F.I.F.A. – Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2013-2014) – controversie di lavoro – ———- F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber (2013-2014) – labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 30 August 2013, in the following composition: Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman Jon Newman (USA), member Damir Vrbanovic (Croatia), member on the claim presented by the player, B, from country P as Claimant against the club, FC A, from country R as Respondent regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties

F.I.F.A. - Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2013-2014) - controversie di lavoro - ---------- F.I.F.A. - Dispute Resolution Chamber (2013-2014) - labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 30 August 2013, in the following composition: Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman Jon Newman (USA), member Damir Vrbanovic (Croatia), member on the claim presented by the player, B, from country P as Claimant against the club, FC A, from country R as Respondent regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties I. Facts of the case 1. On 20 May 2011, the player B from country P (hereinafter: the Claimant), and the country R club, FC A (hereinafter: the Respondent), signed an employment contract (hereinafter: the contract) valid as from 15 June 2011 until 30 June 2014. 2. According to art. V of the employment contract, the Respondent undertakes to pay the Claimant, inter alia, the following net amounts: - EUR 60,000 as sign-on fee, payable until 24 May 2011; - EUR 30,000, payable on 1 July 2011, 10 January 2012, 1 July 2012, 10 January 2013, 1 July 2013 and 10 January 2014 (i.e. 6 x EUR 30,000); - EUR 7,000 as monthly salary, payable 12 times a year, for each season; - EUR 300 per month as rent expenses. 3. In addition, art. V of the contract stipulates that, in case the amount of EUR 30,000 is not paid until 10 January 2012, “the contract becomes void, with the wages paid to date”. 4. Article VII, par. 3 of the contract stipulates that “The litigation arising from the execution of the present agreement shall be settled following the procedural order: a) amiable way; b) by bringing the litigation before the court of jurisdiction of FRF, LPF, AJF, UEFA, FIFA, TAS as the case may be” and art. VIII par. 1 establishes that “This agreement shall be filled in according to the stipulations of the regulations of FRF, LPF and AJF”. 5. In its art. III, par. 1, lit. a), b), c) and f), the contract also establishes that “the club undertakes: a) to pay the player under the sporting services agreement; b) to make available for the player the adequate training and competition equipment and other materials necessary for the training; c) to provide fields and/or training / workout rooms, as well as locker rooms and other necessary annexes; f) to provide the specialty personnel (trainers, physicians, masseurs and other qualified specialty personnel) necessary for a good training of the football player”. 6. On 11 January 2012, the Claimant terminated the contract with the Respondent, in writing, based on the following facts: “By the letters from 13.12.2011, 14.12.2011, 15.12.2011, 16.12.2011, 17.12.2011, 19.12.2011 and 23.12.2011 I notified the club about the outstanding financial rights which are unpaid to the undersigned, in the total amount of 45,000 Euros net approximately, as well as the breach of the contract by the club by refusing my right to train and my expedition to a juniors team where the minimum conditions for the training are not provided. Until the present date the club did not pay the outstanding contractual rights and did not provide any response with respect to my reintegration in the senior’s team. The last term given for the payment of the outstanding rights was 04 January 2012. […] The club is trying abusively at this moment to reduce by 25% the financial rights of the undersigned for the season 2011/2012 so the club’s intention is clear, as well as the impossibility of an amicable settlement of the litigation”. 7. On 12 January 2012, the Claimant lodged a claim in front of FIFA against the Respondent for breach of contract without just cause - in particular, of art. III, par. 1, lit. a), b), c) and f) of the contract - and requested, after amending his claim, the payment of the total amount of EUR 376,414, plus interests of 5% as from 11 January 2012, made up of: - EUR 18,744 net corresponding to outstanding salaries for October 2011 (partial salary in the amount of EUR 4,744), November and December 2011 (2 x EUR 7,000); - EUR 30,000 net corresponding to the instalment due on 10 January 2012; - EUR 327,670 net as compensation, corresponding to his partial salary for January 2012 (EUR 4,670), his salaries for February until June 2012 (5 x EUR 7,000), EUR 144,000 for the season 2012/2013 and EUR 144,000 due for the season 2013/2014. 