F.I.F.A. – Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2014-2015) – controversie di lavoro – ———- F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber (2014-2015) – labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 19 February 2015, in the following composition: Thomas Grimm (Switzerland), Deputy Chairman Joaquim Evangelista (Portugal), member Theodore Giannikos (Greece), member on the claim presented by the player, Player A, country B as Claimant against the club, Club C, country D as Respondent regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties

F.I.F.A. - Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2014-2015) - controversie di lavoro - ---------- F.I.F.A. - Dispute Resolution Chamber (2014-2015) - labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 19 February 2015, in the following composition: Thomas Grimm (Switzerland), Deputy Chairman Joaquim Evangelista (Portugal), member Theodore Giannikos (Greece), member on the claim presented by the player, Player A, country B as Claimant against the club, Club C, country D as Respondent regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties I. Facts of the case 1. On 11 July 2013, the player from country B, Player A (hereinafter: the Claimant), and the club from country D, Club C (hereinafter: the Respondent), allegedly concluded an employment contract (hereinafter: the contract), valid for two seasons until 30 June 2015. The Claimant does not possess a copy of such contract. 2. According to the player, the parties agreed upon a monthly salary of EUR 5,000. 3. On 18 September 2013, the Claimant lodged a claim against the club in front of FIFA, requesting after amending his claim, the payment of EUR 120,000 as remuneration for the entire contractual period (i.e. EUR 5,000 x 24 months). 4. Alternatively, the Claimant requested that the minimum monthly salary in Serie B (i.e. EUR 2,319.75) is taken into account, and that he should be granted at least the amount of EUR 54,674. 5. In his claim, the Claimant stated that, after signing the contract, he injured his ankle during one of the training sessions with the Respondent. Since the estimated recovery time was 6 weeks, the Claimant is of the opinion that the club tried to avoid its obligations by deleting any and all evidences of their contractual relationship, including all references in the Respondent’s website. 6. Furthermore, the Claimant asserted that, in spite of having signed the contract and having specifically requested his copy of it, the Respondent neither provided him with a copy of the contract nor registered it at the Federation from Country D. However, the Claimant held that there are many pieces of evidence supporting his position. 7. In particular, the Claimant submitted the following evidence: a. a letter of the former club of the player, i.e. Club E (hereinafter: Club E), addressed to the club requesting the payment of the transfer fee; b. the transfer agreement signed between the two clubs for the transfer of the player, signed on 11 July 2013; c. the report of the medical exam of the player dated 3 July 2013; d. pictures of the player with two men, allegedly the Sports Director and the Secretary General of the Respondent, signing documents; e. a letter from Club E to the club dated 24 August 2013, in which Club E insists on the validity of the transfer agreement and requests from the Respondent the payment of the relevant transfer fee; f. the declaration of the agent that represented the Respondent in the supposed transfer of the player; g. an article from the Respondent’s website on the acquisition of the player; and h. pictures of the official Facebook page of the Respondent in which the Claimant appears to be training with the club’s jersey. 8. The Claimant claims that, in view of the alleged conclusion of the new contract with the Respondent, he terminated his previous contract with Club E on 11 July 2013 and, thus, found himself without a club after the Respondent denied the existence of their contractual relationship. 9. In its reply to the Claimant’s claim, the Respondent stated that it had never signed an employment contract with the Claimant and that was the reason why he did not have a copy of it. In this respect, the Respondent rejected the legal validity of the evidence provided by the Claimant and assessed that he “pre-fabricated” the present “temerarious dispute and asked for a contract which had never been stipulated”. 10. As to the transfer agreement between Club E and the Respondent, the latter referred to art. 4 of said transfer agreement, in accordance with which, the requirement for its validity is that the Respondent and the Claimant enter into an employment contract. Consequently, the Respondent is of the opinion that the agreement cannot be considered as a proof of the existence of the employment contract. 11. Furthermore, the Respondent referred to the Transfer Matching System (TMS), which does not include any reference to the employment contract the Claimant claims to have signed with the Respondent. 12. As to the statement of the involved agent, the Respondent stated that he has an economic interest in the present dispute since he was hired by the Respondent to carry out the deal. As there was no agreement, he was not remunerated. 13. In addition, the Respondent provided a confirmation of the Football Federation from country D dated 21 August 2013 according to which the Claimant has never been registered for the Respondent. 14. In his replica, the Claimant pointed out that Club E and the Respondent agreed upon a transfer fee payable in instalments, the first one of which was payable when signing the contract. Consequently, the Claimant concluded that this fact evidences the irreversible intention of the parties to transfer the player and that no condition can be opposable to it. 15. The Claimant further argued that the Respondent breached the contract, amongst others, by failing to register it in the Football Federation from country D and to provide him with a copy of it. As a result, the Claimant insisted on the fact that the Respondent cannot reproach him for not having a copy of the contract. 16. In this respect, the Claimant asserted that some of the evidence remitted in order to prove the relationship between the Claimant and the Respondent were written and/or published by the Respondent itself. Thus, in the Claimant’s opinion, the challenge of the Respondent at this point is not valid. 17. In its duplica, the Respondent stated that both national and international regulations stipulate that employment contracts shall be written as a formality in order to have a proof of the agreement. Hence, the Respondent rejected that any media articles or other evidence of that kind can substitute the written contract. 18. Furthermore, the Respondent stated that it had not paid any amount to the former club of the player for his transfer. In this respect, the Respondent underlined that the validity of the transfer agreement depended on the existence of an employment contract, which was never signed. 19. Lastly, and as to the amount of compensation requested by the Claimant, the Respondent held that such claim had no legal basis and that he has not provided any evidence supporting the alleged damages suffered due to the non-conclusion of the contract. II. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter also referred to as Chamber or DRC) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the case at hand. In this respect, it took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 19 August 2013. Consequently, the 2012 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: Procedural Rules) is applicable to the matter at hand (cf. article 21 of the Procedural Rules). 2. Subsequently, the members of the Chamber referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed that in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 and par. 2 in combination with art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (editions 2012 and 2014) the Dispute Resolution Chamber is competent to deal with the matter at stake, which concerns a dispute with an international dimension between a player from country B and a club from country D in relation to an alleged employment relationship between the two aforementioned parties. 3. Furthermore, the Chamber analysed which regulations should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, it confirmed that in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (editions 2012 and 2014), and considering that the present claim was lodged on 19 August 2013, the 2012 edition of said regulations (hereinafter: the Regulations) is applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance. 4. In this respect, the Chamber started by acknowledging all the above-mentioned facts as well as the arguments and the documentation submitted by the parties. However, the Chamber emphasised that, in the following considerations, it will refer only to the facts, arguments and documentary evidence, which it considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand. 5. The competence of the Chamber and the applicable regulations having been established, the Chamber entered into the substance of the matter. 6. The members of the Chamber started by acknowledging that, according to the Claimant, he had, on 11 July 2013, concluded an employment contract with the Respondent for two seasons, in accordance with which he was entitled to receive the total amount of EUR 120,000. The Respondent, however, failed to provide him with a copy of such contract. 7. The Dispute Resolution Chamber furthermore took due note of the fact that the Respondent, on its part, categorically denies the conclusion of an employment contract with the Claimant. The Respondent had admitted that it had contacted an agent in order to carry out the deal but that there was no agreement. 8. In view of this dissent between the parties in respect of the basic question as to whether or not an employment contract between them had been concluded, the members of the Chamber firstly referred to art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules, according to which any party claiming a right on the basis of an alleged fact shall carry the respective burden of proof. The application of the said principle in the present matter led the members of the Dispute Resolution Chamber to conclude that it was up to the player to prove that the employment contract, on the basis of which he claims compensation for breach of contract from the Respondent, indeed existed. 9. Having stated the above, the Dispute Resolution Chamber recalled that the Claimant maintained that he never received a copy of the employment contract he asserts having signed with the Respondent. However, the player had submitted a series of documents in support of his claim which were in continuation examined by the members of the Chamber. 10. In this regard, the Dispute Resolution Chamber took note of the evidences provided by the Claimant, mentioned in point I.7 above. In this respect, the DRC underscored that said evidences consisted in: a) the transfer agreement and correspondence addressed by Club E to the Respondent, requesting the transfer fee for the transfer of the Claimant, which cannot be taken into account in the present proceedings since the transfer agreement was conditional to the signature of an employment contract between the Claimant and the Respondent and does not necessarily imply the actual conclusion of a contract; b) a report of the medical exam of the player dated 3 July 2013, which cannot indisputably lead to the conclusion that the parties indeed entered into an employment contract after such exams; c) an article for the Respondent’s website and pictures of the alleged official Facebook page of the Respondent in which the Claimant appears to be training with the Respondent’s jersey as well as pictures of three men allegedly signing the employment contract, the value of which is informative only and, thus, non-official; and d) the declaration of the agent that represented the Respondent in the supposed transfer of the Claimant, the probative value of which is reduced in view of the fact that it is a personal statement that may be subject to impartiality. 11. Having duly taken note of the aforementioned documentation presented by the Claimant, the members of the Chamber held that in order for the Chamber to be able to assume that the Claimant and the Respondent had indeed been bound through a contractual relationship with the terms as described by the Claimant, it had to be established, beyond doubt, by documentary evidence, that the said parties had indeed entered into a respective labour agreement, and, if so, under which terms. In general, the members of the Chamber held that they could not assume that an employment contract had been concluded by and between parties simply based on circumstances which, in general, may be likely but are not certain to indicate the signing of a contract. In addition, the members of the Chamber agreed that the Dispute Resolution Chamber must be very careful with accepting documents, other than the employment contract, as evidence for the conclusion of a contract. 12. In respect of the foregoing, the members of the Chamber had to conclude that the documents presented by the Claimant did not prove beyond doubt that the Respondent and the Claimant had validly entered into an employment contract. 13. What is more, even if it would have been possible to establish on the basis of the documents on file, other than an employment contract, that the parties had entered into a labour agreement, the Chamber wished to highlight that it would need to be in possession of such labour agreement in order to be able to properly assess the claim of the Claimant. 14. As a consequence, the Dispute Resolution Chamber decided that, since the Claimant had not been able to prove beyond doubt that an employment contract had validly been concluded between himself and the Respondent, there was no possibility for the Chamber to enter into the question whether or not such alleged employment contract had been breached. 15. All the above led the Dispute Resolution Chamber to conclude that the claim of the player has to be rejected, due to its lack of contractual basis. III. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. The claim of the Claimant, Player A, is rejected. ***** Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy): According to art. 67 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives). The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following: Court of Arbitration for Sport Avenue de Beaumont 2 1012 Lausanne Switzerland Tel: +41 21 613 50 00 Fax: +41 21 613 50 01 e-mail: info@tas-cas.org www.tas-cas.org For the Dispute Resolution Chamber: Markus Kattner Deputy Secretary General Encl. CAS directives