F.I.F.A. – Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2013-2014) – controversie di lavoro – ———- F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber (2013-2014) – labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 9 May 2014, in the following composition: Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman Johan van Gaalen (South Africa), member Damir Vrbanovic (Croatia), member on the claim presented by the player, Player S, from country B as Claimant against the club, Club P, from country R as Respondent regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties

F.I.F.A. - Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2013-2014) - controversie di lavoro - ---------- F.I.F.A. - Dispute Resolution Chamber (2013-2014) - labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 9 May 2014, in the following composition: Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman Johan van Gaalen (South Africa), member Damir Vrbanovic (Croatia), member on the claim presented by the player, Player S, from country B as Claimant against the club, Club P, from country R as Respondent regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties I. Facts of the case 1. On 1 July 2008, Player S, from country B (hereinafter: the Claimant), and Club P, from country R (hereinafter: the Respondent), concluded a “Civil Law Convention Activity professional footballer” (hereinafter: the contract) together with a “Financial Annex” which governed the financial terms of the contract (hereinafter: the Financial Annex), both valid as from 1 July 2008 until 30 June 2011. 2. According to the Financial Annex, the Claimant was entitled to receive as remuneration from the Respondent the total amount of EUR 330,000 as follows: a. For the period between 1 July 2008 and 30 June 2009, a total amount of EUR 100,000 to be paid in twelve equal monthly instalments of EUR 8,333 each; b. For the period between 1 July 2009 and 30 June 2010, a total amount of EUR 110,000 to be paid in twelve equal monthly instalments of EUR 9,166 each; c. For the period between 1 July 2010 and 30 June 2011, a total amount of EUR 120,000 to be paid in twelve equal monthly instalments of EUR 10,000 each. 3. In addition, the Financial Annex provided that “These amounts are valid if Claimant play 75% of games”. Moreover, according to the Financial Annex, the Claimant was entitled to the following: (i) two one-way tickets country B –country R and two one-way tickets country R – country B per year; and (ii) “free accommodation and meals”. 4. Furthermore, clause 12 of the contract stipulated that “the applicable law is the law in country R” and that “all disputes, controversies and disagreements arising from this Convention shall be governed, interpreted and resolved in accordance with the country R laws in force, as well as the Statutes and Regulations Sports”. 5. Moreover, clause 13.2 stated that “the parties shall make good faith efforts to amicably settle any dispute, controversy or disagreement arising out of or relating to this Convention. If this is not possible, the dispute will be resolved in a jurisdiction are recognized by the country R Football Federation sport and / or Professional Football League”. 6. On 15 July 2010, the Claimant lodged a claim against the Respondent in front of FIFA, requesting, inter alia, the following: a. To declare null and void the Financial Annex’s provision making full payment of the agreed remuneration conditional upon the Claimant’s participation in 75% of the Respondent’s matches. In this respect, the Claimant held that the relevant provision was inserted in the contract without his knowledge; b. To order the Respondent to pay outstanding salaries totalling EUR 96,600 corresponding to: (i) EUR 38,800 for the 2008/2009 season; (ii) EUR 52,800 for the 2009/2010 season; and (iii) EUR 5,000 for the 2010/2011 season; c. To order the Respondent to pay compensation for the remaining term of the contract, i.e. from 15 July 2010 to 30 June 2011, amounting to EUR 115,000; d. To order the Respondent to pay medical expenses in the amount of EUR 5,300; e. To order the Respondent to pay interest on each instalment due until effective payment; f. To order the Respondent to pay the legal expenses incurred by the Claimant in the amount of EUR 25,000. 7. In particular, the Claimant explained that the Respondent failed to comply with the payment of his salaries since the beginning of the contract, a situation that “remained practically every month”. In this respect, the Claimant provided a detailed breakdown of the payments he received from the Respondent since August 2008 until July 2010. The Claimant explained that during the 2008/2009 season he had only received EUR “60,200” and during the 2009/2010 season he had only received EUR 57,200. 8. In addition, the Claimant asserted that despite putting the Respondent in default, the latter did not respond to his demands. In this respect, the Claimant enclosed two letters dated 6 and 17 June 2010 where he requested the Respondent to pay the outstanding salaries as well as the reimbursement of medical expenses. 