F.I.F.A. – Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2013-2014) – controversie di lavoro – ———- F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber (2013-2014) – labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 9 May 2014, in the following composition: Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman Johan van Gaalen (South Africa), member Damir Vrbanovic (Croatia), member on the claim presented by the player, Player A, country B as Claimant against the club, Club C, country D as Respondent regarding an employment-related dispute between the parties

F.I.F.A. - Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2013-2014) - controversie di lavoro - ---------- F.I.F.A. - Dispute Resolution Chamber (2013-2014) - labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 9 May 2014, in the following composition: Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman Johan van Gaalen (South Africa), member Damir Vrbanovic (Croatia), member on the claim presented by the player, Player A, country B as Claimant against the club, Club C, country D as Respondent regarding an employment-related dispute between the parties I. Facts of the case 1. On 4 July 2007, the player from country B, Player A (hereinafter: the Claimant or player), concluded an employment contract (hereinafter: the contract) with the club from country D, Club C (hereinafter: the Respondent or club), valid from the date of the signature until the end of the season 2010/2011. 2. According to the contract the player would receive for the season 2009/2010 as well as for the season 2010/2011 a monthly salary of 109,450 plus a signing on fee amounting to 172,000 in August of each season. Moreover, according to clause 17.1. the player would be entitled twice every season to a flight ticket (return) to his country of origin. 3. As from January 2008 until May 2009 the player was rendering his services to clubs in country B. 4. On 7 September 2009, the player contacted FIFA arguing that at the end of his loan to a club from country B, on 26 May 2009, he requested from the club the flight ticket to enable him to return to the club to render his services, however, without success. He purchased a ticket and returned to the club on 28 June 2009. However, apparently the club was no longer interested in his services. He notified the club several times in order to get any information, however, without success. The player provided some documents in this respect. The player further explains that he was informed by a member of the club about an alleged termination agreement that he would have signed on 6 January 2008. The player also provided a copy of such document. According to the said document (hereinafter: termination agreement) the parties would have agreed on the early termination of the contract and the player confirmed that the amount of 60,530 (USD 17,400) was a “final discharge of the contract” and “ In the act of transferring the referred amount to my account, I will no longer have the right to claim or demand any amount”. 5. Yet, according to the player another document was signed on the same day, document also provided by player, (hereinafter: second document) according to which the player would have received the amount of USD 15,900 as an advance payment for his future salary. The player argues that at the time he signed the documents, he was advised by a translator of the club, who informed him that the two documents were only receipts of amounts paid for the worked days in January 2008. Considering the club’s lack of information, the player terminated the contract in writing on 13 July 2009. The player provided a copy of the termination letter. 6. As a result, the player claims the outstanding salaries for June and July 2009 (17 June 2009 until 13 July 2009, 26 days) in the amount of USD 24,663, the remaining value of the contract as compensation in the amount of USD 758,180, the reimbursement of the airplane ticket in the amount of USD 2,787, 5% interest and sanctions to be imposed on the club. 7. The player deems that the fact that he was transferred on loan to the club from country B, Club E, on 20 January 2008 and after the end of his contract with Club E, he was transferred on loan again to Club F until 17 June 2009 proofs that he was still bound by an employment contract to the club. The player provided a copy of an International Transfer Certificate (ITC) issued by the Country D Football Association to the Country B Football Association dated 3 February 2009 with the remark: “The player is on agreement loan till 17.06.2009”. 8. On 7 September 2010, the club rejected the claim of the player arguing that after only a few months he informed the club that he wished to return to country B to his family. Therefore the parties mutually terminated the contract on 6 January 2008; the club provided a copy of the termination agreement. The club emphasized that the player has not provided any evidence that the termination agreement was a forgery or that he was forced to sign it. Moreover, the club emphasized that the content of the termination agreement had been read and explained to him in his own language and that he understood its meaning and agreed to sign it on his free will. The club also explained that at the request of the player the club agreed to loan him to two different clubs from country B. The club facilitated the player’s temporary employment with these clubs by signing the required releases for such loans. The club provided a copy of the “release” signed by the player and the club from country B, Club F. By means of this document the club affirmed that the player will be on loan until 17 June 2009. At the end of the loan period, the player will be obliged to notify the club about the potential team for which he intends to play in order to allow the club to agree with the new team upon the financial terms of the player’s transfer and employment. 9. As a result, the club deems that the claim is groundless since it refers to the period after the execution of the termination agreement. The player evidently agreed to the termination of his employment agreement and was no longer employed by the club as from January 2008. 