F.I.F.A. – Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2014-2015) – controversie di lavoro – ———- F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber (2014-2015) – labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 20 August 2014, in the following composition: Thomas Grimm (Switzerland), Deputy Chairman Theo van Seggelen (Netherlands), member Taku Nomiya (Japan), member on the claim presented by the player, Player F, from country P as Claimant against the club, Club C, from country R as Respondent regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties

F.I.F.A. - Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2014-2015) - controversie di lavoro - ---------- F.I.F.A. - Dispute Resolution Chamber (2014-2015) - labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 20 August 2014, in the following composition: Thomas Grimm (Switzerland), Deputy Chairman Theo van Seggelen (Netherlands), member Taku Nomiya (Japan), member on the claim presented by the player, Player F, from country P as Claimant against the club, Club C, from country R as Respondent regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties I. Facts of the case 1. On 8 January 2008, Player F, from country P (hereinafter: the Claimant) and Club C, from country R (hereinafter: the Respondent), signed a “Civil Convention of Sports Services” (hereinafter: the contract) valid as of the date of signature until 30 June 2011. 2. The contract specifies, inter alia, that the Claimant is entitled to the following remuneration: Season 2007-2008 (second half) - EUR 12,000 as sign-on fee due by 31 January 2008; - EUR 24,000 as salary payable in 5 monthly instalments of EUR 4,800 each, starting from February 2008; - USD 7,000 as bonus “after 7 goals scored in championship matches”; - further USD 1,000 as bonus “for each next goal”. Season 2008-2009 - EUR 78,000 as salary payable in 12 monthly instalments of EUR 6,500 each; - USD 20,000 as bonus “after 15 goals scored in championship matches”; - USD 30,000 as bonus for reaching the 2nd position at the end of the championship; - USD 20,000 as bonus for reaching the 3rd position at the end of the championship; - USD 10,000 as bonus for reaching the 4th position at the end of the championship. Season 2009-2010 - EUR 80,000 as salary payable in 12 monthly instalments of EUR 6,666.6 each; - USD 20,000 as bonus “after 15 goals scored in championship matches”; - USD 30,000 as bonus for reaching the 2nd position at the end of the championship; - USD 20,000 as bonus for reaching the 3rd position at the end of the championship; - USD 10,000 as bonus for reaching the 4th position at the end of the championship. Season 2010-2011 - EUR 90,000 as salary payable in 12 monthly instalments of EUR 7,500 each; - USD 20,000 as bonus “after 15 goals scored in championship matches”; - USD 30,000 as bonus for reaching the 2nd position at the end of the championship; - USD 20,000 as bonus for reaching the 3rd position at the end of the championship; - USD 10,000 as bonus for reaching the 4th position at the end of the championship. 3. The contract stipulates that “the club shall rent for the player [Claimant] an apartment with one bedroom”. 4. Article II of the contract states that “the player [Claimant] shall perform football activity under the conditions and quality requested by the club [Respondent], by participating at the training sessions and the official or amicable matches, as well as at the entire programme, as it has been established by the club [Respondent]”. 5. Pursuant to article VI. 2. a) of the contract, the Claimant shall “comply with the provisions of the country R Football Federation and of the Professional Football League, their by-laws, regulations, decisions and other rules”. 6. According to the final provisions of the contract, “the parties understand that this convention is adequately completed with the stipulations of the Regulations regarding the Football Player Transfer Statute and other rules of the country R Football Federation and of the Professional Football League. The parties agree not to take any litigation to the court of law until they have already exhausted all the methods of the sports jurisdiction instances of the Professional Football League”. 7. On 3 May 2010 and on 11 May 2010, the Claimant put the Respondent in default, requesting the payment of outstanding salaries and unpaid rent expenses within the next seven days. 8. On 21 September 2010, the Claimant lodged a complaint before FIFA against the Respondent, claiming the payment of EUR 134,099.60, plus 5% interest p.a. “from the date of the contract termination until full payment”, broken down as follows: - EUR 30,766.4 corresponding to the following outstanding payments: • EUR 26,666.4 as outstanding salaries from January 2010 until April 2010, i.e. EUR 6,666.6 x 4 months; • EUR 4,100 as unpaid rent expenses from September 2009 to May 2010. - EUR 103,333.2 as compensation corresponding to the residual value of the contract, i.e. EUR 13,333.2 as salary for May 2010 and June 2010 + EUR 90,000 as salary for the season 2010-2011. 9. The Claimant alleges that the Respondent only paid his salary until December 2009. In other words, the Claimant apparently did not receive his salary for 4 months, from January 2010 until April 2010. 