F.I.F.A. – Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2013-2014) – controversie di lavoro – ———- F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber (2013-2014) – labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 31 October 2013, in the following composition: Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman Ivan Gazidis (England), member Joaquim Evangelista (Portugal), member on the claim presented by the player, Player W, from country P as Claimant against the club, Club A, from country C as Respondent regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties

F.I.F.A. - Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2013-2014) - controversie di lavoro - ---------- F.I.F.A. - Dispute Resolution Chamber (2013-2014) - labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 31 October 2013, in the following composition: Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman Ivan Gazidis (England), member Joaquim Evangelista (Portugal), member on the claim presented by the player, Player W, from country P as Claimant against the club, Club A, from country C as Respondent regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties I. Facts of the case Facts relating to the preliminary issue on the competence of the DRC: 1. On 16 January 2011, Player W, from country P (hereinafter: the Claimant), and Club A, from country C (hereinafter: the Respondent), signed an employment contract (hereinafter: the contract) valid as from the date of signature until 31 May 2012. 2. Article 17 of the contract stipulates that “If the player shall be guilty of serious misconduct or the disciplinary Rules of the Club or the terms and conditions of this Agreement, the Club may, on giving notice to the player by recorded delivery letter, stating the full reasons for the action taken, terminate this Agreement. Such action shall be subject to the player’s right of appeal as follows: 17.1. to the Dispute Resolution Chamber established to the country C Football Association; 17.2. to any tribunal or labour Court in country C; 17.3. to FIFA and its competent departments; 17.4. to the Court of Arbitration in Lausanne”. 3. In addition, art. 37 of the contract stipulates that “Any dispute between the parties should be submitted exclusively to the court of arbitration of sports”. 4. The Respondent, based on art. 17 of the employment contract, rejected FIFA’s jurisdiction over the present dispute in favour of the Dispute Resolution Chamber of the country C Football Association. 5. In this respect, the Respondent provided FIFA with a copy of the 2005 edition of the country C Football Association’s “Regulations for the registration and transfer of football players”, which establish the following: a. with regard to the jurisdiction of the Dispute Resolution Committee (hereinafter: the Committee): According to art. 22.11 of the Regulations of the country C Football Association, the Committee is competent to “adjudicate and/or resolve any financial or other disputes which may arise: a) between clubs and nonamateur players […]”. b. with regard to the composition: Art. 22.1 par. 1 of the Regulations of the country C Football Association establishes that the Committee consists of five members (Chairman, Vice- Chairman, three members). The Chairman, Vice-Chairman and one member are elected by the Executive Committee of the country C Football Association, whereas two members are elected by the country P Football Players’ Association. c. with regard to the possibility of an appeal: Concerning the possibility of an appeal against a decision taken by the Committee, art. 22.10 stipulates that “any decision of the [Committee] may be appealed to the Disciplinary Authority of the country C Football Association. The Disciplinary Authority shall finally decide on the appeals referred thereto”. 6. The Claimant, however, insists on the competence of the DRC over the present case, as the NDRC in country C cannot be considered as an independent arbitration tribunal guaranteeing fair proceedings and respecting the principle of equal representation of players and clubs. Facts relating to the substance of the matter: 7. The contract signed between the parties on 16 January 2011 was valid until 31 May 2012. 8. According to art. 30 and 31 of the contract, the Claimant shall be entitled to: - EUR 43,750 as remuneration for the 2010/2011 season, payable in five equal installments of EUR 8,750, as of 31 January 2011 until 31 May 2011, with a period of grace of 30 days; - EUR 87,500 as remuneration for the 2011/2012 season, payable in ten equal installments of EUR 8,750, as of 30 August 2011 until 31 May 2012, with a period of grace of 30 days; - bonuses, according to the club’s internal regulations. 9. Article 9 of the contract stipulates that “The player shall promptly submit so far as is a reasonable at the expense of the club to such medical examination as the club shall deem necessary and shall undergo such treatments as may be prescribed by the club’s medical advisers. All injuries and / or sickness shall be reported by the player to the club immediately and the club will record these in an injury register. Dental treatment shall not be covered by the club”. 10. In addition, art. 35 of the contract establishes that “during the player’s illness Club A shall pay to him full salary. If the period of the player’s illness lasts longer than three months or it is by an adequate medical examination confirmed that despite the efforts of the club the disability is not curable, Club A may terminate this contract without any obligation to pay compensation or damages to the player”. 