F.I.F.A. – Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2014-2015) – controversie di lavoro – ———- F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber (2014-2015) – labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 24 April 2015, in the following composition: Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman Leonardo Grosso (Italy), member Theo Van Seggelen (Netherlands), member Philippe Diallo (France), member Todd Durbin (USA), member on the matter involving the player, Player A, country B and country C, as Claimant / Counter-Respondent and the club, Club D, country E as Respondent / Counter-Claimant and the club, Club F, country B and country C as Intervening party regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties

F.I.F.A. - Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2014-2015) - controversie di lavoro – ---------- F.I.F.A. - Dispute Resolution Chamber (2014-2015) - labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 24 April 2015, in the following composition: Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman Leonardo Grosso (Italy), member Theo Van Seggelen (Netherlands), member Philippe Diallo (France), member Todd Durbin (USA), member on the matter involving the player, Player A, country B and country C, as Claimant / Counter-Respondent and the club, Club D, country E as Respondent / Counter-Claimant and the club, Club F, country B and country C as Intervening party regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties I. Facts of the case 1. On 2 July 2011, the player from country B, Player A (hereinafter: the Claimant / Counter-Respondent), born on 4 December 1984, and the club from country E, Club D (hereinafter: the Respondent / Counter-Claimant), concluded an employment contract (hereinafter: the contract) valid as of the date of signature until 31 May 2015. 2. Article 4 of the contract stipulates that “the Employer [the Respondent / CounterClaimant] is obliged to: a) provide the professional and material conditions necessary for Employee [the Claimant / Counter-Respondent] to perform the present contract, b) perform its payment obligations in time, without delay”. 3. Pursuant to article 6 of the contract, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent is to receive the following monthly salary, due by the 10th of the following month: Season 2011-2012 810,000; Season 2012-2013 1,080,000; Season 2013-2014 1,215,000; Season 2014-2015 1,350,000. 4. Article 14 of the contract provides for that “the [Claimant / Counter-Respondent] is entitled to cancel the present contract with termination with cause in case [the Respondent / Counter-Claimant] does not fulfil its obligation defined in point III [article 6 of the contract]. Termination with cause may be exercised by [the Claimant / Counter-Respondent] only after he demanded contractual performance from [the Respondent / Counter-Claimant] in writing, with a time limit of at least 30 days, and the deadline passed to no effect”. 5. Pursuant to article 22 of the contract, “The parties agree that they will attempt to settle any possible disputes between themselves by means of discussion, out of court. In case of a failure to do so, they will turn only to the competent body of the Football Federation of country E (Players Status and Transfer Committee, Disciplinary Body) or the competent civil or labour court for legal remedy”. 6. Article 23 of the contract stipulates that “As regards issues not regulated by the present contract, the relevant provisions of Act XXII of 1992 on the Labour Code, Act I of 2004 on Sports, stipulations of the statutes of the Football Federation of country E and that of international football associations (FIFA, UEFA) shall prevail”. 7. On 15 August 2012, the parties agreed upon the temporary transfer of the Claimant / Counter-Respondent (hereinafter: the loan agreement) to the club from country G, Club H (hereinafter: Club H), for the period as from the date of signature until 30 June 2013. According to the loan agreement, Club D is exempted from paying the Claimant / Counter-Respondent’s remuneration during the loan period. 8. Pursuant to art. 3 of the loan agreement, “the validity of this Agreement is subject to the common agreement of [Club H] and [the Claimant / Counter-Respondent] on terms and condition of the employment contract. Any dispute arising out or in connection with this Agreement shall be solved by mutual negotiations between the Parties. If the Parties do not achieve a common agreement, the conflicts shall be solved by the competent body of the FIFA, in accordance with the FIFA Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players”. 9. Additionally, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant and the Claimant / CounterRespondent signed a “petition” by means of which he requested to “get unpaid leave from 15. August 2012 to 30. June 2013”. 10. On 8 November 2012, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent and Club H terminated the loan agreement by mutual consent. 11. On 3 January 2013, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent asked the Respondent / Counter-Claimant for his return to the team. 12. On 16 January 2013, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant informed the Claimant / Counter-Respondent that it did not count on his services before 1 July 2013 since he technically belonged to Club H until 30 June 2013, as per the loan agreement. 13. On 2 and 16 September 2013, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent put the Respondent / Counter-Claimant in default regarding the non-payment of his salary for July and August 2013 as well as for training-related infringements. 