10. The Claimant further asserts that the Respondent neither replied to his default notices (cf. point I.7 above), nor proceeded to the requested payment. 11. In this context, the Claimant deems that he had just cause to put an end to the contract on 19 May 2010 in writing. 12. In its statement of defence, the Respondent first of all contested the jurisdiction of the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the DRC) on the basis of the arbitration clause contained in the contract (cf. point I.6 above). The Respondent holds that the Claimant should have lodged his claim before the relevant deciding bodies of the country R Football Federation or the country R Professional Football League since the relevant deciding bodies meet the requirement of the FIFA Circular No. 1010 of 20 December 2005. 13. In this respect, the Respondent also claims that the national law of country R applies, by referring to article 24 of the “Rules of Procedure” of the Respondent (hereinafter: the club’s Rules) – which stipulates that “the player agrees to comply with club rules and regulations, the country R Football Federation and the Professional Football League” – as well as article 26.3 of the “Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Football Players” of the country R Football Federation (hereinafter: the country R Football Federation Regulations) – stating that the country R Football Federation Regulations shall be enforced by the national deciding bodies and only in the event that the said Regulations are insufficient, the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Football Players (hereinafter: the FIFA Regulations) shall apply “by analogy”. 14. The Respondent provided FIFA with a copy of the 2010 edition of the country R Football Federation Regulations which establishes the following: a. with regard to the existing deciding bodies: Art. 26.1 lit. a) of the country R Football Federation Regulations indicates that the first instance deciding bodies are the National Dispute Resolution Chamber of the country R Football Federation (hereinafter: the NDRC of the country R Football Federation), the Dispute Resolution Committee of the country R Professional Football League and the Commission for the Players’ Status of the County Football Association. b. with regard to the jurisdiction of the deciding bodies: According to art. 26.2 lit. a) of the country R Football Federation Regulations, the NDRC of the country R Football Federation is competent to decide on disputes concerning “the execution, construing and performance of the contracts entered by clubs and players, as well as regarding the maintenance of contractual stability”. As per art. 26.8 of the country R Football Federation Regulations, the DRC of the country R Professional Football League is “exclusively” competent to solve disputes involving “clubs that participate in the First League National Championship and their officials, players and their coaches (…) according to the annual agreement between the country R Football Federation and the Professional Football League”. c. with regard to the composition of the deciding bodies: Art. 26.5 of the country R Football Federation Regulations provides that the NDRC of the country R Football Federation is composed of a chairman and a deputy chairman elected “by consensus by the representatives of players and clubs from a list containing minimum five names, prepared by the country R Football Federation Executive Committee”, three players’ representatives nominated by the Association of Amateur and Non-Amateur Footballers, and three clubs’ representatives nominated by the Executive Committee of the country R Football Federation. Art. 26.8 in fine of the country R Football Federation Regulations stipulates that the DRC of the country R Professional Football Federation – and its appeal body – is composed of five members, among which one president and one vice-president, their names and functions being approved by the Executive Committee of the Professional Football Federation for a one-year mandate. d. with regard to the possibility of an appeal: Art. 26.1 lit. b) of the country R Football Federation Regulations establishes that the decisions of the NDRC of the country R Football Federation may be appealed before the “country R Football Federation Review Committee” and that the decisions of the DRC of the country R Professional Football League may be appealed before the “country R Professional Football League Review Committee”. Art. 26.1 lit. c) of the country R Football Federation Regulations provides that the decisions of the aforementioned appeal bodies may be appealed to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). 15. As to the substance of the dispute, the Respondent alleges that the Claimant is not entitled to the claimed amounts. The Respondent first of all points to the Claimant’s “lazy and disrespectful attitude” during trainings as well as his repeated delays. The Respondent alleges that such behaviour evidenced the Claimant’s will to leave the Respondent in order to join a new club in country P. 16. The Respondent further argues that the Claimant was absent from trainings since 21 April 2010 as indicated by a coach statement dated 31 May 2010 and allegedly left the Respondent without notice, thus breaching articles 34, 91, 95 and 101 of the club’s Rules. The Respondent recalls the decision of the Board of Directors on 1 June 2010 in this respect, which sanctioned the Claimant with a fine amounting to EUR 20,000. 