11. By means of its correspondence dated 25 July 2011, the Respondent terminated the contract with the Claimant with immediate effect, as per art. 35 of the contract (cf. point I.10. above), based on the fact that he had “not been able to join the team and/or attend at any special sport training in accordance with the instruction given by the club nor even report to the club about the progress of your situation”. 12. On 10 October 2011, the Claimant lodged a claim in front of FIFA against the Respondent for breach of contract, requesting, after amending his claim, the payment of the total amount of EUR 97,622, made up of: - EUR 87,500 as compensation for breach of contract; - EUR 5,872 as reimbursement of medical expenses; - EUR 4,250 as rent costs for April 2011 until August. 13. In his claim, the Claimant states having suffered a spine injury on 11 April 2011, during his professional activity, which hindered him from playing. Because of the aforementioned injury, the Claimant had to undergo spinal surgery and subsequent rehabilitation in country P. 14. While in treatment, the Claimant states having remained in constant contact with the Respondent, which was aware of his medical condition. Upon request of the Respondent, the Claimant returned to country C on 3 June 2011 to attend a series of medical tests conducted in order to assess his health condition. As a consequence of the long trip from country P to country C and back, the Claimant’s condition deteriorated and he had to undergo new surgery. 15. The Claimant claims that, in the course of his therapy and in spite of the medical prohibition to resume his professional activities, the Respondent terminated the contract on 25 July 2011 with immediate effect, based on its art. 35. According to the Claimant, the aforementioned article shall be considered invalid, as it creates for the Respondent an arbitrary possibility of unilateral termination in case an injured player is not able to play for more than three months. In addition, said article does not constitute a just cause, in the light of art. 14 of the Regulations on the Transfer and Status of Players. 16. By means of his correspondence dated 22 August 2011, the Claimant requested that the Respondent should proceed with the payment of the total amount of EUR 185,122, by no later than 6 September 2011, as compensation for the unilateral termination of the contract. The Respondent allegedly never responded to this correspondence. 17. In its response to the claim of the Claimant, the Respondent explained that on 12 April 2011 the Claimant was diagnosed by the club’s doctor with a spinal injury consisting of a “mild posterior displacement and some irritation on the descending nerve root” and that subsequently, on 28 April 2011 he underwent surgery in country P. On 3 June 2011, the Claimant returned to country C, when he was again examined by the club’s doctor, who recommended personal training until he would be able to join the rest of the team. 18. On 13 June 2011, however, the Claimant underwent a new surgery in country P, after which his doctor recommended that he should follow a rehabilitation program for 2 months. 19. By means of its e-mail of 16 June 2011, the Respondent requested that the Claimant resume trainings with the team on 20 June 2011 in country O, where he would also continue his recovery. Should the Claimant fail to be present in country O on 20 June 2011, the Respondent would proceed with the termination of the contract. In response to the Respondent’s letter, the Claimant’s doctor in country P replied on 18 June 2011 that it was “too early to send right now my patient to continue his postoperative treatment in country O” and that he would be able “to join your kind invitation in a few weeks”. The Respondent, however, insisted that the Claimant should be present in country O on 20 June 2011. 20. On 1 July 2011, the Claimant’s doctor stated that “I think / I hope and wish him / he will start his special sport training - improvising it step by step - from the half of this month / July”. On 25 July 2011, however, the Claimant had not yet presented himself at the club’s premises and, thus, the Respondent terminated the contract in writing with immediate effect. 21. The Respondent claims to have had just cause to terminate the contract and that such termination was executed in accordance with art. 35 of the contract (cf. point I.10. above), the content of which was mutually agreed and accepted by the parties to the contract, when the latter was signed. 22. Therefore, the Respondent considers that the Claimant breached the contract without just cause and, therefore, shall not be entitled to receive any compensation from the club. In addition, the Respondent claims that the Claimant should bear all legal expenses as well as any procedural costs due in the present dispute. 23. In his replica, the Claimant insists on the invalidity of art. 35 of the contract, as it is of arbitrary nature, and on his argument that an injury does not constitute a just cause to terminate an employment contract, as per art. 14 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players. 24. The Claimant further claims having always complied with his contractual obligations and insists on the fact that his return to country C by plane on 3 June 2011, after his spinal surgery, considerably deteriorated his health condition to the point that he had to undergo new surgery on 13 June 2011. In this regard, the Claimant provides a copy of a medical certificate dated 30 June 2011, according to which, inter alia, “the patient will be able to take long trips, including flights, after 2 months from the second surgery”. Therefore, he was not able to join the team in country O after the second surgery. However, the Respondent was constantly informed of the progress of his health situation. 