F.I.F.A. – Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2014-2015) – controversie di lavoro – ———- F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber (2014-2015) – labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 30 July 2014, in the following composition: Thomas Grimm (Switzerland), Deputy Chairman Johan van Gaalen (South Africa), member Theodore Giannikos (Greece), member on the claim presented by the club, Club A, country B as Claimant against the player, Player C, country D as Respondent 1 and the club, Club E, country D as Respondent 2 regarding an employment-related dispute between the parties

F.I.F.A. - Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2014-2015) - controversie di lavoro - ---------- F.I.F.A. - Dispute Resolution Chamber (2014-2015) - labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 30 July 2014, in the following composition: Thomas Grimm (Switzerland), Deputy Chairman Johan van Gaalen (South Africa), member Theodore Giannikos (Greece), member on the claim presented by the club, Club A, country B as Claimant against the player, Player C, country D as Respondent 1 and the club, Club E, country D as Respondent 2 regarding an employment-related dispute between the parties I. Facts of the case 1. On 29 August 2008, the Player C from country D, born on 14 February 1985 (hereinafter: the Respondent 1), and the club from country B, Club A (hereinafter: the Claimant), signed an employment contract (hereinafter: the contract) valid as from the date of signature until 31 December 2012. 2. According to the contract, the Respondent 1 was entitled to receive, inter alia, the following amounts: - USD 35,715 as monthly salary as from the beginning of employment until 31 December 2008; - USD 57,472 as monthly salary as from 1 January 2009 until 31 December 2012; - USD 571,430 as an additional premium on 15 September 2008; - USD 172,415 as additional premiums due on 15 January 2009, 15 January 2010, 15 January 2011 and 15 January 2012. 3. According art. 8.2 of the contract, “(…) the Football player has the right to terminate the present Contract by his own initiative (by his own choice), informing the Club about it in writing not later than one month (provided that the present Contract is not concluded for the period, that is less than four months), however, in this case the Football player is obliged to pay to the Club on the date of dismissal the money payment (compensation), at the rate, which is equivalent to 25 000 000 (twenty five million) Euro (…)”. 4. According to art. 11.2 of the contract, “(…) If the dispute between the Parties is not settled, than it is subject to settlement in accordance with the Regulation of the Football Association from country B over the status and transfers of the Football players, and in applicable cases - with the Regulation of FIFA over the status and transfers of the Football players.” 5. On 29 December 2010, the Claimant, the Respondent 1 and the club from country D, Club G (hereinafter: Club G) signed an agreement for the loan of the Respondent 1 with Club G as from 1 January 2011 until 31 December 2011. 6. On 18 July 2011, the Claimant was contacted by Club G in writing, requesting the former’s consent for an envisaged sub-loan of the Respondent 1 to the club from country D, Club E (hereinafter: the Respondent 2) until the end of the loan period, i.e. 31 December 2011. 7. According to the Claimant, it gave its consent to Club G on 19 July 2011 for stated sub-loan. 8. On 16 January 2012, the Claimant addressed a letter to the Respondent 1 via the Respondent 2, by means of which it warned him that he should immediately return to country B and that otherwise the sanctions stipulated in the contract would be applied. 9. Negotiations were held between the Claimant and the Respondent 1 on 24 and 25 January 2012. On the latter date, the Respondent 1 informed the Claimant of the termination of the contract by means of a written notification making reference to art. 8.2 of the contract. 10. On 25 January 2012, the Claimant and the Respondent 1 also signed an additional agreement (hereinafter: the additional agreement), according to which they agreed to change art. 8.2 of the contract (cf. point 3) as follows: “ 8 2 The Football player has the right to prematurely terminate the present Contract by his own initiative (by his own choice), however, in this case the Football player is obliged to pay to the Club the Compensation (according to article 17 of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players) in amount of: a) 300 000 (three hundred thousand) US Dollars – if the Compensation is paid by the Football player or his new club within 20 days following the date of termination of this Contract, or b) 1 000 000 (one million) US Dollars – if the Compensation is paid by the Football player or his new club later than within 20th day but earlier 60th day following the date of termination of this Contract. If the Football player fails to pay the Compensation within 60 days following the date of terminations of this Contract, the interest of 10% per annum shall apply.” 11. Art. 3 of the additional agreement stipulates that ‘’as far as the Football player used the option to unilaterally terminate this Contract, the Contract shall be terminated as of 26 January 2012’’. 12. Moreover, art. 4 of the additional agreement stipulates that ‘’as far as the Football player hasn’t worked in the Club in January 2012, no salary or other remuneration shall be paid to the Football player’’. 