F.I.F.A. – Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2014-2015) – controversie di lavoro – ———- F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber (2014-2015) – labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber (DRC) judge passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 12 May 2015, by Theo van Seggelen (Netherlands), DRC judge, on the claim presented by the player, Player A, Country B, as Claimant against the club, Club C, Country D as Respondent regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties

F.I.F.A. - Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2014-2015) - controversie di lavoro - ---------- F.I.F.A. - Dispute Resolution Chamber (2014-2015) - labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber (DRC) judge passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 12 May 2015, by Theo van Seggelen (Netherlands), DRC judge, on the claim presented by the player, Player A, Country B, as Claimant against the club, Club C, Country D as Respondent regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties I. Facts of the case 1. On 18 March 2014, the Player of Country B Player A (hereinafter: the Claimant), lodged a claim in front of FIFA against the Club of Country D, Club C (hereinafter: the Respondent), for breach of contract, requesting to be awarded with the amount of USD 60,000. 2. In his claim, the Claimant explains that on 20 December 2013, the Respondent sent a letter to his former club, Club E, expressing its interest in his services for the period running as from 1 January 2014 until 30 April 2014. Consequently, and after Club E accepted the Respondent’s proposal in exchange for the Claimant’s waiver of his right to receive USD 20,000, the Claimant asserts that on 1 January 2014, he entered into an employment contract (hereinafter: the contract) with the Respondent, valid as of 10 January 2014 until 10 May 2014. In this respect, the Claimant alleges that the Respondent refused to provide him with a signed copy of the contract. 3. In continuation, the Claimant sustains that on 9 January 2014, he entered Country D with an entry visa that the Respondent provided him. 4. However, according to the Claimant, the Respondent never requested the International Transfer Certificate (ITC) and terminated the contract two days after its signature. In light of the foregoing, the Claimant states that the Respondent terminated the contract without just cause and therefore claims to be awarded with the amount of USD 60,000, allegedly corresponding to the total value of the contract. 5. After the closure of the investigation, the Respondent submitted its reply to the Claimant’s claim. In its submission, the Respondent alleges that the medical examination revealed that the Claimant was suffering an “epidemic hepatitis”. In view of the above, and due to the fact that the law of Country D does not allow to deliver a residence permit to a person suffering from such a disease, the Respondent affirms that it eventually did not sign any employment contract with the Claimant. 6. Upon request, the Claimant informed FIFA that in January 2014, he returned to his former club, Club E and played for free until the end of May 2014. II. Considerations of the DRC judge 1. First of all, the DRC judge analysed whether he was competent to deal with the case at hand. In this respect, he took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 18 March 2014. Consequently, the 2012 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: Procedural Rules) is applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 of the Procedural Rules). 2. With regard to the competence of the DRC judge to decide on the present matter, the DRC judge referred to art. 3 par. 2 and par. 3 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed that in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 and par. 2 in combination with art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2015) the DRC judge is competent to deal with the matter at stake, which concerns an employment-related dispute with an international dimension between a Player of Country B and a Club of Country D in relation to an alleged employment relationship between the two aforementioned parties invoked by the player. 3. Moreover, and in accordance with art. 24 par. 2 lit. i) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, the DRC judge confirmed that he may adjudicate in the present dispute which value does not exceed CHF 100,000. 4. Furthermore, the DRC judge analysed which regulations should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, it confirmed that in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2015), and considering that the present claim was lodged on 18 March 2014, the 2012 version of said regulations (hereinafter: Regulations) is applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance. 5. The competence of the DRC judge and the applicable regulations having been established, the Chamber entered into the substance of the matter. The DRC judge started by acknowledging the above-mentioned facts as well as the documentation contained in the file. However, the DRC judge emphasised that in the following considerations he will refer only to facts, arguments and documentary evidence which he considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand. 6. In doing so, the DRC judge started by acknowledging that, according to the Claimant, he had, on 1 January 2014, concluded with the Respondent an employment contract valid from 10 January 2014 until 10 May 2014, in accordance with which the Respondent allegedly had undertaken to pay him the total amount of USD 60,000. Further, the DRC judge also took note of the Claimant’s allegations according to which the Respondent had terminated the alleged contractual relationship two days after the signature of the contract. Therefore, the Claimant asked to be awarded compensation for breach of contract by the Respondent in the amount of USD 60,000. 