25. Furthermore, the Claimant claims having borne all the costs of his surgeries and claims that the Respondent had no intention to continue the cooperation with him, and therefore used his injury as an excuse to terminate the contract without paying him any compensation. 26. In its duplica, the Respondent claims having always paid the Claimant’s salaries during his absence and having provided him with appropriate treatment. Therefore, the Respondent deems to have complied with its obligation to support the Claimant in case of an injury acquired during the exercise of his professional activities. 27. The Respondent insists on the fact that the Claimant failed to maintain regular contact with it during his recovery and that he only reacted to the termination of the contract one month after the beginning of the new season. 28. The Claimant claims not having signed any new employment contract since the termination of his contract with the Respondent. II. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the DRC or the Chamber) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the matter at stake. In this respect, the Chamber referred to art. 21 par. 1 of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules). The present matter was submitted to FIFA on 10 October 2011. Therefore, the Chamber concluded that the edition 2008 of the Procedural Rules is applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 par. 2 and 3 of the Procedural Rules). 2. Subsequently, the members of the Chamber referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed that, in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 and par. 2 in combination with art. 22 b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2012; hereinafter: the Regulations), the Dispute Resolution Chamber shall adjudicate on employment-related disputes between a club and a player, with an international dimension. 3. Having said that, the DRC stated that it would, in principle, be the competent body to decide on the present litigation involving a country P player and a country C club regarding an employment-related dispute. 4. However, the Chamber acknowledged that the Respondent contested the competence of FIFA’s Dispute Resolution Chamber to deal with the present case, stating that any dispute arisen between the parties should be submitted to the deciding body of the country C Football Association. 5. The Chamber equally noted that the Claimant rejected such position and insisted on the fact that FIFA had jurisdiction to deal with the present matter as he deems that the Dispute Resolution Chamber of the country C Football Association cannot be considered as an independent arbitration body guaranteeing fair proceedings and respecting the principle of equal representation of players and clubs. 6. Taking into account the above, the Chamber emphasised that, in accordance with art. 22 lit. b) of the 2010 FIFA Regulations, it is competent to deal with a matter such as the one at hand, unless an independent arbitration tribunal, guaranteeing fair proceedings and respecting the principle of equal representation of players and clubs has been established at national level within the framework of the association and/or a collective bargaining agreement. With regard to the standards to be imposed on an independent arbitration tribunal guaranteeing fair proceedings, the Chamber referred to the FIFA Circular no. 1010 dated 20 December 2005. In this regard, the members of the Chamber further referred to the principles contained in the FIFA National Dispute Resolution Chamber (NDRC) Standard Regulations, which came into force on 1 January 2008. 7. While analysing whether it was competent to hear the present matter, the Dispute Resolution Chamber considered that it should, first and foremost, analyse whether the employment contract at the basis of the present dispute actually contained a jurisdiction clause. 8. Having said this, the members of the Chamber turned their attention to art. 17 of the contract, which stipulates that “If the player shall be guilty of serious misconduct or the disciplinary Rules of the Club or the terms and conditions of this Agreement, the Club may, on giving notice to the player by recorded delivery letter, stating the full reasons for the action taken, terminate this Agreement. Such action shall be subject to the player’s right of appeal as follows: 17.1. to the Dispute Resolution Chamber established to the country C Football Association; 17.2. to any tribunal or labour Court in country C; 17.3. to FIFA and its competent departments; 17.4. to the Court of Arbitration in Lausanne”. 9. In view of the aforementioned clause, the members of the DRC were of the opinion that art. 17 of the employment contract does not make clear reference to one specific national dispute resolution chamber in the sense of art. 22 lit. b) of the aforementioned Regulations and even provides for the possibility of lodging a contractual dispute in front of FIFA. Therefore, the members of the Chamber deemed that said clause can by no means be considered as a clear arbitration clause in favour of the Dispute Resolution Chamber of the country C Football Association and, therefore, cannot be applicable. 10. Having established the above, the Chamber deemed it unnecessary to examine any further points which would need to be assessed with regard to the competence of a national deciding body. 11. In view of the above, the Chamber established that the Respondent’s objection to the competence of FIFA’s DRC to deal with the present matter had to be rejected and that the DRC is competent, on the basis of art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, to consider the present matter as to the substance. 