F.I.F.A. – Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2014-2015) – controversie di lavoro – ———- F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber (2014-2015) – labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 19 February 2015, in the following composition: Thomas Grimm (Switzerland), Deputy Chairman Joaquim Evangelista (Portugal), member Theodore Giannikos (Greece), member on the claim presented by the club, Club A, from country B as Claimant against the club, Club C, from country D as Respondent regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties

F.I.F.A. - Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2014-2015) - controversie di lavoro - ---------- F.I.F.A. - Dispute Resolution Chamber (2014-2015) - labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 19 February 2015, in the following composition: Thomas Grimm (Switzerland), Deputy Chairman Joaquim Evangelista (Portugal), member Theodore Giannikos (Greece), member on the claim presented by the club, Club A, from country B as Claimant against the club, Club C, from country D as Respondent regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties I. Facts of the case 1. On 1 January 2008, the club from country B, Club A and the club from country E, Club F, concluded a loan agreement regarding the loan of the player from country D, Player X (hereinafter: the player) for the period from 1 January 2008 until 30 June 2008 for a loan compensation of USD 250,000. 2. According to Club A, it then entered into an employment contract with the player valid from 3 January 2008 until 30 June 2008. 3. Art. 8.1 of the schedule 2 of the contract provided for a weekly remuneration of 15,000. According to art. 8.3.1 of the schedule 2 of the contract, the player was also entitled to receive a bonus of 5,000 “when selected in the “starting eleven” of a Premier League match” and a bonus of 3,500 “when selected as a nominated substitute who takes to the field of play in a Premier League match”. Furthermore, the parties agreed in art. 10 of the schedule 2 of the contract that the player should receive, until 18 March 2008, 1,500 per month as “accommodation / car allowance”, as well as a flight allowance of 4,000. 4. On 17 January 2008, Club A lodged a complaint before FIFA against the player and the club from country D, Club C, claiming that the player, induced by Club C, unilaterally breached the contract he had signed with Club A without just cause. 5. In this respect, Club A held that on 3 January 2008 it received an email of the player’s representative informing Club A that the player decided not to follow the contract, but to join Club C. Furthermore, Club A provided FIFA with a communication of Club F dated 14 January 2008, by means of which it assured having tried to convince the player to register with the club from country B, however, without success. Therefore, Club F allegedly cancelled its own employment contract with the player. 6. On 15 June 2011, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (DRC) concluded that the player terminated the contract without just cause and held that the player had to pay Club A compensation for breach of contract in the amount of 400,000 and that Club C was jointly and severally liable for the aforementioned payment. 7. On 31 August 2012, the player lodged an appeal against the decision of the DRC in front of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), which procedure was eventually terminated. 8. Also on 31 August 2012, Club C lodged an appeal against the decision of the DRC in front of CAS. 9. On 20 November 2013, CAS set aside the decision of the DRC and referred the complete file back to the DRC since the Football Association from country D confirmed to CAS that, despite the instructions of the FIFA administration, it had failed to forward Club A’s claim to Club C. As such, Club C’s right to be heard had been violated, reason for which CAS considered the entire DRC proceedings null and void. 10. Club A subsequently appealed the CAS award in front of the Swiss Federal Tribunal. 11. On 28 August 2014, the Swiss Federal Tribunal concluded that CAS had erred in deciding to annul the part of the DRC decision between Club A and the player, as this part had become final and binding since the player had not proceeded with his appeal of the DRC decision. 12. On 10 October 2014, Club A requested the reopening of the DRC proceedings to determine Club C’s liability in the matter. Club A explained that its position remained unchanged from the previous proceedings, requesting the DRC to uphold its previous findings and confirm that Club C is jointly and severally liable to compensate the club as a result of the player’s breach of contract. 13. Nevertheless, Club A claimed that the DRC is not limited to awarding the same compensation as previously awarded. Club A held that it was entitled to the amount of 1,647,639.18, in particular, taking into account the replacement costs of the player. In the alternative, Club A requested that Club C would be jointly and severally liable for the payment of the amount of 400,000 as well as for the interest on any sum of compensation as from the player’s breach in January 2008 until the effective payment. Finally, Club A requested legal costs. 