14. On 16 September 2013, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant proceeded to the payment of the Claimant / Counter-Respondent’s salary for July 2013. 15. On 2 October 2013, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent terminated the contract with the Respondent / Counter-Claimant in writing. 16. On 8 and 10 October 2013, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant paid the Claimant / Counter-Respondent’s salary for August and September 2013 as well as up to 2 October 2013. 17. On 16 October 2013, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent acknowledged the said payment and attempted to reach an amicable settlement with the Respondent / Counter-Claimant. 18. On 22 October 2013, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant refused the amicable settlement, stating that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent was the party who breached the contract and had no valid reason to terminate the contractual relationship. In this context, on the same date, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent warned the Respondent / Counter-Claimant of his subsequent complaint to FIFA. 19. On 13 November 2013, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent lodged a complaint before FIFA against the Respondent / Counter-Claimant, requesting the following amounts, plus 5% interest p.a.:  27,056,613 as compensation corresponding to the residual value of the contract: 1,136,613 as balance of salary for October 2013, plus 9,720,000 as salary from November 2013 until June 2014, and 16,200,000 as salary for the season 2014-2015;  33,536,613 as compensation corresponding to his “disputed salary for the loan period from 1 January 2013 until 30 June 2013”. The Claimant / Counter-Respondent also requested the imposition of sporting sanctions on the Respondent / Counter-Claimant. 20. The Claimant / Counter-Respondent first of all alleged that the Respondent / Counter-Claimant did not provide him with appropriate training conditions in order to perform his professional obligations. The Claimant / Counter-Respondent stated that as from 11 July 2013, he had to train with the club, Club I, which is not the second team of the Respondent / Counter-Claimant and which apparently competes in the non-professional league from country E. In this respect, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent provided a letter dated 17 July 2013 addressed to the Respondent / Counter-Claimant, pointing out the club’s breach of art. 4 of the contract and requesting to resume training with the first team of the latter. 21. Moreover, as from 30 July 2013, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent was apparently moved to the second team of the Respondent / Counter-Claimant. Yet, he was allegedly not allowed to play any matches. The Claimant / Counter-Respondent provided a letter dated 19 August 2013 addressed to the Respondent / CounterClaimant in this regard. 22. In continuation, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent asserted that as from 29 August 2013, he was imposed individual training sessions, in most cases without coach. In this respect, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent provided a training schedule dated 28 August 2013 stating that “the player’s individual skills need improvement” as well as a DVD which displayed the Claimant / Counter-Respondent training on his own. 23. Furthermore, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent held that the Respondent / Counter-Claimant did not fulfil its primary obligation of payment. By the time he put an end to the contract, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant had not paid his salary for two months, i.e. August and September 2013. 24. The Claimant / Counter-Respondent further stated that he was not paid any amount by the Respondent / Counter-Claimant during the loan period, i.e. until 30 June 2013. Yet, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent alleged that, on 18 June 2013, he took part in the preparation and the medical tests of the Respondent / CounterClaimant and, on 29 June 2013, he apparently appeared with its first team in two friendly matches. 25. In addition, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent deemed that the mutual termination of the loan agreement – apparently due to a work permit issue – led to the said loan agreement being null and void and thus, the Respondent / CounterClaimant had to allow him to resume his activity with the team. In particular, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent considered that he warned the Respondent / Counter-Claimant in advance so that it could register him during the following transfer window, i.e. as from 1 January 2013. In this respect, the Claimant / CounterRespondent referred to an e-mail from his agent to the Respondent / CounterClaimant apparently sent on 16 November 2013, by means of which he had requested for the first time to resume the team, whereupon he did not receive any answer. 26. In continuation, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent deemed that the termination of the loan agreement triggered his entitlement to receive remuneration from the Respondent / Counter-Claimant as per the contract, regardless of the “petition” previously signed by the parties. In any event, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent considered the said petition as null and void since it was signed against his own will. 27. In view of the foregoing, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent deemed that he had just cause to terminate the contract on 2 October 2013. 