F.I.F.A. – Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2014-2015) – controversie di lavoro – ———- F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber (2014-2015) – labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 25 September 2014, in the following composition: Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman Mario Gallavotti (Italy), member Alejandro Marón (Argentina), member Rinaldo Martorelli (Brazil), member Santiago Nebot (Spain), member on the claim presented by the player, Player B, from country C as Claimant against the club, Club D, from country E as Respondent regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties

F.I.F.A. - Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2014-2015) - controversie di lavoro - ---------- F.I.F.A. - Dispute Resolution Chamber (2014-2015) - labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 25 September 2014, in the following composition: Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman Mario Gallavotti (Italy), member Alejandro Marón (Argentina), member Rinaldo Martorelli (Brazil), member Santiago Nebot (Spain), member on the claim presented by the player, Player B, from country C as Claimant against the club, Club D, from country E as Respondent regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties I. Facts of the case 1. On 1 February 2013, Player B, from country C (hereinafter: the Claimant), and Club D, from country E (hereinafter: the Respondent), concluded an employment contract (hereinafter: the contract), valid as of the date of signature until 30 November 2013. 2. The contract specifies, inter alia, that the Respondent is to provide the Claimant with a monthly salary of USD 10,000 payable at the end of each month. 3. According to article 2 d) of the contract, “local and overseas medical expenses will be borne by Club D [the Respondent] and also a suitable medical insurance coverage to cover any special medical attention will be provided. Local approve and authorize hospital/medical facilities as follows: i. XY General Hospital; ii. Sports Medicine Center, HB National Stadium; iii. XY Clinic”. 4. Article 4. e) of the contract stipulates that “Club D [the Respondent] shall have the right to terminate this contract should the player [the Claimant] be declared by doctor unfit to play for a period of 30 days or more by giving ONE MONTH notice and be paid by the number of days he attends training during the month on pro-rata basis”. 5. On 8 May 2013, the Respondent terminated the contract in writing. 6. On 30 October 2013, the Claimant lodged a complaint before FIFA against the Respondent for breach of contract, requesting the following amounts: USD 70,000 as compensation corresponding to the residual value of the contract, i.e. salary from May to November 2013; USD 100,000 as damages “due to not providing necessary and adequate medical care to the player [the Claimant] after suffering an injury on a match”. 7. The Claimant alleges that the Respondent unilaterally and without just cause put an end to the contract while he was apparently still recovering from an injury suffered in a match opposing the Respondent to Club H, from country S, on 1 March 2013. 8. The Claimant further holds that the Respondent did not provide him with adequate medical care, thus violating article 2 d) of the contract. In particular, the Respondent apparently did not take the Claimant to one of the stated medical institutions. The Claimant also states that he is suffering from the consequences of the consequent alleged late and inadequate medical care. In this respect, the Claimant provides medical reports dated 6 June 2013 which explain the timeline of events and refer to the brain concussion and the possibilities of injury which can result from it. 9. The Claimant allegedly attempted to settle the dispute amicably with the Respondent by means of a letter dated 12 June 2013 sent to the Respondent. However, the Respondent apparently refused such settlement. 10. In spite of having been invited to do so, the Respondent did not submit its comments pertaining to the matter at stake. 11. Upon FIFA’s request, the Claimant states that he has remained unemployed from 8 May 2013 until the original date of expiry of the contract, i.e. 30 November 2013. The Claimant also stresses that he was not capable to play football during said period due to his health condition. II. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Chamber or DRC) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the case at hand. In this respect, it took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 30 October 2013. Consequently, the 2012 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules) are applicable to the matter at stake (cf. art. 21 par. 1 and 2 of the Procedural Rules). 2. Subsequently, the members of the Chamber referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed that in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 in combination with art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2014), the Dispute Resolution Chamber is competent to deal with the matter at stake, which concerns an employment-related dispute with an international dimension between a country C player and a country E club. 3. Furthermore, the Chamber analysed which regulations should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, it confirmed that in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2014), and considering that the present claim was lodged in front of FIFA on 30 October 2013, the 2012 edition of said Regulations (hereinafter: Regulations) is applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance. 4. The competence of the Chamber and the applicable regulations having been established, the Chamber entered into the substance of the matter. The members of the Chamber started by acknowledging the facts of the case, as well as the documentation contained in the file. In this respect, the Chamber recalled that on 1 February 2013 the parties had signed an employment contract valid as from the date of signature until 30 November 2013, in accordance with which the Claimant was entitled to receive a monthly salary of USD 10,000. 