F.I.F.A. – Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2013-2014) – controversie di lavoro – ———- F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber (2013-2014) – labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 28 March 2014, in the following composition: Thomas Grimm (Switzerland), Deputy Chairman Jon Newman (USA), member Theodore Giannikos (Greece), member on the claim presented by the player, Player P, from country I as Claimant against the club, Club A, from country C as Respondent regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties

F.I.F.A. - Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2013-2014) - controversie di lavoro - ---------- F.I.F.A. - Dispute Resolution Chamber (2013-2014) - labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 28 March 2014, in the following composition: Thomas Grimm (Switzerland), Deputy Chairman Jon Newman (USA), member Theodore Giannikos (Greece), member on the claim presented by the player, Player P, from country I as Claimant against the club, Club A, from country C as Respondent regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties I. Facts of the case 1. On 1 April 2012, Club A, from country C (hereinafter: the Respondent), and Player P, from country I (hereinafter: the Claimant), signed an employment contract (hereinafter: the contract) valid from 1 July 2012 until the end of the season 2012- 2013. 2. According to the contract, the Claimant was entitled to receive a remuneration in the amount of EUR 85,000 payable as follows: - EUR 10,000 already paid upon signing of the contract. - EUR 5,000 before 15 May 2012. - EUR 70,000 divided in ten equal monthly installments, i.e. EUR 7,000, being the first and the last monthly installments due, respectively, on 30 August 2012 and 30 May 2013, to be paid at the latest one month after the due date. In addition, the Claimant was entitled to receive, inter alia, the following benefits: - One return plane ticket (country B - country C - country B) per season for the player and his family members “paid by the club”; - Accommodation in a maximum rental price of EUR 600 per month; - “Free for use of a middleclass car”; 3. Clause 13 of the contract reads as follows: “in case of any disagreement about the implementation of this agreement the Courts of the country C Football Association shall have full jurisdiction, and or FIFA/UEFA”. 4. On 16 June 2012, the Claimant sent a letter to the Respondent requesting payment of the outstanding remuneration within five working days as well as to provide the player with the flight ticket from country B. 5. On 28 June 2012, the Claimant sent a reminder to the Respondent regarding outstanding payments and informed that he had proactively booked a flight ticket to country C in order to ensure that he was present at the club ahead of the start of the training sessions of the Respondent. 6. On 29 June 2012, the Respondent informed the Claimant via fax that he was exempted from the training sessions for a 10-day period starting on 2 July 2012 in order to resolve any issues regarding his contractual situation with the Respondent and that the Claimant was expected at the training center on 13 July 2012. 7. On 13 July 2012, the Respondent’s representative sent a letter to the Claimant, terminating the contract, firstly outlining that the management and administration of the Respondent had changed in May 2012. Furthermore, in the termination letter it was argued that while the contract was indeed signed it was however not enforceable due to the fact that it had not been registered with the country C Football Association within 15 days from its signature, in accordance with the applicable regulations. As a consequence, the Respondent decided to terminate the contract with immediate effect and the payment already received by the Claimant had to be regarded as compensation. 8. On 18 July 2012, the Claimant sent a notice to the Respondent, terminating the contract. The Claimant held that since he did not receive a power of attorney from the representative of the Respondent, but it was clear that there was no basis to continue the contract, he terminated the contract alleging just cause for the Respondent’s failure to fulfill its obligations under the contract concerning the agreed financial terms as well as training, equipment, medical care and work permit. 9. On 13 September 2012, the Claimant lodged before FIFA a claim against the Respondent for breach of contract resulting from the Rspondent’s failure to fulfill its contractual obligations. Therefore, the Claimant alleged having terminated the contract with just cause and requested the aggregate amount of EUR 93,395 plus 5% interest as follows: a) Outstanding remuneration in the total amount of EUR 15,995: 1. EUR 5,000 as advance payment that became due on 15 May 2012; 2. EUR 7,000 for the monthly salary of July 2012 that became due on 30 August 2012; 3. EUR 600 for the rent of July 2012 that became due on 30 July 2012; 4. EUR 400 for rental car related expenses that became due on 1 July 2012; 5. EUR 2,865 for the flight ticket that became due on 28 June 2012; 6. EUR 70 for taxi related expenses that became due on 1 July 2012, since the Respondent did not pick him up at the airport; and 7. EUR 60 for gym related expenses that became due on 2 July 2012, since the Respondent did not provide him with training. b) Compensation in the total amount of EUR 77,400: 1. EUR 63,000 for nine monthly salaries for August 2012 through May 2013; 2. EUR 6,000 for the rent for August 2012 through May 2013; 3. EUR 4,000 for the rental car for August 2012 through May 2013; and 4. EUR 4,400 for average priced flight tickets for Claimant’s wife and child. 