28. In its statement of defence, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant solely contested the jurisdiction of the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the FIFA DRC) in favour of “the competent body of the Football Federation of country E (Player Status and Transfer Committee, Disciplinary Body) or the competent civil or labour court for legal remedy” as set forth in art. 22 of the contract. The Respondent / Counter-Claimant further specified that since the Football Federation of country E had not implemented any national dispute resolution chamber, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent should have lodged his claim before the relevant civil or labour court of country E. 29. In his replica, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent stated that art. 22 of the contract cannot be regarded as an exclusive jurisdiction clause insofar as it provided for various competent “courts of jurisdiction”, i.e. not only the competent body of the Football Federation of country E (hereinafter: the NDRC of the Football Federation of country E) but also the competent civil or labour court of country E. Therefore, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent upheld that FIFA was competent to deal with the matter at stake and thus, reiterated his claim in its entirety. 30. In its duplica, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant considered that art. 22 of the contract did not make a clear reference to the competent judicial authority and did not quote the FIFA DRC as being part of such forum for settling possible disputes. The club further referred to art. 22 of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: the FIFA Regulations) which, according to the Respondent / Counter-Claimant, provided for “the right of players and clubs to seek redress before a civil court for any employment-related disputes”. 31. In continuation, referring to art. 23 of the contract, the Respondent / CounterClaimant asserted that the parties had clearly referred to the law of country E which, according to the Respondent / Counter-Claimant, provided for the “exclusive jurisdiction of state courts in employment disputes”. In this respect, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant provided the following articles of the the Code of Civil Procedure of country E:  Chapter III (Competence), Section 22, para. 2, stipulates that « Administrative actions (Chapter XX) shall fall within the jurisdiction of courts of public administration and labor, as well as legal actions arising from employment and other similar relationships (Chapter XXIII) » ;  Chapter XXIII, Section 349/B, para. 2 (Competence, Jurisdiction) states that « With regard to labor disputes, only the court of public administration and labor competent according to the location of the employer’s address, or according to the employer’s permanent establishment where the employee is or has been employed based on his contract of employment, shall have jurisdiction ». 32. Subsequently, in its duplica and should the FIFA DRC declare itself competent to deal with the present matter, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant provided its position as to the substance. First of all, as regards the statement relating to the loan of the Claimant / Counter-Respondent, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant recalled that it was not required to pay any amount to the Claimant/ CounterRespondent during the term of the loan and thus, his claim as to unpaid salaries under the contract during the loan period is not legitimate. In particular, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant pointed to the “petition” which provided for an unpaid leave request from the Claimant / Counter-Respondent for the relevant period. The Respondent / Counter-Claimant further held that the “petition” for unpaid leave was a prerequisite in order for the loan to be valid and could have been interrupted by the Claimant / Counter-Respondent if he had requested it in writing, in accordance with the labour law of country E. 33. Furthermore, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant sustained that on 16 November 2012, it was informed by Club H – not by the Claimant / Counter-Respondent – of the termination of the loan agreement. Thereafter, on 23 January 2013, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant was apparently provided by Club H with a copy of the termination agreement. In this respect, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant provided a letter from Club H, acknowledging the termination of the loan agreement by mutual consent and pointing to the “poor sports performance” of the Claimant / Counter-Respondent. 34. Yet, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant considered that the early termination of the loan agreement had not affected its validity, which was set to run until 30 June 2013. Therefore, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant deemed that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent still belonged to Club H until the original date of expiry of the relevant loan agreement, i.e. 30 June 2013. Consequently, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant is of the opinion that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent should have claimed outstanding remuneration for the loan period from Club H. 35. Subsequently, after receiving the approval of Club H on 13 June 2013, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant authorised the Claimant / Counter-Respondent to join the first team on 18 June 2013 and acknowledged that he played in three preparation matches, i.e. two on 29 June 2013 and one on 6 July 2013. However, according to the Respondent / Counter-Claimant, the Claimant / CounterRespondent was “not good enough to become member of the first team”. 