12. Subsequently, the members of the Chamber analysed which edition of the Regulations should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, the Chamber confirmed that, in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations (editions 2010 and 2012) and considering that the claim in front of FIFA was lodged on 10 October 2011, the 2010 edition of said Regulations is applicable to the present matter as to the substance. 13. The competence of the DRC and the applicable regulations having been established, the Chamber entered into the substance of the matter. In doing so, it started to acknowledge the facts of the case as well as the documents contained in the file. 14. In this respect, the members of the DRC acknowledged that it was undisputed by the parties that, on 16 January 2011, they signed an employment contract, valid until 31 May 2012. 15. In addition, the DRC took note of the fact that it is also undisputed by the parties that the contract was terminated by the Respondent on 25 July 2011, in writing, based on art. 35 of the contract. 16. The DRC further noted that, on the one hand, the Claimant claims that the Respondent terminated the contract unilaterally and without just cause, during the course of his medical treatment, following an injury acquired while playing. The Claimant further claims having been in constant contact with the Respondent during his treatment in country P. Furthermore, he maintains that the Respondent repeatedly requested his return to the club in order to resume training, in spite of being aware of the fact that he would not be able to do so, as he was still under treatment and unfit to play. Moreover, the Claimant considers that art. 35 of the contract, upon which the Respondent bases the termination, should be considered as invalid, since it is unilateral and arbitrary. 17. Based on the aforementioned, the Claimant deems that the Respondent terminated the contract unilaterally and without just cause, and requests the payment of the total amount of EUR 97,622, made up of EUR 87,500 as compensation for breach of contract; EUR 5,872 as reimbursement of medical expenses; and EUR 4,250 as rent costs for April 2011 until August 2011. 18. Subsequently, the DRC noted that, on the other hand, the Respondent rejects the Claimant’s allegations and insists on the fact that it terminated the contract with just cause, based on art. 35 of the contract, the content of which was agreed upon and accepted by both parties. In this regard, the Respondent makes reference to the entire exchange of correspondence with the Claimant’s doctor in country P, in particular to his e-mail of 1 July 2011, in which he stated that the player would probably be able to resume training within the following 2 weeks. In addition, the Respondent claims to have paid all the Claimant’s salaries during his treatment. As the Claimant had not yet returned to the club on the 25 July 2011, the Respondent deemed that he breached the contract without just cause and, therefore, it terminated the contract with immediate effect on said date. 19. Having established the aforementioned, the Chamber deemed that the underlying issue in this dispute, considering the claim of the Claimant and the allegations of the Respondent, was to determine whether the employment contract had been unilaterally terminated with or without just cause by the Respondent, and which party was responsible for the early termination of the contractual relationship in question. The DRC also underlined that, subsequently, if it were found that the employment contract had been breached by one of the parties without just cause, it would be necessary to determine the consequences for the party that caused the unjust breach of the relevant employment contract. 20. In view of the aforementioned arguments of both parties, the Chamber decided to first focus its attention on the analysis of the content of art. 35 of the contract, upon which the Respondent bases the termination and which the Claimant considers invalid. 21. In this respect, the DRC deemed it important to recall the wording of art. 35 of the contract, which stipulates that “during the player’s illness Club A shall pay to him full salary. If the period of the player’s illness lasts longer than three months or it is by an adequate medical examination confirmed that despite the efforts of the club the disability is not curable, Club A may terminate this contract without any obligation to pay compensation or damages to the player”. 22. At this point, the Chamber deemed it appropriate to analyse the question of whether such clause inserted in an employment contract could be considered valid. In this regard, the Chamber emphasized that, in accordance with its wellestablished jurisprudence, an injury or health condition of a player cannot be considered as a valid reason to cease the payment of a player’s remuneration and even less so to terminate an employment contract. 23. In this context, the DRC noted that art. 35 of the contract entitled the Respondent to unilaterally terminate the contract with the Claimant in case the latter fell ill for more than three months or permanently, without paying him any compensation. After analysing the content of the aforementioned article, the Chamber deemed that the application of such rule was not acceptable, due to its unilateral nature and being to the benefit of the Respondent only. 24. In view of the foregoing, the Chamber was of the unanimous opinion that art. 35 of the contract could not be validly invoked by the Respondent in order to terminate the contract on 25 July 2011 and that, consequently, the respective argumentation of the Respondent could not be upheld by the DRC. 25. Subsequently, the Chamber focused its attention on the Respondent’s allegation according to which the Claimant had breached the contract by not having resumed training with the club on 25 July 2011, and after the Respondent had warned him, by means of its e-mail of 16 June 2011, that should he fail to be present in country O on 20 June 2011, it would terminate the contract. 