10. According to the Claimant, although the Respondent paid the amount of EUR 10,000 due upon signing of the contract, it failed to pay the amount of EUR 5,000 before 15 May 2012, as foreseen in the contract and thus, he put the Respondent in default. However, the Respondent allegedly told him orally that his services were no longer required. Subsequently, the Claimant put the Respondent in default in two occasions (16 and 28 June 2012, cf. points 4 and 5.) and he bought his flight ticket to country C to start training. The Respondent then reacted in writing informing him that he was exempted from the training sessions for a 10-day period starting on 2 July 2012. In this respect, the Claimant held that such an exemption from training was revoked by the Respondent by means of a fax sent on 3 July on the grounds that it had been sent by mistake. 11. Also according to the Claimant, a few days later, on 11 July 2012, a new reminder was sent to the Respondent. In this reminder, it was pointed out that the Claimant had been prevented from entering the Respondent’s training facilities and from taking part in training sessions. At this point, the Claimant requested the Respondent to provide him with a financial proposal for a written mutual early termination of the contract by no later than 13 July 2012. 12. On 13 July 2012 (cf. point 7.), the Respondent’s representative sent to the Claimant a termination letter, arguing inter alia that the contract was signed, but it was not enforceable due to the fact that it had not been registered with the country C Football Association within 15 days from its signature, which is allegedly a requirement for the contract’s enforceability according to the relevant regulations of the country C Football Association governing the status and transfer of players (hereinafter: country C Football Association Regulations). In reply, the Claimant allegedly asked for a power of attorney of the Respondent’s representative, which remained unanswered. 13. As a consequence, on 18 July 2012, since the Claimant did not receive the relevant power of attorney, but it was clear that the Respondent had no intention to continue with the employment relationship, the Claimant terminated the contract in writing alleging just cause (cf. point 8.). 14. The Claimant argued that he tried in good faith to fulfill his obligations under the contract but the Respondent had acted in breach of the contract and of the Swiss Code of obligations, failing to pay him, provide him training and medical care. Furthermore, the Claimant held that the Respondent had ignored the Claimant’s reminders. In the Claimant’s view, the Respondent had acted intentionally and thus, seriously breached the contract. Consequently, the Claimant argued that his termination of the contract was with just cause. 15. In its reply, the Respondent first contested the competence of the DRC, alleging that the contract was never registered with the country C Football Association as well as that clause 13 of the contract “provides full jurisdiction to country C Football Association”. Upon request, the Respondent provided only translated extracts of the “Regulations for the Registration and Transfer of Football Players” of the country C Football Association, edition 2005, namely articles 22.1 to 22.15.2. According to the articles of said Regulations, the country C Football Association “Dispute Resolution Chamber” consists of five members (Chairman, Vice-Chairman, and three members). The Chairman, Vice-Chairman and one member are elected by the Executive Committee of the country C Football Association and two members are elected by the country C Football Players’ Association. Furthermore, the appeal body is the “Disciplinary Authority of the country C Football Association”. 16. As to the substance, the Respondent argued that it could terminate the contract without any liability during the timeframe between the signature of the employment contract, on 1 April 2012, and the commencement of the term of the agreement, on 1 July 2012, as the contract was not enforceable during such period. In addition, the Respondent held that the Claimant’s failure to register the contract with the country C Football Association also resulted in the unenforceability of the contract according to the country C Football Association Regulations. 17. Further, the Respondent accused the Claimant of ignoring its decision, communicated orally in May 2012, that his services were no longer required and so delaying him joining another club; deliberately waiting for the term of the contract to start so that a claim for compensation would be justified. 18. Alternatively, the Respondent requested that, should the termination by the Claimant be deemed with just cause, the country C Football Association regulations should apply and thus, it must be noted that the Claimant signed with another club before the 30-day waiting period after a termination provided for by the country C Football Association Regulations. 19. Therefore, the Respondent alleged having terminated the contract with just cause because it withdrew from it before it was enforceable. As a consequence, no compensation can be claimed by the Claimant. As for the outstanding payments, the Respondent claimed that the EUR 5,000 payment due on 15 May 2012 was actually made. In addition, the compensation for breach of contract claimed by the Claimant must be rejected because, following termination of the contract, the Claimant signed with Club N and is now employed by the said club for a higher salary for the 2012- 2013 season and thus, has mitigated his damages. The Respondent pointed out that during the weeks prior to the termination of the contract the Claimant had allegedly been already negotiating with Club N. 20. Finally, the Respondent requested that the claim be dismissed and the Claimant be ordered to pay the legal costs incurred by the Respondent due to the present proceeding. 