5. The Chamber also took due note of the termination of the contract by the Respondent by means of a written notice dated 8 May 2013 sent to the Claimant. At this stage, the Chamber acknowledged the allegation of the Claimant according to which the Respondent put an end to the contract due to his injury suffered during a match with the Respondent on 1 March 2013. With regard to the stated injury, the Chamber observed the content of the medical report presented by the Claimant, which confirms that he suffered an injury on 1 March 2013. 6. In continuation, the members of the Chamber took into account that, on 12 June 2013, the Claimant pointed out to the Respondent, in writing, that it had terminated the contract without just cause. Moreover, the Chamber noted that in the aforementioned letter addressed to the Respondent, which apparently remained unanswered, the Claimant had sought an amicable settlement of the present dispute and warned the Respondent of the possible consequences. Additionally, the Chamber observed that the stated letter apparently remained unanswered. 7. Furthermore, the Chamber duly noted that the Respondent, for its part, failed to present its response to the claim of the Claimant, in spite of having been invited to do so. Consequently, the Chamber deemed that the Respondent had renounced its right to defence and, thus, had accepted the allegations of the Claimant. 8. As a consequence of the preceding consideration, the DRC established that in accordance with art. 9 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules, it shall take a decision upon the basis of the documents on file. 9. In that context, reverting the Claimant’s explanations as to reasons for the termination of the contract as well as the documentation presented, the Chamber was eager to emphasise that, according to its well-established jurisprudence, and as a general rule, a player’s injury does not constitute a just cause in the sense of art. 14 of the Regulations for a club to terminate a contract. Moreover, referring to the contents of art. 18 par. 4 of the Regulations, the Chamber emphasised that once the parties concluded an employment contract, they had the obligation to implement its terms and a club could not unilaterally question the validity of the contract during its course based on the physical state of the player. 10. Taking into account the preceding considerations, as well as the documentation on file, the Chamber concluded that the Claimant’s allegations that the Respondent had terminated the contract without just cause due to the Claimant’s injury had not been contested by the Respondent. 11. Therefore, the members of the Chamber decided that the Respondent terminated the employment contract without just cause on 8 May 2013. 12. In continuation, having established that the Respondent is to be held liable for the termination of the contract without just cause, the Chamber decided that, in accordance with art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the Respondent is liable to pay compensation for breach of contract to the Claimant. 13. Prior to proceeding to the calculation of the amount of compensation, the Chamber put emphasis on the primacy of the principle of the maintenance of contractual stability. Above all, the Chamber was eager to point out that the measures provided for by the Regulations concerning in particular compensation for breach of contract without just cause serve as a deterrent discouraging the early termination of employment contracts by either contractual party and that a lack of a firm response by the competent deciding authorities would represent an inappropriate example towards all the football stakeholders. 14. In this respect, awarding compensation in favour of the damaged party (either the player or the club, as the case may be) has proven to be an efficient means and has always found a widespread acceptance since it guarantees that the fundamental principle of the respect of the contracts is duly taken care of. 15. Above all, it was emphasised that the criteria contained in art. 17 of the Regulations are applied with the principle of reciprocity for clubs and players, signifying that both clubs and players who are seen to have committed a breach of contract without just cause will in all cases be subject to pay compensation and, under specific circumstances, also subject to the imposition of sporting sanctions. 16. Having stated the above, the Chamber focused its attention on the calculation of the amount of compensation payable to the Claimant by the Respondent in the case at stake. In doing so, the members of the Chamber firstly recapitulated that, in accordance with art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the amount of compensation shall be calculated, in particular and unless otherwise provided for in the contract at the basis of the dispute, with due consideration for the law of the country concerned, the specificity of sport and further objective criteria, including in particular, the remuneration and other benefits due to the Claimant under the existing contract and/or the new contract, the time remaining on the existing contract up to a maximum of five years, and depending on whether the contractual breach falls within the protected period. 17. In application of the relevant provision, the Chamber held that it first of all had to clarify as to whether the pertinent employment contract contained a provision by means of which the parties had beforehand agreed upon an amount of compensation payable by the contractual parties in the event of breach of contract. 18. In this context, the Chamber firstly focussed its attention on article 4. e) (cf. point I.4 above), which stipulates that “Club D [the Respondent] shall have the right to terminate this contract should the player [the Claimant] be declared by doctor unfit to play for a period of 30 days or more by giving ONE MONTH notice and be paid by the number of days he attends training during the month on pro-rata basis”. 