F.I.F.A. – Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2014-2015) – controversie di lavoro – ———- F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber (2014-2015) – labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 10 April 2015, in the following composition: Thomas Grimm (Switzerland), Deputy Chairman Jon Newman (USA), member John Bramhall (England), member Mario Gallavotti (Italy), member Taku Nomiya (Japan), member on the claim presented by the club, Club A, country B, as Claimant/Counter-Respondent against the player, Player C, country D, as Respondent/Counter-Claimant regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties I.

F.I.F.A. - Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2014-2015) - controversie di lavoro – ---------- F.I.F.A. - Dispute Resolution Chamber (2014-2015) - labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 10 April 2015, in the following composition: Thomas Grimm (Switzerland), Deputy Chairman Jon Newman (USA), member John Bramhall (England), member Mario Gallavotti (Italy), member Taku Nomiya (Japan), member on the claim presented by the club, Club A, country B, as Claimant/Counter-Respondent against the player, Player C, country D, as Respondent/Counter-Claimant regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties I. Facts of the case 1. On 20 August 2013, the Club A from country B (hereinafter: club or Claimant/Counter-Respondent) and the Player C from country D (hereinafter: player or Respondent/Counter-Claimant) signed an employment contract (hereinafter: contract) valid as from 21 August 2013 until 30 June 2017, i.e. four sporting seasons. 2. Art. 8.2 of the contract stipulates that “(…) the player has the right to terminate the present Contract by his own initiative (by his own choice), informing the Club about it in writing not later than one month (provided that the present Contract is not concluded for the period, that is less than four months), in this case the Football Player is obliged to pay to the Club on the date of dismissal the money payment, at a rate, which is equivalent to 20000000 (twenty million) Euro at a rate of the Central Bank of country B on the day of termination – if this Contract is terminated before 1st January 2015; 13000000 (thirteen million) Euro at a rate of the Central Bank of country B on the day of termination – if this contract is terminated after 1st January 2015. The same payment shall be made by the Football player if he terminates this Contract without just cause (…).” 3. Art. 8.3 of the contract stipulates that “if the present Contract is terminated by the Club by reasons, which relate to disciplinary sanctions, or if the Football player doesn’t start work on a date, stated in clause 1.2 of the present Contract, or if the Football player breaches this Contract without just cause, the Football player is obliged to pay to the Club on the date of dismissal the money payment at a rate, which is equivalent to 20000000 (twenty million) Euro at a rate of the Central Bank of country B on the day of termination.” 4. Art. 8. 4 of the contract further provides that the “Parties have agreed that payments stipulated in clauses 8.2-8.3 above shall be paid independently of the factual amount of damages caused to the club (…).” 5. Art. 8.5 of the contract provides that the “responsibility of the Club for the damage caused to the Football player (including so-called “positive interest”) is limited by an amount of 3 average monthly income of the Football player.” 6. In continuation, the contract contains various provisions inter alia stipulating that the player shall participate to the club’s activities (art. 2.1.1), that the player shall remain available to enable the club to contact him (art. 2.1.36 and 2.1.37) or that in case of a disease or an injury, the player mandatorily needs to inform the club’s medical staff accordingly and needs the club’s consent prior to consulting third party doctors (art. 2.1.21, 2.1.22 and 2.1.23). 7. Additionally, and on the same day, the parties signed an annex entitled “wage conditions of the football player” which stipulates that, subject to proper performance by the player of his contractual obligations (art. 1.1), the latter is inter alia entitled to the following remuneration, payable in the currency of country B: As from the beginning of the contract and until 30 June 2015, EUR 510,825 gross per month, i.e. a guaranteed net amount of EUR 444,417.75, of which 50% is the salary and 50% “additional premium”; As from 1 July 2015, EUR 560,345 gross per month, i.e. a guaranteed net amount of EUR 487,500.15, of which 50% is the salary and 50% “additional premium”. 8. By means of a termination notice dated 22 August 2014 remitted to the player, the club unilaterally terminated the contract with immediate effect. In said termination notice, the club referred to the player’s “numerous contractual breaches in recent months including in particular [the player’s] failure to return for training in the months of June, July and early August and [his] failure to provide a sufficient explanation despite repeated requests.” 9. On 15 September 2014, the club lodged a claim before FIFA for breach of contract against the player and requested that: The FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber (DRC) considers that the club had just cause to terminate the contract signed with the player; That based on art. 8.3 of the contract, the player be ordered to pay to the club the amount of EUR 20,000,000 as compensation plus interest; Alternatively, that the player be ordered to pay to the club a reasonable amount of compensation for breach of contract, bearing in mind the circumstances of the matter. 10. In support of its claim, the club gave the following account of the facts leading up to the termination of the employment contract. 11. In this regard, the club firstly explained that the player was transferred from the Club E from country B (hereinafter: Club E) to the club in summer 2013 against the payment of a transfer compensation in the amount of EUR 14,000,000. 12. Thereafter, in September 2013, the player was suspended for having received two red cards. On 2 October 2013, the player requested to be granted 9 days off. In this respect, the player asserted being “fed up being a target for referees” and wished to train at home and spend some time with his family so as to come back “mentally fresh”. 13. On the same day, the club rejected the player’s request, explaining that i) it deemed that the last red card which the player received was justified, ii) the player needed to train with the rest of the team and not alone and iii) since it was up to the club’s president to possibly take disciplinary sanctions against the player in connection with his suspension, it was not the right moment to ask for days off. As a conclusion, the club invited the player to wait until the team’s vacations to visit his family. 14. Thereafter, as the player was reportedly absent from two training sessions having taken place on 9 October 2013, the club asked him on the following day to present his explanations in this respect within 48 hours. 15. In his reply dated 11 October 2013, the player inter alia admitted that he “stayed away another day in country D” and confessed that he was feeling homesick and needed to recover from the red cards episode. The player concluded by asserting that he was sorry if he hurt anyone, that he did not mean any disrespect towards the club and would accept being sanctioned like any other player for his behaviour. 16. As a result of the aforementioned, the club reportedly sanctioned the player with a fine of 5% of his monthly salary. In this regard, the club maintained that the player did not object to said sanction. 17. In continuation, the club explained that the player left the club without any authorisation on 15 May 2014, i.e. after the last match of the season, and thus did not attend a club’s event scheduled on 16 May 2014. 18. According to the club, on 17 May and again on 14 June 2014, it informed the player in writing that training would resume on Monday 16 June 2014. 19. On 19 May 2014, the club contacted the player again to ask him to justify his unauthorised absence at the club’s event on 16 May 2014. 20. On 20 May 2014, the player’s agent replied to the club that the player had informed the club that he would miss the event of 16 May 2014 and that his absence to said event was due to a trip to consult a specialist in country D with regard to an injury. The player’s agent further held that since this medical consultation consisted in the continuation of a therapeutic treatment that had already been agreed upon with the club, there player did not breach his obligations and that the situation seemed to be a misunderstanding. 21. On 30 May 2014, the club rejected the player’s agent argumentation and held that according to its understanding of the situation, the player acted again in breach of contract, in a three folds way as i) he did not attend the club’s event of 16 May 2014, ii) he left the club without having been authorised and, finally iii) received a treatment for an (unreported) injury from a doctor not approved by the club. Also, the club stressed that the player was now to be seen as a reoffender. 22. Finally, the club invited the player once more to explain his behaviour and that in the absence of justification, the club would penalise him. 23. According to the club, the player failed to answer to its letter dated 30 May 2014, failed to resume the club’s training on 16 June 2014 and remained unreachable whereas he had only been given holidays until 3 June 2014. 24. On 9 July 2014, the club wrote to the player and stressed that the latter, who was still absent on that date, had not been authorised to be absent from the club. The club pointed out that it deemed that the player was again in breach of contract and asked him to come back to the club immediately and to justify his absence as soon as possible. 