26. At this point and for the sake of good order, the Chamber recalled the basic principle of burden of proof, as stipulated in art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules, according to which a party claiming a right from an alleged fact shall carry the respective burden of proof. 27. In this respect, the Chamber deemed that the Respondent bore the burden of proof regarding the alleged breach of contract on the part of the Claimant and the consequent alleged existence of just cause for the Respondent to unilaterally terminate the contract. 28. In this context, the members of the DRC deemed it important to focus their attention on the analysis of the pieces of evidence provided by the parties, in particular, on the correspondence exchanged between the Claimant’s physician and the Respondent. 29. In this regard, the Chamber first took note of the fact that both parties acknowledge that on 13 June 2011 the Claimant underwent a second spinal surgery. 30. The DRC equally noted that, after the Respondent’s e-mail of 16 June 2011, requesting that the Claimant resume training on 20 June 2011, the Claimant’s physician replied to such e-mail on 18 June 2011 explaining that it was “too early to send right now my patient to continue his postoperative treatment in country O” and that he would be able “to join your kind invitation in a few weeks”. 31. In continuation, the DRC referred to a medical certificate dated 30 June 2011 provided by the Claimant, according to which, inter alia, “the patient will be able to take long trips, including flights, after 2 months from the second surgery”. 32. The DRC further took note of the content of the e-mail of the Claimant’s physician dated 1 July 2011, provided by the Respondent, in which the latter states that “I think / I hope and wish him / he will start his special sport training - improving it step by step - from half of this month / July”. 33. After a thorough analysis of all the aforementioned documentation, the Chamber focused its attention on the very particular choice of words of the Claimant’s physician in his email of 1 July 2011, i.e. “I think / I hope and wish […]”. In this respect, the members of the DRC were of the opinion that such a statement was not able to justify the Respondent’s alleged clear assumption that the Claimant would for sure be able to resume training as from mid-July 2011, but merely conveyed a possibility that was, however, not confirmed. 34. In fact, the content of the medical certificate of 30 June 2011 corroborates the aforementioned conclusion that the Claimant would most likely not be able to join the Respondent’s training camp in July 2011. 35. In addition, the aforementioned conclusions based on the analysis of the documentation on file are consistent with the allegations of the Claimant, according to which the Respondent terminated the contract in the course of his medical treatment, in spite of being aware of the fact that he was not yet fit to resume training and, consequently, to be present in country O in mid-July 2011. 36. Finally, in view of the fact that all the previously analysed documentation is to be found on file, having been provided by the parties, the Chamber also concluded that the Respondent’s argument, as per which the Claimant failed to maintain contact with it during his treatment, could not be sustained. 37. Bearing in mind all the foregoing considerations on art. 35 of the contract and on the written evidence provided by the parties, the DRC deemed that the Claimant was not to be held responsible for the alleged breach of contract without just cause and, consequently, the contract was terminated by the Respondent without just cause on 25 July 2011. 38. Having established the aforementioned, the Chamber focused its attention on the consequences of the termination of the contract without just cause on the part of the Respondent. Taking into consideration art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the Chamber decided that the Claimant is entitled to receive from the Respondent an amount of money as compensation for breach of contract in addition to any outstanding payments on the basis of the relevant contract. 39. Prior to establishing the amount of compensation for breach of contract due to the Claimant by the Respondent, the DRC proceeded with the analysis of the Claimant’s requests for the reimbursement of medical expenses in the amount of EUR 5,872 and for the payment of rent costs for April 2011 until August 2011 in the amount of EUR 4,250. 40. Taking into account the Claimant’s first request for the reimbursement of medical expenses and always bearing in mind the content of art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules, the Chamber noted that the Claimant, in support of his allegation to have borne all the costs for his health treatment, provided the Chamber with copies of medical invoices dated 30 April and 17 June 2011, in the total amount of currency of country P 22,300, corresponding approximately to the amount requested by the Claimant in Euros. 41. In addition, the Chamber referred the parties to art. 9 of the contract, according to which “The player shall promptly submit so far as is a reasonable at the expense of the club to such medical examination as the club shall deem necessary and shall undergo such treatments as may be prescribed by the club’s medical advisers. All injuries and / or sickness shall be reported by the player to the club immediately and the club will record these in an injury register. Dental treatment shall not be covered by the club” 42. In view of the fact that the Claimant was able to provide the DRC with written evidence of the payments made by him in relation to his medical treatment, that the contract does provide for the possibility of such costs to be borne by the Respondent, as well as the fact that the latter was - according to the documentation on file - aware of the fact that the Claimant was following his medical treatment in country P and never contested the treatment or the payment of the expenses incurred by the Claimant in this connection, the Chamber concluded that the Respondent should be held responsible to reimburse the Claimant the amount of EUR 5,872. 