9. In continuation, the Claimant argued that he suffered an injury “to the services of [the Respondent]”, which recovery took from 1 August 2009 until 9 January 2010, and that he had to undergo surgery. In this respect, he asserts that he left to country B to treat said injury with the permission of the Respondent and that the latter “has undertaken to bear all the burden of injury (salaries, travels, surgery and treatments)”. In this regard, the Claimant enclosed two documents, a letter dated 17 August 2009 whereby the Respondent authorized him to travel to country B for “medical treatment and a possible surgery” and that “If surgery is needed, the hospital will issue a invoice for [the Respondent] to agree on the expenses” and an invoice of the surgery paid by the Claimant in the total amount of EUR 5,300. 10. The Claimant further argues that, due to the failure of the Respondent to pay the outstanding remuneration and the medical expenses, by means of a letter dated 15 July 2010, he terminated the contract with just cause. 11. On 13 October 2010, the Respondent replied to the Claimant’s claim, disputing the jurisdiction of the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber on the basis of clause 13.2 of the contract, according to which the competent jurisdictional bodies are exclusively those of the country R Football Federation and of the Professional Football League, as the case may be. 12. Having been requested by FIFA to provide the documentary evidence that there exists an independent arbitration tribunal on national level, the Respondent referred to - and submitted - copies of the following: (i) art. 56 of the country R Football Federation Statutes that stipulates the general jurisdiction of the country R Football Federation DRC; (ii) art. 26 of the country R Football Federation Players’ Status and Transfer Regulation that stipulates the competence of the Professional Football League DRC and country R Football Federation DRC as well as the rules that govern the composition of said bodies; (iii) articles 30-36 of the country R Football Federation Players’ Status and Transfer Regulation regarding the procedure of the Professional Football League DRC and the Appeal Committee of the country R Football Federation; and (iv) article 41.1 of the country R Football Federation Players’ Status and Transfer Regulation that stipulates the date when the regulations came into force. 13. As to the substance, the Respondent rejected the Claimant’s claim that it had inserted the conditional payment provision without his knowledge. In addition, the Respondent argued that due to the Claimant’s absence from trainings from 25 May 2010 it was forced to withhold some of the payment to the Claimant under the contract, on the basis of the exception of non-performance. 14. Moreover, the Respondent held that any outstanding amounts due before 4 August 2009 were time-barred according to the one-year time limit set out in art. 25.3 of the Regulations of the country R Football Federation. In this respect, the Respondent stressed that according to clause 12 of the contract, the contract’s governing law is country R law and that all litigation arising from the contract is to be settled according to country R legislation in force. Furthermore, the Respondent maintained that it had neither agreed to pay for medical expenses nor for the Claimant’s post-surgery recovery in country B. 15. The Respondent further argued that since “payment of monthly remunerations due to [the Claimant] dependant on his participation to at least 75% of the team’s games”, and in view of the “expiration of the statute of limitations in relation to the payment of certain amounts and the exception of nonperformance due [the Claimant’s] own failure to the obligations incumbent upon him” it “does not owe any amount of money to [the Claimant]”. 16. On 23 and 26 March 2012, in additional submissions in reply to the Claimant’s claim, the Respondent provided a detailed breakdown of the minutes played during the relevant season and the corresponding remuneration due in accordance to the provision making payment conditional upon the participation of the Claimant in at least 75% of the Respondent’s games. According to the Respondent, during the 2008/2009 season the Claimant was entitled to EUR 53,896, while the Respondent claimed to have paid EUR 73,466 between 18 July 2008 and 13 July 2009. Moreover, the Respondent referred to a letter where supposedly the Claimant acknowledged having received EUR 70,700 from the Respondent. As for the 2009/2010 season, on the basis of the Claimant’s participation in the Respondent’s games, the Respondent maintained that the Claimant was entitled to EUR 45,287, which the Respondent claimed to have paid. 17. Furthermore, the Respondent argued that on 27 May 2010 it provided the Claimant with a round flight ticket country R – country B. However, the latter did not return to the Respondent. Consequently, in the Respondent’s view, the Claimant terminated the contract without just cause. 18. Despite having been asked to do so, the Claimant did not make any further comments. II. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter referred to as the DRC or the Chamber) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the matter at stake. In this respect, it took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 15 July 2010. Consequently, the 2008 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules) is applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 of the 2008 and 2012 edition of the Procedural Rules). 2. Subsequently, the members of the Chamber referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed that in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 and 2 in combination with art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2012), the Dispute Resolution Chamber shall adjudicate on employment-related disputes between a club and a player that have an international dimension. 