25. On 3 August 2014, the club played its first league match of the new season 2014/15 without the player. 26. According to the club, the player came back on 5 August 2014 and had a meeting with the club only to ask if the club was willing to loan him to Club F from country G and, in this context, to share his salary with this club. The club declined that proposal. 27. As the club asked again the player to explain his absence, the player allegedly replied that “he had mental problems and had been undergoing medical treatment in country D”. 28. The club then reported that the player left country B immediately after said meeting, again without information or authorisation. 29. After the meeting of 5 August 2014, the club asked the player on 6 August 2014 in writing to precisely explain inter alia the reasons of his two-months absence between 4 June 2014 and 5 August 2014, and specified in said request that “failure to show a good reason of [his] absence and further behaviour may cause termination of [the] employment contract by the club with just cause, as [the player has] already breached [his] contractual obligations before.” 30. On 7 August 2014, the player’s agent replied to the club that it had been agreed during the meeting of 5 August 2014 that the player would stay away from the club and would return after i) having given explanations as to his absence and ii) having done some medical tests. The player’s agent concluded his email to the club stating: “you do not need to lie or to arrange the truth”. 31. An exchange of emails between the club and the player’s agent continued on a daily basis. From the contents of the emails, it can inter alia be noted that the player reportedly did not return to the club, therefore failing to meet the club’s sport director at a meeting scheduled on 8 August 2014, and did not answer the club’s calls or emails. 32. Subsequently, the club received from the player’s lawyer a letter dated 8 August 2014 reading: “Mr Player C (…) is able to demonstrate that he has been the victim of racial harassment from the club. So far, however, he always decided not to give any publicity regarding these facts while this behavior caused him a “severe depressive syndrome” for which he is medically required to respect a sick leave from work. Mr Player C is willing to reach an amicable settlement with the club (…).” 33. On 9 August 2014, the player apparently returned to country B. On 11 August 2014, the club and the player held a meeting during which the player was asked to provide details regarding the accusations of racial harassment he made but allegedly refused to give any details to the club in this respect. 34. The exchange of emails between the player’s agent and the club continued. In particular, the club denied in said emails the player’s allegations of racial harassment and asked the player to submit a doctor’s certificate in relation to his alleged “severe depressive syndrome”. It also appears from this exchange of emails that the player returned to the club on or about 9 August 2014 but could not restart training with the club as he apparently refused to undergo a medical test which had to be performed after his return in August. It is also to be noted that the player’s agent denied the club’s request to provide any information to the club about the player’s mental condition and argued in this respect that such medical-related information is confidential under country D’s law. 35. On 16 August 2014, the club sent a final request for explanations to the player and requested him to reply by 19 August 2014. In said request, the club listed various contractual breaches which the player was allegedly responsible for and asked to be provided with i) an official medical report in relation to his “severe depressive syndrome”, ii) a description of the medical treatments the player received while he was in country D and iii) explanations in relation to the player’s absence between 6 to 8 August 2014 as well as during the months of June, July and August 2014. 36. On 18 August 2014, a meeting was organised by the club during which the player reportedly refused to answer the questions he was asked by a local psychotherapist. As a result, the doctor concluded that it was “impossible to conduct full psychiatric examination”. 37. On 19 August 2014, the player’s lawyer answered to the club that the player’s depressive state had been duly established by a medical certificate, which the player keeps at the club’s disposal should the latter wish to contend the player’s position. 38. The player’s lawyer also recalled that the player’s depression was caused by several acts of discrimination and of harassment by the club. 39. Finally, the player’s lawyer wrote that as the player had never been formally asked to be present at the club on 6 and 7 August 2014, the club’s reproaches in this respect show its intentions to exert undue pressure on the player. 40. On the occasion of another meeting held on 20 August 2014 with a Council of psychiatrists, the player would have accepted to give explanations regarding his state under the condition that only the conclusions, i.e. is the player fit to play football or not, would be communicated to the club. 41. After said meeting, and on the same date, a report was issued by the aforementioned psychiatrists, which concludes “The Council’s members are not entitled to make a decision about the possibility of [the player] to play professional football.” 42. On 21 August 2014, the club’s board met to discuss the player’s situation and decided that the latter had committed a serious breach of his contract without just cause. Accordingly, it concluded that a continuation of the employment relationship with the player was impossible in such circumstances. 43. On 22 August 2014, a termination letter was handed to the player by the club’s president. 44. Furthermore, on 22 August 2014, an email was sent to the player, by means of which the club informed the player that following the above-described termination of the contract, and based on art. 8.3 of the contract, the latter had to pay to the club within seven days of his dismissal the equivalent amount of EUR 20,000,000 to the club or to express his position in this respect. 45. On 25 August 2014, the player’s lawyer acknowledged receipt and took note of the club’s termination of contract and once again specified that the player’s absence as from 15 June 2014 until 5 August 2014 was justified by the player’s medically certified depression, which was caused by the club’s harassment. The player concluded by asserting that he remained willing to train with the club as from 5 August 2014 and that the termination of the contract is unjustified. 46. In summary, the club insisted that it had no other alternative but to terminate the contract signed with the player as the latter repeatedly breached his obligations and was given numerous opportunities to explain the causes of his behaviour. In this respect, the club stressed that it warned the player of the possibility of an early termination but that the player persisted in not cooperating with the club. 47. Finally, the club argued that the player’s remark in connection with outstanding monies is i) unspecified and ii) corresponding to a period of time during which he was absent, which entitles the club, based on art. 11.9 of the contract, not to proceed to the payments of the sums at stake. 48. In case said amounts were due, although unspecified, the club offered to offset such sums with the amount of compensation to be paid to it by the player. 49. In his reply, the player rejected the club’s claim and its version of the facts. 50. The player also lodged a counterclaim against the club, the details of which are hereunder described. 51. After having briefly summed-up his career records and stressed in this regard that he always acted in a professional way in all the prestigious clubs he played for, the player submitted the following argumentation. 52. The player firstly acknowledged that he indeed was sent off twice in four league matches and stressed that until then, he only had been sent off three times over ten years of career. Given that he was suspended and that no league matches would take place during the next weeks as a result of the international matches break, the player asked the club to let him take some days off, which the club refused to do. 53. In addition to the feeling that the club was not supporting him from a sportive point of view, the player admitted that he also was missing his family who did not have any visa for country B. 54. In continuation, the player acknowledged that he missed the trainings which took place on 9 October 2013 and referred to the exchanges of communication he had with the club and by means of which he apologized and reassured the club of his commitment. 55. In this respect, the player pointed out though that the fine imposed on him was of EUR 50,000, which is not 5% but rather 10% of his monthly income, and that in spite of his requests, the club never gave him any written justification as to the calculation of said fine. 56. What is more, the player felt that he was not treated like the other players of the club. 57. The player then stressed that no such difficulty ever rose again during the following seven months and that in addition to having been voted three times the club’s most valuable player, the team was at the top of the league’s ranking between the months of October 2013 until March 2014. 58. However, in February, the player started to feel pain in the sacrum area for which he needed to consult a specialist that the club was unable to provide. 59. As the club reportedly refused to invite the specialist the player wanted to meet, the player brought him to country B and paid for the expenses. Yet, the injury did not heal. 60. The player then visited two other specialists on his own expenses and felt that the club was not supporting him. Said specialists confirmed in writing the player’s injury and asserted that they both were in contact with the club’s medical staff. 