F.I.F.A. – Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2014-2015) – controversie di lavoro – ———- F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber (2014-2015) – labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 10 April 2015, in the following composition: Thomas Grimm (Switzerland), Deputy Chairman John Bramhall (England), member Jon Newman (USA), member Taku Nomiya (Japan), member Mario Gallavotti (Italy), member on the claim presented by the club, Club A, country B as Claimant against the player, Player C, country D as Respondent 1 and the club, Club E, country F as Respondent 2 regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties I.

F.I.F.A. - Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2014-2015) - controversie di lavoro – ---------- F.I.F.A. - Dispute Resolution Chamber (2014-2015) - labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 10 April 2015, in the following composition: Thomas Grimm (Switzerland), Deputy Chairman John Bramhall (England), member Jon Newman (USA), member Taku Nomiya (Japan), member Mario Gallavotti (Italy), member on the claim presented by the club, Club A, country B as Claimant against the player, Player C, country D as Respondent 1 and the club, Club E, country F as Respondent 2 regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties I. Facts of the case 1. On 20 May 2014, the player from country D, Player C (hereinafter: the Respondent 1), and the club from country B, Club A (hereinafter: the Claimant), signed a document titled “Proposal Offer” containing the following terms: a) The total remuneration offered by the Claimant to the Respondent 1 amounts to EUR 30,000, to be paid in ten installments of EUR 3,000, for the period from 1 August 2014 to 20 May 2015; b) The document also contains a list of various benefits to be provided to the Respondent 1, including “use of a car”, “accommodation for a rent of not more than EUR 400”, “Bonuses for wins as per the internal regulation of the club”, “one air ticket”, and “insurance”; c) The document established that all emoluments (salary and bonuses) are tax free. 2. On 2 July 2014, the Respondent 1 signed an employment contract with the club from country F, Club E (hereinafter: the Respondent 2), valid as from 1 July 2014 until 30 July 2017, and providing for a monthly remuneration amounting to EUR 3,000. 3. On 29 July 2014, the Claimant lodged a claim against the Respondent 1 and the Respondent 2, for breach of contract and for inducement to the breach, respectively. In its claim, the Claimant requested the following: - EUR 30,000 as compensation corresponding to the salaries the Respondent 1 would have received; - EUR 1,063.73 corresponding to a plane ticket from country D to country B on 1 July 2014 bought for the Respondent 1; - Sporting sanctions to be imposed on the Respondent 1 and Respondent 2; - Damages, costs and any other remedy. 4. In particular, the Claimant explained that despite its efforts to communicate with the Respondent 1 in order to request him to join the club’s trainings, the Claimant was unable to locate him. Furthermore, the Claimant asserted that it was informed that the player had signed a contract with the Respondent 2. 5. The Claimant alleged that the Respondent 1 acted without just cause and in breach of the offer, as he was unjustifiably absent from the trainings of the Claimant and entered into more than one contract during the same period as the one signed with the Claimant. According to the Claimant, the Respondent 2 induced the player into breaching the offer. 6. The Claimant further stated that despite all its efforts, it was unable to locate the player and therefore, unable to notify him of his breach. 7. In his reply, the Respondent 1 rejected the Claimant’s claim. In this respect, the Respondent 1 explained that he was not aware of any obligation assumed by him with the Claimant, as the only employment contract he signed for the 2014/2015 season was with the Respondent 2. Moreover, according to the Respondent 1, he never had direct contact with the Claimant, and the contact was always made by his representative, Mr G. 8. The Respondent 1 held that he was convinced that the offer was not contractually binding and that he only signed it to acknowledge receipt. Furthermore, the Respondent 1 stated that since the date of the offer, nobody from the Claimant’s staff contacted him. 9. Also, the Respondent 1 declared that his representative immediately communicated to a representative from the Claimant, that he did not accept the proposal. The Respondent 1 sustained that he did not receive any monetary sum or even the flight ticket from the Claimant. 10. Lastly, the Respondent 1 stressed that the offer consisted of only a proposal, conditioned to the materializing of a professional contract of employment, which never happened, and that therefore, he felt free to sign an employment contract with another club. 11. In its response, the Respondent 2 rejected the Claimant’s claim. In this regard, the Respondent 2 sustained that it did not recognize any contract or precontract between the Respondent 1 and the Claimant as there is none, besides the one between the Respondent 2 and the Respondent 1. 12. The Respondent 2 held that the player was introduced to it as a free agent, whose last contract was terminated on 13 April 2014. Moreover, Respondent 2 sustained that the issuance of the requested ITC without any restrictions was proof that the Respondent 1 was indeed free to sign an employment contract. 13. In addition, the Respondent 2 asserted that it acted in good faith, and that it did not know, nor did it need to know if any other agreement had been concluded by the Respondent 1 or by his representative. 14. Finally, the Respondent 2 declared that it was never informed by the Claimant of the situation. 