3. As a consequence, the Dispute Resolution Chamber would, in principle, be competent to decide on the present litigation involving a country B player and a country R club regarding an alleged breach of the employment contract concluded between the aforementioned parties. 4. However, the Chamber acknowledged that the Respondent contested the competence of FIFA’s deciding bodies on the basis of article 13.2 of the contract, which, according to the Respondent, clearly excludes the competence of the Dispute Resolution Chamber to adjudicate on the present matter. 5. Taking into account all the above, the Chamber emphasised that in accordance with art. 22 lit. b) of the 2012 edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, it is competent to deal with a matter such as the one at hand, unless an independent arbitration tribunal, guaranteeing fair proceedings and respecting the principle of equal representation of players and clubs, has been established at national level within the framework of the association and/or a collective bargaining agreement. With regard to the standards to be imposed on an independent arbitration tribunal guaranteeing fair proceedings, the Chamber referred to the FIFA Circular no. 1010 dated 20 December 2005. Equally, the members of the Chamber referred to the principles contained in the FIFA National Dispute Resolution Chamber (NDRC) Standard Regulations, which came into force on 1 January 2008. 6. In relation to the above, the Chamber also deemed it vital to outline that one of the basic conditions that needs to be met in order to establish that another organ than the DRC can settle an employment-related dispute between a club and a player of an international dimension, is that the jurisdiction of the relevant arbitration tribunal derives from a clear reference in the employment contract. 7. Therefore, while analysing whether it was competent to hear the present matter, the Dispute Resolution Chamber considered that it should, first and foremost, analyse whether the employment contract at the basis of the present dispute actually contained a clear jurisdiction clause. 8. Having said this, the members of the Chamber turned their attention to art. 13.2 of the employment contract, on the basis of which the Respondent contested FIFA’s jurisdiction. Said article stipulates that “the parties shall make good faith efforts to amicably settle any dispute, controversy or disagreement arising out of or relating to this Convention. If this is not possible, the dispute will be resolved in a jurisdiction are recognized by the country R Football Federation sport and / or Professional Football League”. 9. In this respect, and regardless of the fact that the relevant employment contract contains a reference to dispute resolution at national level, the Chamber pointed out that the relevant article was drafted in a rather vague manner in the sense that it merely refers to “a jurisdiction are recognized by the country R Football Federation sport and / or Professional Football League” and not to a specific deciding body in the sense of art. 22 lit. b) of the aforementioned Regulations, or to any similar arbitration body. In view of the foregoing, the Chamber held that the jurisdiction of the Professional Football League DRC or the country R Football Federation DRC does not derive from a clear reference in the employment contract. 10. In view of the foregoing, the Chamber held that art. 13.2 of the employment contract cannot be considered as a clear and exclusive jurisdiction clause in favour of the country R Football Federation DRC, the Professional Football League DRC or any other national body in country R. 11. In continuation and for the sake of completeness, the DRC turned its attention to the principles of fair proceedings and equal representation of players and clubs and underlined that these principles are fundamental elements to be fulfilled, in order for a national dispute resolution chamber to be recognised as such. 12. In this context, the Chamber went on to examine the documentation presented by the Respondent and noted that the Respondent had provided merely a copy of art. 56 of the country R Football Federation Statutes and copies of arts. 26, 30-36 and 41.1 of the country R Football Federation Players’ Status and Transfer Regulation. 13. From the incomplete documentation provided by the Respondent, the Chamber acknowledged that, apparently, in country R at least two different national dispute resolution bodies exist, namely, the country R Football Federation DRC and the Professional Football League DRC. In this sense, in accordance with art. 26 par. 8 of the country R Football Federation RSTP, the jurisdictional bodies of the Professional Football League, i.e. the DRC of the Professional Football League and the Professional Football League Review Commission, are the competent bodies to adjudicate on disputes and cases involving only clubs that participate in the First League National Championship, and their players. In this respect, the Chamber acknowledged that the Respondent was, and is, playing in the country R First League National Championship. 