36. The Respondent / Counter-Claimant further held that, in order to give the Claimant / Counter-Respondent the opportunity to play, on 8 July 2013, it apparently initiated negotiations in order to loan him to a first division club from country E, Club J, under the same financial conditions as the Respondent / Counter-Claimant, including an option of definitive transfer, which was apparently declined by the Claimant / Counter-Respondent. Thereafter, by means of an e-mail dated 27 August 2013, another first division club from country E, Club K, also requested the Claimant / Counter-Respondent on loan, offer which was apparently also declined by the Claimant / Counter-Respondent. 37. As for the Claimant / Counter-Respondent’s allegations related to Club I, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant insisted on the fact that the Claimant / CounterRespondent was not moved permanently to said club, he was apparently only instructed to play in trial matches. In any event, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant asserted that Club I was its partner club, with which its first team regularly played trial matches. 38. As to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent’s allegations pertaining to its second team, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant emphasised that the contract did not entitle him to “first team football activities”. The Respondent / Counter-Claimant also underlined that the second team was not an amateur team and that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent’s salary remained unchanged at that time. 39. With regard to the individual training program provided to the Claimant / CounterRespondent, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant justified such program by his repeated delays to the training sessions and his undisciplined behaviour as well as in order to help him improve his physical and technical skills. According to the Respondent / Counter-Claimant, such training program was set to last until the staff noticed the improvement. 40. The Respondent / Counter-Claimant further denies the Claimant / CounterRespondent’s allegation according to which he had to train without the assistance of a coach and without appropriate training conditions. The Respondent / CounterClaimant alleged that training sessions were held in its training centre and youth academy and the Claimant / Counter-Respondent was entitled to use all of the services. The Respondent / Counter-Claimant also alleged that the coach of the second team was conducting the said training sessions. 41. Furthermore, as to its alleged unfulfilled financial obligation under the contract, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant sustained that it always complied with its obligations of payment in accordance with the contract. In particular, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant referred to art. 6 of the contract and recalled that after the Claimant / Counter-Respondent’s default notice dated 2 September 2013 for the non-payment of his salary for July and August 2013, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant only paid his salary for July 2013 on 16 September 2013 because the salary for August 2013 had not fallen due yet. Consequently, by the time the Claimant / Counter-Respondent terminated the contract on 2 October 2013, only his salary for August 2013 was outstanding. The Respondent / Counter-Claimant also deemed that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent did not comply with the 30-day time limit required prior to the termination of the contract with just cause, as per art. 14 of the contract. 42. Subsequently, on 29 October 2013, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant informed the Football Federation of country E about the early termination of the contract by the Claimant / Counter-Respondent and the ensuing implications. Notwithstanding the above, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant recalled that, “for the interest of the Football Federation of country E”, on 29 January 2014, it did not contest the issuance of the International Transfer Certificate (ITC) of the Claimant / CounterRespondenbt for his registration with the club from country B, Club F (hereinafter: the Intervening party). 43. In this context, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant deemed that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent did not have just cause to terminate the contract and rejected his claim in its entirety. As a result, on 12 January 2015, the Respondent / CounterClaimant lodged a counterclaim before FIFA against the Claimant / Counter- Respondent, requesting the imposition of sporting sanctions on the latter as well as compensation amounting to 19,370,000, plus 5% interest p.a. as of 3 October 2013, broken down as follows:  3,645,000 as per art. 84 par. 2 of the Labour Code of country E according to which “in case of an unjustified termination of a fix-term employment relationship by the [the Claimant / Counter-Respondent], the latter is obliged to compensate [the Respondent / Counter-Claimant] with the amount which equals to [the Claimant / Counter-Respondent’s] 3 months salaries”;  27,056,000 corresponding to the residual value of the contract, i.e. 1,136,000 as salary from 3 to 31 October 2013, plus 9,720,000 as salary from November 2013 until June 2014 and 16,200,000 as salary for the season 2014-2015;  15,000,000 as loss of possible transfer fee, referring to the offer from Club J for the permanent transfer of the Claimant / Counter-Respondent for the amount of EUR 50,000;  4,370,000 for the specificity of sport as the termination of the contract occurred during the protected period. 