F.I.F.A. – Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2014-2015) – controversie di lavoro – ———- F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber (2014-2015) – labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 20 August 2014, in the following composition: Thomas Grimm (Switzerland), Deputy Chairman Taku Nomiya (Japan), member Theo van Seggelen (Netherlands), member on the claim presented by the club, Club A, country B as Claimant against the player, Player C, country D, as Respondent I and the club, Club E, country D, as Respondent II regarding an employment-related dispute between the parties

F.I.F.A. - Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2014-2015) - controversie di lavoro – ---------- F.I.F.A. - Dispute Resolution Chamber (2014-2015) - labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 20 August 2014, in the following composition: Thomas Grimm (Switzerland), Deputy Chairman Taku Nomiya (Japan), member Theo van Seggelen (Netherlands), member on the claim presented by the club, Club A, country B as Claimant against the player, Player C, country D, as Respondent I and the club, Club E, country D, as Respondent II regarding an employment-related dispute between the parties I. Facts of the case 1. On 16 April 2010, the club from country B, Club A (hereinafter: the Claimant) and the player from country D, Player C (hereinafter: the Respondent I), born on 13 January 1989, concluded an employment contract (hereinafter: the contract) for a period of five seasons as from 1 July 2010 until 30 June 2015. 2. According to clause 3 of the contract, the Respondent I would receive the following amounts: - For the season 2010-2011: EUR 90,000 gross payable in twelve equal monthly instalments; - For the season 2011-2012: EUR 100,000 gross payable in twelve equal monthly instalments; - For the season 2012-2013: EUR 110,000 gross payable in twelve equal monthly instalments; - For the season 2013-2014: EUR 125,000 gross payable in twelve equal monthly instalments; - For the season 2014-2015: EUR 140,000 gross payable in twelve equal monthly instalments. Additionally, the contract states that in the event that the Claimant is promoted to the “Primera division”, the yearly salary would be multiplied by two, while it would be divided by two in the event of relegation to the “Segunda división B”. 3. The first clause of the contract contains a stipulation which reads as follows: “El presente contrato adquiere plena validez en el momento en el que el JUGADOR obtenga la carta de libertad del CLUB al que actualmente tiene cedidos sus derechos federativos y por el tiempo que se fija en el presente contrato, en otro caso se considerará nulo y sin efecto, sin que quepa indemnización alguna para ninguna de las partes. Es decir, que el presente contrato queda sujeto a una condición suspensiva y resolutoria, consistente en que el CLUB debe tener la documentación necesaria para la inscripción del JUGADOR ante LNFP [Liga de Fúbol Profesional] y/o Football Federation of country B para disputar la competición de SEGUNDA DIVISIÓN A como jugador del Club A antes del inicio de la temporada dos mil diez – dos mil once. Si llegada esta fecha el CLUB no hubiera obtenido dicha documentación, o esta fuera insuficiente para que la Liga de Futbol Profesional y/o la Football Federation of country B lo inscriban como jugador del CLUB, el presente contrato quedará anulado y sin efecto jurídico alguno entre las partes, sin derecho a ningún tipo de indemnización entre ambas” (Free translation: the present contract acquires full validity at the moment the player receives the release certificate from the club which currently holds his federative rights and for the duration stipulated therein; in any other case, the contract will be deemed null and void without any right to be compensated for the parties. That is to say that the present contract is subject to a suspensive and resolutive condition, meaning that the club must have the documentation necessary to inscribe the player with the LNFP and/or Football Federation of country B in order to participate in the competition Segunda Liga A as a player of Club A, before the beginning of the 2010-2011 season. Should the club not obtain the abovementioned documentation within the deadline, or should said documentation be insufficient in order for the Liga de Fútbol Profesional and/or Football Federation of country B to inscribe him as a club’s player, the present contract will be considered null and void between the parties without any right for them to be compensated). 4. In addition, the first clause also stipulates that “El JUGADOR manifiesta expresamente que queda libre a partir del día 30/06/2010, por lo que no podrá considerarse la existencia de un contrato con un tercer club como causa de resolución del presente contrato” (free translation: the player expressly states that he will be a free agent as from 30/06/2010; therefore, the existence of contract with a third club will not be considered as a reason to cancel the present contract). 5. Furthermore, clause 6 of the contract provides for a compensation clause stipulating that in the event that the Claimant terminates the contract prior to its term, it shall pay 50% of the salary due for the following season. Conversely, if the early termination is attributable to the Respondent I, he shall pay the Claimant the amount of EUR 10,000,000. 6. On 14 June 2010, the Respondent I signed an employment contract with the club from country D, Club E (currently known as Club E; hereinafter: the Respondent II) according to which he was entitled to a monthly remuneration amounting to EUR 6,000 gross. 