14. In this respect, the Chamber observed that as to the composition of the Professional Football League DRC, art. 26 par. 8 merely indicates that it is formed of five members, two of them acting as chairman and deputy chairman, respectively. However, no further details are provided as to the composition of the Professional Football League DRC and therefore the Chamber was unable to determine whether the Professional Football League DRC complies with the principle of equal representation between players and clubs. 15. In view of the above, the Chamber deemed that the Respondent had failed to prove that the Professional Football League DRC is indeed an independent arbitration tribunal guaranteeing fair proceedings and respecting the principle of equal representation of players and clubs. 16. On account of all the above-mentioned considerations, the Chamber established that the Respondent’s objection towards the competence of FIFA to deal with the present matter has to be rejected, and that the Dispute Resolution Chamber is competent, on the basis of art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, to consider the present matter as to the substance. 17. In continuation, the Chamber analysed which regulations should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, it confirmed that in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and par. 2 of the Regulations (editions 2009, 2010 and 2012), and considering that the present claim was lodged on 15 July 2010, the 2009 edition of said regulations is applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance. 18. The competence of the Chamber and the applicable regulations having been established, and entering into the substance of the matter, the Chamber started by acknowledging the above-mentioned facts as well as the documentation contained in the file. However, the Chamber emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to the facts, arguments and documentary evidence which it considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand. 19. First of all, the members of the Chamber acknowledged that, on 1 July 2008, the parties entered into an employment contract and a Financial Annex in accordance with which the Respondent would pay the Claimant EUR 100,000 for the period between 1 July 2008 and 30 June 2009, EUR 110,000 for the period between 1 July 2009 and 30 June 2010 and EUR 120,000 for the period between 1 July 2010 and 30 June 2011. Moreover, said Financial Annex provided that “These amounts are valid if [Claimant] play 75% of games”. 20. The DRC further observed that on 15 July 2010, the Claimant lodged a claim against the Respondent requesting, inter alia, (i) EUR 38,800 for the 2008/2009 season; (ii) EUR 52,800 for the 2009/2010 season, (iii) EUR 5,000 for the 2010/2011 season, (iv) EUR 5,300 as medical expenses and (v) EUR 115,000 as compensation for breach of contract. 21. Likewise, the members of the Chamber noted that the Claimant sent to the Respondent two default letters dated 6 and 17 June 2010 in which the Claimant requested the Respondent to pay him the outstanding salaries as well as his medical expenses, however to no avail. 22. Furthermore, the Chamber noted that on 15 July 2010, the Claimant terminated the contract concluded between the parties invoking just cause in view of the failure of the Respondent to respond to his demands. 23. On the other hand, the DRC noted that the Respondent rejects such allegations and argues that the Claimant had no just cause to terminate the employment contract since, in view of the contents of the Financial Annex, it had the right to subtract the player’s salary. In this respect, the Chamber observed that the Respondent alleges having paid the Claimant EUR 73,466 for the season 2008/2009 and EUR 45,287 for the season 2009/2010, which corresponds to the amounts to which he was entitled in accordance with his appearances’ percentage with the Respondent. 24. Moreover, the Respondent argues that due to the Claimant’s absence from trainings from 25 May 2010 it was forced to withhold some of the Claimant’s salaries, on the basis of the exception of non-performance. 25. Having established the aforementioned, the Chamber deemed that the underlying issue in this dispute, considering the claim of the Claimant and the allegations of the Respondent, was to determine whether the employment contract had been unilaterally terminated with or without just cause by the Claimant, and which party was responsible for the early termination of the contractual relationship in question. The DRC also underlined that, subsequently, it would be necessary to determine the consequences for the party that caused the breach of the relevant employment contract. 26. Bearing in mind the previous considerations, the members of the Chamber noted first that whereas the Claimant argues that the Respondent failed to remit his salaries in a complete and timely manner and that, therefore, he had just cause to terminate the contract, the Respondent argues that in accordance with the Financial Annex it had the right to deduct the Claimant’s salary and therefore, it has no outstanding payments towards him. 27. In view of the foregoing, the DRC firstly focused its attention on the content of the relevant clause of the Financial Annex. In this respect and after a careful and exhaustive analysis of such, the Chamber was of the unanimous opinion that the said clause is unilateral and to the benefit of the Respondent only. In this regard, the members of the Chamber wished to point out that the decision on the liningup of a player in a match is normally left fully to the discretion of the club and that if it had chosen to not play the Claimant at all, he would not have received any remuneration according to the relevant clause. Hence, in view of such potestative character of the pertinent contractual clause, the members of the Chamber agreed that such cannot be accepted and thus, shall not have any effect. 