8. In his arguments, the Claimant states that, on 3 December 2011, he accidentally scored an own goal, which led to the defeat of the Respondent in a match. According to the Claimant, after the incident, the Respondent’s sponsor publicly accused him of intentionally scoring the own goal. As a consequence, and by means of the Respondent’s letters dated 8 and 9 December 2011, respectively, the Claimant was assigned by the board of directors to train with the club’s junior team and was excluded from the main squad - “likely to be put on the transfer list”. 9. The Claimant claims having accepted the Respondent’s decision, but for three days he allegedly had to train alone in a damaged stadium without any equipment. Taking into account the possible prejudice of training with the junior team to his career as well as the fact that his contract was not meant for the junior team, the Claimant, by means of his letters dated 13, 14 and 16 December 2011, requested to be readmitted to train with the main squad. Through the aforementioned correspondence, he also reminded the Respondent of its arrears, corresponding to salaries and rent expenses for October and November 2011. 10. Furthermore, with his correspondence of 17, 19 and 23 of December 2011, the Claimant additionally requested the payment of his contractual rights for December 2011 and informed the Respondent that he would terminate the employment contract with just cause, in case the relevant amounts were not paid. 11. The Claimant alleges never having received any response from the Respondent regarding the above-mentioned requests, except for a notification of the ratification by the Disciplinary Commission of the country R Professional Football League of a fine of 25% to his contractual rights for the 2011/2012 season, imposed on him by the club on 8 December 2011 and allegedly notified on 10 January 2012. Allegedly, during the course of the aforementioned procedure, the Claimant only received documentation in country R language and was, without his knowledge, represented by the AFAN, the Association of Amateur and Professional Player’s in country R. Such fact was communicated to the Respondent by means of the Claimant’s letter dated 15 December 2011, in which he requested, inter alia, that the documents related to the disciplinary procedure should be forwarded to him directly. 12. Therefore, the Claimant stressed that, on 11 January 2012, he terminated the contract with the Respondent with just cause. 13. In its reply, the Respondent disputed the jurisdiction of the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: DRC), referring to the employment contract. 14. The Respondent provided FIFA with a copy of the “Regulation on the Status and Transfer of Football Players” (edition 2011; hereinafter: the FF Regulations) and of the country R Football Federation Statute (edition 2011; hereinafter: the FF Statute), which establish the following: a. with regard to the existing deciding bodies: Art. 26.1 lit. a) of the country R FF Regulations indicates that the first instance deciding bodies are the NDRC of the country R FF, the DRC of the country R Professional Football League and the Commission for the Players’ Status of the County Football Association (CFA). b. with regard to the jurisdiction of the deciding bodies: According to art. 26.2 lit. a) of the country R FF Regulations, the NDRC of the country R FF is competent to decide on disputes concerning “the conclusion, interpretation and execution of contracts concluded between clubs and players, and maintaining contractual stability”. As per art. 26.8 of the country R FF Regulations, the DRC of the country R PFL is “exclusively” competent to solve disputes involving “Clubs participating in the 1st League National Championship, officials, players and their coaches (…) according to the country R FF and the country R PFL annual convention”. c. with regard to the composition of the deciding bodies: Art. 26.5 of the country R FF Regulations provides that the NDRC of the country R FF is composed of a chairman and a vice-chairman “elected by consensus by the players and clubs’ representatives from a list containing the names of at least five people, drawn by the Executive Committee of the country R FF”, three players’ representatives nominated by the Association of Amateur and NonAmateur Footballers, and three clubs’ representatives nominated by the Executive Committee of the country R FF. Art. 26.8 in fine of the country R FF Regulations stipulates that the DRC of the country R PFL - and its appeal body - is composed of five members, among which one president and one vice-president, their names and functions being approved by the Executive Committee of the Professional Football League for a one-year mandate. d. with regard to the possibility of an appeal: Art. 26.1 lit. b) of the country R FF Regulations establishes that the decisions of the NDRC of the country R FF may be appealed before the “Appeal Committee of the country R FF” and that the decisions of the DRC of the country R PFL may be appealed before the “Appeal Commission of the country R PFL”. Art. 26.1 lit. c) of the country R FF Regulations provides that the decisions of the aforementioned appeal bodies may be appealed to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). 15. As to the substance of the case, the Respondent rejects the Claimant’s accusations and guarantees the quality of its infrastructure, equipment and personnel. 