7. On 26 July 2010, the Claimant sent a fax to the Respondent I requesting him to be present at training on 27 July 2010. 8. On 13 August 2010, the Claimant contacted the Respondent II by fax, stating that the contract concluded with the Respondent I was sent as an attachment and that they would speak over the phone in the afternoon. 9. The Respondent II, in a letter dated 16 August 2010, but apparently received by the Claimant on 24 August 2010, stated that it considered the affair to be closed on the following basis: - The first clause of the contract contains a suspensive condition which foresees that the contract is null and void if the Claimant does not obtain the International Transfer Certificate, which it did not since the Football Federation of country D never issued such a certificate. Therefore, this “contract” is not legally binding; - The signature of the Respondent I has been forged; - The Claimant violated art. 18 par. 3 of the the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: the Regulations) since it did not request in writing the authorisation of Club F before negotiating with the Respondent I. 10. On 23 August 2010, the Claimant sent a further fax to the Respondent I requesting him to attend training and informing him that if he does not do so within 24 hours, it would consider his behaviour as a unilateral breach of the contract. On the same day, the Claimant also requested the Respondent II to allow the Respondent I to join it and fulfil his contract. Otherwise, the Claimant informed the Respondent II that in the event of a breach of contract, the latter would also be held liable to pay the compensation set in clause 6 of the contract, for inducement to the breach of contract. 11. On 31 August 2010, the Claimant responded to the Respondent II that it still had the possibility of registering the Respondent I but was impeded from doing so because of the conduct of the Respondent II and the Respondent I. Additionally, the Claimant alleged that the contract was signed in the presence of witnesses who could verify its validity. 12. On 27 January 2011, the Claimant lodged a claim against the Respondent I for breach of contract as well as against the Respondent II for inducement to the breach. In this context, the Claimant requests: - the Respondent I and the Respondent II to be held jointly to pay the amount set in the compensation clause in the contract (EUR 10,000,000); - a 6-month ban from playing in official matches to be imposed on the Respondent I; - a 2-year ban from registering new players to be imposed on the Respondent II. 13. In its claim, the Claimant points out that the Respondent I’s agent had provided assurance that the contract between the Respondent I and his previous club, Club F, was valid until June 2010 and that therefore, in line with art. 18 par. 3 of the Regulations, he was free to sign an employment contract with another club. In this respect, the Claimant makes reference to the above-mentioned stipulation contained in the first clause of the contract. 14. According to the Claimant, on 26 April 2010, it was contacted by the Respondent I’s agent requesting a payment on behalf of the Respondent I in order to compensate the latter for his move to country B. Subsequently, on 5 May 2010 and after the Claimant had rejected such request, the Respondent I’s agent informed the Claimant that the Respondent I in fact requested EUR 30,000 as additional payment and that the Respondent I would sign for another club if such request was rejected. At the same time, the Respondent I’s agent mentioned that he would no longer represent the Respondent I. 15. Furthermore, the Claimant explains having unsuccessfully attempted to contact the Respondent I by phone and sent him a fax on 26 July 2010 requesting him to be present at its training facilities on 27 July 2010. As the Respondent I was absent and never answered the Claimant, it supposedly started to investigate and discovered via the internet that the Respondent I had signed another employment contract with the Respondent II on 14 June 2010. 16. In relation to the first clause of the contract, the Claimant asserts that it may be interpreted in two ways: either as a potestative clause, or as a “resolutive” one. While the former interpretation would render the clause null and void, the latter resorts to the principle of effectiveness and considers that the condition referred to in the clause is a condition the fulfilment of which is independent from the will of both parties. According to the Claimant, no matter the interpretation chosen, the only condition to the contract is that the player is free at the end of the season and the lack of an ITC request would not affect the validity of the contract. 17. In his response, the Respondent I stresses that his previous contract with Club F was due to expire on 30 June 2011 and not on 30 June 2010. Therefore, the Claimant should be considered in breach of art. 18 par. 3 of the Regulations since it did not request in writing the authorisation of Club F before establishing a contact with the Respondent I. 18. Furthermore, the Respondent I acknowledges having signed a pre-contract with the Claimant without ever having the intention of signing a definitive contract. The Respondent I also states that the Claimant’s representatives informed him that the signed document was not binding since it contained a suspensive condition stipulating that the agreement would only come into force if he could not find a club in the Ligue 1 or Ligue 2 of country D before the end of the 2010 transfer window. In this respect, he considers that the Claimant’s representatives abused the fact that he did not speak the language of country B to mislead him. In addition to that, he