14. In its reply, Club C firstly stressed that in accordance with the decision of the Swiss Federal Tribunal, art. 17 of the Regulations “carries a joinder of co-defendants”. Hence, in the matter against Club C, the DRC can reach a completely different decision to the one previously taken against the player as the DRC must assess again all the evidence, facts and arguments. 15. As to the substance, Club C claimed that no contract was ever concluded between the player and Club A, since the latter never provided the former with a complete copy of said contract. 16. Furthermore, Club C asserted that even if it was concluded that the player was negligent by signing an illegible and incomplete document, said negligence cannot lead to the assumption that a contract was concluded between the parties when it did not contain the essential requirements needed in order for a contract to exist. 17. In addition, Club C claimed that the amount the player was condemned to pay is arbitrary and has no legal or factual basis. 18. Furthermore, Club C alleged that when referring to art. 17 par. 2 of the Regulations, the first registration must be taken into account. In this line of reasoning, Club C argued that the player’s new club is jointly and severally liable to pay the relevant compensation to the player’s former club and emphasised that, according to the Commentary on the Regulations, any compensation payable by the new club is only payable to the former club of the player. In this framework, Club C asserted that Club F, and not Club A, is the player’s former club since the player was never registered with Club A. 19. Club C further alleged that any other interpretation would go against the objectives of the Regulations, which is to protect the principle of contractual stability. In this respect, Club C asserted that a different interpretation would mean that if a player signs many contracts and is then transferred, the new club would be held jointly and severally liable for all the contracts that the player signed. 20. Finally, Club C stressed that the contract between Club A and the player was concluded on 3 January 2008 and that on 14 January 2008, Club F and the player mutually terminated their labor relationship. On 19 January 2008, Club C and the player concluded an employment contract and therefore, in any case, the player’s last contract before joining Club C was the one signed with Club F and not with Club A. II. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter also referred to as the Chamber or DRC) referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed that in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 and 2 in combination with art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, the Dispute Resolution Chamber is competent to deal with the matter at stake, which concerns an employment-related dispute with an international dimension. 2. Furthermore, the Chamber referred to the previous decision of the DRC rendered on 15 June 2011 and concluded that the 2008 edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: the Regulations), is applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance. 3. The competence of the Chamber and the applicable regulations having been established, and entering into the substance of the matter, the Chamber started by acknowledging the above-mentioned facts, the documentation contained in the file as well as the decision rendered by the DRC on 15 June 2011. However, the Chamber emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to the facts, arguments and documentary evidence which it considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand. 4. In this respect, the Chamber acknowledged that Club A requested the DRC to uphold its previous findings and to confirm that Club C is jointly and severally liable to compensate it as a result of the player’s breach of contract. In this respect, Club A claimed that the DRC is not limited to awarding the same compensation as previously awarded, claiming an amount for breach of contract of 1,647,639.18. In the alternative, Club A requested that Club C would be held jointly and severally liable for the payment of the amount of 400,000, for the payment of interest and, in addition, for the payment of its legal costs. 5. The Chamber equally acknowledged that Club C, in its reply, basically put forward two arguments why it should not be held liable for the payment of any amount: i) the player did not terminate a contract without just cause, since there was no contract in existence between the player and Club A, and ii) even if there was a contract in existence between the player and Club A, Club C cannot be held jointly and severally liable for the termination of such contract by the player, since Club A was not the player’s former club, therewith also implying that Club C was not the player’s new club in the sense of art. 17 par. 2 of the Regulations. 