44. In his final comments pertaining to the Respondent / Counter-Claimant’s counterclaim, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent sustained that he declined the loan offers submitted by the Respondent / Counter-Claimant because he did not want to move to “a lower classified team”. According to the Claimant / CounterRespondent, such decision prompted the Respondent / Counter-Claimant to apply the relevant individual training schedule to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent, not to help him improve his physical and technical skills as stated by the Respondent / Counter-Claimant. 45. At last, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent recalled that (i) the refusal of the Respondent / Counter-Claimant to allow him to participate in the training sessions with the first team as well as in the matches in the Super League from country E, (ii) the fact that he was left without any professional assistance and training facilities (iii) and the several written reminders to be re-integrated in the first team and to be paid the outstanding salaries constituted a just cause to terminate the contract on 2 October 2013. Therefore, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent rejected the Respondent / Counter-Claimant’s counterclaim and reiterated his claim in his entirety. 46. Upon FIFA’s request, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent confirmed that he first of all signed a “limited-contract” with the Intervening party on 20 January 2014 set to run until 30 June 2015. Thereafter, on 1 October 2014, the Claimant / CounterRespondent and the Intervening party extended the contractual relationship until 30 June 2017. 47. According to the contract, for the period as from 20 January 2014 until 30 June 2015, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent is entitled to the following fixedremuneration: From 20 January 2014 until 30 June 2014  EUR 300 as monthly salary;  EUR 1,000 as monthly “share for the execution of the contract;  EUR 3,000 as lump-sum payment due on 31 March 2014; From 1 July 2014 until 30 September 2014  EUR 300 as monthly salary;  EUR 1,200 as monthly “share for the execution of the contract; From 1 October 2014 to 30 June 2015  600 as monthly salary;  2,400 as monthly “share for contracting compensation”. 48. As regards the Intervening party, the latter acknowledged the present facts and the signing of the contract with the Claimant / Counter-Respondent on 20 January 2014. In particular, the Intervening party underlined inter alia the Claimant / CounterRespondent’s good performance as well as his sporting qualities. II. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. First of all, the DRC analysed whether it was competent to deal with the matter at stake. In this respect, the DRC referred to art. 21 par. 1 of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules). The present matter was submitted to FIFA on 13 November 2013. Therefore, the DRC concluded that the edition 2012 of the Procedural Rules was applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 of the Procedural Rules). 2. Subsequently, the DRC referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed that, in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 in combination with art. 22 b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (editions 2015; hereinafter: the Regulations), the DRC shall adjudicate on employment-related disputes between a club and a player, with an international dimension. 3. Having said that, the Chamber stated that it would, in principle, be competent to decide on the present litigation involving a player from country B, a club from country E and a club from country B regarding an employment-related dispute. 4. However, the DRC acknowledged that the Respondent / Counter-Claimant contested the competence of FIFA’s DRC to deal with the present case, referring to art. 22 of the contract. The Chamber further observed that the Respondent / Counter-Claimant specified that since the Football Federation of country E had not implemented any national dispute resolution chamber, the relevant civil or labour court of country E was competent to deal with the present matter. 5. The Chamber equally noted that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent rejected such position and insisted on the fact that FIFA had jurisdiction to deal with the present matter since the relevant article 22 of the contract is not an exclusive jurisdiction clause. 6. Taking into account the above, the DRC emphasised that, in accordance with art. 22 lit. b) of the 2012 FIFA Regulations, it is competent to deal with a matter such as the one at hand, unless an independent arbitration tribunal, guaranteeing fair proceedings and respecting the principle of equal representation of players and clubs, has been established at national level within the framework of the association and/or a collective bargaining agreement. With regard to the standards to be imposed on an independent arbitration tribunal guaranteeing fair proceedings, the DRC referred to the FIFA Circular no. 1010 dated 20 December 2005. In this regard, the members of the Chamber further referred to the principles contained in the FIFA National Dispute Resolution Chamber (NDRC) Standard Regulations, which came into force on 1 January 2008. 