13. On 21 March 2012, the Claimant sent a letter to the Respondent 1 acknowledging having received a cheque issued on 17 February 2012 in the amount of USD 300,000. However, the Claimant maintained that the cheque was issued outside of the 20-day deadline, meaning that the amount owed by the Respondent 1 to the Claimant is USD 1,000,000. In addition, the Claimant mentioned that the payment should be made via bank transfer since cheques are not an accepted means of payment in country B. 14. On 17 October 2012, the Claimant lodged a claim against the Respondent 1 and the Respondent 2 in front of FIFA for breach of contract and inducement to such and asks to be awarded compensation as follows from the Respondent 1 and the Respondent 2 as jointly and severally liable: a) EUR 25,000,000 in accordance with the compensation clause of the contract; or, in the alternative, USD 2,430,079 corresponding to the non-amortised expenses and the residual value of the contract (i.e. EUR 5,270,000 for the acquisition of the Respondent 1 – 363 days remaining period of contract = USD 1,568,000; Residual value of contract 689,664 + 172,415 = USD 862,079; USD 1,568,000 + USD 862,079 = USD 2,430,079); b) interest of 10% p.a. as of 26 March 2012 (61st day following the termination; or, in the alternative; interest of 10% p.a. as of 18 April 2012 (the date on which the formal request to pay interest was served by the Claimant); c) to apply consequences for failing to give the notice of termination within 15 days of the last official match of the season. 15. In the joint reply from the Respondent 1 and the Respondent 2, they contest FIFA’s competence referring to art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: the Regulations) and stating that the DRC of the Football Association from country B is competent. In this regard, the Respondents provided a copy of the “Regulations of the Football Association from country B for the Resolution of Disputes” (March 2012 edition; hereinafter: the Regulations of the Football Association from country B). The Regulations of the Football Association from country B stipulate inter alia the following: a) with regard to the jurisdiction of the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Chamber of the Football Association from country B): According to art. 13 of the Regulations of the Football Association from country B, the Chamber of the Football Association from country B is competent to “consider and resolve the following disputes: (…) registration of the football players (…) (…) between the football club and the football player. (…) head coach, coaches (…) (…) for payment if the compensation for education and training of the football player (…)” b) with regard to the composition: Art. 7 of the Regulations of the Football Association from country B establishes that the Chamber of the Football Association from country B consists of twelve members (Chairman, Deputy of the Chairman, five representatives of professional football players and five representatives of the professional football clubs). The composition of the Chamber of the Football Association from country B is approved by the Executive Committee, whereas the representative of the professional football players are elected by the trade unions and of the representatives of the professional football club three are elected from the country B Football Premier League, one of the Football National League and one of the second division and other disciplines. Moreover, according to art. 8.9 of the Regulations of the Football Association from country B the “Chamber [of the Football Association from country B] may make a decision in the case of presence at the session Chamber of the majority of all appointed members of the Chamber [of the Football Association from country B], including the Chairman or his deputy.” c) with regard to the possibility of an appeal: Concerning the possibility of an appeal against a decision taken by the Chamber of the Football Association from country B, art. 53 stipulates that “1. The decision of the Chamber may be appealed only to the Committee within 7 calendar days from the receipt of the decision. 2. The Committee’s decision can be appealed only in the Sports Court of Arbitration (Tribunal Arbitral du Sport) in Lausanne (Switzerland) within 21 calendar days from the receipt of the decision.” 16. With regard to the substance of the claim, the Respondent 1 and the Respondent 2 argue that the contract was terminated as of 26 January 2012 and by signing the additional agreement the provisions of the contract shall be set aside. Thus, no breach of an employment contract was committed by the Respondent 1, meaning that no compensation as per art. 17 of the Regulations is due and no sporting sanctions can be imposed on the Respondent 1. 17. The Respondent 2 for its part maintains that it is not party to the additional agreement and therefore assumes no responsibility in relation to the obligations undertaken by the Respondent 1 towards the Claimant. In this context, and since there was no breach of an employment contract committed by the Respondent 1, the provisions of art. 17 par. 2 and 4 of the Regulations are not applicable towards the Respondent 2. 18. In addition, the Respondent 2 also states as reason for not being liable for the payment of any compensation, the fact that the Claimant expressly agreed to the delivery of the International Transfer Certificate (ITC) for the Respondent 1. 