28. In this context and for the sake of completeness, the members of the Chamber wished to highlight that, in general, potestative clauses, i.e. clauses that contain obligations which fulfilment are conditional upon an event that one party entirely controls, cannot be considered since they generally limit the rights of the other contractual party in an excessive manner and lead to an unjustified disadvantage of the latter towards the other. 29. Therefore, the Chamber concurred that the said clause of the Financial Annex does not constitute a reason that can be validly invoked nor a legal basis to reduce the Claimant’s salary. Consequently, the Chamber rejected the Respondent’s argument in this respect. 30. Moreover, in respect of the allegation of the Respondent that the Claimant failed to attend some trainings, was absent as from 25 May 2010 and that, therefore, it was entitled to deduct the Claimant’s salary, the Chamber referred to the flight itinerary provided by the Respondent in accordance with which the Claimant was to return to country R on 14 June 2010. Equally, the Chamber referred to the default letters dated 6 and 17 June 2010, by means of which the Claimant had informed the Respondent about its arrears. In view of the foregoing, and since the Respondent had not replied to the aforementioned letters, the Claimant had a justified reason not to return to country R. 31. Finally, and in relation to the Respondent’s position that it had already paid certain amounts to the Claimant, the DRC referred to the principle of the burden of proof contained in art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules and established that the Respondent did not provide any documentary evidence that could prove that it had actually paid to the Claimant any of the amounts which it claimed to have paid. 32. Having taken into account the previous considerations and in view of the nullity of the relevant clause of the Financial Annex, the Chamber decided that it could be established that the Respondent had seriously neglected its contractual obligations towards the Claimant in a continuous and constant manner, i.e. the Respondent had failed to remunerate the Claimant for a substantial period of time and decided that by means of the letter dated 15 July 2010, the Claimant terminated the contract with just cause. 33. Bearing in mind the previous considerations, the Chamber went on to deal with the consequences of the early termination of the employment contract with just cause by the Claimant. 34. First of all, the members of the Chamber concurred that the Respondent must fulfil its obligations as per the employment contract in accordance with the general legal principle of pacta sunt servanda. Consequently, the Chamber decided that the Respondent is liable to pay to the Claimant the remuneration that was outstanding at the time of the termination, i.e. the amount of EUR 38,800 corresponding to the 2008/2009 season as well as EUR 52,800 corresponding to the 2009/2010 season i.e. the total amount of EUR 91,600. 35. For the sake of completeness, the Chamber stressed that since the DRC is competent to adjudicate on the employment-related dispute between the Claimant and the Respondent (cf. par II./16. above), also art. 25 par. 5 of the Regulations shall apply to the present proceedings. As a consequence, the Chamber decided to reject the Respondent’s argument that any amount that fell due prior to 4 August 2009 is time-barred in accordance with art. 25.3 of the country R Football Federation Regulations. 36. Moreover, the members of the Chamber acknowledged that the Claimant argues having suffered an injury while rendering his services to the Respondent during August 2009 which required surgery and which costs amounted to EUR 5,300. Thus, the Claimant is seeking from the Respondent the reimbursement of said amount. In this respect, the Chamber observed that whereas the Claimant argues that the Respondent committed to pay for the relevant surgery, the Respondent denies having ever committed to cover for said expenses. 37. Having said this, the members of the Chamber turned their attention to the Respondent’s letter of 17 August 2009, on which the Claimant bases this part of his claim. In this respect, the members of the Chamber came to the unanimous conclusion that the phrase “If surgery is needed, the hospital will issue an invoice for the club to agree on the expenses” does not constitute a commitment of the Respondent to cover any and all of the medical expenses of the Claimant, but merely a possibility of doing so, which can be concluded from the phrase “for the club to agree on the expenses”. Therefore, the claim of the Claimant regarding medical expenses in the amount of EUR 5,300 has to be rejected. 38. Having established the aforementioned, the Chamber turned its attention to the consequences of the early termination of the employment contract with just cause by the Claimant. Taking into consideration art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the Chamber decided that the Claimant is entitled to receive from the Respondent an amount of money as compensation for breach of contract. 