17. Regarding the Claimant’s apartment, the Respondent deems having paid his monthly rent directly to the landlord. 18. Subsequently, the Respondent deems that the Claimant is not entitled to the amount claimed as compensation insofar as the contract between both parties was allegedly mutually terminated on 1 July 2010 (hereinafter: the termination agreement), the original of which was provided by the Respondent. In its support, the Respondent refers to the International Transfer Certificate (ITC) issued by the country R Football Federation in order to evidence the Respondent’s good faith. 19. As to the outstanding salaries, the Respondent considers owing the Claimant the amount of EUR 10,766.4 – instead of EUR 26,666.4 as claimed by the Claimant – insofar as the salary provided for in the contract is apparently conditioned to the Claimant providing his services as per article II of the contract (cf. point I.4 above). Therefore, according to the Respondent, since the Claimant allegedly left on 21 April 2010 (cf. point I.16 above) or, at the latest, on 3 May 2010 or 11 May 2010 (cf. point I.7 above), the Claimant would only be entitled to receive a proportional amount. 20. In his replica, the Claimant indicates that FIFA has jurisdiction in accordance to the FIFA Circular letter no. 1010 and art. 22 b) of the FIFA Regulations. In particular, the Claimant also holds that the national deciding bodies do not guarantee fair proceedings as well as do not comply with the principle of equal representation since the representatives of the clubs (in the NDRC of the country R Football Federation) are nominated by the Executive Committee of the country R Football Federation, and not directly by the clubs or its associations. Additionally, the Claimant underlines that according to art. 26.5 of the country R Football Federation Regulations, from the eight members of the NDRC of the country R Football Federation, five are appointed by the Executive Committee of the country R Football Federation and only three by the local associations of players. The Claimant also recalls that the NDRC of country R is not recognized by the player’s representative bodies, i.e. the country R Football Players Union and FIFPro. Moreover, the Claimant argues that the aforementioned jurisdiction clause does not make a clear reference to a national dispute resolution body in the sense of art. 22 lit. b) of the FIFA Regulations, and therefore, does not constitute an arbitration clause. 21. With respect to his alleged absence from trainings as of 21 April 2010, the Claimant responds by emphasising that his salary since January 2010 was outstanding and the default notices (cf. point I.7 above) remained unanswered, leading to the termination in writing on 19 May 2010 (cf. point I.11 above). 22. Equally, the Claimant rejects the Respondent’s argumentation relating to the aforementioned fine. The Claimant underlines that the said decision had not been notified to him and thus, his right of defence had not been respected. The Claimant also stresses that the said decision is dated 1 June 2010, i.e. two weeks after he had allegedly terminated the contract and almost one month after the first default notice. 23. Furthermore, the Claimant emphasises that he put an end to the contract in writing on 19 May 2010 and that no mutual termination agreement had been signed by him. On 1 July 2010 – the alleged date of signature of the said mutual termination agreement – the Claimant asserts that he had joined his new club, Club T, hence it was impossible for him to sign such document. In his support, the Claimant provided a statement of Club T according to which the new club asserts that “the player never been away from work or the country from the date of May 27, 2010”. 24. As to the Respondent’s argument regarding the issuance of the ITC, the Claimant holds that it is irrelevant and rather assumes that the ITC was issued because the Respondent considered that at that time, the contract between the Respondent and the Claimant was terminated and that no amount was outstanding. 25. In its final comments, the Respondent maintains that the Claimant wanted to leave the Respondent in order to sign with a new club and that, in this respect, the Respondent signed the termination agreement in good faith. The Respondent asserts having sent the relevant termination agreement via e-mail. The Respondent denies having said that the termination agreement had been signed by the Claimant in country R. The Respondent further holds that the Claimant did not contest the validity of the termination agreement when the ITC had been issued in order for him to sign with the new club. Finally, the Respondent alleges that it is currently not solvent. 26. On 23 June 2010, the Claimant signed an employment contract with the country P club, Club T, valid as of 1 July 2010 until 30 June 2011. The contract states that the Claimant is entitled to a gross remuneration of EUR 36,680 payable in 10 monthly instalments, “the first to be paid until 20 September [2010] and the other until the same day of the subsequent months”. Comment [LED1]: Better to leave it out if we are not taking it into consideration for the calculation. II. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter also referred to as Chamber or DRC) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the matter at hand. In this respect, it took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 21 September 2010. Consequently, the Rules governing the procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (edition 2008; hereinafter: Procedural Rules) are applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 par. 1 and par. 2 of the Procedural Rules). 2. Subsequently, the members of the Chamber referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed that in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 in combination with art. 22 lit. b of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2014) the Dispute Resolution Chamber would, in principle, be competent to deal with the matter at stake, which concerns an employment-related dispute with an international dimension between a country P player and a country R club. 3. However, the Chamber acknowledged that the Respondent contested the competence of FIFA’s DRC to deal with the present case, referring to the arbitration clause contained in the contract (cf. point I.6 above) and stating that any dispute arisen between the parties should be submitted to the deciding bodies of the country R Football Federation and of the country R Professional Football League. 4. The DRC equally noted that the Claimant rejected such position and insisted on the fact that FIFA had jurisdiction to deal with the present matter because the country R national deciding bodies do not fulfil the requirements set out in art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations. 5. Taking into account the above, the Chamber emphasised that, in accordance with art. 22 lit. b) of the 2012 FIFA Regulations, it is competent to deal with a matter such as the one at hand, unless an independent arbitration tribunal, guaranteeing fair proceedings and respecting the principle of equal representation of players and clubs, has been established at national level within the framework of the association and/or a collective bargaining agreement. With regard to the standards to be imposed on an independent arbitration tribunal guaranteeing fair proceedings, the Chamber referred to the FIFA Circular no. 1010 dated 20 December 2005. In this regard, the members of the Chamber further referred to the principles contained in the FIFA National Dispute Resolution Chamber (NDRC) Standard Regulations, which came into force on 1 January 2008. 6. While analysing whether it was competent to hear the present matter, the DRC considered that it should, first and foremost, analyse whether the contract at the basis of the present dispute actually contained an arbitration clause. Having said this, the members of the DRC turned their attention to the relevant arbitration clause contained in the final provisions of the contract (cf. point I.6 above) according to which “the parties understand that this convention is adequately completed with the stipulations of the Regulations regarding the Football Player Transfer Statute and other rules of the country R Football Federation and of the Professional Football League. The parties agree not to take any litigation to the court of law until they have already exhausted all the methods of the sports jurisdiction instances of the Professional Football League”. 7. In view of the aforementioned clause, the members of the Chamber were of the opinion that the employment contract does not make clear reference to one specific national dispute resolution chamber in the sense of art. 22 lit. b) of the aforementioned Regulations. Therefore, the members of the Chamber deem that said clause can by no means be considered as a clear arbitration clause in favour either of the national deciding bodies, i.e. of the country R Football Federation or the country R Professional Football League, and, therefore, cannot be applicable. In this regard, the Chamber pointed out that this lack of clarity is also reflected in the Respondent’s argumentation since it refers to the alleged competence of the deciding bodies of both the country R Football Federation and country R Professional League, without further precision. 8. Having established that the first criteria for the recognition of the competence of a national decision-making body is not fulfilled in the present matter, the Chamber deemed unnecessary to examine any further points which would need to be assessed before concluding to the competence of a national deciding body. 9. In view of the above, the Chamber established that the Respondent’s objection to the competence of FIFA to deal with the present matter had to be rejected and that the DRC is competent, on the basis of art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, to consider the present matter as to the substance. Comment [LED2]: I would leave all this out…no need to go into it unless it was otherwise said in the meeting. 