61. As the player could not follow a proper treatment, his fitness and playing time diminished and the sporting results of the club were also impacted, to such an extent that the club finally ranked third of the league. 62. In relation to his absence at the club’s event of 16 May 2014, the player held that he did not know that his attendance was mandatory and that as the league was finished, he thought that he could leave and return to country D to continue treatment for his injury. 63. Furthermore, the player stressed that contrary to what the club set forth, he was not the only player absent at such event and submitted in this regard a statement issued by one of his teammates who also held that they both went through the same harassment from the club. 64. The player then held that as he understood that the club was interested in transferring him to another club, some negotiations started. In this context, the club reportedly authorised the player to be absent from the club’s trainings between 16 June 2014 and 1 July 2014 but, as a counterpart, would have asked him to renounce to the payment of his salaries during that period of time. 65. In this respect, the player submitted a copy of a request for a “leave without pay” starting on 16 June until 1 July 2014 as well as a copy of text messages conversations showing that someone apparently in contact with the club offered to balance the player’s absence during such period of time with an application for a two weeks leave without pay. 66. Eventually, the player refused to sign said application as he did not want this document to be used as a waiver from his side to his yearly bonus of EUR 70,000. 67. According to the player, the club afterwards proposed to him via the aforementioned intermediary to stay away from the club for a longer period of time, i.e. until it would have received a transfer offer. 68. In this respect, the player highlighted that whereas the club always immediately reacted when the player was absent before, this time it did not send any notification to the player until 9 July 2014, i.e. three weeks after the club’s training had resumed. 69. The player further underlined that during the month of July 2014, he was treated for anxiety and depression and transmitted in this respect a statement and a medical certificate by means of which two doctors certified the aforementioned and in particular that the player was unable to play football. 70. The player continued by explaining that on 1 August 2014, the club received a season-loan offer from Club F from country G, the details of which were discussed during a meeting on 5 August 2014. However, as the financial terms of the offer would have led to reduce his remuneration by 50%, the player asserted that he declined Club F’s offer. 71. Following this meeting, the player’s agent sent an email to the club, reportedly attaching the above-described medical certificate and underlining that the player would come back to the club in two days. In this respect, the player held that whereas the club was in possession of the medical certificate confirming his incapacity to play football, the club sent him on 6 August 2014 a request for explanations accompanied by the mention that the club was contemplating the option to put an end to the contract signed with the player. 72. In this respect, the player held that the club thereby revealed its real intentions, i.e. to part ways with him and not to have to pay his salaries any more. The player then replied to the club via his lawyer who sent the aforementioned correspondence dated 8 August 2014 (cf. point I.32 above). 73. In continuation, the player explained that the club repeatedly made him go through medical tests during training hours and eventually meet a psychiatrist with whom he was expected to describe the substance of the club’s harassment in front of representatives of the club, which the player refused to do. The player also asserted that said consultation was to be filmed and recorded. As the player did not cooperate, the doctor issued the abovementioned report. 74. Following the club’s subsequent request for explanations dated 16 August 2014, the player’s agent replied on 19 August 2014 that the club was already in possession of the player’s medical certificate, issued by an independent doctor from country D and that he therefore did not have to further specify his psychological condition. 75. According to the player, several other attempts of meetings took place, but he refused to cooperate due to the fact that the conversations were being recorded or that a club representative insisted on being present at the meeting. A meeting eventually took place on 20 August 2014 in the conditions described in the point I.40 above. According to the player, the conclusion of said Council of doctors that it is not entitled to make a decision about the player’s possibility to play football does not contradict the contents of the player’s medical certificate. 76. As a conclusion, the player insisted that the club did not have any just cause to terminate the contract as the regulatory conditions for the termination of contract with just cause were not met. In particular, the player stressed that his absence between the 15 June and 1 July 2014 was agreed upon with the club in view of the player’s envisaged transfer, whereas his absence between 1 July 2014 until 5 August 2014 is justified by his medical convalescence. 77. What is more, the player stressed that he was again at the club’s disposal as from 5 August 2014 and accepted thereafter to go through the medical tests organised by the club. 78. In the player’s opinion, the club neither opted for more lenient sanctions nor did it properly put the player in default of his obligations. 79. Finally, the player stressed that his absence of 9 October 2013 had already been sanctioned and cannot be a basis for a second sanction. 80. Should the player be held liable for having breached the contract without just cause, he asserted that the amount claimed by the club is disproportionate and therefore should be reduced to reasonable proportions. The player also stressed that the Dispute Resolution Chamber is not bound by a lump amount stipulated in the relevant contract and has the power to make its own appreciation of the circumstances of the case. In this respect, the player held that the club did not suffer any prejudice and was even willing to transfer him so that it would not have to pay his salaries any longer. 81. Finally, the player requested made the following requests: An outstanding bonus in the amount of EUR 70,000, corresponding to the ranking bonus related to the sporting season 2013/2014; Outstanding salaries in the amount of EUR 1,214,740 and corresponding to the player’s monthly salaries for the period between 1 June 2014 and 22 August 2014; EUR 16,707,098 net, corresponding to the residual financial value of the contract signed with the club (EUR 5,007,098 corresponding to the sporting season 2014/2015, calculated as from 22 August 2014, i.e. the termination date, and EUR 5,850,000 for each of the two remaining sporting seasons, i.e. 2015/2016 and 2016/2017); An amount of EUR 2,000,000 in connection with the player’s moral prejudice; Disciplinary proceedings to be opened against the club. 82. In its reply to the player’s counterclaim, the club maintained its version of the facts and in particular rejected the player’s accusations of harassment, bad faith and discrimination. It insisted in this respect that the player’s rights were respected and that it is him who is acting out of bad faith. As a general statement, the club asserted that unless explicitly accepted, all the player’s arguments are challenged. 83. As a starting point, the club challenged the player’s representation in relation to the exchanges which the player’s agent had with an individual presented as acting on behalf of the club and having particularly taken place on or about 15 June 2014 in relation to the extension of the player’s absence from the club until beginning of July. In this respect, it claimed that said individual is not a member of the club but an intermediary with which the player’s agent communicated, as said individual had previously organised the player’s transfer from Club E to the club. According to the club, the latter individual was thus not entitled to negotiate or to allow the player’s absence as from mid-June and 1 July 2014. 84. The club further denied having ever been interested in transferring the player and claimed that its priority was to pursue the employment relationship with him. In this respect, the club held that it is the player and the aforementioned individual who convinced Club F to send an offer to the club so that the player would be able to leave the club and have his salary shared between the two clubs. 85. In continuation, the club insisted that it did not receive the player’s medical certificate until it was attached to the player’s counterclaim. 86. In this respect, the club pointed out that the club’s representatives’ email addresses are incorrectly written in the player’s agent email and that it never received any such email. 87. Additionally, the club stressed that the player’s medical certificate is not dated and does not specify any date(s) as to when the player visited the doctor who issued said certificate. 88. What is more, the club insisted that the certificate does not mention any treatment to be followed and was not issued by a doctor specialised in psychiatry. 89. Finally, the club alleged that the urine analysis that was performed on the player did not show any residual of medication that yet are commonly used for the treatment of mental disorders. 90. Likewise, the club challenged the second doctor’s statement, pointing out its lack of precision as to the date on which the player met said second doctor or as to the precise substance of the harassment the player reported having gone through. 