VIII of the contract, which deals with permanent inability to play, inter alia, “The Club is entitled to insure the Player at its own expense against death or permanent inability to play as the result of an accident or sickness” and that claims arising in this respect are ceded by the player to the club, which assumes the transfer of such claims. Claim of the player: 5. On 12 August 2011, the player lodged a claim against the club in front of FIFA asking that a) the club be ordered to pay his salary for March, April, and August 2011 plus interest; b) to order the club to further comply with its contractual obligations as of 1 September 2011 including those related to a car and accommodation; c) to impose a penalty fee of EUR 1,000 per day as long as the contractual violation continues; d) to order the club to pay to the player extrajudicial costs of EUR 10,000 and the costs of the proceedings; e) to sanction the club. 6. The player submitted that the club had ceased the payment of his salary since April 2011, when the club had been informed of a medical advice that he should end his professional career on the basis of medical tests that the club asked him to undergo in April 2011. In addition, the club had reclaimed the car and ended the housing lease. The player held that such medical advice does not constitute a valid reason not to remit his remuneration. 7. The player added that he asked the club to arrange for a second opinion at a West-European hospital, on the basis of which he would be able to make a decision on his future, which he was still waiting for in spite of the club’s promises to arrange for it. 8. The player explained that throughout his entire career and during the contractual negotiations with the club, it had been known that he suffers from a heart condition. He asserted that he provided the club with his medical file and that the club subjected him to two extensive medical tests, as a result of which he was given medical clearance to play professional football. 9. The player further pointed out that after an incident on 16 September 2010, during which he lost consciousness for 15-30 seconds during training, and after medical examination, it was concluded that he had suffered from dehydration. The player asserted that, since this incident, he participated, without exception, in all club games and training sessions and that recent tests had shown that he is in a very good physical condition. 10. He further maintained that after having left for holidays, apparently in early June 2011, he returned to the club on 6 July 2011, when he was told by the club that he was not allowed to travel with the first team to a training camp in country F. Club’s reply to the claim and counterclaim: 11. In reply to the claim, the club referred to the player’s contractual obligations to participate in competitions and training and to the insurance referred to in art. VIII of the contract (cf. point I./4. above), which, according to the club, was to be undertaken by the player at his expense in order to cover financial risks relating to permanent incapacity to play. 12. The club admitted that it had suspended the effects of the contract since 1 April 2011 and that it had not paid the player’s salary between April and June 2011, during which time the parties allegedly tried to settle the matter amicably. 13. The club further referred to its letter dated 6 July 2011 addressed to the player, via which it informed the latter of the club’s position that it considered the contract to have been terminated. In this letter, the club highlighted the following elements: the player’s alleged failure to inform the club of his medical condition prior to concluding the contract, the player’s permanent incapacity to play, and the player’s alleged absence from the club as of 1 July 2011. 14. The club held that, primarily, the contract must be considered terminated as of 1 May 2011 due to the player’s permanent incapacity to play football at professional level, as confirmed by medical specialists on that day, in combination with the bilateral character of an employment contract, or, subsidiarily, as of 6 July 2011, when the club terminated the employment contract (cf. the aforementioned letter dated 6 July 2011) with just cause, as a result of which the player is not in the position to claim the execution of the contract as of 2 May 2011 or 7 July 2011, respectively. 15. As regards its statement that the contract must be considered terminated as of 1 May 2011, the club submitted that the player failed to duly inform the club of his medical condition and it denies having received a full medical file from him. According to the club, the player carries the burden of proof in this respect. The club acknowledged that it has the obligation to obtain all necessary information prior to concluding an employment contract, but insists that the player must duly inform the club before signing on. In this respect, it refers to a CAS decision in accordance with which, allegedly, a player may not disguise medical information in the context of contractual negotiations. Furthermore, the club pointed out that it intended to follow the medical advice and no longer let the player practice professional football. 