7. While analysing whether it was competent to hear the present matter, the DRC considered that it should, first and foremost, analyse whether the employment contract at the basis of the present dispute actually contained an arbitration clause. 8. Having said this, the members of the DRC turned their attention to art. 22 of the contract according to which “The parties agree that they will attempt to settle any possible disputes between themselves by means of discussion, out of court. In case of a failure to do so, they will turn only to the competent body of the Football Federation of country E (Players Status and Transfer Committee, Disciplinary Body) or the competent civil or labour court for legal remedy”. 9. In view of the aforementioned, the DRC carefully considered that, by signing the contract, the parties agreed upon either the national football jurisdiction or the ordinary civil court. The Chamber further brought into account that, by accepting the football jurisdiction, the parties accepted the football dispute resolution system. In this context, the Chamber deemed it fit to recall the content of art. 22 b) of the FIFA Regulations, which stipulates that employment related disputes between a club and a player of an international dimension can be referred to the FIFA DRC. In this context, the DRC concurred that if the football jurisdiction body selected by the parties on a national level does not exist or does not meet the minimum requirements as per art. 22 lit. b) of the FIFA Regulations, the DRC becomes the competent jurisdiction body for employment-related disputes of an international dimension. 10. In due consideration of the above, the members of the DRC established that, since the parties to the dispute agreed upon the football dispute resolution and, according to the information and documentation in the Chamber’s possession, no national dispute resolution body has been implemented, the DRC is therefore competent to deal with the present matter, on the basis of art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, as to the substance, and thus, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant’s objection to the competence of FIFA had to be rejected. 11. Subsequently, the Chamber analysed which regulations should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, it confirmed that in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2015), and considering that the present claim was lodged in front of FIFA on 13 November 2013, the 2012 edition of said Regulations (hereinafter: the Regulations) is applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance. 12. Furthermore, the DRC wished to point out that when deciding a dispute before the DRC, FIFA’s Regulations prevail over any national law chosen by the parties. In this regard, the Chamber emphasised that the main objective of the FIFA Regulations is to create a standard set of rules to which all the actors within the football community are subject to and can rely on. This objective would not be achievable if the DRC would have to apply the national law of a specific party on every dispute brought to it. 13. The competence of the DRC and the applicable regulations having been established, the Chamber entered into the substance of the present matter. In doing so, it started by acknowledging the abovementioned facts of the matter as well as the documentation contained in the file. However, the DRC emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to the facts, arguments and documentary evidence which it considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand. 14. In this respect, the Chamber acknowledged that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent and the Respondent / Counter-Claimant entered into a contractual relationship, which was to run from 2 July 2011 until 31 May 2015 and according to which the Claimant / Counter-Respondent was entitled to a monthly salary of 810,000 for the season 2011-2012, 1,080,000 for the season 2012-2013, 1,215,000 for the season 2013-2014 and 1,350,000 for the season 2014-2015. The DRC also took into account that on 15 August 2012, the parties agreed upon the loan of the Claimant / Counter-Respondent to Club H, which was to last until 30 June 2013, but was mutually terminated on 8 November 2012. 15. In continuation, the Chamber also took note that it is uncontested by both parties that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent terminated in writing the contractual relationship on 2 October 2013, after having put the Respondent / Counter-Claimant in default on 2 and 16 September 2013. 16. In this regard, the Chamber took due note that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent, on the one hand, insisted on the fact that his salary for July and August 2013, as well as any amount during the loan period, had not been paid at the time he put the club in default. Moreover, the DRC observed that the Claimant / CounterRespondent deplored his training conditions, insofar as, when he came back from loan, he had to train with a different team than the Respondent / CounterClaimant, then he was moved to the second team of the Respondent / CounterClaimant but was not allowed to play any matches and, in addition, he was imposed individual training sessions. Finally, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent maintained that the Respondent / Counter-Claimant wanted to loan him on two occasions during the summer 2013. On this basis, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent considers that he had a just cause to terminate the contract. 