19. Moreover, the Respondent 1 and the Respondent 2 argue that the Respondent 1 fulfilled the payment of USD 300,000 according to the additional agreement by means of a cheque remitted to the Claimant, which was even acknowledged by the latter. With regard to the Claimant’s statement that it could not properly discount the cheque, the Respondent 1 and the Respondent 2 emphasise that no documentary evidence in this regard was provided and the cheque was never returned to the Respondent 1. The Respondent 1 and the Respondent 2 add that the Respondent 1 should anyhow not be held responsible for a problem between the Claimant and its bank although the Respondent 1 is willing to pay directly to the Claimant’s bank account if the cheque is returned to him. 20. Finally, the Respondent 1 and the Respondent 2 reject the 10% interest p.a. requested by the Claimant, since there is no legal basis for such a claim and it goes against the longstanding jurisprudence of FIFA’s deciding bodies. 21. In its replica, the Claimant rejects the competence of the Chamber of the Football Association from country B, since there is no clear reference in the contract in this respect, the Football Association from country B Regulations are only in force since March 2012 and there is no requirement for equal representation in accordance with art. 8.9 (cf. point 15 lit. b.) of the Regulations of the Football Association from country B since a presence of 7 from a total of 12 members is sufficient. 22. As to the substance of the claim, the Claimant emphasises that the Respondent 1 breached the contract in the beginning of January 2012 by failing to return to country B after his loan ended, despite being informed of his obligation through the letter dated 16 January 2012 (cf. point 8). Since said letter was sent via the Respondent 2, the latter was also aware that the Respondent 1 had breached the contract. 23. The Claimant also insists that the Respondent 1 took the decision to unilaterally terminate the contract using the option set out in art. 8.2 of the contract. Subsequently, the parties to the contract agreed to sign the additional agreement which served the sole purpose of agreeing to a reduced amount of compensation against the guarantee of being paid in a short time frame. Thus, the additional agreement is to be regarded as a mere agreement for the reduction of compensation and not a mutual termination of the contract. 24. With regard to the Respondent 2’s allegation that the Claimant had agreed to the delivery of the ITC, the Claimant states that it had no reason to put obstacles for the Respondent 1’s future career if the latter decided to unilaterally terminate the contract and there is a compensation clause in the contract. 25. Furthermore, the Claimant reiterates that it did not receive any amount from the Respondent 1 and that cheques are not a form of payment in country B. What is more, the cheque was issued after the 20-day deadline and thus the compensation due at the time of its issuance was USD 1,000,000. The Claimant also insists that it has submitted proof that the cheque had been rejected and referred to a report from the Bank A which indicates that a remittance for USD 300,000 has remained unpaid. In this respect, the Claimant also provided the copy of a letter from Bank B stating that the cheque was being returned to the Claimant since the Bank A had refused the cheque. 26. Finally, the Claimant insists that 10% interest p.a. shall be applied, since it was agreed in the additional agreement and the interest in country B is much higher than 5% interest. 27. To this, the Respondent 1 and the Respondent 2 reiterate that the Chamber of the Football Association from country B is the competent deciding body to adjudicate the present matter. In this respect, the Respondent 1 and the Respondent 2 state that said body respects the obligation of equal representation since it is constituted of an equal number of player and club representatives. They also mention that since art. 11.2 of the contract refers to the Regulations of the Football Association from country B, the deciding bodies of the Football Association from country B shall consequently adjudicate all disputes on the basis of the contract. The Respondent 1 and the Respondent 2 also state that the Chamber of the Football Association from country B is competent to hear the present dispute since said body had been created at the time the Claimant lodged its claim, regardless of the fact that it was not existent at the time of the signature of the contract. 28. Furthermore, the Respondent 1 and the Respondent 2 maintain that the contract was terminated by mutual agreement through the signature of the additional agreement. They insist that this reflects the intention of the parties at the time of its signature and deem that this is corroborated by the wording of the document. 29. In relation to the cheque, the Respondent 1 insists that he was in good faith since he was never informed that cheques are not a means of payment in country B and has never been given the cheque in return after its alleged rejection. 30. In addition, referring to the 20-day deadline stipulated in the additional agreement, the Respondent 1 and the Respondent 2 claim that the cheque was issued with a delay of 4 days only, which they deem derisory. They also state that the validity of the additional agreement was made conditional to its registration at the country B Football Premier League, which only occurred two weeks later. Thus, the issuance of the cheque was in fact not made with any delay. 31. In addition, a raise from USD 300,000 to USD 1,000,000 for a difference of 4 days is to be considered as arbitrary and disproportionate. The Respondent 1 and the Respondent 2 also claim that the Claimant’s request for interest cannot be accepted because it is responsible for the delay in payment since the cheque was never returned to the Respondent 1 who has consequently not been in a position to settle the matter. II. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter also referred to as DRC or Chamber) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the matter at stake. In this respect, the Chamber referred to art. 21 par. 1 and 2 of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (edition 2012; hereinafter: the Procedural Rules). The present matter was submitted to FIFA on 17 October 2012. Consequently, the Chamber concluded that the 2012 edition of the Procedural Rules is applicable to the matter at hand. 2. With regard to the competence of the Dispute Resolution Chamber, art. 3 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules states that the Dispute Resolution Chamber shall examine its jurisdiction in the light of art. 22 to 24 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2012). In accordance with art. 24 par. 1 in combination with art. 22 lit. b) of the aforementioned Regulations, the Dispute Resolution Chamber would, in principle, be competent to deal with the matter at stake, which concerns an employment-related dispute with an international dimension between a club from country B and a player from country D as well as a club from country D. 3. However, the Chamber acknowledged that the Respondents contested the competence of FIFA’s deciding bodies stating that an independent arbitration tribunal in line with art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, in fine, exists within the Football Union of country B. In addition, the Respondent referred to art. 11.2 which stipulates that “if the dispute between the Parties is not settled, than it is subject to settlement in accordance with the Regulations of the Football Association from country B over the status and transfers of Football Players, and in applicable cases – with the Regulation of FIFA over the status and transfers of the Football players”. On the basis thereof, and since the stated article of the contract stipulates that the applicable regulations within the Football Union of country B are to be applied in case of a dispute between the parties, the Respondents argue that the relevant bodies of the Football Union of country B are competent to adjudicate the present dispute. 4. In this regard, the Chamber noted that the Claimant rejected such position and insisted that FIFA has jurisdiction to deal with the present matter. 5. While analysing whether it was competent to hear the present matter, the Chamber deemed it vital to outline that one of the basic conditions that needs to be met in order to establish that another organ than the DRC is competence to settle an employment-related dispute between a club and a player of an international dimension, is that the jurisdiction of the relevant national arbitration tribunal or national court derives from a clear reference in the employment contract. 6. Therefore, while analysing whether it was competent to hear the present matter, the Dispute Resolution Chamber considered that it should, first and foremost, analyse whether the employment contract at the basis of the present dispute contained a clear jurisdiction clause. 7. In this connection, the Chamber was of the firm opinion that the art. 11.2 of the contract does not consist in a choice of jurisdiction, but rather a choice of applicable law, which does not concern procedural matters. The members of the Chamber therefore concluded that the contract does not contain any arbitration or jurisdiction clause. Hence, article 11.2 of the contract clearly does not refer to a national dispute resolution chamber or any similar arbitration body in the sense of art. 22 lit. b) of the aforementioned Regulations. 8. In view of all the above, the Chamber established that the Respondents’ objection to the competence of FIFA to deal with the present matter has to be rejected and that the Dispute Resolution Chamber is competent, on the basis of art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, to consider the present matter as to the substance. 9. Subsequently, the Chamber analysed which edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, the Chamber referred, on the one hand, to art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (editions 2012) and, on the other hand, to the fact that the present claim was lodged on 17 October 2012. The Dispute Resolution Chamber concluded that the 2012 version of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: the Regulations) is applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance. 10. The competence of the Chamber and the applicable regulations having been established, and entering into the substance of the matter, the Chamber started by acknowledging the above-mentioned facts as well as the documentation contained in the file. However, the Chamber emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to the facts, arguments and documentary evidence which it considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand. 11. In this regard, the Chamber started by taking note of the argumentation put forward by the Claimant, according to which the Respondent breached the contract by not returning to country B at the end of the loan period with the Respondent 2 and then terminated the contract by means of the written notice dated 25 January 2012. On this basis, the Claimant claims compensation for breach of contract from the Respondent 1 as well as from the Respondent 2, as the latter allegedly induced such breach of contract. As to the amount claimed, the Claimant refers to clause 8.2 of the contract and claims the amount of EUR 25,000,000 as compensation from the Respondent 1 and the Respondent 2. In addition, the Claimant requests sporting sanctions to be imposed both on the Respondent 1 and the Respondent 2. 