F.I.F.A. – Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2015-2016) – controversie di lavoro – ———- F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber (2015-2016) – labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 17 December 2015, in the following composition: Thomas Grimm (Switzerland), Deputy Chairman Mario Gallavotti (Italy), member Joaquim Evangelista (Portugal), member on the claim presented by the player, A, country S, represented by Mr xxx as Claimant against the club, B, country P, represented by Mr xxxxx as Respondent regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties I.

F.I.F.A. - Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2015-2016) - controversie di lavoro – ---------- F.I.F.A. - Dispute Resolution Chamber (2015-2016) - labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 17 December 2015, in the following composition: Thomas Grimm (Switzerland), Deputy Chairman Mario Gallavotti (Italy), member Joaquim Evangelista (Portugal), member on the claim presented by the player, A, country S, represented by Mr xxx as Claimant against the club, B, country P, represented by Mr xxxxx as Respondent regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties I. Facts of the case 1. On 14 June 2010, the club from country P, club B (hereinafter: the Respondent) and the player from country S, A (hereinafter: the Claimant) concluded an employment contract (hereinafter: the contract), valid from the date of the signature until 14 June 2015. 2. According to art. 5 par. 1 of the contract, the Respondent undertakes to pay the Claimant, inter alia, the following remuneration: i. From 14 June 2010 until 30 June 2011: a. EUR 125,000 divided as follows: EUR 5,000 for the month of June 2010, then 12 monthly instalments of EUR 10,000 each, payable until the 10th day of the following month. ii. From 1 July 2011 until 30 June 2012: a. EUR 132,000, divided in 12 monthly instalments (12x EUR 11,000), payable until the 10th day of the following month. iii. From 1 July 2012 until 30 June 2013: a. EUR 144,000, divided in 12 monthly instalments (12x EUR 12,000), payable until the 10th day of the following month. iv. From 1 July 2013 until 30 June 2014: a. EUR 168,000, divided in 12 monthly instalments (12x EUR 14,000), payable until the 10th day of the following month. v. From 1 July 2014 until 14 June 2015: a. EUR 187,000, divided in 12 monthly instalments [12x EUR 14,000 (sic!)] payable until the 10th day of the following month. For the month of June 2015, the Claimant is entitled to a salary of EUR 7,000. 3. According to art. 5 par. 1. and par. 3.,“The remuneration defined in p. hereinabove will be paid after conversion of the amount in EURO into currency country P at an average rate of exchange of the National Bank (NB) for the last day of each month for which the remuneration is due”. 4. Furthermore, art. 5 par. 4 stipulates that the Claimant would be entitled to a bonus of: i. EUR 15,000 if the Respondent qualifies for the group phase of the UEFA European League; ii. EUR 20,000 if the Respondent qualifies for the group phase of the Champions League; iii. EUR 10,000 if the Respondent wins the championship. 5. In addition, art. 5 par. 4.iv further stipulates that “All of the bonuses mentioned above shall be paid in the defined amounts under the condition that the Claimant participates in the preliminaries leading to achieve a given sport result for the time not less than 100% of the duration of these preliminaries. In any other case the amount of the bonus will be calculated in proportion to the number of matches payed and to the time spent by the Claimant on the field during those matches. The parties agree that the bonuses for achieving sport results by the 10th day of the month following the month in which B receives the funds from the parties rewarding the club for achieving the discussed sport results”. 6. Art. 5. par. 6. a stipulates that the Respondent will pay the Claimant for each entire matches played, additional bonuses as follows: i. EUR 2,000 gross for the first until the third season; ii. EUR 2,500 gross for the fourth season; iii. EUR 3,000 gross for the fifth season. 7. Additionally, art. 5. par. 7 further stipulates that “Within the term of this Contract – B will provide for the Claimant 4 round-trip air tickets: A – B – A in each season”. 8. According to art. 7. par. 4 “ Subject to provisions in Clause 3 paragraph 3, any disputes arising from the execution of this Agreement shall be settled amicably, and in cases of a lack of agreement, will be settled by a court proper for the jurisdiction of XY, except when valid law regulations stipulate others as an exclusive proper for the jurisdiction”. Art. 7. par. 6 further stipulates that, “The Agreement is bilingual, written in language of country P and English language versions. In case of any doubts and interpretation problems between those two versions. Moreover, each party has the right to refer the matter in question to the FIFA’s Claimants Status Committee or FIFA’s Dispute Resolution Chamber. “ 9. On 28 March 2012, the parties concluded an agreement (hereinafter: the agreement), by means of which they agreed to defer “the payment term for the Creditor’s [the Claimant’s] liabilities to the Club until 30th September 2012, together with interests calculated from the due date until payment of the liabilities. The Creditor declares that he waives the interest for the above-mentioned period (…) [and] that during the period, he would refrain from taking actions to enforce his liabilities (…).” 