challenges the authenticity of the signature contained in the contract that the Claimant enclosed to its claim and questions the validity of the contract because he did not understand it and was never provided with a translation in the language of country D. 19. In its submission, the Respondent II challenges FIFA’s jurisdiction considering that the conditions set out in art. 22 lit. a) of the Regulations, i.e. a dispute between a club and a player in relation to the maintenance of contractual stability where there has been an ITC request, have not been fulfilled since the Claimant never requested the aforementioned ITC. 20. With regard to the substance of the matter, the Respondent II reiterates the arguments raised in its letter dated 16 August 2010. First of all, Claimant violated art. 18 par. 3 of the Regulations. According to the Respondent II, the Claimant had a positive obligation to enquire about the contractual status of the Respondent I and could not rely on the mere statement of his agent. In this regard, the Respondent II submits a copy of the Respondent I’s contract with Club F which was due to expire on 30 June 2011 as well as a termination agreement, dated 20 May 2010, signed by the Respondent I and the President of Club F, registered by the Football Federation of country D on 3 June 2010, and coming into force on 22 May 2010. On the other hand, the Respondent II explains that when it first contacted the Respondent I, it was informed about the ongoing contract with Club F. Thereupon, the Respondent II contacted the said club which agreed to release the Respondent I without claiming transfer compensation. 21. Moreover, the Respondent II reiterates the fact that the first clause of the contract made its validity subject to the Claimant obtaining the documents necessary to register the Respondent I with the league of country B or the Football Federation of country B. However, according to the Respondent II, the Claimant never requested the issuance of the International Transfer Certificate that would have been necessary for the registration. Therefore, the contract should be considered null and void. 22. Besides, the Respondent II states that, should the Dispute Resolution Chamber hold it liable for inducement to the breach of contract, clause 6 of the contract should be disregarded since the compensation set therein is inequitable and discriminatory towards the Respondent I. Therefore, the Respondent II requests the Dispute Resolution Chamber to rely on the amount which would be due if the Claimant had breached the contract as per clause 6 of the contract and set a compensation amount of EUR 45,000. In any case, the Respondent II deems that the compensation set out in the contract should be reduced and requests, among others, the following elements to be considered: - the Claimant did not pay any transfer fee or commission for the Respondent I; - the Claimant did not participate in the sporting development of the Respondent I; - the Claimant did not suffer any sporting harm; - the Respondent II and the Respondent I mutually terminated the contract on 20 January 2012 without any compensation to be paid. 23. As far as art. 17 par. 4 of the Regulation is concerned, the Respondent II considers that no sporting sanction should be imposed. First of all, it alleges that the contract was supposedly breached before coming into force and thus outside the protected period. Additionally, the Respondent II states that it could not have induced the breach since it only became aware of the existence of the contract between the Claimant and the Respondent I after it had signed its own contract with the latter and completed his registration. 24. According to the information and documentation contained in the Transfer Matching System (TMS), on 30 January 2012, the Respondent I concluded an employment contract with the club from country H, Club G, valid as of 27 February 2012 until 10 June 2014 and entitling him to a monthly salary amounting to 30,000 (approx. EUR 765). However, on 22 January 2013, the parties terminated the contract and the club “guarantee[d] to the debt to Player C in the amount of 211 350 in the period until 15 May 2013”. Subsequently, as per the documentation uploaded into TMS, the Respondent I entered into an employment agreement with the club from country J, Club I, valid as of 1 January 2013 until 31 December 2013 and according to which the Respondent I was entitled to receive USD 10,000 as a sign-on fee as well as a monthly salary of 395,000. On 6 June 2013, the club from country J terminated the contract and undertook to pay: “(i) the amount equivalent to your threemonth salaries being a total of Eight Hundred Sixty Six Thousand Seven Hundred and Ninety (866,790) NET; (ii) your salary of June 2013 being a net amount of Two Hundred Eighty Eight Nine Hundred and Thirty (288,930); and (iii) one way economy flight ticket routing Country J-Country D”. Then, according to the documentation uploaded in the TMS by the club concerned, on 10 December 2013, the Respondent I and the club from country D, Club K, signed an employment contract valid as of 1 January 2014 until 30 June 2014 and entitling the Respondent I to a monthly remuneration of EUR 4,004 gross. 25. By means of a correspondence dated 23 May 2014, the Football Federation of country D confirmed that up until 23 July 2010 its affiliated club was known as Club E and changed its name to Club E on the stated date. II. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter also referred to as Chamber or DRC) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the case at hand. In this respect, it took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 27 January 2011. Consequently, the 2008 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: Procedural Rules) is applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 par. 2 and 3 of the Procedural Rules). 