91. On the other hand, the club admitted that the player was indeed suffering from a back injury but stressed that it authorised the player to consult specialists in this respect in March and April 2014. As to the second specialist the player referred to, the club held that it never authorised the player to consult him nor did its medical staff ever have contacts with this doctor. 92. To conclude in this respect, the club set forth that the treatment which the player underwent in March/April 2014 produced satisfactory effects and that the player never complained in this respect after he returned from therapy. According to the club’s doctor’s statement, the player even played the entire duration of the last match of the season on 15 May 2014 and did not report any problem to the club’s staff. 93. More generally, the club contended all the player’s arguments, for instance be it in relation to the allegation that the club performed less well in his absence or that the club harassed him, and pointed out that the player never explained in what ways he would have been harassed. 94. In the club’s opinion, there is no doubt that it complied with art. 14 in combination with art. 17 of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players. In particular, it repeatedly wrote to the player in order to collect his explanations in relation to his repeated misbehaviours and to respect his right of defence. 95. As to the financial aspects of the player’s counterclaim, the club held the amounts claimed by the player are legally unsustainable, referring to art. 8.5 of the contract. 96. In particular, the club stressed that according to the contract, the player’s monthly remuneration was guaranteed provided the player would not miss training and the payment of the bonus part depending on the player’s fulfilment of his contractual obligations. In this respect, the club held that the player failed to give reasons why the contractual provisions should not be applied. 97. In continuation, the club also stressed the lack of evidence on the player’s part as to his attempts to mitigate his losses. 98. Furthermore, and in relation to outstanding remuneration, the club firstly rejected the players’ claim related to the ranking bonus of EUR 70,000 and held in this respect that there is no contractual basis for this request. 99. As to the amount of EUR 1,214,740, the club recalled that on 5 August 2014, the player would have confirmed that he did not wish to be paid any salary for the period of time during which he was absent from the club. 100. Finally, the club rejected the player’s “arbitrary” claim in the amount of EUR 2,000,000 related to moral damages. 101. Whereas the investigation phase related to the matter at hand had been concluded, the player insisted on being given the possibility to present his position on the comments submitted by the club in relation to his counterclaim. In this respect, the player stressed that all of the club’s points which are not herein dealt with shall be seen as challenged. 102. In his submission, the player firstly insisted that between 16 June 2014 and the beginning of July 2014, his absence from the club had been agreed upon. 103. In this respect, the player reiterated that the club was acting via an agent/intermediary who is well known to the club, since some of the club’s players were recruited through said agent. 104. The player thus held that the club’s arguments that said intermediary is not an agent and is not connected to the club are bad faith and that it is clear that as from 16 June and until beginning of July 2014, the player was absent with the consent of the club as his transfer was being organised via said intermediary. 105. In this respect, the player stressed that the failure to loan him to Club F is only due to the absence of an agreement between the club and the player in relation to the payment of his salary. If the club did not want to transfer the player at all, as the club states, no meeting would have taken place on 5 August 2014. 106. In continuation, the player addressed the question of his subsequent absence based on medical reasons and firstly held in this respect that if the club representatives’ email addresses were incorrectly spelt, the intermediary’s one was correct and that he could have forwarded it to the club. 107. As to the medical certificate itself, the player stressed that said document was issued by a general doctor fully able to diagnose anxiety symptoms and that its date of issuance is the same date as when said doctor deemed that the player was unable to play football, i.e 4 July 2014. 108. As to the second medical certificate, the player remarked that said document does specify that the doctor who issued it met the player several times during the month of July 2014 and that if no residue of medicine wa found in his urine, it is because he did not take any, as said medication would have been incompatible with his physical activity. 109. In addition, the player explained that as the club knew it did not have just cause for the termination, and after a change of the club’s head coach, the club approached the player to sign a new employment contract. 110. The player submitted in this respect screenshots of a conversation between the intermediary and his agent dated 5 October 2014 in which both are discussing the terms of a contract and in which the intermediary gave the player’s agent the club’s new head coach’s phone number so that the player can communicate directly with him. 111. Finally, the player maintained his financial claims, and in particular stressed that the club stopped paying him his salary in full as from May 2014 whereas the contract was only terminated in August 2014. 112. The player held that for the month of June 2014, he only received about 10% of his salary whereas his alleged unjustified absence only started as from 16 June 2014. Likewise, the player stressed that no salary was paid to him at all for the month of July 2014 whereas he was absent for medical reasons. Also, the player pointed out that he did not get any payment for August 2014 whereas he came back to the club on 5 August 2014. 113. In its final comments, the club firstly maintained that whereas the player confessed in his last submission that he was indeed willing to leave the club, the club, for its part, neither authorised him to be absent between 16 June and the beginning of July 2014, nor was it willing to transfer him to another club. 114. In connection with the player’s absence, the club asserted that if it is true that the intermediary involved in the talks with the player is an agent who, in particular, had been involved in the player’s transfer from Club E, it is untrue that the club would have had appointed him to represent it in any talks with the player. The club therefore does not consider that it is bound by said intermediary’s stance. 115. On the contrary, according to the club, it is the player who solicited said intermediary’s intervention on the basis that he acted as an intermediary on the occasion of the player’s transfer from Club E to the club. Also, the club stressed that the media platform on which the intermediary spoke is not the club’s official website or Twitter account but a third party media platform. 116. In continuation, the club held that the player’s position that it had been agreed with the club that he would stay away during the transfer talks is the player’s own interpretation of the emails exchanged and that there is no evidence that the club ever authorised the player to be absent. On the other hand, the club insisted that its interpreter informed the player twice of the date on which he had to return to the club, i.e. 16 June 2014. 117. As to the question of the player’s transfer, the club pointed out the lack of evidence on the player’s side and stressed that the aim of the meeting of 5 August 2014 was not only to discuss Club F’s offer but also the player’s unjustified absence from the club. 118. In relation to the player’s first medical certificate allegedly sent by email to the club, the club firstly reiterated that the email containing said certificate was sent to wrong email addresses or to somebody who is not a club-authorised representative. 119. Likewise, the club maintained that the first certificate at hand does not stand scrutiny. In this respect, the club stated that the certificate, issued by an unspecialized doctor, does not only refer to anxiety or depressive syndrome any doctor could identify, but to a “severe” state of depression. 120. Also, the club deemed that it would have been pointless for the player to obtain a certificate on 4 July 2014 if it was not to transmit it to his employer or not to transmit to said employer after having been requested to do so. 121. As to the second medical certificate, the club pointed out that it is not issued by a qualified doctor and that it does not state any details in relation to the meetings said psychologist had with the player. 122. What is more, the club deemed that should the player have indeed suffered from a severe anxiety syndrome and depressive state, he would not have been able to recover that fast on the sole basis of alleged conversations with a psychologist and without any medication. 123. In connection with a previous (unauthorised) medical treatment the player received during the season, the club underlined that whereas it authorised such process between 27 March and 2 April 2014, the doctor whom the player consulted indicated having treated him between February and May 2014. It is therefore clear that the player consulted external doctors without the club’s authorisation. 124. In relation to the club’s alleged attempt to sign a new contract with the player, the club denied said representation and held that it is the player who, via the aforementioned intermediary, took the initiative to contact the club to settle the matter opposing the parties since, as assumed by the club, he was not finding any new club and was afraid of the consequences of the club’s termination of the contract. 