39. In this context, the Chamber outlined that, in accordance with said provision, the amount of compensation shall be calculated, in particular and unless otherwise provided for in the contract at the basis of the dispute, with due consideration for the law of the country concerned, the specificity of sport and further objective criteria, including, in particular, the remuneration and other benefits due to the Claimant under the existing contract and/or the new contract, the time remaining on the existing contract up to a maximum of five years, and depending on whether the contractual breach falls within the protected period. 40. In application of the relevant provision, the Chamber held that it first of all had to clarify whether the pertinent employment contract contained any clause, by means of which the parties had beforehand agreed upon a compensation payable by the contractual parties in the event of breach of contract. In this regard, the Chamber established that no such compensation clause was included in the employment contract at the basis of the matter at stake. 41. Subsequently, and in order to evaluate the compensation to be paid by the Respondent, the members of the Chamber took into account the remuneration due to the Claimant in accordance with the employment contract as well as the time remaining on the same contract, along with the professional situation of the Claimant after the early termination occurred. 42. Bearing in mind the foregoing, the Chamber proceeded with the calculation of the monies payable to the player under the terms of the employment contract until 30 June 2011. Taking into consideration that the contract was terminated in July 2010, the Chamber concluded that the amount of EUR 120,000, i.e. the remuneration for the 2010/2011 season, serves as the basis for the final determination of the amount of compensation for breach of contract. 43. In continuation, the Chamber remarked that the Claimant had signed two new employment contracts. The first one, with the Club G, from country B, valid as from 15 August 2010 until 30 November 2010, in accordance with which he was entitled to a monthly salary of 1,000 currency of country B. The second one, with Club Q, from country B, valid as from 1 March 2011 until 31 May 2011, according to which he was entitled to a monthly salary of currency of country B 3,200. All together, the value of the Claimant’s new contracts would correspond to approximately EUR 7,400. Consequently, in accordance with the constant practice of the Dispute Resolution Chamber and the general obligation of the Claimant to mitigate his damages, such remuneration under the new employment contract shall be taken into account in the calculation of the amount of compensation for breach of contract. 44. In view of all of the above, the Chamber decided that the Respondent must pay the amount of EUR 112,600 to the Claimant as compensation for breach of contract, which is considered by the Chamber to be a reasonable and justified amount as compensation. 45. In addition, taking into account the Claimant’s request, the Chamber decided that the Respondent must pay to the Claimant interest of 5% p.a. on both the outstanding remuneration as well as the amount of compensation as of the date on which the claim was lodged, i.e. 15 July 2010, until the date of effective payment. 46. Moreover, the Dispute Resolution Chamber decided to reject the Claimant’s claim pertaining to legal costs in accordance with art. 18 par. 4 of the Procedural Rules and the Chamber’s respective longstanding jurisprudence in this regard. 47. The Dispute Resolution Chamber concluded its deliberations in the present matter by establishing that any further claim lodged by the Claimant is rejected. ****** III. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. The claim of the Claimant, Player S, is admissible. 2. The claim of the Claimant is partially accepted. 3. The Respondent, Club P, has to pay to the Claimant, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision, outstanding remuneration in the amount of EUR 91,600 plus 5% interest p.a. on said amount as from 15 July 2010 until the date of effective payment. 4. The Respondent has to pay to the Claimant, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision, compensation for breach of contract in the amount of EUR 112,600 plus 5% interest p.a. on said amount as from 15 July 2010 until the date of effective payment. 5. In the event that the amounts due to the Claimant in accordance with the abovementioned numbers 3 and 4 are not paid by the Respondent within the stated time limit, the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision. 6. Any further claim lodged by the Claimant is rejected. 7. The Claimant is directed to inform the Respondent immediately and directly of the account number to which the remittances are to be made and to notify the Dispute Resolution Chamber of every payment received. ***** Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy): According to art. 67 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives). The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following: Court of Arbitration for Sport Avenue de Beaumont 2 1012 Lausanne Switzerland Tel: +41 21 613 50 00 / Fax: +41 21 613 50 01 e-mail: info@tas-cas.org www.tas-cas.org For the Dispute Resolution Chamber: Markus Kattner Deputy Secretary General Encl. CAS directives