10. In his second submission the player first requested that the DRC should disregard the late submission of the club. As to the substance the player contested the club’s allegations. As to the termination agreement, the player once again emphasized that he was informed by the translator of the club that such documents referred to a payment made in connection with his salary for January 2008 and that he was loaned to the club from country B until 17 June 2009. 11. In its second submission, the club contested the competence of the DRC. As to the substance the club provided some testimonies of club’s representatives in connection with the player’s request to return to country B due to personal issues. Moreover, the club insists that the player intends to mislead FIFA, first the player denies the existence of the termination agreement, then he objects to the true intentions of its content and finally the player requests that FIFA should not consider the submissions of the club. The club explained that in spite of the financial damage it would incur it had decided to approve the player’s request to prematurely terminate the contract. Such termination was subject to the verbal agreement between the parties that if in the future the player were to enter into an agreement with a third club that was willing to pay for his transfer and services, the player would notify the club and allow the latter to receive some monetary compensation to compensate the club for paying such a high transfer compensation (USD 375,000). Furthermore, the club emphasized that the amount of USD 15,900 corresponded to 60,530 on 6 January 2008 and therefore the player signed both documents on 6 January 2008. The second document when he received the amount in cash and the termination agreement to confirm that he received the amount as final discharge of the contract. Since the player signed the second document, according to which he undertook to pay said amount back to the club or in the alternative the club to take it back from his next salary, the club was no longer obliged to transfer said amount to his account as stated in the termination agreement and the amounts were set off against each other’s. Also the allegation of the player that the amount mentioned in the second document was paid as an advance for the 6 days in January is fabricated as USD 15,900 is more than ½ a monthly salary. The player did not provide any evidence to support any of its allegations. The fact that the player knew that he was no longer playing for the club is supported by the fact that he was transferred several times between different clubs from country B in 2008, 2009 and 2010 without the knowledge /intervention of the club, the player had rendered his services to 5 different clubs since the termination. As a result, the club requested the DRC to dismiss all financial claims of the player. 12. Upon FIFA’s request the player explained that he signed an employment contract with the club from country B, Club G, valid as from 1 January 2010 until 31 December 2010. II. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. First, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter also referred to as DRC or Chamber) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the matter at stake. In this respect, the Chamber referred to art. 21 par. 1 and 2 of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (edition 2012; hereinafter: the Procedural Rules). The present matter was submitted to FIFA on 7 September 2009. Consequently, the Chamber concluded that the former Procedural Rules (edition 2008) are applicable to the matter at hand. 2. With regard to the competence of the Dispute Resolution Chamber, art. 3 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules states that the Dispute Resolution Chamber shall examine its jurisdiction in the light of art. 22 to 24 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2012). In accordance with art. 24 par. 1 in combination with art. 22 lit. b) of the aforementioned Regulations, the Dispute Resolution Chamber would, in principle, be competent to deal with the matter at stake, which concerns an employment-related dispute with an international dimension between a player from country B and an club from country D. 3. However, the Chamber acknowledged that the Respondent contested the competence of FIFA explaining that the national sports arbitration bodies are competent. 4. While analysing whether it was competent to hear the present matter, the Dispute Resolution Chamber considered that it should, first and foremost, analyse whether the employment contract at the basis of the present dispute actually contained a clear jurisdiction clause towards another decision-making body. 5. In this respect, the Chamber deemed it of utmost importance to highlight that the contract signed between parties does not contain any jurisdiction clause at all. In view of the aforementioned, the competence of Chamber is confirmed and the claim is admissible. 6. Finally, and for the sake of completeness, the members of the Chamber also underlined that the Respondent did not provide any documentary evidence to support its allegations in relation to the competence question. 7. Subsequently, the Chamber analysed which edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. 8. In this respect, the Chamber referred, on the one hand, to art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (editions 2012, 2010, 2009 and 2008) and, on the other hand, to the fact that the present claim was lodged on 7 September 2009. The Dispute Resolution Chamber concluded that the 2009 version of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: the Regulations) is applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance. 9. The competence of the Chamber and the applicable regulations having been established, the Chamber started by acknowledging the above-mentioned facts as well as the documentation contained in the file. However, the Chamber emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to the facts, arguments and documentary evidence which it considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand. 10. In this respect, the members of the DRC acknowledged that it was undisputed by the parties that, on 4 July 2007, they signed an employment contract valid as from the date of signature until the end of the season 2010/2011, according to which the Claimant was entitled to receive the remuneration detailed in point I.2. above. 