F.I.F.A. – Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2013-2014) – controversie di lavoro – ———- F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber (2013-2014) – labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 9 May 2014, in the following composition: Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman Johan van Gaalen (South Africa), member Damir Vrbanovic (Croatia), member on the claim presented by the player, Player B, from country A as Claimant against the club, Club V, from country G as Respondent regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties

F.I.F.A. - Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2013-2014) - controversie di lavoro - ---------- F.I.F.A. - Dispute Resolution Chamber (2013-2014) - labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 9 May 2014, in the following composition: Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman Johan van Gaalen (South Africa), member Damir Vrbanovic (Croatia), member on the claim presented by the player, Player B, from country A as Claimant against the club, Club V, from country G as Respondent regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties I. Facts of the case 1. On 8 January 2009, Player B, from country A (hereinafter: the Claimant) and the Club V, form country G (hereinafter: the Respondent), concluded a standard country G Super League employment contract (hereinafter: the contract) valid as from 8 January 2009 until 30 June 2009. 2. In accordance with the contract, the Claimant was entitled to the following: - EUR 783 per month; - EUR 783 as Christmas bonus; - EUR 391.50 as Easter bonus; - EUR 391.50 as holiday bonus; - EUR 15,000 (net) to be paid in 4 instalments a) EUR 3,750 on 28 February 2009; b) EUR 3,750 on 31 March 2009; c) EUR 3,750 on 30 April 2009; d) EUR 3,750 on 31 May 2009; - EUR 1,000 for each game played; - EUR 500 for each game played as a substitute; - 3 flight tickets country A –country G; - Bonuses “in accordance with the internal regulations of the club”. 3. Art. 10 of the contract reads as follows: “All disputes between the parties are settled exclusively from the Appeals Committee for the resolution of financial disputes PEEOD of the country G Football Federation at first instance, and the court of Arbitration of the country G Football Federation at Second Instance.” 4. On 13 June 2011, the Claimant lodged a claim in front of FIFA against the Respondent requesting the amount of EUR 29,319.25, plus interest and costs. To its claim, the Claimant enclosed a claim dated 25 February 2010 apparently lodged in front of the Court of Arbitration of the country G Football Federation, whilst indicating that he never received a reply from said body. 5. On 6 September 2011, the Claimant explained that “the detailed breakdown of the amount claimed is EUR 29,319.25 included in all the claims made by the player and due to May 31st 2009”, is the following: a) EUR 13,000 according to 4.3 of the contract; b) 4 salaries of EUR 783; c) 2 salaries of EUR 500; d) 5 salaries of EUR 1,000: e) Christmas bonus of EUR 391.50: f) Easter bonus of EUR 195.75.” 6. At a later stage, the Claimant reverted to FIFA indicating that all payments were due on “20” June 2009 “when the contract ended” and stressed that his claim in front of FIFA was only initiated “after a non-successful claim in the country G Football Federation.” 7. Subsequently, the Claimant provided a statement of the “country G Football Federation First Instance Committee” which body confirmed that “during 2009 and 2010 no claim was lodged between the player and club.” 8. On 13 September 2013, the Claimant amended his claim to the amount of EUR 31,514, plus 5% interest as of each respective due date, as follows: a) EUR 15,000 concerning the 4 installments; b) 4 salaries of EUR “785”, for the months of March 2009 to June 2009; c) EUR 7,000 for 7 matches played; d) EUR 1,000 for two matches played as a substitute; e) EUR 1,174 for the Christmas and Easter bonus; f) EUR 1,200 for one flight ticket to country A 9. The Claimant insisted that all amounts fell due on 30 June 2009 and that by filing a claim in front of the country G Football Federation, the statute of limitations period was interrupted. The Claimant further argued that a claim was lodged in front of the country G Football Federation, but that the country G Football Federation did not reply. 10. In reply to the claim lodged against it, the Respondent referred to art. 10 of the contract and held that the “country G Football Federation Committee for the resolution of financial disputes” is competent to adjudicate on the present matter and, therefore, FIFA is not. 11. In this respect, the Respondent provided FIFA with an extract of the 2008 edition of the country G Football Federation Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players. 12. In the alternative, the Respondent held that the claim of the Claimant is timebarred, apart from the salary of EUR 783 for June 2009. As to the interruption of the statute of limitations period, the Respondent stressed that the Claimant’s statements are contradictory since he indicated that “the report before the country G FA was never lodged.” 