125. As to the player’s financial claim, the club denied that any (collective) bonus of EUR 70,000 was paid to all members of the team and stressed that anyhow, the player failed to prove this allegation, which shall therefore be rejected. 126. In relation to unpaid salaries in the months having preceded the termination of the contract, the club pointed out that it is telling that the player never submitted any claim in this regard and that it is the player himself who asked not to be paid for the period of time during which he was absent from the club. Also, the club recalled that this particular point, which it had already raised in its previous submission, was not commented on by the player. 127. Finally, the club challenged the player’s evidence based on the former head coach’s testimony of February 2015 and held that said testimony was made six months after the facts and that said coach’s contract ended in “acrimonious circumstances”, which degenerated into a dispute with the club. On the other hand, the club recalled that, in August 2014, the same person was testifying in the media that he would not be able to tell the press what was going on with the player since the latter had been absent from the club for the last three months. “For the avoidance of doubt”, the club concluded by denying the player’s allegation that he had had authorisation to be absent during the month of June 2014. 128. The club concluded its statement by reiterating that it had grounds and no other options but to terminate the contract. It also maintained its financial claims against the player and added that the player’s counterclaim shall be rejected. 129. The player remained unemployed as from the termination of the contract by the club until the date of passing the present decision. II. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter also referred to as Chamber or DRC) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the matter at hand. In this respect, it took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 15 September 2014. Consequently, the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (edition 2014; hereinafter: Procedural Rules) are applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 of the Procedural Rules). 2. Subsequently, the Chamber referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed that in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 in combination with art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2015) the DRC is competent to deal with the matter at stake, which concerns an employment– related dispute with an international dimension between a Club from country B and a player from country D. 3. Furthermore, the DRC analysed which edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, it confirmed that in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations (edition 2015) and considering that the present claim was lodged in front of FIFA on 15 September 2014, the 2014 edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: the Regulations) is applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance. 4. The competence of the DRC and the applicable regulations having been established, the DRC entered into the substance of the matter. The DRC started by acknowledging the above-mentioned facts of the case as well as the documentation contained in the file. However, the Chamber emphasized that in the following considerations it will refer only to the facts, arguments and documentary evidence, which it considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand. 5. First of all, the Chamber acknowledged that, on 20 August 2013, the club and the player concluded an employment contract valid as from 21 August 2013 until 30 June 2017, i.e. four sporting seasons. 6. The DRC further observed that on 22 August 2014 the club terminated the aforementioned contract in writing on the basis of the player’s alleged numerous breaches of contract and lack of presentation of satisfactory explanations in relation thereto. 7. The DRC then noted that in its subsequent claim received on 15 September 2014, the club requested that the player be ordered to pay it EUR 20,000,000 plus interest or, alternatively, any other amount the present Chamber deems reasonable as compensation for the player’s alleged breach of his contractual obligations. 8. On the other hand, the DRC members duly noted that the player, in his answer to the club’s claim, inter alia held that the club’s termination of contract lacks just cause. The player argued that as it is the club that is in breach of contract, it shall therefore be liable to compensate him for the unjustified termination of the contractual relationship. 9. In this respect, the player inter alia claimed outstanding remuneration and compensation as specified in point I.81 above. 10. Considering the above-described antagonist positions of the parties, the Chamber highlighted that the underlying issue in this dispute was to determine as to whether the employment contract had been terminated by the Club with or without just cause. The Chamber also underlined that, subsequently, if it was found that the employment contract was terminated by the Claimant with just cause, it would be necessary to determine the consequences thereof. 11. Having stated the above, the Chamber turned its attention to the reasons invoked by the Claimant/Counter-Respondent for proceeding to the early termination of the employment contract concluded between the parties. 12. In this context, the DRC first referred to the reported conflict that arose between the parties during the execution of the contractual relationship, i.e. the player’s absence during two trainings which both took place on 9 October 2013. 13. In this respect, and after having reviewed the parties’ submissions in this regard, the Chamber was eager to note that the player admitted to having acted in breach of contract on said occurrence as he recognised having deliberately ignored the club’s position and did not join the latter in time to participate to the two training sessions scheduled on said date. 14. In this regard, the Chamber also duly noted that the Respondent/CounterClaimant had written back to the club to explain himself and apologised in said correspondence for having disregarded the club’s refusal to grant him additional days of holidays. 15. Said breach of contract having led the club to impose a fine upon the player in the amount of EUR 50,000, and the player having not submitted any specific request in connection with the imposition of said fine, the Chamber concluded that this breach of contract by the player had to be considered as having been dealt with directly by the parties at the time the aforementioned events occurred. 16. In continuation, the Chamber moved on to analyse the question of the player’s non-appearance to a club’s team meeting scheduled on 16 May 2014 and which amounted, in the club’s opinion, to a second breach of contract by the player. 17. More precisely, the Chamber noted that according to the club, the player’s absence to said event actually amounted to a three-fold breach of contract since the player (i) failed to attend the club’s event, (ii) left the club without authorisation and did so (iii) in order to receive medical treatment from a doctor reportedly not approved by the club. 18. In this respect, the Chamber reverted to the player’s position and noted that in his explanations, the player had not disputed the fact that he did not attend the club’s event; he contended however that the club had not made him aware that his presence at such event was mandatory. 19. In continuation, the Chamber noted that in reply to the club’s request for explanations, the player’s agent wrote on 20 May 2014 that the player had informed the club’s staff that he would not be able to attend the team-meeting scheduled on 16 May 2014 for medical reasons. 20. Bearing the aforementioned considerations in mind, the Chamber wished to recall that according to art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules, any party claiming a right on the basis of an alleged fact shall carry the burden of proof. 21. In this context, the Chamber primarily found that the player had not submitted any evidence showing that the club would have agreed to his absence to the event at stake. 22. In continuation, the Chamber analysed the two written submissions that were provided by the doctors having reportedly worked with the player, i.e. Dr H and Dr I, and duly noted that both of them inter alia indicated in their respective statements having had consultations with the player, including during the month of May; said statements however do not set out any specific date of such consultations. 23. In this context, the Chamber was satisfied that the player was well aware of the event of 16 May 2014 taking place. Equally, the player has not submitted any evidence showing that his departure from the club before said event was justified by any specific appointment with any doctor, nor that the club ever agreed to the player’s absence to the event of 16 May 2014. 24. Finally, the DRC reverted to article 2.1.1 of the contract, according to which the player is subject to a general obligation to take part in a specific list of activities and inter alia reads that the player is obliged “to take part in all events”. 25. In view of the above, the Chamber decided that the player’s (undisputed) absence to the club’s team event on 16 May 2014 was deprived of any authorisation given by the club and therefore constituted a breach by the player of his contractual obligations towards the club. 26. Having so found, the Chamber continued its analysis of the matter at hand and turned its attention to the question of the player’s absence from the club as from 4 June 2014 until 4 August 2014. 