16. The club asserted that it had no contractual obligation to have a second opinion carried out on Western European territory as alleged by the player. In addition, the club highlighted that the player has not brought forward any (medical) documentation demonstrating a divergent medical diagnosis. 17. Furthermore, on the basis of its primary position (cf. point I./14. above), the club deemed that the player would be entitled to his salary for April 2011. In addition, the club indicated that it would be willing, out of good faith and amicably, to pay damages corresponding to two monthly salaries. 18. In the context of its subsidiary position that it terminated the employment contract with just cause on 6 July 2011, it refers to the circumstance that the player had, in fact, been absent as from 28 June 2011, date on which training sessions had started and which was allegedly communicated to the player on 29 May 2011. The player’s unjustified absence was, according to the club, while invoking a DRC decision, a just cause to terminate the employment contract on 6 July 2011. 19. On this basis, the club asked to be awarded compensation for breach of contract in the amount of EUR 500,000, which was not further specified. Player’s replica to claim and response to counterclaim: 20. The player rejected the counterclaim and amended his initial claim. 21. Contrary to the club’s position, the player held that the employment relation had not ended. In addition, he deemed that there was no (just) cause to terminate the contract. He stated that the club never terminated the contract or confirmed this to him and that it failed to present evidence of any termination. 22. Should the Dispute Resolution Chamber (DRC) decide that the club terminated the employment contract, the player held that, in such event, the club terminated it without just cause and is thus to be held liable for payment of compensation equalling the residual value of the employment contract plus outstanding salary payments for May, August, and September 2011. 23. Should the DRC decide that the club terminated the employment contract with just cause on the basis that he is no longer able to compete in professional football, which is denied by the player, the player held that, on the basis of DRC case law, he is entitled to at least four months’ salary as compensation in addition to the aforementioned outstanding salaries. 24. The player asserted that he stayed in country Q until the beginning of September 2011 and visited the club every two days and repeatedly visited the team training and had lunch with the rest of the squad, until the club replied to his claim in front of FIFA. He further asserted that, in fact, neither he nor the club acted as if the employment contract had indeed been terminated by the club. On 20 September 2011, he informed the club that he decided to await the result of the pending procedure in country N emphasising that he did not accept or recognise any termination of the employment contract and that he remained at the club’s disposal at any moment. 25. The player referred to art. 18 par. 4 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, pointing out that neither this article nor case law of the DRC makes a distinction between short or long term injuries. Furthermore, according to the player, the DRC decided in the past that an injury of the player does not constitute just cause to terminate an employment contract. 26. The player further insisted that he had informed the club of his medical history, in particular of his heart condition, as a result of which the club proceeded with extensive medical tests both in country L and country Q in May 2010, which tests proved to be satisfactory. He added that he informed the club of the medical reports of his previous clubs dated 2007 and 2008, which show his heart condition. In addition, the player pointed out that it is the club’s responsibility to inform itself of the player’s career and (medical) history prior to entering into a contract with him. 27. In February 2011, he was tested in country Q again, the results of which were fine. According to the player, suddenly, in April 2011, the club insisted that he would undergo several medical examinations, as a result of which he was advised to end his professional career. 28. The player believes that the club wanted to create the possibility to hire another player in view of the three foreign players’ rule in country Q. 29. Furthermore, in view of the implications for the player of this medical advice, he deems that it can be expected that the club would cooperate with a second opinion, but the club did not let him leave the country to undergo the relevant examinations. 30. Consequently, since the permanent incapacity of the player has never been finally determined due to the lack of a second opinion by an independent hospital, the player held that the club was not in the position to terminate the contract as of 1 May 2011. 31. Should the DRC decide that the employment contract was indeed terminated as of 1 May 2011 because he is no longer able to compete in professional football, the player held that there is no just cause for this unilateral termination as no second opinion was performed and therefore no permanent incapacity was established. 