7. Subsequently, the DRC judge observed that the Respondent, for its part, in spite of having been invited to do so, failed to present its response to the claim of the Claimant within the relevant time-limit. In fact, the reply of the Respondent was only received after the investigation-phase of the matter had already been concluded. As a result, the DRC judge decided not to take into account the reply of the Respondent and established that, in accordance with art. 9 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules, he shall take a decision upon the basis of those documents on file that were provided prior to the closure of the investigation-phase, in casu, upon the statements and documents presented by the Claimant. 8. In continuation, the DRC judge referred to art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules, according to which any party claiming a right on the basis of an alleged fact shall carry the respective burden of proof. The application of the said principle in the present matter led the DRC judge to conclude that it was up to the Claimant to prove that the employment contract, on the basis of which he claims compensation for breach of contract from the Respondent, indeed existed. 9. Having stated the above, the DRC judge recalled that the Claimant maintained that he never received a copy duly signed by both parties of the employment contract he asserts having signed with the Respondent. However, the Claimant had submitted several documents in support of his claim which were in continuation examined by the DRC judge. 10. Firstly, the DRC judge deemed it important to highlight that, in order for an employment contract to be considered as valid and binding, it must bear the signature of both the employer and the employee. In this respect, the DRC judge observed that the Claimant was unable to provide with a copy of the employment contract duly signed by both the Claimant and the Respondent. 11. Furthermore, the DRC judge took note that the Claimant submitted an exchange of correspondence between the Respondent and his former club, Club E, by means of which the Respondent expressed its interest in the Claimant’s services for the period running as from 1 January 2014 until 30 April 2014 and Club E accepted to release the Claimant for this period. In addition, the DRC judge noticed that the Claimant presented a copy of his passport evidencing that he had obtained a visa and had entered Country D on 9 January 2014. 12. Having duly taken note of the aforementioned documentation presented by the Claimant, the DRC judge held that in order for him to be able to assume that the Claimant and the Respondent had indeed been bound through a contractual relationship with the terms as described by the Claimant, it had to be established, beyond doubt, by documentary evidence, that the said parties had indeed entered into a respective labour agreement, and, if so, under which terms. In general, the DRC judge held that he could not assume that an employment contract had been concluded by and between parties simply based on circumstances which, in general, may be likely but are not certain to indicate the signing of a contract. In addition, the DRC judge agreed that he must be very careful with accepting documents, other than the employment contract, as evidence for the conclusion of a contract. 13. In respect of the foregoing, and referring to art. 12 par. 3 and 6 of the Procedural Rules, the DRC judge had to conclude that the documents presented by the Claimant did not prove beyond doubt that the Respondent and the Claimant had validly entered into an employment contract. Indeed, according to the DRC judge, the exchange of correspondence only evidence that discussions had been undertaken between both clubs but did not prove anything as to the relationship between the Claimant and the Respondent. Regarding the information contained in the Claimant’s passport, the DRC judge deemed it fit to outline that the Claimant could have travelled to Country D for other reasons than signing the alleged contract. In particular, the DRC judge pointed out that the Claimant could have gone to Country D in order to take trial tests with the Respondent in view of a potential signature of a contract. 14. Moreover, even if it would have been possible to establish on the basis of the documents on file, other than an employment contract, that the parties had entered into a labour agreement, the DRC judge wished to highlight that he would need to be in possession of such labour agreement in order to be able to properly assess the claim of the Claimant. 15. As a consequence, the DRC judge decided that, since the Claimant had not been able to prove beyond doubt that an employment contract had validly been concluded between himself and the Respondent, there was no possibility for the DRC judge to enter into the question whether or not such alleged employment contract had been breached. 16. All the above led the DRC judge to conclude that the claim of the Claimant has to be rejected. ***** III. Decision of the DRC judge The claim of the Claimant, Player A, is rejected. ***** Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy): According to art. 67 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives). The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following: Court of Arbitration for Sport Avenue de Beaumont 2 1012 Lausanne Switzerland Tel: +41 21 613 50 00 Fax: +41 21 613 50 01 e-mail: info@tas-cas.org www.tas-cas.org For the DRC judge: Markus Kattner Acting Secretary General Encl. CAS directives