16. Furthermore, the Respondent states that as per its internal regulations, if a player fails to meet the club’s expectations, he can either be transferred to the junior team and participate in matches, or stay in the main team, but not participate in matches. According to the Respondent, the first option presented more advantages for both the Claimant and the Respondent, and therefore it was the one implemented by the club. 17. In addition, the Respondent encloses a copy of its own decision, dated 8 December 2011, by means of which it sanctioned the player “with 25% penalty on financial rights for competitive season 2011/2012”, based on his “behaviour and low efficiency and inadequate performance of the obligations incumbent civil convention”. The Respondent adds that such decision, however, had not yet been ratified by the country R FF, since the Claimant had allegedly been delaying such procedure. The Respondent further claims that mandatory tax deductions had to be made from the Claimant’s salaries. 18. Furthermore, the Respondent states having paid the Claimant all of his salaries due until 10 January 2012. In this regard, it encloses a list including payments made between 23 May 2011 and 19 October 2011, in the total amount of EUR 119,745. The documents submitted by the Respondent in this respect are a list of payments not signed by the player and bank statements submitted in country R language only. 19. Finally, the Respondent suggests that the DRC either considers the contract terminated de jure by the club’s failure to pay the Claimant the instalment of 10 January 2012, as per the mechanism of automatic termination agreed by the parties in art. V of the contract (cf. point I.3. above) or that the Claimant terminated the contract without just cause, based on the fact that the Respondent failed to pay one instalment only, i.e. that of January 2012. 20. In his replica, the Claimant insists on FIFA’s jurisdiction over the present case, based on art. 22 lit. a) of the FIFA Regulations and also on art. VII par. 3 of the contract (cf. point I.4. above), which authorizes the parties to bring the case to FIFA. In addition, the Claimant states that neither the NDRC of the country R Football Federation nor the DRC of the RPFL can be considered as independent tribunals, since the procedures are conducted in country R language only, the documents are not forwarded to the parties, there exists no published version of the country R FF Regulations in English and no equal representation in the panel. 21. As to the substance of the case, the Claimant states that the termination of the contract was not only based on the Respondent’s failure to pay him the instalment of 10 January 2012, as the club alleges, but also on the fact that he was excluded from the main team for scoring an own goal and neither received his salaries as from October 2011 nor an answer to his notifications. 22. The Claimant also rejects the allegations of the Respondent regarding the deduction of taxes from his salaries, since the contract stipulated in its art. V that such amounts are net. In addition, the Claimant claims that the club provided no proof of payment of such taxes on his behalf. 23. The Claimant equally rejects the Respondent’s decision to sanction him with a fine corresponding to 25% of his financial rights as per the contract, as being an “abusive decision”. In addition, the Claimant claims that such disciplinary procedure was conducted in country R language only, a language he does not understand, and that the Disciplinary Committee of the country R PFL does not ensure equal representation of clubs and players. 24. Finally, the Claimant states never having received any correspondence from the club to AFAN, within the scope of the aforementioned disciplinary procedure against him, in particular since he never provided such entity with a power of attorney and did not authorize them to represent him in such procedure. 25. In its final position, the Respondent claims that art. VII par. 3 combined with art. VIII par. 1 of the contract (cf. point I.4. above) stipulate that the country R Football Federation should be competent to deal with disputes arising from the contract and that such interpretation is also in line with art. 22 lit. b) of the FIFA Regulations. The Respondent further states that the national deciding bodies do guarantee equal representation of players and clubs and, even if the procedures are conducted in language of country R, the parties can always request an interpreter. 26. As to the substance of the case, the Respondent insists on the fact that all payments have been made, except for the instalment due on 10 January 2012. In addition, the Respondent claims that according to the country R Law, taxes are to be retained by the tax payer, i.e. the club, even if this was not explicitly mentioned in the contract. 