F.I.F.A. – Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2014-2015) – controversie di lavoro – ———- F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber (2014-2015) – labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber(DRC) judge passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 17 March 2015, by Theo van Seggelen (Netherlands), DRC judge, on the claim presented by the player, Player A, country B as Claimant against the club, Club C, country D as Respondent regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties

F.I.F.A. - Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2014-2015) - controversie di lavoro - ---------- F.I.F.A. - Dispute Resolution Chamber (2014-2015) - labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber(DRC) judge passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 17 March 2015, by Theo van Seggelen (Netherlands), DRC judge, on the claim presented by the player, Player A, country B as Claimant against the club, Club C, country D as Respondent regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties I. Facts of the case 1. According to the player from country B, Player A (hereinafter: the Claimant), in December 2013, himself and the club from country D, Club C (hereinafter: the Respondent) concluded an employment contract (hereinafter: the contract) valid until December 2016. 2. According to the Claimant, the contract provided for the following amounts: USD 10,000 as sign-on fee; USD 3,000 as monthly salary. 3. On 14 October 2014, the Claimant lodged a complaint before FIFA against the Respondent, claiming the amount of USD 98,000 broken-down as follows: USD 5,000 as balance of sign-on fee; USD 93,000 as compensation corresponding to the residual value of the contract. 4. According to the Claimant, the Respondent paid his salary up to May 2014. As from June 2014, the Respondent apparently no longer paid. 5. The Claimant also states that the Respondent undertook to pay “later” the amount of USD 5,000, apparently corresponding to the remaining portion of the sign-on fee. However, the Respondent allegedly did not pay the said amount either. 6. After having been invited on two occasions to provide the relevant contract, the Claimant explained that he was not able to do so since the Respondent apparently kept all copies of the contract. Instead and in order to prove the existence of the relevant contractual relationship between the parties, the Claimant provided a letter dated 4 July 2014 apparently sent by the Respondent to the Claimant according to which the parties “hereby confirm that the contract between Club C [the Respondent] and the Player A [the Claimant] has been terminated by mutual agreement. The player [the Claimant] is therefore free to join any club of his choice”. 7. Notwithstanding the above, the Claimant sustains that the Respondent unilaterally terminated the contract without previously trying to settle with the Claimant. 8. In spite of having been invited to do so, the Respondent did not submit its comments pertaining to the matter at stake. 9. Upon FIFA’s request, the Claimant stated to have remained unemployed from May 2014 to date. II. Considerations of the DRC judge 1. First of all, the DRC judge analysed whether he was competent to deal with the case at hand. In this respect, he took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 14 October 2014. Consequently, the 2014 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules) is applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 of the Procedural Rules). 2. Subsequently, the DRC judge referred to art. 3 par. 2 and par. 3 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed that in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 and par. 2 in conjunction with art. 22 lit. (b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2014), he is competent to deal with the matter at stake which concerns a dispute with an international dimension between a player from country B and a club from country D in relation to an alleged employment relationship between the two aforementioned parties invoked by the player, and which value does not exceed CHF 100,000. 3. Furthermore, the DRC judge analysed which edition of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, he confirmed that in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2014), and considering that the present claim was lodged in front of FIFA on 14 October 2014, the 2014 edition of said regulations (hereinafter: the Regulations) is applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance. 4. The competence of the DRC judge and the applicable regulations having been established, the DRC judge entered into the substance of the matter. In doing so, the DRC judge started by acknowledging the abovementioned facts of the case as well as the documentation contained in the file. However, the DRC judge emphasised that in the following considerations he will refer only to the facts, arguments and documentary evidence which he considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand. 5. In this respect, the DRC judge acknowledged that, according to the Claimant, in December 2013, he had concluded an employment contract with the Respondent for three years, in accordance with which the Respondent allegedly had undertaken to pay him the amount of USD 10,000 as sign-on fee as well as a monthly salary in the amount of USD 3,000. The Respondent allegedly no longer paid the Claimant’s salary as from June 2014 and the Claimant therefore asked to be awarded compensation for breach of contract by the Respondent in the amount of USD 93,000, in addition to the balance of sign-on fee amounting to USD 5,000. 6. The DRC judge further noted that the Respondent had been given the opportunity to reply to the claim submitted by the Claimant, but that the Respondent had failed to present its response in this respect. In this way, so the DRC judge deemed, the Respondent renounced to its right of defence and, thus, accepted the allegations of the Claimant. 7. As a consequence of the preceding consideration, and in view of the basic question as to whether or not an employment contract between the parties had been concluded, the DRC judge referred to art. 9 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules, according to which he shall take a decision upon the basis of the documents on file, as well as art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules, according to which any party claiming a right on the basis of an alleged fact shall carry the respective burden of proof. The application of the said principles in the present matter led the DRC judge to conclude that it was up to the Claimant to prove that the employment contract, on the basis of which he claims outstanding amount and compensation for breach of contract from the Respondent, indeed existed. 8. Having stated the above, the DRC judge recalled that the Claimant maintained that he never received a copy of the employment contract he asserts having signed with the Respondent. However, the Claimant provided a letter dated 4 July 2014 apparently sent by the Respondent which was in continuation examined by the DRC judge. 9. According to said letter, the parties “hereby confirm that the contract between Club C [the Respondent] and Player A [the Claimant] has been terminated by mutual agreement. The player [the Claimant] is therefore free to join any club of his choice”. 10. Having duly taken note of the aforementioned documentation presented by the Claimant, the DRC judge held that in order for him to be able to assume that the Claimant and the Respondent had indeed been bound through a contractual relationship with the terms as described by the Claimant, it had to be established, beyond doubt, by documentary evidence, that the said parties had indeed entered into a respective labour agreement, and, if so, under which terms. In general, the DRC judge held that he could not assume that an employment contract had been concluded by and between parties simply based on circumstances which, in general, may be likely but are not certain to indicate the signing of a contract. In addition, the DRC judge agreed that he must be very careful with accepting documents, other than the employment contract, as evidence for the conclusion of a contract. 11. In respect of the foregoing, the DRC judge had to conclude that the documents presented by the Claimant did not prove beyond doubt that the Respondent and the Claimant had validly entered into an employment contract. 12. What is more, even if it would have been possible to establish on the basis of the documentation on file, other than an employment contract, that the parties had entered into a labour agreement, the DRC judge wished to highlight that he would need to be in possession of such labour agreement in order to be able to properly assess the claim of the Claimant. 13. As a consequence, the DRC judge decided that, since the Claimant had not been able to prove beyond doubt that an employment contract had validly been concluded between himself and the Respondent, there was no possibility for the DRC judge to enter into the question whether or not such alleged employment contract had been breached. 14. All the above led the DRC judge to conclude that the claim of the Claimant has to be rejected. III. Decision of the DRC judge The claim of the Claimant is rejected. ***** Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy): According to art. 67 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives). The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following: Court of Arbitration for Sport Avenue de Beaumont 2 1012 Lausanne Switzerland Tel: +41 21 613 50 00 Fax: +41 21 613 50 01 e-mail: info@tas-cas.org www.tas-cas.org For the DRC judge: Markus Kattner Deputy Secretary General Encl. CAS directives