32. In this regard, should the DRC decide, though, that the club had valid reasons to examine his heart condition, that there is no reason to cooperate with a second opinion and that the club had valid reasons to terminate the contract, the player held that the club should be held liable to pay compensation. 33. As regards the club’s subsidiary position, the player held that it was agreed with the club that he was to return on 6 July 2011, which he did. He highlighted that he had no reason to return late if only because he wanted the club to fulfil its contractual obligations. He enjoyed playing for the club and for that reason he never terminated the contract with just cause after the club ceased the payment of his salary and took his apartment and ended the car lease. 34. Should the DRC decide that the club terminated the employment contract on 6 July 2011, the player held that there was no just cause for such termination, as it was agreed that he would return on 6 July 2011 and, at worst, the delay of five days is not sufficient or serious enough to terminate an employment contract. In this respect, he refers to DRC decisions. Club’s duplica to claim and replica to its counterclaim 35. The club highlighted that given that the employment contract was terminated as of 1 May 2011 or, subsidiarily, on 6 July 2011, the player is not in the position to claim any remuneration for services rendered for the period of time as of 2 May 2011 or 7 July 2011, respectively. 36. According to the club, the allegation that he remained in country Q visiting the club and team training until the beginning of September 2011 does not imply that he executed his contractual obligations nor that, thus, according to the player, the employment relation continued to exist. 37. The club insisted that the player failed to provide the club with a full medical dossier and it pointed out that along with his reply to the counterclaim only, the player presented medical reports that the club had never seen before. 38. The club further highlighted that, contrary to the player’s position, he was absent from training several times during the course of the employment relation. 39. In addition, the club insisted that on the basis of the player’s medical examination by various doctors in April 2011, by the end of April 2011, it was concluded that the player should not participate in competitive football. The club highlighted that the relevant medical corps was impartial, the relevant clinic having an outstanding international reputation and one of the doctors involved being attached to a country F university. 40. The club further pointed out that it was not against any second opinion arranged for by the player himself, and that, till today, he has not presented any documentation establishing any contrary medical result. 41. In addition, the club asserted that it replied to the player’s correspondence of 20 September 2011 (cf. point I./24. above) by indicating that it was his choice and without any prejudice or recognition on the club’s part. 42. For these reasons, the club maintained its counterclaim asking, primarily, that the contract be considered terminated as of 1 May 2011 and granting the player compensation corresponding to two months’ remuneration or, subsidiarily, that the contract be considered terminated with just cause as of 6 July 2011 asking to awarded compensation to be paid by the player in the amount of EUR 500,000, which amount was not further specified. Player’s duplica to counterclaim 43. The player insisted that the counterclaim be rejected in its entirety. 44. He asserted that he always acted in a professional manner and duly informed the club of his medical history. He highlighted that also following the two medical examinations in connection with his employment at the club his cardiac condition was determined and the club nevertheless decided to offer him an employment contract for two years. 45. The player believed that the club wanted to get rid of him being aware of a) his age (35) b) his salary, c) his nationality (non-country Q), and d) his heart condition and ordering, without any specific reason, new examinations only at the end of the football season. 46. He wanted to continue to play matches and train with the team, but he was no longer allowed to. Therefore, it cannot be held against him that he did not render his services to the club and there was thus no reason for the club not to pay his salaries. 47. He reiterated that he returned to the club in a timely manner and he asserted that he never received any instruction from the club to return on 28 June 2011, which would in any case, so the player, still not have been valid reason to terminate the contract on 6 July 2011. 48. He highlighted that the club did not substantiate at all its request for compensation amounting to EUR 500,000. 49. The player informed FIFA that since his forced departure from the club, he did not play professional football elsewhere. II. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter also referred to as Chamber or DRC) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the case at hand. In this respect, it took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 12 August 2011. Consequently, the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (edition 2008; hereinafter: Procedural Rules) are applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 par. 2 and par. 3 of the Procedural Rules). 2. Subsequently, the members of the Chamber referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed that in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 in combination with art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2012) the Dispute Resolution Chamber is competent to deal with the matter at stake, which concerns an employment-related dispute with an international dimension between a country N player and a country Q club. 3. Furthermore, the Chamber analysed which regulations should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, it confirmed that in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and par. 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (editions 2012 and 2010), and considering that the present claim was lodged on 12 August 2011, the 2010 edition of said regulations (hereinafter: Regulations) is applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance. 4. The competence of the Chamber and the applicable regulations having been established, the Chamber entered into the substance of the matter. In this respect, the Chamber started by acknowledging the above-mentioned facts as well as the arguments and the documentation submitted by the parties. 5. The members of the Chamber acknowledged that the parties were contractually bound by means of an employment contract valid as from 1 July 2010 until 31 May 2012 and its annexe (hereinafter: contract). 6. The Claimant/Counter-Respondent, on the one hand, maintained that the Respondent/Counter-Claimant failed to comply with its contractual obligations by ceasing the payment of his receivables as from April 2011, subsequent to having asked him to undergo medical examinations and having received a medical advice that the Claimant/Counter-Respondent should end his professional career. In addition, the Claimant/Counter-Respondent deemed that the contract had remained in force. 7. The Chamber noted that the Respondent/Counter-Claimant, on the other hand, rejected the claim put forward by the Claimant/Counter-Respondent and lodged a counterclaim against the latter. According to the Respondent/Counter-Claimant, the contract had been terminated either on the basis of the aforementioned medical advice, on 1 May 2011, which advice allegedly implies a permanent incapacity to play football at professional level, or, alternatively, on 6 July 2011 at the Claimant/Counter-Respondent’s fault, as the player allegedly had been absent from the club as from 28 June 2011. In the latter case, the Respondent/Counter- Claimant asked that the Claimant/Counter-Respondent shall be held liable to pay compensation to the Respondent/Counter-Claimant. 8. In continuation, the Chamber took into account that the Claimant/Counter- Respondent fully rejected the Respondent/Counter-Claimant’s counterclaim and amended his claim. Indeed, the Claimant/Counter-Respondent asked that, should it be decided that the contract is to be considered terminated, with or without just cause by the Respondent/Counter-Claimant, the Respondent/Counter- Claimant shall be held liable to pay compensation to him. 9. The members of the Chamber highlighted that the underlying issue in this dispute, considering the diverging position of the parties, was to determine as to whether the contract had been terminated by one of the parties, and, in the affirmative, as to whether such termination was with or without just cause. The Chamber also underlined that, subsequently, if it were found that the contract was terminated without just cause, it would be necessary to determine the consequences for the party that was responsible for the early termination of the contractual relation. 10. In continuation, the members of the Chamber firstly focussed their attention on the circumstances that occurred prior to the Respondent/Counter-Claimant’s letter dated 6 July 2011 (cf. point 1./13. above). 11. The Chamber acknowledged that the Respondent/Counter-Claimant had ceased the payment of the player’s receivables as of April 2011, as it had suspended the effects of the contract as of 1 April 2011. This was confirmed as such by the Respondent/Counter-Claimant. The members of the Chamber took into account that such suspension was initiated by the Respondent/Counter-Claimant in the period of time during which it had asked the player to undergo medical examination, following which it received the medical advice, on 1 May 2011, that the player should end his professional player career. Obviously, if the Respondent/Counter-Claimant considered the effects of the contract to be suspended as of 1 April 2011, such effects would not only apply to the payment of the player’s receivables, but equally to the player’s obligations to render his services to the club. In this context, the Chamber noted that the Claimant/Counter-Respondent, though, continued to offer his services to the club. 12. In continuation, the Chamber reverted to the club’s letter dated 6 July 2011, by means of which the club notified the player that the contract was to be considered terminated on the basis of the following allegations: the player’s failure to inform the club of his medical condition prior to concluding the contract, the player’s permanent incapacity to play, and the player’s absence from the club as of 1 July 2011. 