27. Finally, the Respondent claims that the disciplinary sanction imposed on the Claimant is the result of fair proceedings and the decision has already become valid and binding, since the Claimant did not appeal such decision. The Respondent insists on the fact that the Claimant was duly represented by the AFAN and that such fact can be verified by FIFA with the AFAN. 28. On 30 May 2012, the Claimant signed a new employment contract with the country P club, E, valid as from 1 July 2012 until 30 June 2013, according to which he is entitled to a global salary of EUR 35,500, payable in 12 equal monthly instalments of EUR 2,958.33. II. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the DRC or the Chamber) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the matter at stake. In this respect, the Chamber referred to art. 21 par. 1 of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules). The present matter was submitted to FIFA on 12 January 2012. Therefore, the Chamber concluded that the edition 2008 of the Procedural Rules was applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 par. 2 and 3 of the Procedural Rules). 2. Subsequently, the members of the Chamber referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed that, in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 and 2 in combination with art. 22 b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (editions 2010 and 2012; hereinafter: the Regulations), the Dispute Resolution Chamber shall adjudicate on employment-related disputes between a club and a player, with an international dimension. 3. Having said that, the DRC stated that it would, in principle, be the competent body to decide on the present litigation involving a country P player and a country R club regarding an employment-related dispute. 4. However, the Chamber acknowledged that the Respondent contested the competence of FIFA’s Dispute Resolution Chamber to deal with the present case, stating that any dispute arisen between the parties should be submitted to the deciding bodies of the country R Football Federation and of the country R Professional Football League. 5. The Chamber equally noted that the Claimant rejected such position and insisted on the fact that FIFA had jurisdiction to deal with the present matter, firstly because art. VII par. 3 of the contract explicitly mentions that he can bring his case to FIFA and, secondly since the deciding bodies of the country R Football Federation and the country R Professional Football League do not respect the principle of equal representation of players and clubs and cannot provide for fair proceedings. 6. Taking into account the above, the Chamber emphasised that, in accordance with art. 22 lit. b) of the 2010 FIFA Regulations, it is competent to deal with a matter such as the one at hand, unless an independent arbitration tribunal, guaranteeing fair proceedings and respecting the principle of equal representation of players and clubs, has been established at national level within the framework of the association and/or a collective bargaining agreement. With regard to the standards to be imposed on an independent arbitration tribunal guaranteeing fair proceedings, the Chamber referred to the FIFA Circular no. 1010 dated 20 December 2005. In this regard, the members of the Chamber further referred to the principles contained in the FIFA National Dispute Resolution Chamber (NDRC) Standard Regulations, which came into force on 1 January 2008. 7. While analysing whether it was competent to hear the present matter, the Dispute Resolution Chamber considered that it should, first and foremost, analyse whether the employment contract at the basis of the present dispute actually contained a jurisdiction clause. 8. Having said this, the members of the Chamber turned their attention to art. VII par. 3 of the contract, which stipulates that “The litigation arising from the execution of the present agreement shall be settled following the procedural order: a) amiable way; b) by bringing the litigation before the court of jurisdiction of FRF, LPF, AJF, UEFA, FIFA, TAS as the case may be”. 9. In view of the aforementioned clause, the members of the DRC were of the opinion that art. VII par. 3 of the employment contract does not make clear reference to one specific national dispute resolution chamber in the sense of art. 22 lit. b) of the aforementioned Regulations and even provides for the possibility of lodging a contractual dispute in front of FIFA. Therefore, the members of the Chamber deem that said clause can by no means be considered as a clear arbitration clause in favour either of the national deciding bodies, i.e. of the country R Football Federation or the country R PFL, and, therefore, cannot be applicable. In this regard, the Chamber pointed out that this lack of clarity is also reflected in the Respondent’s argumentation since it refers to the alleged competence of the deciding bodies of both the country R Football Federation and Professional Football League, without further precision. 10. Having established that the first criteria for the recognition of the competence of a national decision-making body is not fulfilled in the present matter, the Chamber deemed unnecessary to examine any further points which would need to be assessed before concluding to the competence of a national deciding body. 11. In view of the above, the Chamber established that the Respondent’s objection to the competence of FIFA to deal with the present matter had to be rejected and that the DRC is competent, on the basis of art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, to consider the present matter as to the substance. 