27. In this respect, the Chamber firstly wished to recall that on the basis of the documents on file, it could be verified that the player had been granted holidays until 3 June 2014 and that, subsequently, training was to resume on 16 June 2014. According to the club however, the player did not return to the club until 5 August 2014. 28. The Chamber also noted that in this context, on 9 July 2014, the club sent an email to the player requesting that the latter comes back to the club and to explain the reason(s) of his absence. 29. What is more, the Chamber noted that according to the club, the player missed the team’s first league match of the season 2014/2015 and which took place on 3 August 2014. 30. The DRC then took due note that according to the player, his absence from the club until the beginning of the month of July 2014 is justified by the fact that the club had decided to transfer him to another club. The club would have therefore asked the player to stay away and not to take part in the club’s training sessions until the latter would be able to present a transfer offer to the player. 31. In this respect, the DRC also took due note of the player’s statements in accordance with which negotiations therefore started via an intermediary, Mr J, and that the latter had authorised the player to be absent as from 16 June and 1 July 2014 on the basis of a leave without pay. In this respect, the Chamber also noted that eventually, the player refused to sign a document confirming the said leave without pay as he became apprehensive that his signing such document could be interpreted by the club as a waiver of a bonus which he deemed being entitled to. 32. On the other hand, the Chamber noted that for its part, the club had repeatedly denied having ever been interested in transferring the player to any club or that it had been represented by said intermediary who, therefore, would not have been in a position to negotiate or make decisions on the club’s behalf. 33. In this context, the DRC once more referred to art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules, and considered, from the content of the documentation on file, that the aforementioned intermediary appears to have intervened in the player’s transfer from Club E to the club, and that he had been in contact with the player and his agent during the time of the player’s absence in summer 2014. 34. The DRC wished to stress, however, that at no point did the player submit any document proving that said intermediary was authorised to represent the club after his transfer from Club E. 35. For the sake of completeness, the Chamber wished to specify that it did not agree with the player’s interpretation of the messages exchanged between his agent and Mr J, as said messages do not indicate in any way the existence of a clear and firm agreement on the club’s side to authorise the player to be absent from the club between 16 June 2014 and 1 July 2014 but rather consists of hypothesis and reported speeches. 36. For the above-mentioned reason, the DRC decided that the player’s allegations that the club, via said intermediary, authorised the player to be absent from the club as of 16 June 2014 and during the developments of alleged transfer talks was absolutely unproven and therefore had to be rejected. 37. In this respect, the Chamber further wished to underline that it did not share the player’s view that the club was interested in transferring him to another club during the summer 2014 since, notwithstanding the club’s repeated denials in this regard, no evidence on file permitted the Chamber to corroborate this hypothesis. In particular, the Chamber deemed it worth specifying that ad minima, it cannot be interpreted from the contents of the offer which the club received from Club F that negotiations had been ongoing between said clubs. 38. Consequently, the Chamber found no reason to believe that the player’s absence during the summer 2014 could be justified by the fact that the club had the intention to loan him, either to Club F or to any other club. 39. What is more, and for the sake of completeness, the Chamber pointed out that the player had indicated having refused to sign a document consenting to his leave without pay. 40. Thus, the player’s absence as from 16 June 2014 can only qualify as unauthorised by the club and therefore constitutes a breach of contract on the player’s side. 41. In light of the above, the Chamber reached the conclusion that by having been absent without any authorisation from the club as of 4 June 2014, date of the end of the player’s holidays, until 1 July 2014, date until which the player asserts having been allowed by the club not to return to the club’s premises, the player acted for the third time in breach of his contractual obligations towards the club. 42. The Chamber continued its analysis of the matter at hand and, at this stage, contemplated the period of the player’s absence from the club as from 1 July 2014 until 5 August 2014, date on which the player finally returned to the club and on which a meeting was held between the parties. 43. In this respect, the Chamber noted that in his statements, the player explained that his absence during the month of July 2014 was caused by a severe anxiety syndrome and that he repeatedly met psychologists in this regard during that month. 44. In continuation, the Chamber further noted that according to the player, the cause of his medical condition was rooted in the club’s behaviour towards him, as he inter alia felt pressured, disrespected and racially discriminated against. 45. In this regard, the DRC was mindful to underline that in order to justify the reality of his medical state and his correlated incapacity to play football, the player explained that his agent sent a medical certificate via email (hereinafter: the medical certificate) to the club on 5 August 2014, i.e. shortly after the aforementioned meeting with the club. 46. Additionally, the Chamber also noticed that following the club’s request for explanations on 6 August 2015, which inter alia reads that “(…) failure to show a good reason of your absence and further behavior may cause termination of your employment contract by the Club with just cause, as you have already breached your contractual obligations several times before”, the player replied to the club via his legal representative by inter alia asserting having been victim of racial harassment by the club, which caused him to suffer from a severe depression syndrome that prevented him from coming back to the club. 47. In continuation, the DRC recalled that the club organised several meetings between 11 August and 20 August 2014 during which the player was expected to provide more explanations as to the causes of his anxiety and with the purpose of assessing as to whether the player was able to resume work. 48. Whilst analysing the above-described elements, the DRC firstly found that although the player repeatedly brought forward having been the victim of acts of harassment of a racist nature by the club, such allegations were not corroborated by any elements of any kind, be it, for instance, documented evidence or reported situations and/or declarations. 49. The Chamber thus deemed that the player’s accusations that he suffered from racial harassment from the club had to be set aside as unproven. 50. In continuation, the DRC turned its attention to the medical certificate which the player’s agent reportedly sent to the club on 5 August 2014. 51. In this respect, and after having reviewed the evidence at hand, the DRC found that it could not ascertain with certainty that said email and been sent to the correct email address. The Chamber held that the player could not discharge his burden of proof that the club had indeed received the email containing the relevant medical certificate at the time his agent allegedly sent such email to the club. 52. Notwithstanding the above, the DRC further took note that surprisingly, and although the club repeatedly asserted that it had not received any medical certificate in relation to the player’s absence, the player did not attempt to send such certificate again to the club, or at least there are no records on file of him having done so. In particular, the Chamber noted that on 16 August 2014, the club sent to the player a “Final request about granting of a written explanation” which inter alia reads that the club requested to immediately be provided with an official medical report and that the mere allegations of the player’s lawyer, as the latter had not attached any copy of medical certificate to his answer dated 8 August 2014, were not satisfactory justifications. 53. More generally, whilst analysing the above-described situation, the Chamber was first of all incredulous as to why the player appeared to have waited until 5 August 2014 to inform the club of his anxiety syndrome for the first time. 54. In this respect, the DRC considered that the player’s behaviour was, from a general standpoint, lacking in professionalism and transparency as would be expected during a normal professional course of action, and that he should have forwarded his medical certificate to the club as soon as possible, i.e. already during the month of July 2014. 55. What is more, the DRC held that by having waited for about one month to orally inform the club of his state of health, and by not (re)submitting any documentation in relation thereto in spite of the contractual provisions and the club’s requests, the player had obviously breached the provisions of art. 2.1.22 and 2.1.23 of the employment contract signed by the parties and in accordance with which, inter alia, the player shall immediately inform the club’s medical staff about health-related issues. 56. In particular, and after careful analysis of the medical certificate submitted by the player and relating to his depressive state, the members of the Chamber first noticed that the certificate at hand was neither dated, nor signed by a doctor specialised in mental illness. 