12. As concerns the position submitted by the Respondents in this respect, the Chamber observed that they argued that the contract was set aside by means of the termination of the contract on 26 January 2012. Therefore, since there was no breach of the employment contract, the Respondents claim that the Claimant is not entitled to compensation for breach of contract in the sense of art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations. Moreover, the Respondent 2 maintains that in these circumstances as well as the fact that it is not party to the document concluded between the Claimant and the Respondent 1 on 25 January 2012, the consequences of art. 17 par. 2 and 4 of the Regulations may not be opposed to it. 13. On account of the above, the members of the Chamber turned their attention to the circumstance surrounding the termination of the contract. The Chamber noted in this regard that as the result of negotiations held between the Claimant and the Respondent, on 25 January 2012, the Respondent 1 notified the Claimant of the termination of the contract and the latter parties signed the additional agreement. According to the additional agreement, the parties thereto inter alia agreed to modify the content of clause 8.2 of the contract and acknowledged that the contract was terminated as of 26 January 2012. 14. In this context, and in consideration of the entire events that took place on 25 January 2012, the Chamber concluded that the Claimant and the Respondent 1, by means of the two documents established on that day, agreed on the termination of the contract as well as its consequences. In particular, by agreeing to the consequences of the termination of the contract on the same day as the player’s notification of termination and this as a result of negotiations held between the Claimant and the Respondent 1, these circumstances suggested that both parties expressed their agreement to the termination of the contract. 15. On account of the above, the Chamber reached the conclusion that the contract is to be considered as terminated on 25 January 2012 and in application of the additional agreement, the consequences stipulated therein are to be applied. In particular, the Chamber emphasised that by means of the additional agreement, the parties thereto agreed that only the consequences provided for in the amended version of clause 8.2 could be applied and, a contrario, those foreseen in clause 8.2 of the contract were set aside. 16. Moreover, the DRC deemed fit to point out that after the termination of the contract, the actions taken by both the Claimant and the Respondent 1 suggest that both were in agreement with the fact that no further consequences than those outlined in the additional agreement would apply as a result of the termination of the contract. In particular, on the one hand, the Respondent 1 issued a cheque in the amount of USD 300,000 dated 17 February 2012. On the other hand, in its correspondence dated 21 March 2012, the Claimant requested the payment of the amount of USD 1,000,000 following the fact that the Respondent 1 had apparently failed to pay the amount of USD 300,000 within 20 days after the termination of the contract. 17. Having stated the above, the Chamber turned its attention to the consequences of the above-mentioned termination of the contract. In this respect, the members of the Chamber reverted to the consequences provided for in the additional agreement, according to which the Respondent 1 is obliged to pay the Claimant the amount of USD 300,000 ‘’if the Compensation is paid by the Football player or his new club within 20 days following the date of termination of this Contract’’ or USD 1,000,000 ‘’if the Compensation is paid by the Football player or his new club later than within 20th day but earlier 60th day following the date of termination of this Contract. If the Football player fails to pay the Compensation within 60 days following the date of termination of this Contract, the interest of 10% per annum shall apply.’’ 18. In continuation, in order to determine what amount remains outstanding in application of clause 8.2 of the additional agreement, the DRC took note of the parties’ respective argumentation as to whether the Respondent 1 has paid any of the amounts as stipulated in clause 8.2 of the additional agreement. On the one hand, the Chamber noted that the Claimant acknowledged having received a cheque for an amount of USD 300,000 issued on 17 February 2012. However, the Claimant maintains that it was not able to cash-in said cheque and provided in this regard two bank statements to corroborate such allegation. In this regard, the DRC also noted the Claimant’s statement that at the time of the issuance of the cheque, the amount due by the player was in fact USD 1,000,000 since the pertinent cheque was issued more than 20 days after the date of termination of the contract. On the other hand, the Chamber noted the Respondents’ line of argument according to which the amount of USD 300,000 has been paid in good faith since the Respondent 1 has never received the cheque in return. Moreover, the Respondents acknowledge that the cheque was issued four days after the 20-day deadline, but insist that a raise from USD 300,000 to USD 1,000,000 for having missed the deadline to pay the former amount is arbitrary and disproportionate. 