12. Subsequently, the members of the Chamber analysed which edition of the Regulations should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, the Chamber confirmed that, in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations (editions 2010 and 2012) and considering that the claim in front of FIFA was lodged on 12 January 2012, the 2010 edition of said Regulations is applicable to the present matter as to the substance. 13. The competence of the DRC and the applicable regulations having been established, the Chamber entered into the substance of the matter. In doing so, it started to acknowledge the facts of the case as well as the documents contained in the file. 14. In this respect, the members of the DRC acknowledged that it was undisputed by the parties that, on 20 May 2011, they signed an employment contract, in accordance with which the player was entitled to receive, inter alia, EUR 60,000 as sign-on fee, payable until 24 May 2011; EUR 30,000, payable on 1 July 2011, 10 January 2012, 1 July 2012, 10 January 2013, 1 July 2013 and 10 January 2014 (i.e. 6 x EUR 30,000); EUR 7,000 as monthly salary, payable 12 times per year, for each season; and EUR 300 per month as rent expenses. 15. The DRC noted that, on the one hand, the Claimant claims having been excluded from the main team and subsequently from the collective training after having accidentally scored and own goal during a match. The Claimant further claims that the Respondent failed to pay his remuneration for the months of October, November and December 2011, in the total amount of EUR 18,744 as well as the instalment of EUR 30,000 due on 10 January 2012. In spite of his reminders dated 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19 and 23 December 2011 addressed to the Respondent in this regard, the Claimant claims that the only reaction received from the club was the notification of its decision of 8 December 2011, imposing on him a fine amounting to 25% of his earnings for the season 2011/2012. The Claimant claims never having taken part in these procedures or having authorized the country R Players’ Union (AFAN) to act on his behalf. Therefore, he deems the fine and the procedure leading to it to be abusive. 16. Based on the aforementioned, the Claimant deems that the Respondent breached the contract without just cause. Thus, he terminated the employment contract on 11 January 2012 in writing based on the existence of outstanding financial rights in the amount of EUR 45,000, on his exclusion from the main team and on the imposition of a fine corresponding to 25% of his earnings for the season 2011/2012. 17. On 12 January 2012 the Claimant lodged a claim against the Respondent in front of FIFA, requesting the payment of the total amount of EUR 376,414 plus interest of 5% as from 11 January 2012, made up of EUR 18,744 in outstanding salaries for October to December 2011, EUR 30,000 net corresponding to the instalment due on 10 January 2012 and EUR 327,670 net as compensation for breach of contract. 18. Subsequently, the DRC noted that, on the other hand, the Respondent rejects the Claimant’s allegations and asserts that, as the player failed to meet its expectations, it had the possibility of either maintaining him in the main squad and prohibit him to play matches or transferring him the junior team with the possibility of playing matches, which the club deemed more advantageous for both parties. In addition, the Respondent claims having paid all the Claimant’s salaries until the termination of the contract, except for the instalment of EUR 30,000 due on 10 January 2012. The Respondent further claims that some missing partial payments are due to the mandatory deduction of taxes by the club in country R, even if such deductions are not mentioned in the contract. Moreover, the Respondent states that the fine imposed on the player on 8 December 2011, which has in the meantime become final and binding, was the result of a legal procedure, in which the Claimant was duly represented by the AFAN. 19. In view of the aforementioned, the Respondent refers to art. V of the contract (cf. point I.3. above) and claims that, in accordance with such article, the contract should be considered as automatically terminated on 10 January 2012, since the amount of EUR 30,000 due on that date was not paid by the club. In case the DRC does not accept the aforementioned solution, the Respondent claims that the Chamber should decide that the Claimant terminated the contract without just cause. 20. Having established the aforementioned, the Chamber deemed that the underlying issue in this dispute, considering the claim of the Claimant and the allegations of the Respondent, was to determine whether the employment contract had been unilaterally terminated with or without just cause by the Claimant, and which party was responsible for the early termination of the contractual relationship in question. The DRC also underlined that, subsequently, if it were found that the employment contract had been breached by one of the parties without just cause, it would be necessary to determine the consequences for the party that caused the unjust breach of the relevant employment contract. 