57. Also, the DRC noticed that said certificate was extremely short and general as to its contents, its author having limited himself to state the nature of the player’s disease, i.e. a severe anxiety/depressive syndrome, and that consequently, the player was incapable to play football as from 4 July 2014. 58. Hence, it appears that said doctor did not provide any explanations as to how and when the player and himself had met before rendering such a diagnosis and does not contain any mention of past and/or future consultations/treatment(s), whereas one could reasonably expect such important information to be specified. 59. Having stated the above, the members of the Chamber reasoned that, considering the circumstances of the matter at hand, i.e. the player’s absence for more than two months as from 3 June until 5 August 2014, and the implications of such a lengthy absence from a professional point of view, the medical certificate submitted by the player in support of his argumentation that he was suffering from a severe state of depression and thus could not perform his services towards the club was inconclusive and insufficient. 60. In light of the foregoing considerations, the Chamber unanimously agreed that the player had acted in breach of contract stricto sensu, and more generally lacked professionalism and transparency in the process of communicating with the club in connection with his medical state. 61. Bearing in mind the aforementioned, the Chamber agreed with the club’s opinion that, following the meeting of 5 August 2014 and in the subsequent days, the link of trust between the parties was exhausted and that consistent continuation of the contractual relationship with the player under these circumstances appeared unrealistic. 62. In this respect, the Chamber deemed that the player’s last absence from the club on 6 and 7 August 2014, for which the player simply replied that the club did not formally ask him to be available during that time, is a supplementary illustration of the aforementioned reasoning. 63. What is more, the DRC could verify that as of mid-May 2014 until the termination of the contract, i.e. on 22 August 2014, the club communicated with the player on repeated occasions, explaining in detail its analysis of the situation while offering the player to explain his position. The Chamber therefore deemed that the club had followed a constant and transparent approach before it finally took the decision to put an end to the employment contract signed with the player. 64. As a result of the above-mentioned considerations, the Chamber decided that the club had just cause to prematurely terminate the relevant employment contract on 22 August 2014 on the basis of the repeated breaches by the player of his contractual obligations during the months between May and August 2014. 65. In continuation and prior to establishing the consequences of the unilateral termination of the contract with just cause by the club in accordance with art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the Chamber held that it had to address the issue raised by the player in connection with alleged unpaid remuneration at the moment the contract was terminated by the club. 66. In this regard, the members of the Chamber recalled that the player’s claim relating to outstanding remuneration is composed of an amount of EUR 1,214,740 related to the player’s monthly salaries for the months of June, July and August 2014 as well as of an amount of EUR 70,000 related to a “ranking bonus”. 67. In this respect, the Chamber firstly held that in the absence of explanations and of a clear contractual basis in connection with the player’s claim for the payment of said “ranking bonus” in the amount of EUR 70,000, the Chamber decided to reject the player’s claim relating to said bonus. 68. In continuation, the Chamber held that considering that the player was absent from the club without any authorisation during the entire months of June and July 2014, he was not entitled to receive the monthly remuneration corresponding to said two months. 69. Finally, and as to the player’s claim relating to his monthly remuneration payable in connection with the month of August 2014, the Chamber was eager to note that first, the player had been absent from the club without any authorisation during the first four days of August 2014, i.e. until 5 August 2014, and was then absent again without any authorisation on 6 and 7 August 2014, representing 6 days of unauthorised absence. 70. What is more, the Chamber noted that in the contractual documents it received from the parties, the annex related to the player’s remuneration did not contain any specific payment date for the player’s monthly salaries. On account of the above, the Chamber had to assume that according to the general practice, the player’s salaries were to be paid at the end of the month. 71. The contract having been unilaterally terminated by the club with just cause on 22 August 2014, the Chamber therefore found that at the date of termination, the player’s monthly salary of August 2014 was not yet outstanding. The player’s claim in this respect was therefore rejected. 72. Having established the above, the Chamber turned its attention to the question of the consequences of the unilateral termination of the contract by the club with just cause on 22 August 2014. 73. Taking into consideration art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the Chamber decided that the club is entitled to receive compensation from the player for the termination of the contract with just cause based on the player’s repeated breaches of contract. 74. The members of the Chamber then firstly recapitulated that, in accordance with art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the amount of compensation shall be calculated, in particular and unless otherwise provided for in the contract on the basis of the dispute, with due consideration for the law of the country concerned, the specificity of sport and further objective criteria, including, in particular, the remuneration and other benefits due to the player under the existing contract and/or the new contract, the time remaining on the existing contract up to a maximum of five years, the fees and expenses paid or incurred by the former club and depending on whether the contractual breach falls within the protected period. 75. In application of the relevant provision, the Chamber held that it first of all had to clarify whether the pertinent contract contains a provision by means of which the parties had previously agreed on an amount of compensation payable by the contractual parties in the event of breach of contract. 76. The members of the Chamber recalled that according to art. 8.3 of the contract, i.e. in the hypothesis that the club would have terminated the contract signed with the player based on disciplinary-related grounds, or if the player failed to resume work or breached the contract without just cause, the player is liable to pay to the club the equivalent amount of EUR 20,000,000. 77. On the other hand, the Chamber noted that according to art. 8.5 of the contract, the maximum amount of compensation payable by the club to the player is limited to “3 average monthly income of the Football player”, i.e. three monthly salaries. 78. On account of the above, the members of the Chamber referred to its wellestablished jurisprudence, according to which a compensation clause must be reciprocal, in the sense that it must grant both parties to the employment contract, if not equal rights, at least proportionate rights. Applying this principle to the case at hand, the Chamber concluded that the rights of each party are clearly disproportionate and thus the application of the said clause must be set aside. 79. As a consequence, the members of the Chamber determined that the amount of compensation payable by the player to the club had to be assessed in application of the other parameters set out in art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations. The Chamber recalled that said provision provides for a non-exhaustive enumeration of criteria to be taken into consideration when calculating the amount of compensation payable. Therefore, other objective criteria may be taken into account at the discretion of the deciding body. In this regard, the Dispute Resolution Chamber emphasised beforehand that each amount of compensation for contractual breach has to be assessed by the Chamber on a case-by-case basis taking into account all specific circumstances of the respective matter. 80. In this context, the Chamber considered the first of the objectives criteria provided for under art. 17 of the Regulations, i.e. the remuneration and other benefits under the contract which has been breached. 81. In this regard, it was ascertained that the amounts paid by the club to the player for the period during which the player duly provided his services to the club up until the termination of the employment relationship on 22 August 2014, cannot be considered within the scope of the assessment of the amount of compensation due for breach of contract. In fact, the relevant remuneration constitutes the legitimate income of the player which was paid to him in exchange for his services. 82. Yet, the deciding authority was eager to emphasise that it is widely undisputed that within the criterion of remuneration and other benefits under the existing contract, the remaining value of the employment contract breached by the player must be taken into consideration for the calculation of the compensation payable by the player to his former club due to the unjustified breach of contract. This was confirmed also by the Court of Arbitration for Sport in several of its decisions. In the case at stake, the remaining value of the contract in question can be established at EUR 16,588,600, corresponding to the salaries due to the player as per the contract as from August 2014 until 30 June 2017. 83. In accordance with of art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, another objective criterion to consider is the amount of unamortised costs of acquiring the services of the player. 