17. The Chamber further took note of the argumentation of the Respondent / CounterClaimant, which argued that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent had unilaterally terminated the contractual relationship without just cause and had thus lodged a counterclaim, inter alia, for compensation. The Respondent / Counter-Claimant first and foremost recalled that it did not owe any amount to the Claimant / CounterRespondent during the loan period and referred to the loan agreement which stipulates that the Respondent / Counter-Claimant is exempted from paying his remuneration during the loan period. Moreover, the Respondent / CounterClaimant sustained that by the time the Claimant / Counter-Respondent terminated the contract, there was only one monthly salary outstanding, i.e. August 2013, since on 16 September 2013 it had paid his salary for July 2013. The Respondent / Counter-Claimant also underlined that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent did not comply with the grace period set forth in art. 14 of the contract. 18. Having established the aforementioned, the Chamber deemed that the underlying issue in this dispute, considering the claim and counterclaim respectively lodged by the parties, was to determine whether the employment contract had been unilaterally terminated with or without just cause by the Claimant / CounterRespondent, and which party was responsible for the early termination of the contractual relationship in question. 19. At this point and for the sake of good order, the Chamber recalled the basic principle of burden of proof, as stipulated in art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules, according to which a party claiming a right from an alleged fact shall carry the respective burden of proof. 20. In this respect, the Chamber observed that, when the Claimant / CounterRespondent came back from loan in July 2013, he was first sent to another club, Club I. The DRC further noted that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent objected such decision in writing on 17 July 2013, which was uncontested by the Respondent / Counter-Claimant. Moreover, the DRC duly observed that the Claimant / CounterRespondent was subsequently sent to the second team of the Respondent / CounterClaimant, was ordered to follow individual training sessions and also was offered to be loaned to two different clubs, decisions which were either uncontested or not duly justified by the Respondent / Counter-Claimant. Finally, the Chamber acknowledged the payment of the Claimant / Counter-Claimant’s salary for July 2013 on 16 September 2013 but underlined that such payment occurred only after the Claimant / Counter-Respondent had put on twice the Respondent / CounterClaimant in default. 21. On account of all the above circumstances, the Chamber established that the Respondent / Counter-Claimant had no longer been interested in the Claimant / Counter-Respondent’s services. Such conduct constitutes, in the Chamber’s view, a clear breach of contract. Accordingly, the Chamber concurred that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent had just cause to terminate the contract. Consequently, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant is to be held liable for the early termination of the employment contract with just cause by the Claimant / Counter-Respondent and thus the Respondent / Counter-Claimant’s counterclaim is rejected. 22. Having established that the Respondent is to be held liable for the early termination of the contract, the DRC focussed its attention on the consequences of such termination. Taking into consideration art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the DRC decided that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent is entitled to receive an amount of money from the Respondent / Counter-Claimant as compensation for the termination of the contract with just cause, in addition to any outstanding payments on the basis of the relevant employment contract. 23. First of all, the Chamber reverted to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent’s financial claim, which includes outstanding amounts on the basis of the loan period. In this regard, the Chamber recalled the content of the loan agreement, according to which the Respondent / Counter-Claimant was exempted from paying any amounts to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent during the loan period. Therefore, the DRC decided to reject any financial claim of the Claimant / Counter-Respondent against the Respondent / Counter-Claimant based on the loan agreement and for the relevant original loan period. 24. As to the amounts based on the contract with the Respondent / Counter-Claimant, the DRC observed that, on 16 October 2013, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent acknowledged the payment by the Respondent / Counter-Claimant of his salary up to 2 October 2013. 25. In view of the aforementioned, the Chamber concluded that no payments are due as outstanding. 26. In continuation, the Chamber focused its attention on the calculation of the amount of compensation for breach of contract in the case at stake. In doing so, the members of the Chamber firstly recapitulated that, in accordance with art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the amount of compensation shall be calculated, in particular and unless otherwise provided for in the contract at the basis of the dispute, with due consideration for the law of the country concerned, the specificity of sport and further objective criteria, including, in particular, the remuneration and other benefits due to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent under the existing contract and/or the new contract, the time remaining on the existing contract up to a maximum of five years, and depending on whether the contractual breach falls within the protected period. 