21. In view of the above, the Chamber noted that the Claimant claims that the Respondent failed to pay part of his salary for October 2011 and his salaries for November and December 2011, in the total amount of EUR 18,744, as well as the instalment of EUR 30,000 due on 10 January 2012. In this respect, the Chamber noted that the Claimant provided copies of his reminders dated 13, 14 15, 16, 17, 19 and 23 December 2011 addressed to the Respondent, referring, inter alia, to the unpaid remuneration for the aforementioned months. 22. Subsequently, the Chamber took into account that the Respondent, in turn, maintains having paid to the Claimant all his salaries due until 10 January 2012, except for the instalment of EUR 30,000 due on said date. In addition, the members of the Chamber noted that the Respondent asserts that all alleged outstanding payments towards the player are the result, on the one hand, of a mandatory tax deduction to be performed by the club, and on the other hand, of the imposition of a fine on the Claimant. The Chamber equally acknowledged the Respondent’s argument related to the existence of a fine imposed on the player amounting to 25% of his earnings for the season 2011/2012, for his “behaviour and low efficiency and inadequate performed of the obligations”. 23. At this point and for the sake of good order, the Chamber recalled the basic principle of burden of proof, as stipulated in art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules, according to which a party claiming a right from an alleged fact shall carry the respective burden of proof. 24. In this respect, the Chamber deemed that the Respondent bore the burden of proof regarding the fulfilment of all payments mentioned as outstanding by the Claimant. In the present case, the Chamber noted that the Claimant provided a copy of his letters dated 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19 and 23 December 2011, reminding the Respondent inter alia of its arrears towards him. The Chamber also observed that the Respondent not only acknowledged having failed to pay the player the amount of EUR 30,000 due on 10 January 2012, but also did not provide the DRC with any type of substantial evidence regarding the alleged payment of the Claimant’s salaries for October until December 2011, as the only documentation provided by the club consists of a list of payments not signed by the player, and of bank statements submitted in country R language only. 25. At this point, the Chamber reminded the parties that, in accordance with art. 9 par. 3 lit. e) of the Procedural Rules, all documentation provided in the context of a dispute in front of FIFA should be presented in the original version and, if applicable, translated into one of the official FIFA languages (English, French, Spanish and German). Consequently, documents presented in any other language cannot be taken into account. 26. In continuation, the Chamber took note of the Respondent’s arguments, according to which some of the unpaid amounts requested by the Claimant were retained by the club in order to comply with its obligation to pay taxes over the aforementioned amounts. In this respect, bearing in mind the legal principle of burden of proof and the wording of art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules, the DRC considered that the Respondent did not provide substantial documentation of its alleged obligation to deduct taxes from the amounts payable to the Claimant or of the actual payment of such amounts to the country R tax authorities. In addition, the Chamber observed that such deductions were not stipulated in the contract. Thus, the DRC concluded that the aforementioned argument of the Respondent could not be sustained. 27. Subsequently, the Chamber then turned its attention to the Respondent’s argument, according to which a fine amounting to 25% of his earnings for the season 2011/2012 had been imposed on the Claimant for his inappropriate “behaviour and low efficiency and inadequate performed of the obligations”. 28. The Chamber firstly wished to underline that, in spite of the Respondent’s objection, the Claimant claims not having been notified of or taken part in the proceedings before the club, neither did he authorize the AFAN to represent him in such proceedings. In addition, the Chamber noted that no power of attorney issued by the Claimant on behalf of the AFAN is to be found on file. Thus, the members of the DRC considered that the aforementioned procedure does not appear to have been conducted in accordance with the principle of due process of law. 29. The Chamber further wished to point out that the fine imposed on the Claimant for alleged wrongdoing in relation to his behaviour and performance, not supported by substantial evidence in this regard, and amounting to 25% of his earnings for an entire season must be considered disproportionate and therefore not applicable. 