84. In this respect, it was noted that the club paid the player’s former club, Club E, transfer compensation amounting to EUR 14,000,000. Taking into account the fact that the employment contract in question was to run for four years and that the breach occurred about thirteen months into the contract, the unamortised costs of acquiring the services of the player would amount to EUR 10,500,000 (for the remaining 34 months of the contract, i.e. as from September 2014 until 30 June 2017). 85. In view of the above, and in the absence of evidence provided with regard to any further damage which the club would have suffered, and in particular as to any amounts which the club would have spent in relation to the player’s recruitment, the Chamber decided that the amount of compensation in favour of the club calculated on the grounds of the aforementioned objective criteria would therefore total EUR 27,088,600. 86. Subsequently, the Chamber recalled that within its competence to assess the amount of compensation to be paid by a party (club or player) breaching an employment contract to its counter party, as provided for by art. 17 of the Regulations, it had to also consider the specificity of sport. 87. The notion of the specificity of sport permits the reassessment of the amount of compensation payable by a player to his former club in case of an unjustified breach of contract not only on the basis of a strict application of civil or common law, but also on the basis of considerations that players are an asset of a club in terms of their sporting value and also from an economic point of view. Therefore, the assessment of compensation that is higher than compensation calculated only on the basis of the objective criteria of art. 17 of the Regulations is not, in every case, to be considered as a punitive measure, but may be the result of consideration based on the specificity of sport. In particular, taking into account the value attributed to the services of a player when assessing the compensation payable for an unjustified breach of contract by the player is in line with the notion of the specificity of sport. In other words, the notion of specificity of sport allows to assess the compensation payable to a club in case of an unjustified breach of contract by a player not only on the basis of the objective criteria. Such an understanding of the notion of the specificity of sport allows for the calculation of amounts of compensation that are appropriate, fair and acceptable for all stakeholders within the world of football, and which take into consideration the interest of both the players and the clubs. 88. In this respect, the Chamber stated that, bearing in mind the concept of specificity of sport and the list of objective criteria contained in art. 17 of the Regulations, the DRC has established, inter alia, guidelines for the calculation of compensation payable for the unjustified breach of contract by a player. In particular, as a general rule, the compensation payable to the former club shall be the result of an addition of the amount of the fees paid or incurred by the former club, amortised over the term of the contract, plus the amount of remuneration due to the player under the contract that was breached until the ordinary expiry of the former contract. Moreover, in case of breach of contract during the protected period, thus under circumstances like in the case at hand, this amount needs to be increased accordingly subject to particular circumstances. By means of this formula for the calculation of the compensation, the DRC aims, on the one hand, to take into account objective criteria such as the amount of the fees paid or incurred by the former club, the remuneration due to the player under the existing contract and the time remaining on the existing contract. On the other hand, the possibility to increase the relevant amount of compensation accordingly subject to particular circumstances allows the DRC to take into consideration the specificity of sport and other criteria that are not explicitly listed in art. 17 if the Regulations on a case-by-case basis. Obviously, in case it deems it necessary, the DRC is always free to deviate from these guidelines. 89. Bearing in mind the above, the Chamber took note of the club’s compensation request of EUR 20,000,000 and declared that, in order not to go ultra petitum, the amount of compensation in any case may not exceed such amount. 90. Once the objective criteria along with the relevant figures were thus established, and the central role of the specificity of sport having been recalled, the Chamber went on to consider the specificities of the case at hand. 91. In this regard, the Chamber underlined the noticeable financial investment made by the club in order to secure the services of the player in terms of transfer compensation paid to the player’s former club. Equally, the DRC recalled the player’s contractual remuneration due under the contract as well as the remaining value of the relevant contract concluded between the club and the player in terms of salary and other benefits due to the player under said contract as from the termination of the contract by the club until its ordinary expiration. 92. Notwithstanding the above, whilst confirming once again that from the legal point of view the contract at stake was repeatedly breached by the player, the members could not help pointing out that the club de facto notified the termination letter to the player with immediate effect. 93. By doing so, the club complied with a general legal principle and was able to mitigate the financial loss which it could have incurred had it kept paying the player’s salary after the termination date. 94. It is this very last consideration which made the Chamber wonder whether or not, under the exceptional circumstances surrounding this case, the remaining value of the contract should be taken into account among the criteria to assess the compensation for breach of contract. 95. In this regard, while referring to the longstanding jurisprudence whereby this deciding-body has always applied the criteria to assess the compensation for breach of contract provided for in the applicable Regulations and having given necessary consideration to the specificity of sport, the Chamber concluded that, in the specific case at hand, by handing out the termination notice with immediate effect to the player at the end of the month of August 2014, the club had indeed mitigated the damage it suffered as far as the remaining value of the contract that was breached is concerned. 96. In light of the above, and after extensive deliberation, the members of the Chamber came to the unanimous conclusion that in light of the specific circumstances of the matter at hand, the remaining value of the contract at stake, i.e. the contract concluded between the club and the player on 20 August 2013, shall not be taken into account amongst the criteria applied to assess the compensation for breach of contract due to the club by the player. 97. The Dispute Resolution Chamber therefore decided that the player has to pay the amount of EUR 10,500,000 to the club for having repeatedly breached the contact signed on 20 August 2013. 98. The Chamber then paid due consideration to art. 17 par. 2 of the Regulations, in accordance with which the player’s new club is jointly and severally liable for the payment of compensation. In this context, the Chamber recalled that, following the termination of the contract, the player did not find a new club, and still remains unemployed at the time of passing the present decision. Thus, in principle, art. 17 par. 2 of the Regulations cannot be applied in casu. 99. Notwithstanding the above, and considering the time which elapsed between the date of the termination of the contract and the date on which the present decision was passed, and whilst taking into account the principle of legal certainty, according to which, after the passing of a decision, all parties to a dispute should be aware of the consequences of their behaviour, the DRC wished to stress that since as at the time this decision is made there is no club with which the player has registered, art. 17 par. 2 of the Regulations should also not apply in future, should the player find a new club. 100. The Dispute Resolution Chamber concluded its deliberations in the present matter by establishing that any further claims lodged by the club and the player are rejected. III. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. The claim of the Claimant/Counter-Respondent, Club A, is partially accepted. 2. The claim of the Respondent/Counter-Claimant, Player C, is rejected. 3. The Respondent/Counter-Claimant has to pay to the Claimant/CounterRespondent EUR 10,500,000 within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision. 4. In the event that the amount due to the Claimant/Counter-Respondent in accordance with the above-mentioned number 3. is not paid by the Respondent/Counter-Claimant within the stated time limit, interest at the rate of 5% p.a. will fall due as of expiry of the aforementioned time limit and the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision. 5. Any further claim lodged by the Claimant/Counter-Respondent is rejected. 6. The Claimant/Counter-Respondent is directed to inform the Respondent/Counter-Claimant immediately and directly of the account number to which the remittance is to be made and to notify the Dispute Resolution Chamber of every payment received. ***** Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy): According to article 67 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives). The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following: Court of Arbitration for Sport Avenue de Beaumont 2 1012 Lausanne Switzerland Tel: +41 21 613 50 00 Fax: +41 21 613 50 01 e-mail: info@tas-cas.org www.tas-cas.org For the Dispute Resolution Chamber: ______________________ Jérôme Valcke Secretary General Encl. CAS Directives