2. The Dispute Resolution Chamber further referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and took note that the Respondent II challenged its competence to deal with the matter on the ground that the conditions set out in art. 22 lit. a) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, i.e. a dispute between a club and a player in relation to the maintenance of contractual stability where there has been an ITC request, have not been fulfilled since the Claimant never requested the aforementioned ITC. 3. In this regard, the members of the Chamber recalled that according to art. 24 par. 1 in combination with art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations (edition 2014), the Dispute Resolution Chamber is competent to deal with employment-related disputes with an international dimension. 4. In this context, the DRC stressed that the employment-related dispute at stake has an international dimension since it involves a club from country B, a player from country D and a club from country D and therefore concluded that it is competent to deal with the matter. 5. In continuation, the Chamber analysed which regulations should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, it confirmed that in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (editions 2010, 2012 and 2014), and considering that the claim in the present matter was lodged on 27 January 2011, the 2010 edition of said regulations (hereinafter: the Regulations) is applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance. 6. The competence of the Chamber and the applicable regulations having been established, entering into the substance of the matter, the members of the Chamber started by acknowledging the facts as well as the documentation contained in the file. However, the Chamber emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to facts, arguments and documentary evidence which it considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand. 7. In view of the allegations and arguments presented by the parties involved in the present matter, the Chamber underlined that in order to be able to establish as to whether, as claimed by Claimant, a breach of contract had been committed by the Respondent I, it should first of all pronounce itself on the issue of the validity of the relevant employment contract dated 16 April 2010, which was submitted by the Claimant. 8. In this respect, the Chamber duly noted that the Respondent I challenged the validity of said contract, arguing that his signature was forged. At this point, the members of the Chamber deemed it important to highlight that it is beyond the Chamber’s competence to determine as to whether a document or signature has been falsified or tampered with. In fact, such matters would fall within the competence of a penal court. 9. Furthermore, the Chamber recalled that in accordance with art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules, any party claiming a right on the basis of an alleged fact shall carry the burden of proof. In this regard, the Chamber took note that the Claimant had provided the original contract duly bearing the signature of both parties. On account thereof as well as the contradictory statements of the Respondent I in this respect, the Chamber concluded that this argument of the Respondent I had to be rejected. 10. In continuation, the DRC took note that the Respondent I acknowledged having signed a “pre-contract” on 16 April 2010. However, the Respondent I argued that the Claimant’s representatives abused the fact that he did not speak Spanish to mislead him and make him sign a document different from what they agreed on. In this regard, the Chamber was eager to refer to its longstanding and well-established jurisprudence and emphasised that a party signing a document of legal importance without knowledge of its precise contents, as a general rule, does so on its own responsibility. In light of the above, the Chamber concluded that the Respondent I’s reported ignorance of the language of country B was not a valid cause to consider the document he signed as null and void. 11. The Chamber further noted that the Respondent II challenged the validity of the contract on the basis that the first clause of the contract contains a suspensive condition which foresees that the contract is null and void if the Claimant does not obtain the International Transfer Certificate, which it did not since the Football Federation of country D never issued such a certificate. 12. In this respect, the DRC deemed of pertinence to recall its jurisprudence in accordance with which the validity of an employment contract cannot be made conditional upon the execution of (administrative) formalities, such as, but not limited to, the registration procedure in connection with the international transfer of a player, which are of the sole responsibility of one party and on which the other party has no influence. 13. Having stated the aforementioned, the Chamber first wished to highlight that, in order for an employment contract to be considered as valid and binding, apart from the signature of both the employer and the employee, it should contain the essentialia negotii of an employment contract, such as the parties to the contract and their role, the duration of the employment relationship and the remuneration payable by the employer to the employee, i.e. respectively, the Claimant and the Respondent I. 14. After careful study of the contract presented by the Claimant, the Chamber concluded that all such essential elements are included in the pertinent employment contract, in particular, the facts that the contract establishes that the Respondent I has to render his services to the Claimant during a fixed period of time, which, in exchange therefor, has to pay to the Respondent I a monthly remuneration. 