13. In this regard, the Chamber recalled that the Respondent/Counter-Claimant’s primary position was that the contract, in fact, terminated on 1 May 2011, i.e. the day on which medical specialists, following examinations undertaken at the club’s initiative, issued an advice that the player should end his professional career, which according to the club equals a permanent incapacity to play at professional level. The members of the Chamber, though, agreed that the contract cannot be considered automatically terminated on the day that said medical advice was issued, irrespective of any implications such medical advice may have, and, consequently, the Chamber could not uphold the Respondent/Counter-Claimant’s viewpoint. 14. On account of the above, in particular, the Respondent/Counter-Claimant’s notice dated 6 July 2011 addressed to the Claimant/Counter-Respondent, the members of the Chamber established that the contractual relation between the parties was terminated by the club on 6 July 2011, when the Respondent/Counter-Claimant had notified the Claimant/Counter-Respondent that it considered the contract to be terminated. 15. Having established that the Respondent/Counter-Claimant terminated the employment contract on 6 July 2011, the Chamber turned its attention to the question as to whether the contract had been terminated by the Respondent/Counter-Claimant with or without just cause. 16. First and foremost, in the light of the main reason at the basis of the termination of the contract in the matter at hand, i.e. the player’s medical condition, the Chamber wished to emphasise that on the basis of art. 18 par. 4 of the Regulations and the Chamber’s respective jurisprudence, a club wishing to employ a player has to exercise due diligence and carry out all relevant medical examination prior to entering into an employment contract with a player. 17. The members of the Chamber noted from the file that the player had been medically checked prior to the signature of the contract by and between the parties, following which he had been medically cleared. The Chamber also took into account that the player had rendered his services to the club for almost an entire season. 18. The Chamber further took into consideration that an injury or health condition of a player can be no valid reason to cease the payment of a player’s remuneration and even less so to terminate an employment contract. In this regard, the Chamber highlighted that it is the club’s responsibility to secure the continuation of payment of remuneration in such cases, possibly by means of adequate insurance. In the case at stake, the topic of insurance was even explicitly included in articles VII and VIII of the contract. Furthermore, the Chamber took into account that the Respondent/Counter-Claimant had ceased the payment of the player’s remuneration as early as in April 2011. 19. In addition, the members of the Chamber agreed that permanent incapacity in itself can be no valid reason to unilaterally terminate an employment contract. However, such specific circumstance will have an effect on the amount of compensation, in the light of the bilateral character of an employment contract and the circumstance that in the event of permanent incapacity to play, a player is no longer in the position to render his services to the club. 20. As regards the Respondent/Counter-Claimant’s allegation that the Claimant/Counter-Respondent had not disclosed his medical condition prior to entering into the contract, which was also invoked by the Respondent/Counter- Claimant as a reason for the termination of the contract, the Chamber stressed that there is documentation on file from which it can be noted that the player had undergone extensive medical examination both in country L and country Q prior to the signature of the contract and recalled that the player had rendered his services to the club during almost one season. 21. On account of all of the above, the members of the Chamber unanimously rejected the Respondent/Counter-Claimant’s counterclaim and decided that the Respondent/Counter-Claimant terminated the contract on 6 July 2011 without just cause. 22. For the sake of good order, the Chamber wished to emphasise that a 5 days’ absence of a player, even if duly corroborated with relevant documentation, cannot be considered a just cause to terminate a contract, particularly without any previous warning. In this regard, the Chamber was eager to emphasise that only a breach or misconduct which is of a certain severity justifies the termination of a contract without prior warning. A premature termination of an employment contract can always only be an ultima ratio. 