11. The DRC noted that, on the one hand, the Claimant claims that on 13 July 2009 he terminated the contract in writing with just cause. In particular the Claimant states that when he returned from loan in June 2009 the Respondent was no longer interested in his services and he was informed about an alleged termination agreement that he would have had signed on 6 January 2008. 12. In view of the foregoing the Claimant terminated the contract, in writing, on 13 July 2009 and on 7 September 2009, he lodged a claim in front of FIFA against the Respondent, requesting the payment of outstanding remuneration and compensation for breach of contract, as detailed in point I.6. above. 13. Subsequently, the DRC noted that, on the other hand, the Respondent claims that upon the Claimant’s request the parties mutually terminated the contract and signed the termination agreement on 6 January 2008. 14. Having established the aforementioned, the Chamber deemed that the underlying issue in this dispute, considering the claim of the Claimant and the allegations of the Respondent, was to determine whether the employment contract had been mutually terminated by the parties in January 2008 or with just cause by the Claimant in July 2009. The Chamber also underlined that, subsequently, if it were found that the employment contract had been breached by one of the parties without just cause, it would be necessary to determine the consequences for the party that caused the unjust breach of the relevant employment contract. 15. In view of the above, the Chamber first focused its attention on the termination agreement by means of which the Claimant confirmed that the amount of 60,530 was a “final discharge of the contract” and “In the act of transferring the referred amount to my account, I will no longer have the right to claim or demand any amount”. 16. The Chamber also noted the content of the second document: “I, Player A here by to confirm that I have Received an amount of 15900$, on 6/1/08, from Club C… I promise to pay this amount in cash or allow you to take it of my next salary.” 17. In this respect, the Chamber took due note that, on the one hand, the Claimant argues that at the time he signed the documents, he was advised by a translator of the Respondent, who informed him that the two documents were only receipts of amounts paid for the days he had rendered his services to the Respondent in January 2008 as indicated in point I.4. 5. and 10. above. 18. The Chamber also observed that the Respondent, on the other hand stated that the amount of USD 15,900 corresponded to 60,530 in January 2008. Thus, the Claimant signed the second document when he received the amount in cash and the termination agreement to confirm that he received the amount as final discharge of the contract. Since the player signed the second document, according to which he undertook to pay said amount back to the club or in the alternative the club to deduct it from his next salary, the club was no longer obliged to transfer said amount to his account as stated in the termination agreement and the amounts were set off against each other. 19. In connection with the preceding paragraphs, the Chamber noted that the Claimant did neither contest the validity of the termination agreement nor that he had in fact signed the relevant termination agreement but holds that he was misled from the actual content of the termination agreement, since the original version was in the language of country D. 20. In this regard, the Dispute Resolution Chamber was eager to emphasise that in accordance with its well as well-established jurisprudence a party signing a document of legal importance without knowledge of its precise contents, as a general rule, does so on its own responsibility. 21. Moreover, the Chamber confirmed that as stated by the Respondent the amount of 60,530 corresponded to more or less USD 15,880 on 6 January 2008 and it remains uncontested that the Claimant received said amount. 22. Finally, the member of the Chamber did not follow the argumentation of the Claimant, by means of which the above-mentioned amount would have been paid to him as an advance payment for rendering his services to the club during 6 days in January 2008, particularly considering that said amount corresponds to more than half of a monthly salary. 23. In view of all the foregoing, the members of the Chamber concluded that the parties had indeed agreed upon the premature termination of the contract by means of the document signed on 6 January 2008. 24. Consequently, taking into account the clear wording of the termination agreement “final discharge of the contract” and “In the act of transferring the referred amount to my account, I will no longer have the right to claim or demand any amount” and the fact that the amount agreed upon in the termination agreement has been paid to the Claimant, the Dispute Resolution Chamber unanimously concluded to reject the claim of the Claimant. II. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. The claim of the Claimant, Player A, is admissible. 2. The claim of the Claimant is rejected. ***** Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy): According to art. 67 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives). The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following: Court of Arbitration for Sport Avenue de Beaumont 2 1012 Lausanne Switzerland Tel: +41 21 613 50 00 Fax: +41 21 613 50 01 e-mail: info@tas-cas.org www.tas-cas.org For the Dispute Resolution Chamber: Jérôme Valcke Secretary General Encl: CAS directives