21. In his replica, the Claimant stressed that the DRC was competent to deal with the present matter both according to clause 13 of the contract, which reads “In case of any disagreement about the implementation of this agreement the Courts of the country C Football Association shall have full jurisdiction, and/or FIFA” (emphasis added), and to art. 22 par. b of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players and FIFA Circular letter No. 1010. Further, the Claimant requested that there is no independent court that could guarantee fair proceedings involving foreign players in country C. 22. In addition, the Claimant underlined that the reference to the “law of the country concerned” in art. 17 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players is not a choice-of-law clause, but an element to be taken into consideration. The Claimant argues that art.17 par. 1 of the aforementioned Regulations does not require that the compensation be determined in application of a national law or that the rules on contractual damage contained in the law of the country concerned have any sort of priority over the other elements and criteria listed in art. 17 par. 1. In this regard, the player brought to the attention of the DRC that “under the country C law, resp. the country C Football Regulations upon a breach of a contract, only the due amount can be claimed until the date of the rendered decision and the contract can be terminated, if applied so”. Therefore, the Claimant argued that the country C law and the country C Football Federation Regulations are in contrary to the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players. 23. The Respondent presented its final comments, insisting in the arguments previously raised. 24. In continuation, the Claimant informed that he received a final payment from the country C FA amounting EUR 5,000 relating to the 2º share of the advance-payment in accordance with the contract which was due on 15 May 2012. In consequence, he amended his claim for outstanding amount to EUR 10,995 (see point 9.a) 1.). 25. Regarding his contractual situation, the Claimant informed that, on 20 July 2012, he entered into an employment contract with the Club N, from country C, valid from 20 July 2012 to 31 May 2013 or “the date of the last League or Cup match of the Club’s first team, whichever is the later” in exchange for a yearly net base salary amounting to EUR 20,000 to be paid “in ten equal monthly installments, with 45 days period of grace, starting from 30 August 2012”. 26. This agreement signed with Club N was terminated prematurely on 2 January 2013 as informed by the Claimant. Therefore, he maintains that he only received 5 salaries amounting EUR 10,000 until 31 December 2012. 27. The Claimant informed that afterwards, he signed a contract with the Club B, from country C starting on 04 January 2013 valid until 31 May 2013 with a monthly salary of EUR 1,500 and a sign-on-fee amounting EUR 5,000. Again, the Claimant stated that in the beginning of May 2013, the contract was terminated due to the financial situation of the Club B 28. Finally, regarding the contract provided by the Claimant concluded with Club N, the Respondent held that the Claimant had not provided the DRC with complete information regarding his contractual relationship with Club N, since the parties allegedly signed a supplementary agreement with further amounts. II. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the DRC or the Chamber) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the matter at stake. In this respect, the Chamber referred to art. 21 par. 1 of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules). The present matter was submitted to FIFA on 13 September 2012. Therefore, the Chamber concluded that the edition 2008 of the Procedural Rules was applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 par. 2 and 3 of the Procedural Rules). 2. Subsequently, the members of the Chamber referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed that, in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 and 2 in combination with art. 22 b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2012), the Dispute Resolution Chamber shall adjudicate on employment-related disputes between a club and a player, with an international dimension. 3. Having said that, the DRC stated that it would, in principle, be the competent body to decide on the present litigation involving an country I player and a country C club regarding an employment-related dispute. 4. However, the Chamber acknowledged that the Respondent contested the competence of FIFA’s deciding bodies on the basis of art. 13 of the contract, stating that any dispute arisen between the parties should be submitted to the Dispute Resolution Committee of the country C Football Association. 5. The Chamber equally noted that the Claimant rejected such position and insisted on the fact that FIFA had jurisdiction to deal with the present matter, firstly because clause 13 of the contract explicitly mentions that he can bring his case to FIFA and, secondly since the Dispute Resolution Committee of the country C Football Federation allegedly does not respect the principle of equal representation of players and clubs and, therefore, cannot provide for fair proceedings. 6. Taking into account the above, the Chamber emphasised that, in accordance with art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, it is competent to deal with a matter such as the one at hand, unless an independent arbitration tribunal, guaranteeing fair proceedings and respecting the principle of equal representation of players and clubs, has been established at national level within the framework of the association and/or a collective bargaining agreement. With regard to the standards to be imposed on an independent arbitration tribunal guaranteeing fair proceedings, the Chamber referred to the FIFA Circular no. 1010 dated 20 December 2005. In this regard, the members of the Chamber further referred to the principles contained in the FIFA National Dispute Resolution Chamber (NDRC) Standard Regulations, which came into force on 1 January 2008. 