23. In continuation, prior to establishing the consequences of the breach of contract without just cause by the Respondent/Counter-Claimant in accordance with art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the Chamber held that it had to address the issue of any unpaid remuneration at the moment the contract was terminated by the Respondent/Counter-Claimant. 24. Indeed, in his amended statement of claim, the Claimant/Counter-Respondent alleges that his remuneration relating to May, August, and September 2011 was to be considered outstanding. The Respondent/Counter-Claimant, for its part, confirmed that it had ceased the payment of the player’s remuneration as of April 2011. Bearing in mind, as stated above, that the contract was terminated by the Respondent/Counter-Claimant on 6 July 2011, in virtue of the principle pacta sunt servanda and bearing in mind the Claimant/Counter-Respondent’s amended claim, the Chamber decided that the Respondent/Counter-Claimant is liable to pay the amount of EUR 91,000 to the Claimant/Counter-Respondent as outstanding remuneration for May 2011. 25. Having established the above, the Chamber turned its attention to the question of the consequences of the unilateral termination of the contract by the Respondent/Counter-Claimant without just cause on 6 July 2011. 26. Taking into consideration art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the Chamber decided that the Claimant/Counter-Respondent is entitled to receive compensation from the Respondent/Counter-Claimant for the termination of the contract without just cause in addition to the aforementioned amount of EUR 91,000 on the basis of the contract. 27. The members of the Chamber firstly recapitulated that, in accordance with art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the amount of compensation shall be calculated, in particular and unless otherwise provided for in the contract at the basis of the dispute, with due consideration for the law of the country concerned, the specificity of sport and further objective criteria, including, in particular, the remuneration and other benefits due to the Claimant under the existing contract and/or the new contract, the time remaining on the existing contract up to a maximum of five years, and depending on whether the contractual breach falls within the protected period. 28. In application of the relevant provision, the Chamber held that it first of all had to clarify as to whether the pertinent employment contract contains a provision by means of which the parties had beforehand agreed upon an amount of compensation payable by the contractual parties in the event of breach of contract. The members of the Chamber recalled that according to the contract, if it is terminated without just cause or mutual agreement, the club or the player shall be entitled to receive from the other party in breach a compensation “for an all amount”. The members of the Chamber agreed that the wording of this clause is insufficiently clear for it to be taken into consideration in the determination of the amount of compensation. 29. As a consequence, the members of the Chamber determined that the amount of compensation payable by the Respondent/Counter-Claimant to the Claimant/Counter-Respondent had to be assessed in application of the other parameters set out in art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations. The Chamber recalled that said provision provides for a non-exhaustive enumeration of criteria to be taken into consideration when calculating the amount of compensation payable. Therefore, other objective criteria may be taken into account at the discretion of the deciding body. In this regard, the Dispute Resolution Chamber emphasised beforehand that each request for compensation for contractual breach has to be assessed by the Chamber on a case-by-case basis taking into account all specific circumstances of the respective matter. 30. In order to estimate the amount of compensation due to the Claimant/Counter- Respondent in the present case, the members of the Chamber first turned their attention to the remuneration and other benefits due to the Claimant under the existing contract and/or the new contract, which criterion was considered by the Chamber to be essential. The members of the Chamber deemed it important to emphasise that the wording of art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations allows the Chamber to take into account both the existing contract and the new contract, if any, in the calculation of the amount of compensation. 31. In accordance with the contract signed by the Claimant/Counter-Respondent and the Respondent/Counter-Claimant, which was to run for ten months more, i.e. until 31 May 2012, after the breach of contract occurred, the Claimant/Counter- Respondent was to receive remuneration amounting to EUR 910,000. Consequently, the Chamber concluded that the amount of EUR 910,000 serves as the basis for the final determination of the amount of compensation for breach of contract. 