15. In its replica, the Claimant denied the allegations of both the Respondent 1 and the Respondent 2. The Claimant alleged that the sent offer and the acceptance signed by the Respondent 1 created a contractual obligation between the parties, which was breached by the Respondent 1. 16. Furthermore, the Claimant stated that all the negotiations involved the Claimant, the Respondent 1 and his agent. In this respect, the Claimant held that it sent the flight ticket bought directly to the player and to his agent. 17. Also, the Claimant sustained that the Respondent 2, although informed by the representative of Respondent 1 that the latter had already signed a precontract with the Claimant, induced the Respondent 1 into rejecting it by claiming that the Respondent 1 was not bound by the offer. As a consequence, the Claimant maintained its claim in full. 18. In his duplica, the Respondent 1 repeated his position. In this regard, he explained that under his understanding, by refusing the offer and without having received any sum or flight ticket, the offer ceased to exist. 19. The Respondent 2 submitted its final comments in relation with this matter, upholding its position. In this regard, the Respondent 2 held that the offer was not a contractually binding document. Finally, the Respondent 2 sustained that it was not aware of the existence of the offer by the Claimant until the claim was lodged and that it only assumed an obligation with the Respondent 1 after confirming with his previous club and the respective federation that he was free and that the previous contract was indeed terminated, which was then verified by the issuance of the ITC without any restrictions. II. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. First, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter also referred to as Chamber or DRC) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the matter at hand. In this respect, it took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 29 July 2014. Consequently, the Rules governing the procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (edition 2012; hereinafter: Procedural Rules) are applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 of the 2012, 2014 and 2015 editions of the Procedural Rules). 2. Subsequently, the members of the Chamber referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed that in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 in combination with art. 22 lit. b of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2015) the Dispute Resolution Chamber is competent to deal with the matter at stake, which concerns an employment-related dispute with an international dimension between a club from country B, a player from country D and a club from country F. 3. Furthermore, the Chamber analysed which edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, it confirmed that in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (editions 2012, 2014 and 2015), and considering that the present claim was lodged on 29 July 2014, the 2012 edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: Regulations) is applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance. 4. The competence of the Chamber and the applicable regulations having been established, the Chamber entered into the substance of the matter. In this respect, the Chamber started by acknowledging all the above-mentioned facts as well as the arguments and the documentation submitted by the parties. However, the Chamber emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to the facts, arguments and documentary evidence, which it considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand. 5. In view of the allegations and arguments presented by the parties involved in the present matter, the Chamber underlined that in order to be able to establish as to whether, as claimed by Claimant, a breach of contract had been committed by the Respondent 1, it should first of all pronounce itself on the issue of the validity of the relevant offer, which was signed by and between the Claimant and the Respondent 1 on 20 May 2014. 6. In this context, the DRC took note that the Respondent I did not challenge having signed the document titled “Proposal Offer” on 20 May 2014. However, the Chamber also noted that the Respondent 1 argued that he signed the offer only to acknowledge receipt of it, considering it only a proposal and therefore not considering it contractually valid and binding. 7. The Chamber also took note that Respondent 2 considered the document signed on 20 May 2014 as not contractually binding. 8. In this regard, the Chamber was eager to refer to its longstanding and wellestablished jurisprudence and emphasised that a party signing a document of legal importance without knowledge of its precise contents, as a general rule, does so on its own responsibility. In light of the above, the Chamber concluded that the Respondent 1’s reported signature to just acknowledge reception was not a valid cause to consider the document he signed as null and void and therefore, not valid and binding. 9. Having stated the aforementioned, the Chamber highlighted that, in order for an employment contract to be considered as valid and binding, apart from the signature of both the employer and the employee, it should contain the essentialia negotii of an employment contract, such as the parties to the contract and their role, the duration of the employment relationship and the remuneration payable by the employer to the employee, i.e. respectively, the Claimant and the Respondent I. 10. After a careful study of the contract, the Chamber concluded that all such essential elements are included in the pertinent employment contract, in particular, the fact that the contract establishes that the Respondent I has to render his services to the Claimant during a fixed period of time, which, in exchange therefor, has to pay to the Respondent I a staggered remuneration. 