15. On account of the above, the Chamber came to the firm conclusion that the arguments of the Respondent I and the Respondent II cannot be upheld and that the contract signed by and between the Claimant and the Respondent I on 16 April 2010 was a valid employment contract binding the parties as from the 2010-11 season until the 2014-15 season. 16. Having so found, the Chamber followed its analysis and turned its attention to the question of the alleged breach of contract without just cause by the Respondent I. 17. In this respect, the Chamber was eager to highlight that based on the parties’ respective statements and the documentation available on file, it was undisputed that the Respondent I never joined the Claimant in order to offer his services to the Claimant in accordance with the relevant employment contract. Also, it is undisputed that, on 14 June 2010, the Respondent I signed an employment contract with the Respondent II covering partially the same period of time as the employment contract the Respondent I signed with the Claimant. By acting as such, the Chamber concurred that the Respondent I had acted in breach of the employment contract concluded with the Claimant and is therefore to be held liable for termination of the contract without just cause. 18. Given these circumstances, the Chamber recalled that, according to art. 18 par. 5 of the Regulations, if a player enters into an employment contract with different clubs for the same period of time, the provisions of Chapter IV of the Regulations regarding the maintenance of contractual stability between professionals and clubs shall apply. 19. In continuation, the members of the Chamber referred to item 7. of the “Definitions” section of the Regulations, which stipulates inter alia that the protected period comprises “three entire seasons or three years, whichever comes first, following the entry into force of a contract, where such contract is concluded prior to the 28th birthday of the professional, or two entire seasons or two years, whichever comes first, following the entry into force of a contract, where such contract is concluded after the 28th birthday of the professional”. In this regard, the Dispute Resolution Chamber pointed out that given the facts of the present case, the unjustified breach of contract by the Respondent I had obviously occurred within the applicable protected period. 20. Having stated the above, the members of the Chamber turned their attention to the question of the consequences of such unjustified breach of contract committed by the Respondent I during the protected period. 21. In doing so, the Dispute Resolution Chamber first of all referred to the provisions of art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, in accordance with which a consequence of terminating a contract without just cause is the payment of compensation by the party in breach to the counterparty. In this respect, the members of the Chamber recalled that the Claimant’s claim includes a request for compensation for breach of contract in the total amount of EUR 10,000,000 corresponding to the amount set in clause 6 of the contract. 22. Having recalled the aforementioned, the Chamber strongly affirmed, however, that the particular circumstances surrounding the breach of contract by the Respondent I in the present case had to be taken into consideration in order to determine whether compensation was payable by the Respondent I and, in joint liability, the Respondent II (cf. art. 17 par. 2 of the Regulations). 23. In this regard, the Chamber observed that the Claimant asserted that it was informed by the Respondent I and his agent that the former’s contract with Club F was due to expire on 30 June 2010. The DRC further noted that the Claimant acknowledged having relied on their statements and never mentioned having contacted Club F in order to assess the actual contractual situation of the Respondent I. 24. In light of the above, the Chamber considered that prior to signing the employment contract with the Respondent I on 16 April 2010, the Claimant had not taken the necessary measures in order to establish whether or not the Respondent I was still contractually bound to Club F. What is more, by acting as stated above, the DRC deemed that the Claimant did not exercise the due diligence in order to inform itself as to the Respondent I’s contractual situation. 25. In this respect, the members of the Chamber were eager to emphasise that prior to starting the relevant negotiations and entering into an employment contract with the Respondent I, in line with the stipulations set forth in art. 18 par. 3 of the Regulations, the Claimant should have contacted Club F. 26. In particular, bearing in mind the Claimant’s allegation that it was informed that the Respondent I’s contract with Club F would have ended in June 2010, the Chamber wished to highlight that if art. 18 par. 3 of the Regulations reads that a professional shall only be free to conclude a contract with another club if his contract with his present club has expired or is due to expire within six months, said particular provision may only be seen as a right for the player and may by no means be understood as an exoneration for a potential club from its duty of care consisting of contacting in writing a player’s current club before entering into contractual negotiations with a player. What is more, the members of the Chamber deemed fit to point out that the Claimant had explicitly been made aware of the name of the club with which the player was registered at the time and therefore possessed all the information necessary to complete its due diligence 27. In light of the considerations mentioned above, the Chamber came to the conclusion that the Claimant had clearly committed a fault by entering into an employment contract with the Respondent I who still had a valid contract for one more season without having previously contacted his current club, and, consequently, had acted in violation of the Regulations. 