30. In this context, and irrespective of the foregoing consideration, the Chamber wished to point out that the imposition of a fine, or any other available financial sanction in general, shall not be used by clubs as a means to set off outstanding financial obligations towards players. Consequently, the Chamber decided to reject the Respondent’s argument in this regard. 31. In continuation, the DRC noted that the Claimant claims having been excluded from the main squad, after accidentally scoring an own goal. In this respect, the Chamber also noted that the Claimant provided copies of two letters from the club dated 8 and 9 December 2011, by means of which he was excluded from the main squad and assigned to train with the junior team. In addition, the members of the Chamber noted that the Respondent does not dispute the aforementioned allegations of the Claimant and claims having taken the most advantageous measure for both parties, in view of the player’s unsatisfactory performance. The Respondent, however, did not provide any evidence of the Claimant’s inappropriate behaviour or his bad performance, neither did it dispute the Claimant’s allegation that he was subsequently assigned to individual training. 32. Finally, the Chamber focused its attention on the allegation of the Respondent, according to which, the contract should be considered as automatically terminated, in application of art. V of the contract. 33. In this respect, the DRC recalled the wording of art. V of the aforementioned contract, which stipulates that in case the amount of EUR 30,000 is not paid until 10 January 2012, “the contract becomes void, with the wages paid to date”. 34. At this point, the Chamber deemed it appropriate to analyse the question of whether such clause inserted in an employment contract could be considered valid. In this regard, the Chamber deemed that the application of the above- mentioned rule was arbitrary, since it led to an unacceptable result based on non- objective criteria, which entitled the Respondent to unilaterally terminate the contract by not making a due payment, without having to grant the Claimant with compensation for such unilateral termination. The DRC emphasised that the application of the aforementioned article led to an unjustified disadvantage to the Claimant’s financial rights. 35. In this regard, the members of the DRC considered that the possibility granted to the Respondent to prematurely terminate the contract by failing to pay the instalment due on 10 January 2012 appeared to be of a highly arbitrary nature, entailing that, de facto, it is left to the complete and utter discretion of the Respondent whether or not it was willing to continue the contractual relationship. 36. In view of the foregoing, the Chamber was of the opinion that art. V of the contract invoked by the Respondent in order to consider the contract as automatically terminated on 10 January 2012 without the payment of any compensation for breach was clearly potestative and that, consequently, the respective argumentation of the Respondent could not be upheld by the DRC. 37. Therefore, based on the fact that the Claimant has not received his salaries for October to December 2011 or the instalment due on 10 January 2012, that he had been excluded from the main squad, that his alleged disciplinary failure could not be proven by the Respondent and that the fine applied on 8 December 2011 was clearly disproportionate, the Chamber decided that the Respondent was to be held responsible for the breach of contract without just cause and that, consequently, the contract was terminated by the Claimant with just cause on 11 January 2012. 38. Having established the aforementioned, the Chamber focused its attention on the consequences of the breach of contract without just cause on the part of the Respondent. Taking into consideration art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the Chamber decided that the Claimant is entitled to receive from the Respondent an amount of money as compensation for breach of contract in addition to any outstanding payments on the basis of the relevant contract. 39. Prior to establishing the amount of compensation for breach of contract due to the Claimant by the Respondent, the DRC proceeded with the calculation of the outstanding monies payable to the Claimant under the terms of the employment contract until the date of termination, i.e. on 11 January 2012. 40. Taking into consideration the Claimant’s claim as well as the reasons previously exposed, the DRC concluded that, in accordance with the general legal principle of pacta sunt servanda, the Respondent must fulfill its obligations as per the employment contract concluded with the Claimant and, consequently, is to be held liable to pay the outstanding remuneration due to the latter in the total amount of EUR 48,744, corresponding to EUR 18,744 in salaries for October to December 2011 and EUR 30,000 as the instalment due on 10 January 2012. 41. The Chamber further established that an interest rate of 5% p.a. would apply over the aforementioned amounts, as from 11 January 2012, as per the Claimant’s claim. 