11. On account of the above and on the basis of the applicable Regulations, the Chamber came to the firm conclusion that the arguments of the Respondent 1, as well as the arguments of Respondent 2, cannot be upheld and that the offer signed by and between the Claimant and the Respondent 1, on 20 May 2014, was a valid employment contract binding the parties as for the 2014-2015 season. 12. Having so found, the Chamber followed its analysis and turned its attention to the question of the alleged breach of contract without just cause by the Respondent I. 13. In this respect, the Chamber was eager to highlight that based on the parties’ respective statements and the documentation available on file, it was undisputed that the Respondent 1 never joined the Claimant in order to offer his services to the Claimant in accordance with the relevant employment contract. Also, it remains undisputed that the parties did not have any more contact after signing the employment contract on 20 May 2014. 14. It was taken into account by the DRC that the Claimant sustained that it could not reach the Respondent 1 again after 20 May 2014, while Respondent 1 sustained that he never had direct contact with the Claimant and that all the approaches were made through his representative, but providing no evidence of his allegation. 15. In this respect, the chamber took note that the Respondent 2, on its part, argued that it acted in good faith as it did not have any knowledge of an alleged previous contract signed by the Respondent 1, as the Respondent 1 was introduced to it as a free agent. It was further noted that the Respondent 2 sustained that there were no problems with the release of the ITC of the Respondent 1 and that the Claimant never contacted it to notify it with any issue in connection with the Respondent 1. 16. In this context, the Chamber considered relevant to recall its jurisprudence in accordance with which the validity of an employment contract cannot be made conditional upon the execution of (administrative) formalities, such as, but not limited to, the registration procedure in connection with the international transfer of a player, which is the sole responsibility of a club and on which a player has no influence. As regards to the case at stake, no ITC was requested by the Claimant. Bearing in mind that according to Annexe 3 of the Regulations an ITC request depends on the new club’s application to the new association to register a professional, the club is actually in the position to prevent the occurrence of the registration by willfully choosing not to proceed with the application for an ITC request. The Chamber emphasized that, in accordance with art. 2 par. 1 of Annexe 3 of the Regulations, an application to register a professional shall be accompanied by a copy of the contract between the new club and the professional. 17. Subsequently, the Chamber recalled that both parties had acknowledged that there was no further contact between them after the date of the signature of the employment contract. 18. The DRC then analyzed the fact that the Claimant failed to provide evidence to show its intention to carry out its obligations as agreed in the offer. Furthermore, the DRC took note that the Claimant failed to provide any evidence to show its intention to bring the Respondent 1 to the club, in order for him to comply with the agreed contractual conditions, after the signature of the employment contract. 19. In this context, the DRC noted that the Claimant did not provide any evidence in regards to an invitation sent to the Respondent 1 to start trainings with the club, or that it sent the Respondent 1 a formal contract after the signature of the “Proposal Offer”. Moreover, the Claimant did not provide any evidence in relation to an attempt made to register the Respondent 1 with it. 20. It was also considered by the members of the Chamber, that the Claimant did not submit any evidence regarding its allegation of sending the alleged flight ticket bought directly to the Respondent 1 or his representative. 21. Therefore, bearing in mind art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules, in accordance with which any party claiming a right on the basis of an alleged fact shall carry the burden of proof, the Chamber concluded that the Claimant had failed to present any documentation in support of its position. In particular, the members of the Chamber observed that the Claimant was not able to corroborate that at least it tried to contact the Respondent 1 in order to inform him about joining the club, or that it had tried to register him. 22. On account of all the above circumstances, in particular, by not inviting the Respondent 1 to trainings, not offering a formal contract that would have shown the clear intention to formalize the contractual relationship, and by not requesting the relevant ITC although this being the responsibility of the Claimant, the Chamber established that the Claimant had no longer been interested in the services of the Respondent 1. Therefore, in the Chamber’s view, no breach of contract by the Respondent 1 could be established. 23. The members of the Chamber concluded their deliberations by establishing that the claim of the Claimant is entirely rejected. III. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. The claim of the Claimant, Club A, is rejected. ***** Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy): According to art. 67 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives). The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following: Court of Arbitration for Sport Avenue de Beaumont 2 1012 Lausanne, Switzerland Tel: +41 21 613 50 00 Fax: +41 21 613 50 01 e-mail: info@tas-cas.org / www.tas-cas.org For the Dispute Resolution Chamber: Jérôme Valcke Secretary General Encl. CAS directives