19. In this respect, the Chamber started by noting that the Respondent 1 had failed to pay the Claimant the amount of USD 300,000 within 20 days as from the termination of the contract, which fell on 14 February 2012. As a consequence, the DRC determined that as of 15 February 2012, the Respondent 1 had the obligation to pay the amount of USD 1,000,000 to the Claimant, as contractually agreed by means of clause 8.2 of the additional agreement. Furthermore, with reference to art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules, which stipulates that any party claiming an alleged fact shall carry the burden of proof, the Chamber acknowledged that the Claimant had presented convincing documentation confirming that it had been unable to cash-in the cheque. 20. On account of the thereof, the Chamber concluded that the Respondent 1 had failed to pay the amount of USD 300,000 within the 20-days deadline as stipulated in clause 8.2 of the additional agreement and consequently that this failure necessarily triggered the application of the second part of clause 8.2, i.e. that the Respondent 1 must pay the amount of USD 1,000,000 to the Claimant. Therefore, and in compliance with the general principle of pacta sunt servanda and the stipulations of the additional agreement, the DRC decided that the Respondent 1 has to pay the amount of USD 1,000,000 to the Claimant. 21. With due consideration to the above and particularly the fact that the Claimant had been unable to cash-in the cheque remitted by the Respondent 1, the DRC established that the Claimant has to return to the Respondent 1 the cheque amounting to USD 300,000 bearing the date 17 February 2012. 22. The Chamber then turned its attention to the Claimant’s request for interest at a rate of 10% p.a. as of 26 March 2012, which corresponds to the 61st day after the termination of the contract. In this regard, the Chamber noted the Respondents’ stance stating the Claimant’s claim for interest should not be accepted because the latter is responsible for any delay in payment because it did not return the cheque to the Respondent 1. 23. In this regard, the DRC members took due note of the wording of the additional agreement which stipulates that in case the Respondent 1 or his new club fail to pay the amount of USD 1,000,000 within 60 days after the termination of the contract, interest of 10% shall apply. On the basis of such a clear contractual stipulation and since, as established above, the Respondent 1 has failed to pay the amount of USD 1,000,000 within 60 days after the termination of the contract, the Chamber deemed that interest of 10% p.a. as of 26 March 2012 shall apply on the above-mentioned due amount of USD 1,000,000. 24. In continuation, and for the sake of completeness, the Chamber deemed necessary to address the Claimant’s request for the Respondent 2 to be declared jointly and severally liable for the payment of the amounts due by the Respondent 1 to the Claimant. In this regard, the members of the Chamber unanimously deemed that in compliance with the consideration II. 12. above, the provision of art. 17 par. 2 could not find application in the circumstances at stake, since, as stated above, by means of the additional agreement, the Claimant and the Respondent 1 expressed their mutual agreement to the termination of the contract. Therefore, and since the termination of the contract cannot be seen as a breach of contract without just cause by the Respondent 1, the Respondent 2 cannot be held liable for the payment of any amounts due by the Respondent 1 to his former club. Moreover, in spite of the fact that the additional agreement states that the respective amounts may be paid either by the Respondent or his new club, the Chamber emphasised that its provisions can only be opposed to its contractual parties (inter partes), i.e. the Claimant and the Respondent 1. Thus, since the effects of the additional agreement, and in particular the obligation of payment, are only opposable to the Respondent 1, the latter is solely liable to pay the amount of USD 1,000,000. 25. Finally, the DRC concluded its deliberations by deciding that any further claim lodged by the Claimant is rejected. III. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. The claim of the Claimant, Club A, is partially accepted. 2. The Respondent 1, Player C, has to pay to the Claimant, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision, the amount of USD 1,000,000 plus 10% interest p.a. as from 26 March 2012. 3. If the aforementioned amount plus interest is not paid within the stated time limit, the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to FIFA’s Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision. 4. Any further claim lodged by the Claimant is rejected. 5. The Claimant is directed to inform the Respondent 1 immediately and directly of the account number to which the remittance is to be made and to notify the Dispute Resolution Chamber of every payment received. 6. The Claimant is ordered to return to the Respondent 1, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision, the cheque bearing the date 17 February 2012 for an amount of USD 300,000. ***** Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy): According to art. 67 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives). The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following: Court of Arbitration for Sport Avenue de Beaumont 2 1012 Lausanne Switzerland Tel: +41 21 613 50 00 Fax: +41 21 613 50 01 e-mail: info@tas-cas.org www.tas-cas.org For the Dispute Resolution Chamber: Jérôme Valcke Secretary General Encl. CAS directives