10. Subsequently, the members of the DRC analysed which edition of the Regulations should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, the DRC confirmed that, in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations (editions 2009, 2010, 2012 and 2014) and considering that the claim in front of FIFA was lodged on 21 September 2010, the 2009 edition of said Regulations is applicable to the present matter as to the substance. 11. The competence of the DRC and the applicable regulations having been established, the Chamber entered into the substance of the matter. In doing so, it started to acknowledge the facts of the case as well as the documents contained in the file. However, the Chamber emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to the facts, arguments and documentary evidence which it considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand. 12. In this respect, the members of the DRC acknowledged that it was undisputed by the parties that on 8 January 2008, they signed a contract valid until 30 June 2011, in accordance with which the player was entitled to receive, inter alia, a total remuneration of EUR 80,000 for the 2009-2010 season and EUR 90,000 for the 2010-2011 season as well as to be covered his accommodation expenses. 13. The DRC further observed that the Claimant unilaterally terminated the contract in writing on 19 May 2010, asserting that the monthly salaries of January, February, March and April 2010 had not been paid and after having put the Respondent in default on 3 and 11 May 2010. As a result, the Claimant deemed that he terminated the contract with just cause and requested payment of the total amount of EUR 134,099.60 from the Respondent. 14. Furthermore, the Chamber duly noted that the Respondent, on the other hand, held that the contract was mutually terminated by means of a termination agreement allegedly signed by the parties on 1 July 2010 which, apparently, was sent to the Claimant via e-mail. 15. In view of aforementioned dissent between the parties regarding the termination of the contract, the DRC first of all stressed the need to establish how the contract was terminated, i.e. either by unilateral termination by the player or by mutual agreement. The Chamber observed that on the one hand, the Claimant argued not having signed the alleged termination agreement. The Respondent, on the other hand, did not contest having received the termination notice dated 19 May 2010 and stated that the document remitted as termination agreement was sent to the Claimant via e-mail prior to its alleged signing. 16. In this context, the Chamber duly noted that the signature of the Claimant on the document referred to as termination agreement by the Respondent, appeared to be merely scanned. Consequently, the Chamber referred to art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules which stipulates that any party claiming a right on the basis of an alleged fact shall carry the burden of proof and determined that it could not establish whether the Claimant had indeed signed the termination agreement. In this regard, the DRC further underlined that the Respondent did not provide any other piece of evidence that could sufficiently prove that the Claimant had, indeed, signed the termination agreement. What is more, the members of the Chamber were of the opinion that, if a mutual termination agreement had been indeed signed by the parties, a copy of such would be available in the Transfer Matching System (TMS) and, as there is no such document uploaded, they could determine that there was in fact no mutual termination between the Claimant and the Respondent. 17. In view of the above, the Chamber established that the Respondent did not sufficiently substantiated its allegations regarding the signing of a termination agreement, and thus, rejected the argument of the Respondent in this respect, concluding that the contract was terminated on 19 May 2010 by means of a termination notice sent by the Claimant. 18. Having established the above, the DRC highlighted that the underlying issue in the present dispute, considering the claim of the Claimant and the allegations of the Respondent, was to determine whether the contract had been terminated by the Claimant on 19 May 2010 with or without just cause. The Chamber also underlined that, subsequently, it would be necessary to determine the financial consequences for the party that is to be held liable for the early termination of the pertinent employment contract. 19. In this respect, the Chamber noted that it had remained uncontested by the Respondent that the salaries of January, February, March and April 2010 had remained unpaid. On the other hand, the DRC also observed that the Respondent held that the Claimant had left the club of the Respondent, without its authorisation, on 21 April 2010, fact that was not disputed by the Claimant. 20. In view of the foregoing and turning its attention to the financial conditions of the contract as well as to the arguments brought forward by the parties, the DRC noted that when the Claimant left the Respondent, i.e. 21 April 2010, three salaries were outstanding, i.e. from January to March 2010. Moreover, the DRC noted that the Respondent did not react to the Claimant’s default notices sent on 3 and 11 May 2010. 