43. With regard to the Claimant’s request for the payment of rent costs for April until August 2011 and once again making reference to the principle of burden of proof contained in art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules, the Chamber observed that no written documentation whatsoever was provided by the Claimant in this respect. Therefore, the DRC concluded that such request of the Claimant had to be rejected. 44. In continuation, the Chamber focussed its attention on the calculation of the amount of compensation for breach of contract in the case at stake. In doing so, the members of the Chamber firstly recapitulated that, in accordance with art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the amount of compensation shall be calculated, in particular and unless otherwise provided for in the contract at the basis of the dispute, with due consideration for the law of the country concerned, the specificity of sport and further objective criteria, including, in particular, the remuneration and other benefits due to the Claimant under the existing contract and/or the new contract, the time remaining on the existing contract up to a maximum of five years, and depending on whether the contractual breach falls within the protected period. 45. In application of the relevant provision, the Chamber held that it first of all had to clarify as to whether the pertinent employment contract contains a provision by means of which the parties had beforehand agreed upon an amount of compensation payable by the contractual parties in the event of breach of contract. In this regard, the Chamber established that no such compensation clause was included in the employment contract at the basis of the matter at stake. 46. Bearing in mind the foregoing, the Chamber proceeded with the calculation of the monies payable to the player under the terms of the employment contract until 31 May 2012. The Chamber concluded that the amount of EUR 87,500 serves as the basis for the final determination of the amount of compensation for breach of contract. 47. In continuation, the Chamber verified as to whether the Claimant had signed an employment contract with another club during the relevant period of time, by means of which he would have been enabled to reduce his loss of income. According to the constant practice of the Dispute Resolution Chamber, such remuneration under a new employment contract shall be taken into account in the calculation of the amount of compensation for breach of contract in connection with the player’s general obligation to mitigate his damages. 48. In this regard, the Chamber noted that, according to the Claimant’s allegation and in accordance with the information contained in the Transfer Matching System (TMS), the Claimant did not sign a new employment contract between 25 July 2011, i.e. the date of termination, and 31 May 2012, the expiry date of the contract with the Respondent. Consequently, the Chamber concluded that no deductions were to be made from the residual amount of the contract, payable to the Claimant as compensation. 49. Consequently, on account of all of the above-mentioned considerations and the specificities of the case at hand, the Chamber decided that the Respondent must pay the amount of EUR 87,500 to the Claimant as compensation for breach of contract. 50. For all the above reasons, the DRC decided to partially accept the claim of the Claimant and held the Respondent liable to pay the Claimant the amount of EUR 5,872 related to medical expenses, as well as the amount of EUR 87,500 as compensation for breach of contract. 51. The Dispute Resolution Chamber concluded its deliberations in the present matter by establishing that any further request filed by the Claimant is rejected. III. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. The claim of the Claimant, Player W, is admissible. 2. The claim of the Claimant is partially accepted. 3. The Respondent, Club A, is ordered to pay to the Claimant, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision, the amount of EUR 5,872 related to medical expenses. 4. The Respondent is ordered to pay to the Claimant, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision, the amount of EUR 87,500 as compensation for breach of contract. 5. If the aforementioned sums are not paid within the above-mentioned time limit, an interest rate of 5% p.a. will apply on said amounts as of expiry of the above- mentioned time limit and the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee for its consideration and a formal decision. 6. Any further claims lodged by the Claimant are rejected. 7. The Claimant is directed to inform the Respondent immediately and directly of the account number to which the remittance is to be made and to notify the Dispute Resolution Chamber of every payment received. Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy): According to art. 67 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives). The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following: Court of Arbitration for Sport Avenue de Beaumont 2 1012 Lausanne Switzerland Tel: +41 21 613 50 00 Fax: +41 21 613 50 01 e-mail: info@tas-cas.org www.tas-cas.org For the Dispute Resolution Chamber: Jérôme Valcke Secretary General Encl. CAS directives