32. The Chamber then took due note of the employment situation of the Claimant/Counter-Respondent after the termination of the contract at the basis of the case at stake. Bearing in mind art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations and in accordance with the constant practice of the Dispute Resolution Chamber as well as the general obligation of the player to mitigate his damages, such remuneration under a new employment contract(s) shall be taken into account in the calculation of the amount of compensation for breach of contract. In this regard, the members of the Chamber noted that the Claimant/Counter- Respondent indicated that he had not played professional football after the termination of the contract and, thus, had not been able to mitigate damages. 33. The Chamber further took into account that the player, in May 2011, received medical advice to end his professional career and that he had not played any professional football since then. In addition, the members of the Chamber noted that following such advice in May 2011, it had not been demonstrated with documentation issued subsequent to said advice that this specific medical advice was to be considered erroneous, either in part or in full, or even ambiguous. 34. As stated above, the circumstance of permanent incapacity to play professional football is taken into consideration in the determination of the amount of compensation. Indeed, an employment contract is essentially based on a mutual exchange of obligations between the parties involved, i.e. the employer (in football, the club) undertakes the obligation to remunerate the employee (in football, the player) in exchange of his services and the employee undertakes the obligation to render his services to the employer in exchange of the employer’s remuneration, for the duration agreed upon between the parties. In the event of permanent incapacity to play, the player is obviously prevented from fulfilling his main obligations arising from the employment contract, i.e. to render his services to the club. A permanent incapacity of a player thus creates a particular situation, in that the other party, a club, can no longer be expected to continue to fulfil its contractual obligations. 35. Consequently, the Chamber deemed that effects inherent to permanent incapacity to play professional football have to be taken into account in the determination of the amount of compensation. 36. In the present matter, in view of all of the above as well as the particular issue at stake, the members of the Chamber deemed that compensation within the range of 70% to 80% of the final amount of compensation, including any possible mitigation of damages by the player, was considered reasonable and proportionate as compensation for breach of contract in the specific case at hand. 37. Consequently, on account of all of the above-mentioned considerations and the specificities of the case at hand, the Chamber decided to partially accept the Claimant/Counter-Respondent’s claim and decided that the Respondent/Counter- Claimant must pay the amount of EUR 670,000 as compensation for breach of contract in the specific case at hand. 38. In conclusion, the Dispute Resolution Chamber decided that the Respondent/Counter-Claimant has to pay EUR 91,000 to the Claimant/Counter- Respondent relating to outstanding remuneration as well as EUR 670,000 as compensation for the unjustified breach of the contract by the Respondent/Counter-Claimant. 39. The Dispute Resolution Chamber concluded its deliberations in the present matter by establishing that any further request filed by the Claimant/Counter- Respondent is rejected. III. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. The claim of the Claimant/Counter-Respondent, Player M, is partially accepted. 2. The counterclaim of the Respondent/Counter-Claimant, Club U, is rejected. 3. The Respondent/Counter-Claimant has to pay outstanding remuneration in the amount EUR 91,000 to the Claimant/Counter-Respondent within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision. 4. The Respondent/Counter-Claimant has to pay compensation for breach of contract in the amount EUR 670,000 to the Claimant/Counter-Respondent within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision. 5. In the event that the amounts due to the Claimant/Counter-Respondent are not paid by the Respondent/Counter-Claimant within the stated time limits, 5% interest p.a. will fall due as of expiry of the aforementioned time limits and the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision. 6. Any further request filed by the Claimant/Counter-Respondent is rejected. 7. The Claimant/Counter-Respondent is directed to inform the Respondent/Counter- Claimant immediately and directly of the account number to which the remittance is to be made and to notify the Dispute Resolution Chamber of every payment received. ** Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy): According to art. 67 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives). The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following: Court of Arbitration for Sport Avenue de Beaumont 2 1012 Lausanne Switzerland Tel: +41 21 613 50 00 Fax: +41 21 613 50 01 e-mail: info@tas-cas.org www.tas-cas.org For the Dispute Resolution Chamber: Jérôme Valcke Secretary General Encl.: CAS directives