F.I.F.A. – Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2015-2016) – controversie di lavoro – ———- F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber (2015-2016) – labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 13 August 2015, in the following composition: Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman Mario Gallavotti (Italy), member Jon Newman (USA), member on the claim presented by the club, Club A, country B as Claimant against the player, Player C, country D as Respondent 1 and the club Club E, country F as Respondent 2 regarding an employment-related dispute between the parties

F.I.F.A. - Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2015-2016) - controversie di lavoro – ---------- F.I.F.A. - Dispute Resolution Chamber (2015-2016) - labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 13 August 2015, in the following composition: Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman Mario Gallavotti (Italy), member Jon Newman (USA), member on the claim presented by the club, Club A, country B as Claimant against the player, Player C, country D as Respondent 1 and the club Club E, country F as Respondent 2 regarding an employment-related dispute between the parties I. Facts of the case 1. According to the club from country B, Club A (hereinafter: the Claimant), on 16 April 2014, the player from country D, Player C (hereinafter: the Respondent 1), and the Claimant signed an agreement which stipulated the following: “This official pre contract agreement is made today 16th of April 2014 … The two parties agreed to sign an official contract of employment with the following minimum terms. (…) 3) The agreement must be for ONE year (2014-2015) and option on the Club for another year (2015-2016); 4) BENEFITS FOR THE PERIOD 2014-2015: Salary: €55000 (Fifty Five Thousand) Payable in Ten equal instalments. Prims: According to the internal regulations (same for all players). €3000 (Three Thousand euro) if the men’s team of the Employer participates at the 1 to 6 Group stage of the championship of 2014-2015. €3000 (Three Thousand euro) if the men’s team of the Employer participates at the Cup final of 2014-2015. €5000 (Five Thousand euro) if the men’s team of the Employer wins the Cup competition of 2014- 2015. 5) BENEFITS FOR THE PERIOD 2015-2016: Salary: €60000 (Sixty Thousand) Payable in Ten equal instalments. Prims: According to the internal regulations (same for all players). €3000 (Three Thousand euro) if the men’s team of the Employer participates at the 1 to 6 Group stage of the championship of 2015-2016. €3000 (Three Thousand euro) if the men’s team of the Employer participates at the Cup final of 2015-2016. €5000 (Five Thousand euro) if the men’s team of the Employer wins the Cup competition of 2015- 2016.” 2. On 29 July 2014, the Claimant lodged a claim in front of FIFA against the Respondent 1 and his new club, Club E from country F (hereinafter: the Respondent 2), stating that it had signed the aforementioned agreement with the Respondent 1 and that “it was an express term of the agreement that [the Respondent 1] would join [the Claimant] and sign an official contract of employment”. However, the Claimant stated that the Respondent 1 failed to come to country B to “eventually sign his official contract of employment” and to join the Claimant’s training and, instead, signed an employment contract with the Respondent 2. 3. Therefore, the Claimant argued that the Respondent 1 had breached the agreement without just cause and, further, that the Respondent 2 had induced the Respondent 1 to breach the agreement and requested compensation in the amount of EUR 55,000 as well as sanctions to be imposed on both Respondents. 4. In his response thereto, the Respondent 1 denied having signed a pre-contract with the Claimant. According to the Respondent 1, the signature and the date of birth in the agreement are not the same as the signature and the date of birth in his passport. Furthermore, the Respondent 1 argued that his passport number was not indicated in the agreement and that he had never had such case in his professional football career. 5. With regard to the signature, the Respondent 1 explained that the signature in the agreement does not match his writing style. Moreover, the signature of the last name in the agreement contains an “s” instead of a “z”, like the Respondent 1 wrote his last name in his passport. Therefore, the Respondent 1 argued that the signature on the agreement was forged. 6. For its part, the Respondent 2 replied to the Claimant’s claim and declared that it did not know about the existence of an agreement between the Claimant and the Respondent 1. In fact, the Respondent 2 was only aware of the Respondent 1’s employment relationship with his former club, Club G from country H. 7. Furthermore, the Respondent 2 explained that it had received an authorization, on 23 June 2014, from the Respondent 1’s representative to negotiate on his behalf. Moreover, the Respondent 1 had declared that his contract with Club G had expired on 30 June 2014. After having received the aforementioned documents, the Respondent 2 and the Respondent 1 signed an employment contract on 1 July 2014 and, subsequently, the International Transfer Certificate (ITC) was delivered on 3 July 2014. 8. Based on the foregoing, the Respondent 2 argued that it had “not induced nor violated the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players”. 9. Upon request of FIFA, the Claimant provided the alleged original copy of the agreement, denying that the Respondent 1’s signature is forged. Furthermore, the Claimant provided a declaration of the agent, Agent I, who allegedly represented the Respondent 1 during the negotiations with the Claimant, in which he stated that the Respondent 1 had signed the agreement, as well as a representation contract apparently signed between the agent and the player. Following the signing of the agreement, the Claimant proceeded to buy a flight ticket for the Respondent 1 to come to country B and join the Claimant’s training. 10. Furthermore, in its replica, the Claimant argued that the Respondent 2 should have known about the existence of the agreement between the Claimant and the Respondent 1. As to the signing of the agreement, the Claimant explained that the Respondent 1 signed while he was in his home country. The agreement was subsequently forwarded to the Claimant by the Respondent 1’s agent “through mail and/or email”. Finally, as to the aforementioned difference between the “s” and the “z”, the Claimant argued that “[the Respondent 1] might be using both the letters and that is something the club is not aware of”. 11. In his duplica, the Respondent 1 repeated his arguments and added that he had spoken to Agent I but that he had rejected Agent I’s proposal. 12. In its final comments, the Respondent 2 repeated its arguments and added that the pre-contract attached to the Claimant’s claim does not bear a signature, whereas the alleged original does. 13. According to the employment contract concluded between the Respondent 1 and the Respondent 2, valid as from 1 July 2014 until 30 June 2015, the Respondent 1 was to be remunerated with a sign-on fee of USD 33,334 as well as a monthly salary of USD 13,889. II. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter also referred to as Chamber or DRC) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the case at hand. In this respect, it took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 29 July 2014. Consequently, the 2012 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: Procedural Rules) is applicable to the matter at hand (cf. article 21 of the 2012, 2014 and 2015 editions of the Procedural Rules). 2. Subsequently, the members of the Chamber referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed that in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 and 2 in combination with art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2015) the Dispute Resolution Chamber is competent to deal with the matter at stake, which concerns a dispute with an international dimension between a club from country B, a player from country D and a club from country E in relation to an alleged employment relationship between the Claimant and the Respondent 1, invoked by the Claimant. 3. Furthermore, the Chamber analysed which edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, the Chamber referred, on the one hand, to art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (editions 2012, 2014 and 2015) and, on the other hand, to the fact that the present claim was lodged on 29 July 2014. The Dispute Resolution Chamber concluded that the 2012 version of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: the Regulations) is applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance. 4. The competence of the Chamber and the applicable regulations having been established, the members of the Chamber entered into the substance of the matter. In doing so, the Chamber started by acknowledging all the above-mentioned facts as well as the arguments and the documentation submitted by the parties. However, the Chamber emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to the facts, arguments and documentary evidence which it considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand. 5. In this respect, the members of the Chamber started by acknowledging that, according to the Claimant, it had, on 16 April 2014, concluded a pre-contract with the Respondent 1 with the aim of concluding an “official contract” at a later stage. However, instead of joining the Claimant’s training and signing the “official contract”, the Respondent 1 signed an employment contract with the Respondent 2. Therefore, the Claimant asked to be awarded, inter alia, compensation for breach of contract by the Respondent 1 in the amount of EUR 55,000 to be paid jointly by both Respondents as well as sporting sanctions to be imposed on the Respondent 1 and the Respondent 2. 6. The Chamber equally took due note of the fact that the Respondent 1, on his part, had categorically denied the conclusion of the pre-contract with the Claimant. The Respondent 1 argued that the signature on the pre-contract contains an “s” instead of a “z” and the birth date in the pre-contract does not correspond to his birth date in his passport and, therefore, the Respondent 1 held that the signature on the precontract is forged. 7. The Dispute Resolution Chamber also gave due consideration to the arguments of the Respondent 2. Firstly, its assessment that it was not aware of an agreement between the Claimant and the Respondent 1 and that the Respondent 1 declared that his contract with his previous club, Club G, had expired on 30 June 2014. Secondly, its argument that the pre-contract attached to the Claimant’s claim did not contain a signature of a representative of the Claimant, whereas the alleged original submitted by the Claimant does. 8. In view of aforementioned dissent between the parties in respect of the basic question as to whether or not a contract between the Claimant and the Respondent 1 had been concluded, the members of the Chamber firstly referred to art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules, according to which any party claiming a right on the basis of an alleged fact shall carry the respective burden of proof. The application of the said principle in the present matter led the members of the Chamber to conclude that it was up to the Claimant to prove the existence of a contract on the basis of which compensation for breach of contract is claimed. 9. Having stated the above, the Chamber recalled that the Respondent 1 maintained that he never signed the relevant contract with the Claimant and maintained that the signature contained on the copy of said contract remitted by the Claimant was forged. 10. At this stage, the DRC considered it appropriate to remark that, as a general rule, FIFA’s deciding bodies are not competent to decide upon matters of criminal law, such as the ones of alleged falsified signature or document, and that such affairs fall into the jurisdiction of the competent national criminal authority. 11. In continuation, the members of the Chamber recalled that all documentation remitted shall be considered with free discretion and, therefore, they focused their attention on the contract as well as on the other documents containing the Respondent 1’s signature, provided by the parties in the context of the present dispute. In this regard, the Chamber pointed out that the alleged original version of the contract was provided by the Claimant. 12. After a thorough analysis of the aforementioned documents, in particular, comparing the relevant signatures of the Claimant in the various documents provided in the present affair, i.e. the passport and the employment contracts signed by the Respondent 1 with his previous club, Club G, as well as with the Respondent 2, the members of the Chamber noted that the alleged signature of the Respondent 1 on the contract with the Claimant was spelled with an “s”. This, as opposed to the signatures of the Respondent 1 in his passport, the representation agreement as well as on the employment contracts with Club G and the Respondent 2, where his signature was spelled consistently with a “z”. 13. As a consequence, the members of the Chamber unanimously concluded that the signatures on such documents appear to be different. As such, the Chamber was not sufficiently satisfied that the Respondent 1 had signed the relevant contract and, as a result, found that it could not be established that the Respondent 1 had entered into an employment relationship with the Claimant. Therefore, the Chamber decided that, since the Claimant had not been able to prove that the pre-contract had been concluded between itself and the Respondent 1, there was no possibility for the Chamber to enter into the question whether or not such alleged employment contract had been breached. 14. All the above led the Dispute Resolution Chamber to conclude that the claim of the Claimant has to be rejected. III. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. The claim of the Claimant, Club A, is rejected. ***** Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy): According to art. 67 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives). The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following: Court of Arbitration for Sport Avenue de Beaumont 2 1012 Lausanne Switzerland Tel: +41 21 613 50 00 Fax: +41 21 613 50 01 e-mail: info@tas-cas.org www.tas-cas.org For the Dispute Resolution Chamber: Markus Kattner Acting Secretary General Encl. CAS directives