7. While analysing whether it was competent to hear the present matter, the Dispute Resolution Chamber considered that it should, first and foremost, analyse whether the employment contract at the basis of the present dispute actually contained a jurisdiction clause. 8. Having said this, the members of the Chamber turned their attention to clause 13 of the contract, which stipulates that “in case of any disagreement about the implementation of this agreement the Courts of the country C Football Association shall have full jurisdiction, and or FIFA / UEFA”. 9. In view of the aforementioned clause, the members of the DRC were of the opinion that clause 13 of the employment contract does not make clear reference to one specific national dispute resolution chamber in the sense of art. 22 lit. b) of the aforementioned Regulations and even provides for the possibility of lodging a contractual dispute in front of FIFA. Therefore, the members of the Chamber deem that said clause can by no means be considered as a clear arbitration clause in favour of the national deciding body and, therefore, cannot be applicable. 10. Having established that the first criteria for the recognition of the competence of a national decision-making body is not fulfilled in the present matter, the Chamber deemed unnecessary to examine any further points which would need to be assessed before concluding to the competence of a national deciding body. 11. In view of the above, the Chamber established that the Respondent’s objection to the competence of FIFA to deal with the present matter had to be rejected and that the DRC is competent, on the basis of art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, to consider the present matter as to the substance. 12. Subsequently, the members of the Chamber analysed which edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, the Chamber confirmed that, in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (editions 2012 and 2010) and considering that the claim in front of FIFA was lodged on 13 September 2012, the 2010 edition of said Regulations is applicable to the present matter as to the substance. 13. The competence of the DRC and the applicable regulations having been established, the Chamber entered into the substance of the matter. In doing so, it started to acknowledge the facts of the case as well as the documents contained in the file. However, the Chamber emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to the facts, arguments and documentary evidence, which it considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand. 14. In this respect, the members of the DRC acknowledged that it was undisputed by the parties that, on 1 April 2012, they signed an employment contract valid from 1 July 2012 until the end of the season 2012-2013. According with the contract the claimant was entitled to receive, inter alia, EUR 10,000 paid upon signing of the contract, EUR 5,000 before 15 May 2012 and EUR 7,000 as monthly salary, payable 10 times per year, being the first and the last monthly instalments due respectively on 30 August 2012 and 30 May 2013; Additionally the Claimant was entitled to the following benefits: One return plane ticket (country B – country C – country B) per season for the player and his family members, accommodation in a maximum rental price of EUR 600/month and a “Free for use of a middleclass car”. 15. The DRC first took note that the Claimant lodged a claim against the Respondent in front of FIFA for breach of contract. 16. The DRC noted that, on the one hand, the Claimant held inter alia that the Respondent failed to fulfil its obligations under the contract and in spite of his reminders requesting the fulfilment of their obligations, the information’s about the location and schedule of the training sessions and the flight tickets for him and his family, the Respondent never replied. Furthermore, the Claimant affirmed that the Respondent sent to the Claimant a termination letter terminating the contract and stating that the contract was not enforceable due to the fact that it had not been registered with the country C Football Association. 17. Based on the aforementioned, the Claimant considered that the Respondent breached the contract without just cause. Thus, considering that it was not possible to continue with the employment relationship, the Claimant terminated the employment contract on 18 July 2012 in writing. 18. Subsequently, the DRC noted that, on the other hand, the Respondent rejected the Claimant’s allegations and asserted that, it had the possibility to terminate the contract without any liability during the timeframe between the signature of the employment contract, on 1 April 2012, and the commencement of the term of the agreement, on 1 July 2012, as the contract was not enforceable during such period. In addition the Respondent maintained that the Claimant´s failure to register the contract with the country C Football Association also resulted in its unenforceability according to the country C Football Association Regulations that requires the registration of the contract within 15 days from its signature. Therefore, the Respondent alleged having terminated the contract with just cause by means of the letter sent on 13 July 2012 to the Claimant, because it withdrew from the contract before it became enforceable. 