21. Having taken into consideration all of the above, the DRC decided that it could be established that the Respondent had seriously neglected its contractual obligations towards the Claimant in a continuous and constant manner, i.e. the Respondent had failed to remunerate the Claimant for a substantial period of time. Therefore, the DRC considered that the Respondent was found to be in breach of the contract and that the breach was of such seriousness that, in line with the Chamber’s long-standing and well-established jurisprudence, the Claimant had a just cause to unilaterally terminate the contractual relationship with the Respondent on 19 May 2010, having previously put the Respondent in default of payment of the outstanding amounts. 22. On account of the above, the Chamber established that the Claimant had terminated the contract with just cause on 19 May 2010 and that, consequently, the Respondent is to be held liable for the early termination of the employment contact with just cause by the Claimant. 23. Having established that the Respondent is to be held liable for the early termination of the contract with just cause by the Claimant, the DRC focussed its attention on the consequences of such termination. Taking into consideration art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the DRC decided that the Claimant is entitled to receive an amount of money from the Respondent as compensation for the termination of the contract with just cause in addition to any outstanding payments on the basis of the relevant employment contract. 24. First of all, the DRC concurred that the Respondent must fulfil its obligations as per the contract in accordance with the general legal principle of pacta sunt servanda. Consequently, the DRC decided that the Respondent is liable to pay to the Claimant the remuneration that was outstanding at the time the Claimant left, this is, at the time the Claimant stopped rendering his services to the Respondent, i.e. 21 April 2010. 25. In this regard, the Chamber recalled the argument of the Respondent according to which the Claimant is not entitled to the claimed amounts due to the fine amounting to EUR 20,000 imposed on the Claimant by the Respondent on 1 June 2010. Consequently, the Respondent considered owing the Claimant only the amount of EUR 10,766.4 as outstanding remuneration. 26. In this regard, without expressing itself on the question as to whether or not the fine in the amount of EUR 20,000 is to be considered proportionate and acceptable, the DRC highlighted that said fine of EUR 20,000 was imposed on the Claimant by the Respondent by means of a decision of the Board of Directors of the Respondent rendered on 1 June 2010. In continuation, the DRC concurred that, as opposed to the issue relating to the outstanding payments on the basis of the contract, the execution of the disciplinary decision passed by the Respondent does not fall within the competence of the DRC. Moreover, the members of the Chamber wished to highlight that the aforementioned fine, was apparently imposed by the Respondent on the Claimant, only after the latter had already put an end to the contract. Consequently, the DRC agreed that the Respondent’s debt towards the Claimant on the basis of the contract cannot be set off with the aforementioned fine of EUR 20,000. As a result, the Chamber rejected the respective argument of the Respondent. Comment [LED3]: It wasn’t a national decision, but an internal disciplinary measure. 27. In line with the above, the Chamber decided that the Respondent shall pay the amount of EUR 20,000, consisting of the outstanding salaries corresponding to January, February and March 2010. 28. The DRC then turned its attention to the other claim for unpaid accommodation expenses, i.e. in relation to the period during which the Claimant rendered his services to the Respondent. In this respect, in the absence of any monetary value in the contractual condition pertaining to accommodation, and in the absence of any documentary evidence in this connection (cf. art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules recalling the principle of the burden of proof), the DRC had to reject the Claimant’s claim relating to said fringe benefits. 29. On account of the above and bearing in mind the general legal principle of pacta sunt servanda, the DRC decided that the Respondent is liable to pay to the Claimant outstanding remuneration in the total amount of EUR 20,000. 30. In addition, taking into account the Claimant’s claim for interest and in accordance with its well-established jurisprudence, the DRC decided that the Respondent must pay to the Claimant interest of 5% p.a. on the amount of EUR 20,000 as from the respective due dates until the date of effective payment. 31. In continuation, the members of the Chamber focused its attention on the calculation of the amount of compensation for breach of contract in the case at stake. In doing so, the DRC firstly recapitulated that, in accordance with art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the amount of compensation shall be calculated, in particular and unless otherwise provided for in the contract at the basis of the dispute, with due consideration for the law of the country concerned, the specificity of sport and further objective criteria, including, in particular, the remuneration and other benefits due to the Claimant under the existing contract and/or the new contract, the time remaining on the existing contract up to a maximum of five years. 