28. Having stated the above, the members of the Chamber held that, in accordance with the legal principle of nemo auditur propriam turpitudinem allegans, it could not enforce the Claimant’s claim for compensation for breach of contract by the Respondent I, since, as established above, the Claimant was itself at fault by signing the relevant employment contract with the Respondent I on 16 April 2010. In other words, the Chamber concluded that due to the Claimant’s own fault, i.e. the disrespect of the Regulations, as established above, it could not be entitled to receive compensation in the case at hand. The Chamber highlighted that this is in line with existing jurisprudence of the Chamber. 29. Therefore, the Dispute Resolution Chamber decided that the Claimant’s claim for compensation for breach of contract against the Respondent I and, in joint liability, the Respondent II, must be rejected. 30. Any other argument raised by the parties in relation to the payment of compensation for breach of contract does, therefore, not need to be further addressed. 31. In continuation, the Chamber focused its attention on the further consequences of the breach of contract by the Respondent I within the protected period, and in this respect, addressed the question of sporting sanctions against the Respondent I in accordance with art. 17 par. 3 of the Regulations. The cited provision stipulates inter alia that sporting sanctions shall be imposed on any player found to be in breach of contract during the protected period. Furthermore, the Chamber recalled, once again, that art. 18 par. 5 of the Regulations, which deals with the consequences of entering into more than one contract covering the same time period, clearly states that a player shall be subject to the provisions of Chapter IV of the Regulations regarding the maintenance of contractual stability between professionals and clubs. 32. With regard to the quoted provision, the Chamber emphasised that a suspension of four months on a player’s eligibility to participate in official matches is the minimum sporting sanction that can be imposed for breach of contract during the protected period. This sanction, according to the explicit wording of the relevant provision, can be extended in case of aggravating circumstances. In other words, the Regulations intend to guarantee a restriction on the player’s eligibility of four months as the minimum sanction. Therefore, the relevant provision does not provide the possibility for deciding body to reduce the sanction under the fixed minimum duration in case of mitigating circumstances. 33. In this regard, the Dispute Resolution Chamber recalled that the breach of contract by the Respondent I had occurred during the applicable protected period. In this respect, the members of the Chamber outlined that the Respondent I actually breached two contracts insofar as when he signed his contract with the Claimant he still had a contract valid for one year with Club F. The latter fact is evidence of the Respondent’s disregard to the principle of contractual stability. Consequently, the Chamber decided that, by virtue of art. 17 par. 3 of the Regulations, the Respondent I had to be sanctioned with a restriction of four months on his eligibility to participate in official matches. 34. In continuation, the Chamber held that the issue of inducement with respect to the Respondent II is not to be considered since from the documentation on file it can be noted that the Respondent II duly contacted the club with which he was registered at the time with a view to sign a contract with the player and complete his registration, in accordance with the applicable rules. 35. The Chamber concluded its deliberations in the present matter by establishing that any further claims of the Claimant are rejected. III. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. The claim of the Claimant, Club A, is admissible. 2. The claim of the Claimant is partially accepted. 3. The Respondent I, Player C, is found to have terminated the employment contract with the Claimant without just cause within the protected period. 4. A restriction of four months on his eligibility to play in official matches is imposed on the Respondent I. This sanction applies with immediate effect as of the date of notification of the present decision. The sporting sanctions shall remain suspended in the period between the last official match of the season and the first official match of the next season, in both cases including national cups and international championships for clubs. 5. Any further claim lodged by the Claimant is rejected. ***** Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy): According to art. 67 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives). The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following: Court of Arbitration for Sport Avenue de Beaumont 2 1012 Lausanne, Switzerland Tel: +41 21 613 50 00 Fax: +41 21 613 50 01 e-mail: info@tas-cas.org / www.tas-cas.org For the Dispute Resolution Chamber: Jérôme Valcke Secretary General Encl. CAS directives