19. In this regard, the Chamber took into account that article 4. e) of the contract appears to be unilateral and to the benefit of the Respondent only. In the light of such unilateral character of the pertinent contractual clause, the members of the Chamber concluded that it cannot be taken into consideration. 20. Likewise, the Chamber concluded that the said article 4. e) of the contract does not clearly indicate the exact monetary value for compensation and, therefore, cannot be taken into consideration. 21. As a consequence, the members of the Chamber determined that the amount of compensation payable by the Respondent had to be assessed in application of the parameters set out in art. 17 par. 1 of the FIFA Regulations. In this regard, the Dispute Resolution Chamber emphasised beforehand that each request for compensation for contractual breach has to be assessed by the Chamber on a case-by-case basis taking into account all specific circumstances of the respective matter. 22. In casu, the Dispute Resolution Chamber took note that, in accordance with the contract signed by the Claimant and the Respondent, which was to run for nine months, i.e. until 30 November 2013, after the breach of contract occurred on 8 May 2013, the Claimant was to receive the total amount of USD 70,000, made up of seven monthly salaries in the amount of USD 10,000 each, during the remaining term of the contract. 23. As a consequence, and bearing in mind that the Claimant had not been able to mitigate damages since he remained unemployed between the date of termination of the contract by the Respondent and the end date of the contract, the Dispute Resolution Chamber concluded by deciding that the Respondent has to pay the total amount of USD 70,000 to the Claimant, as compensation for breach of contract. 24. Reverting to the Claimant’s petition regarding damages “due to not providing necessary and adequate medical care to the player after suffering an injury on a match”, the Chamber agreed that such claim is to be rejected as it is not sufficiently specified and due to a lack of legal basis. 25. In continuation, the Chamber focused its attention on the further consequences of the breach of contract in question and, in this respect, addressed the question of sporting sanctions in accordance with art. 17 par. 4 of the Regulations. The cited provision stipulates inter alia that, in addition to the obligation to pay compensation, sporting sanctions shall be imposed on any club found to be in breach of contract during the protected period. 26. Subsequently, the members of the Chamber referred to item 7 of the “Definitions” section of the Regulations, which stipulates, inter alia, that the protected period shall last “for three entire seasons or three years, whichever comes first, following the entry into force of a contract, where such contract is concluded prior to the 28th birthday of the professional, or two entire seasons or two years, whichever comes first, following the entry into force of a contract, where such contract is concluded after the 28th birthday of the professional”. Since the contract was concluded for a period of ten months only, the Chamber concluded that, irrespective of the Claimant’s age, the breach of contract by the Respondent occurred within the protected period. 27. In order to consider the imposition of sporting sanctions on the Respondent, the DRC further deemed it fit to recall the circumstances in which the Respondent proceeded to the termination of the contract, i.e. due to the Claimant’s injury as well as the Respondent’s apparent disinterest in the Claimant since it apparently never replied to the Claimant’s subsequent communications. 28. Consequently, the Chamber decided that, by virtue of art. 17 par. 4 of the Regulations, the Respondent shall be banned from registering any new players, either nationally or internationally, for the two next entire and consecutive registration periods following the notification of the present decision. On account thereof, in accordance with the fourth sentence of art. 17 par. 4 of the Regulations, the club shall be able to register new players, either nationally or internationally, only as of the next registration period following the complete serving of the relevant sporting sanction. 29. The Dispute Resolution Chamber concluded its deliberations in the present matter by establishing that any further claims lodged by the Claimant are rejected. III. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. The claim of the Claimant, Player B, is partially accepted. 2. The Respondent, Club D, has to pay to the Claimant the amount of USD 70,000, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision. 3. In the event that the abovementioned amount is not paid by the Respondent within the stated time limit, interest at the rate of 5% p.a. will fall due as of expiry of the aforementioned time limit and the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision. 4. The Claimant is directed to inform the Respondent immediately and directly of the account number to which the remittance is to be made and to notify the Dispute Resolution Chamber of every payment received. 5. The Respondent shall be banned from registering any new players, either national or internationally, for the two entire and consecutive registration periods following the notification of the present decision. 6. Any further claim lodged by the Claimant is rejected. ***** Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy): According to art. 67 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives). The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following: Court of Arbitration for Sport Avenue de Beaumont 2 1012 Lausanne Switzerland Tel: +41 21 613 50 00 Fax: +41 21 613 50 01 e-mail: info@tas-cas.org www.tas-cas.org For the Dispute Resolution Chamber: Jérôme Valcke Secretary General Encl. CAS directives