32. In application of the relevant provision, the DRC held that it first of all had to clarify whether the pertinent contract contained any clause, by means of which the parties had beforehand agreed upon a compensation payable by the contractual parties in the event of breach of contract. In this regard, the DRC established that no such compensation clause was included in the contract at the basis of the matter at stake. 33. As a consequence, the Chamber determined that the amount of compensation payable by the Respondent to the Claimant had to be assessed in application of the other parameters set out in art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations. The DRC recalled that said provision provides for a non-exhaustive enumeration of criteria to be taken into consideration when calculating the amount of compensation payable. Therefore, other objective criteria may be taken into account at the discretion of the deciding body. 34. The members of the Chamber then turned their attention to the remuneration and other benefits due to the Claimant under the existing contracts and/or the new contract, which criterion was considered by the DRC to be essential. The DRC deemed it important to emphasise that the wording of art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations allows the Chamber to take into account both the existing contract and the new contract in the calculation of the amount of compensation. 35. Bearing in mind the foregoing, the DRC proceeded with the calculation of the monies payable to the Claimant under the terms of the contract, as from April 2010 until 30 June 2011, and concluded that the residual value of the said contract amounts to EUR 110,000. Consequently, the DRC concluded that the amount of EUR 110,000 serves as the basis for the final determination of the amount of compensation for breach of contract in the case at hand. 36. In continuation, the Chamber verified as to whether the Claimant had signed an employment contract with another club during the relevant period of time, by means of which he would have been enabled to reduce his loss of income. According to the constant practice of the DRC, such remuneration under a new employment contract shall be taken into account in the calculation of the amount of compensation for breach of contract in connection with the Claimant’s general obligation to mitigate his damages. 37. The Chamber recalled that, on 23 June 2010, the Claimant signed an employment contract with Club T, from country P, valid as of 1 July 2010 until 30 June 2011, in accordance with which the Claimant was to receive a total fixed remuneration of EUR 36,680 during the said period of time. 38. In view of all of the above, the Chamber decided that the Respondent must pay the amount of EUR 73,320 to the Claimant, which is considered by the Chamber to be a reasonable and justified amount as compensation for breach of contract. 39. In addition, taking into account the Claimant’s request for interest as well as the constant practice of the Dispute Resolution Chamber in this regard, the DRC decided that the Respondent must pay to the Claimant interest of 5% p.a. on the amount of compensation as of the date of claim, i.e. 21 September 2010, until the date of effective payment. 40. The Dispute Resolution Chamber concluded his deliberations in the present matter by establishing that any further claim lodged by the Claimant is rejected. III. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. The claim of the Claimant is admissible. 2. The claim of the Claimant is partially accepted. 3. The Respondent has to pay to the Claimant, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision, outstanding remuneration in the amount of EUR 20,000 plus 5% interest until the date of effective payment as follows: a. 5% p.a. as of 1 February 2010 on the amount of EUR 6,666; b. 5% p.a. as of 1 March 2010 on the amount of EUR 6,667; c. 5% p.a. as of 1 April 2010 on the amount of EUR 6,667. 4. The Respondent has to pay to the Claimant, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision, compensation in the amount of EUR 73,320 plus 5% interest p.a. on said amount as from 21 September 2010 until the date of effective payment. 5. In the event that the aforementioned amounts plus interest are not paid within the stated time limit, the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to FIFA’s Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision. 6. Any further claim lodged by the Claimant is rejected. 7. The Claimant is directed to inform the Respondent immediately and directly of the account number to which the remittances are to be made and to notify the Dispute Resolution Chamber of every payment received. ***** Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy): According to art. 67 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives). The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following: Court of Arbitration for Sport Avenue de Beaumont 2 1012 Lausanne Switzerland Tel: +41 21 613 50 00 Fax: +41 21 613 50 01 e-mail: info@tas-cas.org www.tas-cas.org For the Dispute Resolution Chamber: Jérôme Valcke Secretary General Encl. CAS directives