42. In continuation, the Chamber focussed its attention on the calculation of the amount of compensation for breach of contract in the case at stake. In doing so, the members of the Chamber firstly recapitulated that, in accordance with art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the amount of compensation shall be calculated, in particular and unless otherwise provided for in the contract at the basis of the dispute, with due consideration for the law of the country concerned, the specificity of sport and further objective criteria, including, in particular, the remuneration and other benefits due to the Claimant under the existing contract and/or the new contract, the time remaining on the existing contract up to a maximum of five years, and depending on whether the contractual breach falls within the protected period. 43. In application of the relevant provision, the Chamber held that it first of all had to clarify as to whether the pertinent employment contract contains a provision by means of which the parties had beforehand agreed upon an amount of compensation payable by the contractual parties in the event of breach of contract. In this regard, the Chamber established that no such compensation clause was included in the employment contract at the basis of the matter at stake. 44. Bearing in mind the foregoing, the Chamber proceeded with the calculation of the monies payable to the player under the terms of the employment contract until 30 June 2014. The Chamber concluded that the amount of EUR 330,000 serves as the basis for the final determination of the amount of compensation for breach of contract. 45. In continuation, the Chamber verified as to whether the Claimant had signed an employment contract with another club during the relevant period of time, by means of which he would have been enabled to reduce his loss of income. According to the constant practice of the Dispute Resolution Chamber, such remuneration under a new employment contract shall be taken into account in the calculation of the amount of compensation for breach of contract in connection with the player’s general obligation to mitigate his damages. 46. In this regard, the Chamber noted that on 30 May 2012 the Claimant signed a new employment contract with the country P club, E, valid as from 1 July 2012 until 30 June 2013, according to which he was entitled to a global salary of EUR 35,500. The Chamber further pointed out that, by the time the decision was taken, no information regarding the Claimant’s contractual situation was available for the season 2013/2014 and, thus, the Chamber would have to estimate this amount. 47. Consequently, on account of all of the above-mentioned considerations and the specificities of the case at hand, the Chamber decided that the Respondent must pay the amount of EUR 270,000 to the Claimant as compensation for breach of contract, plus interest of 5% p.a. as of 30 August 2013 until the date of effective payment. 48. For all the above reasons, the DRC decided to partially accept the claim of the Claimant and holds the Respondent liable to pay the Claimant the amount of EUR 48,744 as outstanding remuneration, plus 5% interest p.a. as of 11 January 2012 until the date of effective payment, as well as the amount of EUR 270,000 as compensation for breach of contract, plus interest of 5% p.a. as of 30 August 2013. 49. The Dispute Resolution Chamber concluded its deliberations in the present matter by establishing that any further request filed by the Claimant is rejected. ** III. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. The claim of the Claimant, B, is admissible. 2. The claim of the Claimant, B, is partially accepted. 3. The Respondent, FC A, is ordered to pay to the Claimant, B, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision, outstanding remuneration in the amount of EUR 48,744, plus 5% interest p.a. as of 11 January 2012 until the date of effective payment. 4. The Respondent, FC A, has to pay to the Claimant, B, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision, compensation for breach of contract in the amount of EUR 270,000, plus interest of 5% p.a. as of 30 August 2013 until the date of effective payment. 5. If the aforementioned sums plus interest are not paid within the above-mentioned time limits, the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee for its consideration and a formal decision. 6. Any further claims lodged by the Claimant, B, are rejected. 7. The Claimant, B, is directed to inform the Respondent, FC A, immediately and directly of the account number to which the remittances are to be made and to notify the Dispute Resolution Chamber of every payment received. ** Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy): According to art. 67 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives). The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following: Court of Arbitration for Sport Avenue de Beaumont 2 1012 Lausanne Switzerland Tel: +41 21 613 50 00 Fax: +41 21 613 50 01 e-mail: info@tas-cas.org www.tas-cas.org For the Dispute Resolution Chamber: Markus Kattner Deputy Secretary General Encl. CAS directives