19. Having established the aforementioned, the Chamber deemed that the underlying issue in this dispute, considering the claim of the Claimant and the allegations of the Respondent, was to determine when was the contract terminated as well as whether the contract had been unilaterally terminated with or without just cause and which party was responsible for the early termination of the contractual relationship in question. The DRC also underlined that, subsequently, if it were found that the employment contract had been breached by one of the parties without just cause, it would be necessary to determine the consequences for the party that caused the unjust breach of the relevant employment contract. 20. In this context, the Chamber first and foremost considered that the contract was terminated by the Respondent, on 13 July 2012, through the letter sent to the player (cf. point I.7), alleging that the management and administration of the Respondent had changed in May 2012. Furthermore, in the termination letter it was argued that while the contract was indeed signed it was however not enforceable due to the fact that it had not been registered with the country C Football Federation within 15 days from its signature. 21. In this respect, the DRC considered that it had to examine whether the reasons put forward by the Respondent could justify the termination of the contract in the present matter. 22. In view of the above, the Chamber first of all observed that the Respondent sent a letter dated 13 July 2012 by means of which they terminated the contract unilaterally “due to changes in the management and administration of the club” and to the fact that the contract had not been registered with the country C Football Association within 15 days from its signature according to the country C Football Association Regulations. Also the Respondent alleges that it had the possibility to terminate the contract without any liability during the timeframe between the signature of the employment contract, on 1 April 2012 and the commencement of the term of the agreement on 1 July 2012, as the contract was not enforceable during such period. However, regardless of the question of the enforceability of the contract and the changes in the management and administration of the Respondent, the Chamber was of the firm opinion that the Respondent, in any case, did not have just cause to prematurely terminate the employment contract with the Claimant, since such arguments could not be considered as a valid reasons to justify the termination of the contract. Moreover, the Chamber also emphasised that the termination letter was sent by the Respondent on 13 July 2012, after the starting date of execution and validity of the contract and the first payment established in the contract was already made. 23. Moreover, the Chamber noted that the Respondent held that the employment contract could not be properly registered within the country C Football Federation due to the Claimant’s fault, since the latter did not provide the relevant documentation. 24. In this context, the Chamber considered relevant to recall its jurisprudence in accordance with which the validity of an employment contract cannot be made conditional upon the execution of (administrative) formalities, such as, but not limited to, the registration procedure in connection with the international transfer of a player, which is the sole responsibility of a club and on which a player has no influence. For these reasons and since the Claimant and the Respondent had already signed a contract, the members of the Chamber decided to reject the Respondent’s arguments in this regard. 25. On account of the above, the Chamber decided that the Respondent had no just cause to unilaterally terminate the employment relationship with the Claimant and, therefore, concluded that the Respondent had terminated the employment contract without just cause on 13 July 2012 and that, consequently, the Respondent is to be held liable for the breach of the contract. 26. Bearing in mind the previous considerations, the Chamber went on to deal with the consequences of the early termination of the employment contract without just cause by the Respondent. 27. First of all, the members of the Chamber concurred that the Respondent must fulfil its obligations as per the employment contract up until the date of termination of the contract in accordance with the general legal principle of “pacta sunt servanda”. Consequently, the Chamber decided that the Respondent is liable to pay to the Claimant the remuneration that was outstanding at the time of the termination, i.e. 13 July 2012, corresponding to the total amount of EUR 3,265, composed of EUR 400 for the car rental expenses and EUR 2,865 for the flight ticket to arrive to country C, in accordance with the documents attached by the Claimant in this respect. 28. In addition, taking into account the Claimant’s request as well as the constant practice of the Dispute Resolution Chamber, the DRC decided that the Respondent must pay to the Claimant interest of 5% p.a. on the amount of EUR 3,265 as from 13 September 2012 until the date of effective payment. 29. Regarding the claim for the payment of the rent of July 2012 allegedly paid by the Claimant, the DRC referred to the principle of the burden of proof and considered that, in the absence of any documentary evidence (cf. art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules), the claim shall be rejected. Moreover, regarding the claim for the gym and taxi costs, in the absence of a contractual basis, the Chamber had also to reject the Claimant’s claim. 30. In continuation, the Chamber decided that, taking into consideration art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the Claimant is entitled to receive from the Respondent compensation for breach of contract in addition to the outstanding amounts on the basis of the relevant employment contract. 