6. In relation to Club C’s first argument, the members of the DRC referred in full to the previous decision rendered by the DRC on 15 June 2011 and did not see any reason to differ from the conclusion reached in said decision. The Chamber concurred that Club C had not provided any new argumentation or documentation that would justify a different conclusion than the one reached by the members of the DRC on 15 June 2011. As a result, the Chamber fully endorsed the conclusion that Club A and the player had concluded a valid employment contract for the period from 3 January 2008 until 30 June 2008 and that, by not joining Club A and by entering into an employment contract with Club C, the player had terminated his employment contract with Club A without just cause. In view of the foregoing, the Chamber decided to reject the first argument of Club C. 7. Following the same reasoning, the Chamber determined that the request of Club A for a higher amount of compensation for breach of contract is rejected. Again referring in full to the reasoning of the Chamber on 15 June 2011, the members of the DRC held that no new elements had been provided which would justify another conclusion in relation to the amount of compensation to be awarded to Club A. In view of the foregoing, the Chamber agreed that the sum of 400,000 is the appropriate and justified amount of compensation for breach of contract without just cause to be awarded to Club A. 8. In continuation, the Chamber analysed the argumentation of Club C in relation to Chapter IV of the Regulations. 9. In this respect, the Chamber recalled that art. 17 par. 2 of the Regulations reads as follows: “Entitlement to compensation cannot be assigned to a third party. If a professional is required to pay compensation, the professional and his new club shall be jointly and severally liable for its payment. The amount may be stipulated in the contract or agreed between the parties.” 10. With due consideration to the above, and in accordance with the unambiguous content of art. 17 par. 2 of the Regulations, the Chamber reiterated that a player’s new club shall be jointly and severally liable for the payment of compensation if a player is required to pay such compensation and underlined that the joint liability of the player’s new club is independent from the question as to whether the new club has committed an inducement to the contractual breach. This conclusion is in line with the well-established jurisprudence of the Chamber and has been repeatedly confirmed by CAS. 11. In this context, the Chamber observed that Club C argued that Club A was not the player’s former club, since the player was never registered with Club A. Therefore, the last club with which the player was registered and had a contract with before joining Club C was in fact Club F. The Chamber is however unanimous in its conclusion that in the present matter, which involves the loan of a player and the non-execution of said loan, Club A should undoubtedly be considered the former club of the player in the sense of Chapter IV of the Regulations, since it was clearly the club that suffered damages from the decision of the player to unilaterally terminate the contract. Indeed, it is evident from the content of the e-mail dated 3 January 2008 that the reason for which the player decided not to join Club A was his wish to join Club C instead. It follows from said e-mail that it was therefore also not the intention of the player to return to Club F, i.e. his club of origin which had just agreed with Club A to loan the player. What is more, the player never actually returned to Club F to render his services to said club. The Chamber is of the firm opinion that the circumstances of the present matter, in particular the fact that a loan was contemplated but eventually never executed due to the player’s decision to join Club C, can lead to no other conclusion than that Club A is the player’s former club, i.e. the club that suffered damages from the early termination of the contract by the player, and that Club C needs to be considered as the player’s new club in the sense of art. 17 par. 2 of the Regulations. 12. Hence, the Chamber decided that Club C is jointly and severally liable for the payment of the amount of compensation for breach of contract that the player has been ordered to pay to Club A in accordance with the decision rendered by the Dispute Resolution Chamber on 15 June 2011. 13. Finally, the Dispute Resolution Chamber decided to reject Club A’s claim pertaining to legal costs in accordance with art. 18 par. 4 of the Procedural Rules and the Chamber’s respective longstanding jurisprudence in this regard. 14. The Chamber concluded its deliberations by rejecting any further claim lodged by Club A. ***** III. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. The claim of the Claimant, Club A, is partially accepted. 2. The Respondent, Club C, is jointly and severally liable for the payment of the amount of compensation for breach of contract that the Player X has been ordered to pay to the Claimant in accordance with the decision rendered by the Dispute Resolution Chamber on 15 June 2011. 3. If the relevant amount is not paid within 30 days as from the notification of this decision, the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to FIFA’s Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision. 4. Any further claim lodged by the Claimant is rejected. 5. The Claimant is directed to inform the Respondent, immediately and directly, of the account number to which the remittance is to be made and to notify the Dispute Resolution Chamber of every payment received. ***** Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy): According to art. 67 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives). The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following: Court of Arbitration for Sport Avenue de Beaumont 2 1012 Lausanne Switzerland Tel: +41 21 613 50 00 / Fax: +41 21 613 50 01 e-mail: info@tas-cas.org www.tas-cas.org For the Dispute Resolution Chamber: Jérôme Valcke Secretary General Encl. CAS directives