13. Finally, the Respondent held that the amount requested for the flight ticket should be rejected, since the Claimant neither specified the date nor the purpose of the flight. 14. On 22 July 2013, the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) rendered an award whereby it decided that the national arbitration bodies of the country G Football Federation fulfil the requirements of equal representation and of an independent chairman and guarantee fair proceedings. II. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter also referred to as Chamber or DRC) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the case at hand. In this respect, it took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 13 June 2011. Consequently, the 2008 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: Procedural Rules) is applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 par. 2 and par. 3 of the Procedural Rules). 2. With regard to the competence of the Dispute Resolution Chamber, art. 3 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules states that the Dispute Resolution Chamber shall examine its jurisdiction in the light of articles 22 to 24 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2012). In accordance with art. 24 par. 1 and par. 2 in combination with art. 22 lit. b) of the aforementioned Regulations, the Dispute Resolution Chamber would, in principle, be competent to deal with the matter at stake, which concerns an employment-related dispute with an international dimension between a country A player and a country G club. 3. However, the DRC acknowledged that the Respondent contested the competence of FIFA’s deciding body on the basis of art. 10 of the employment contract. 4. In this respect, and first of all, the Chamber outlined that the standard country G Super League employment contract signed by and between the Claimant and the Respondent contains a clause in accordance with which all disputes between the parties are settled by the Appeals Committee for the Resolution of Financial Disputes (PEEOD) at first instance and the Court of Arbitration of the country G Football Federation at second instance. 5. In continuation, the Chamber emphasised that in accordance with art. 22 lit. b) of the 2012 edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, it is competent to hear a matter such as the one at hand, unless an independent tribunal, guaranteeing fair proceedings and respecting the principle of equal representation of players and clubs, has been established at national level within the framework of the association and/or a collective bargaining agreement. With regard to the standards to be imposed on an independent arbitration tribunal guaranteeing fair proceedings, the DRC referred to FIFA Circular no. 1010 dated 20 December 2005. In this regard, the Chamber further referred to the principles contained in the FIFA National Dispute Resolution Chamber (NDRC) Standard Regulations, which came into force on 1 January 2008. 6. In this respect, the Chamber took into account that, on 22 July 2013, the CAS issued an award, whereby it decided that the national arbitration bodies of the country G Football Federation fulfill the requirements of equal representation and of an independent chairman and guarantee fair proceedings, in compliance with the aforementioned applicable standards. 7. In this context, the Chamber took note that the country G deciding bodies at the basis of the aforementioned CAS decision are the same deciding bodies as the one included in the jurisdiction clause of the standard country G Super League employment contract in the present matter. 8. On account of the above, the DRC referred to art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players and established that it is not competent to adjudicate on the present matter, since a) clause 10 of the relevant employment contract constitutes a clear and exclusive jurisdiction clause in favour of the PEEOD and the Court of Arbitration of the country G, and b) CAS confirmed that the relevant country G deciding bodies fulfill the requirements of equal representation and of an independent chairman and guarantee fair proceedings, i.e. the relevant country G deciding bodies are competent to adjudicate on disputes between players and clubs like the matter at hand. 9. In light of the above, the Chamber decided that the claim of the Claimant is inadmissible. ***** III. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. The claim of the Claimant, Player B, is inadmissible. Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy): According to art. 67 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives). The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following: Court of Arbitration for Sport Avenue de Beaumont 2 1012 Lausanne Switzerland Tel: +41 21 613 50 00 / Fax: +41 21 613 50 01 e-mail: info@tas-cas.org www.tas-cas.org For the Dispute Resolution Chamber: Jérôme Valcke Secretary General Encl. CAS directives