27. In application of the relevant provision, the Chamber held that it first of all had to clarify as to whether the pertinent employment contracts contained a provision by means of which the parties had beforehand agreed upon an amount of compensation payable by the contractual parties in the event of breach of contract. In this regard, the Chamber established that no such compensation clause was included in the said employment contracts and financial protocols at the basis of the matter at stake. 28. As a consequence, the members of the Chamber determined that the amount of compensation payable by the Respondent / Counter-Claimant to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent had to be assessed in application of the other parameters set out in art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations. The Chamber recalled that said provision provides for a non-exhaustive enumeration of criteria to be taken into consideration when calculating the amount of compensation payable. 29. Bearing in mind the foregoing, the Chamber proceeded with the calculation of the monies payable to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent under the terms of the employment contract as from its date of termination with just cause by the Claimant / Counter-Respondent until its original date of expiry. The DRC thus concluded that, in accordance with the Claimant / Counter-Respondent’s submission, he would have received 27,056,613 as salary from October 2013 until 30 June 2015. 30. Consequently, the Chamber concluded that the amount of 27,056,613 serves as the basis for the final determination of the amount of compensation for breach of contract in the case at hand. 31. In continuation, the Chamber verified as to whether the Claimant / CounterRespondent had signed an employment contract with another club during the relevant period of time, by means of which he would have been enabled to reduce his loss of income. According to the constant practice of the DRC, such remuneration under a new employment contract shall be taken into account in the calculation of the amount of compensation for breach of contract in connection with the Claimant / Counter-Respondent’s general obligation to mitigate his damages. 32. The Chamber recalled that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent signed an employment contract with the Intervening party valid as from 20 January 2014 until 30 June 2015, in accordance with which the Claimant / Counter-Respondent was to receive a total fixed remuneration amounting to EUR 27,570 during the said period of time, corresponding approximately to 8,260,000. 33. Moreover, in addition to the above-mentioned amount which is to be imputed on the amount due as compensation, the DRC considered the specificities of the case at hand, inter alia, that the Respondent / Counter-Claimant paid all due amounts just after the termination of the contract by the Claimant / Counter-Respondent. 34. On account of the above, the DRC partially accepted the Claimant / CounterRespondent’s claim and determined that the Respondent / Counter-Claimant must pay the amount of 15,000,000 as compensation for breach of contract in the case at hand. 35. In addition, taking into account the Claimant / Counter-Respondent’s request as well as the constant practice of the Dispute Resolution Chamber in this regard, the Chamber decided that the Respondent / Counter-Claimant must pay to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent interest of 5% p.a. on the amount of 15,000,000 as of 13 November 2013 until the date of effective payment. 36. The DRC concluded its deliberations in the present matter by establishing that any further claims lodged by the Claimant / Counter-Respondent are rejected. III. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. The claim of the Claimant / Counter-Respondent is admissible. 2. The claim of the Claimant / Counter-Respondent is partially accepted. 3. The counter-claim of the Respondent / Counter-Claimant is rejected. 4. The Respondent / Counter-Claimant has to pay to the Claimant / CounterRespondent, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision, the amount of 15,000,000, plus 5% interest p.a. on said amount as from 13 November 2013 until the date of effective payment. 5. In the event that the aforementioned amount plus interest is not paid within the stated time limit, the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to FIFA’s Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision. 6. Any further claim lodged by the Claimant / Counter-Respondent is rejected. 7. The Claimant / Counter-Respondent is directed to inform the Respondent / CounterClaimant immediately and directly of the account number to which the remittance is to be made and to notify the Dispute Resolution Chamber of every payment received. ***** Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy): According to art. 67 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives). The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following: Court of Arbitration for Sport Avenue de Beaumont 2 1012 Lausanne Switzerland Tel: +41 21 613 50 00 Fax: +41 21 613 50 01 e-mail: info@tas-cas.org www.tas-cas.org For the Dispute Resolution Chamber: Marco Villiger Acting Deputy Secretary General Encl. CAS directives