31. In this context, the Chamber outlined that, in accordance with said provision, the amount of compensation shall be calculated, in particular and unless otherwise provided for in the contract at the basis of the dispute, with due consideration for the law of the country concerned, the specificity of sport and further objective criteria, including, in particular, the remuneration and other benefits due to the Claimant under the existing contract and/or the new contract, the time remaining on the existing contract up to a maximum of five years, and depending on whether the contractual breach falls within the protected period. 32. In application of the relevant provision, the Chamber held that it first of all had to clarify whether the pertinent employment contract contained any clause, by means of which the parties had beforehand agreed upon a compensation payable by the contractual parties in the event of breach of contract. In this regard, the Chamber established that no such compensation clause was included in the employment contract at the basis of the matter at stake. 33. Subsequently, and in order to evaluate the compensation to be paid by the Respondent, the members of the Chamber took into account the remuneration due to the Claimant in accordance with the employment contract as well as the time remaining on the same contract, along with the professional situation of the Claimant after the early termination occurred. In this respect, the Chamber pointed out that at the time of the termination of the employment contract, on 13 July 2012, the contract would run until the end of the season 2012-2013, in which a total of ten instalments were still to be paid. Consequently, taking into account the financial terms of the contract and the maximum stipulated for the rent of the apartment, the Chamber concluded that the remaining value of the contract as from its early termination by the Respondent, on 13 July 2012, until the regular expiry of the contract amounted to EUR 76,600 and that such amount shall serve as the basis for the final determination of the amount of compensation for breach of contract. 34. In continuation, the Chamber remarked that following the early termination of the employment contract at the basis of the present dispute the Claimant had found new employment contracts with two clubs. Firstly, the Claimant signed an employment contract with Club N, from country C, valid as from 20 July 2012 to 31 May 2013, which was prematurely terminated on 2 January 2013, in accordance with which he was entitled to the total amount of EUR 10,000. Secondly, the Claimant signed an employment contract with Club B, from country C valid as from 4 January 2012 until 31 May 2013, in accordance with which the Claimant was entitled to a monthly salary of EUR 1,500 and a sign-on-fee amounting EUR 5,000. These employment contracts enabled the Claimant to earn an income of EUR 22,500 during said period of time. Consequently, in accordance with the constant practice of the Dispute Resolution Chamber and the general obligation of the Claimant to mitigate his damages, such remuneration under the new employment contracts shall be taken into account in the calculation of the amount of compensation for breach of contract. 35. Consequently, on account of all of the above-mentioned considerations and the specificities of the case at hand as well as the Claimant’s general obligation to mitigate his damage, the Chamber decided to partially accept the Claimant’s claim and that the Respondent must pay the amount of EUR 54,100 as compensation for breach of contract in the case at hand, which is considered by the Chamber to be a reasonable and justified amount as compensation. 36. In addition, taking into account the Claimant’s request as well as the constant practice of the Dispute Resolution Chamber, the DRC decided that the Respondent must pay to the Claimant interest of 5% p.a. on the amount of EUR 54,100 as from 13 September 2012 until the date of effective payment. 37. The Dispute Resolution Chamber concluded its deliberations in the present matter by establishing that any further claim lodged by the Claimant is rejected. ***** III. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. The claim of the Claimant, Player P, is admissible. 2. The claim of the Claimant is partially accepted. 3. The Respondent, Club A, has to pay to the Claimant, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision, outstanding remuneration in the amount of EUR 3,265, plus 5% interest as from 13 September 2012 until the date of effective payment. 4. The Respondent has to pay to the Claimant, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision, compensation for breach of contract in the amount of EUR 54,100 plus 5% interest p.a. on said amount as from 13 September 2012 until the date of effective payment. 5. In the event that the amounts due to the Claimant in accordance with the abovementioned numbers 3. and 4. are not paid by the Respondent within the stated time limits, the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision. 6. Any further claim lodged by the Claimant is rejected. 7. The Claimant is directed to inform the Respondent immediately and directly of the account number to which the remittances are to be made and to notify the Dispute Resolution Chamber of every payment received. ***** Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy): According to art. 67 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives). The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following: Court of Arbitration for Sport Avenue de Beaumont 2 1012 Lausanne Switzerland Tel: +41 21 613 50 00 Fax: +41 21 613 50 01 e-mail: info@tas-cas.org www.tas-cas.org For the Dispute Resolution Chamber: Jérôme Valcke Secretary General Encl. CAS directives