10. On 25 July 2012, the Claimant sent a reminder to the Respondent, inviting it to pay his salaries and bonuses for the months May and June 2012 (EUR 22,000 for his salaries of May and June 2012, EUR 2,000 as additional bonuses and EUR 16,200 for “Bonus for UEFA League”). 11. On 27 July 2012, the Respondent confirmed not having paid the amounts claimed in the Claimant’s reminder dated 25 July 2012. It explains that his salary for May 2012 will be paid as soon as possible and hopes to do it at the end of July 2012. Regarding the Claimant’s salary for the month of June 2012 the Respondent holds to have retained it because of his poor performance. As per the bonuses, the Respondent refers to the agreement dated 28 March 2012 signed by the parties (cf. point I.9. above) and assured that it will pay the Claimant on 30 September 2012. 12. On 2 October 2012, the Claimant sent another reminder to the Respondent, by means of which he urged the Respondent to pay his salaries for half of the month of June, plus the full months of July and August 2012 as well as the outstanding bonuses claimed in point I.10. above. 13. On 23 November 2012, the Claimant sent a last reminder to the Respondent by means of which he invited the Respondent a last time to pay the outstanding amounts within 7 days i.e. until 30 November 2012, his salaries from July to October 2012 (EUR 48,000) plus the “rest of the bonus for qualification for the UEFA League” (EUR 12,795) for a total amount of EUR 60,795, otherwise it will terminate the contract with the Respondent and refer the matter to FIFA. 14. On 3 December 2012, the Claimant terminated the employment contract in writing, alleging that the Respondent had not fulfilled its financial obligations for “more than four months”, and informed the Respondent that he will claim in front of FIFA an outstanding amount of EUR 60,975 plus “the rest of the contract until 14/06/2015, amounting to EUR 511,975, plus 5% interest”. 15. In response to this letter, the Respondent sent a fax dated 10 December 2012, by means of which it urged the Claimant to resume training within 3 days. 16. Between 14 December 2012 and 7 February 2013, the Claimant and the Respondent tried to solve the matter amicably but failed to do so. 17. On 20 February 2013, the Claimant lodged a claim against the Respondent in front of FIFA for breach of contract without just cause, requesting the total amount of EUR 512,087 broken down as follows: i. EUR 73,087 as outstanding remuneration, broken down as follows: a. EUR 60,000 corresponding to his salaries from July to November 2012; b. EUR 8,000 corresponding to his UEFA Europa League Bonus due on 3 August 2011; c. EUR 4,795 corresponding to his UEFA Europa League Bonus due on 26 July 2011. d. EUR 292, corresponding to a flight ticket for his wife. ii. EUR 439,000 as compensation; iii. 5% interest on both compensation and outstanding amounts, according to Swiss law. iv. Sporting sanctions to be imposed on the Respondent. 18. In this regard, the Claimant explains that the Respondent failed to pay him five consecutive monthly salaries and bonuses in spite of all his efforts to solve the matter amicably. The Claimant holds having always complied with his contractual obligations but the Respondent from its side, was regularly late in the payment of his monies and only paid him (with consequent delay) his salary until the month of June 2012. The Claimant further explains that he proposed a termination agreement in exchange of an amount of compensation of EUR 130,000 plus the outstanding salaries and bonuses due to him but it was refused by the Respondent who would accept to release him only without paying any amount to him. 19. On account of the Respondent’s failure to pay his remuneration in the amount of EUR 73,087, i.e. bonuses and five monthly salaries (July-November 2012), the Claimant insists that the Respondent clearly breached the contract and that he therefore had a just cause to terminate the contract on 3 December 2012. 20. In its reply, the Respondent disputed the jurisdiction of the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: DRC) in favour of a civil court or the Football Court of Arbitration of Football Association concerned. 21. The Respondent provided FIFA with a copy of the “resolution of the Board of the Football Association of country P no. II/25 dated 12 December 2012 regarding the Football Arbitration Tribunal” (hereinafter: the resolution) and a copy of the “Football Association Statute” in language of country P (hereinafter: P Statute). 22. As to the substance of the case, the Respondent claims that the Claimant is not entitled to the claimed amounts and left the Respondent without any reason. It explains that the Claimant did not train with commitment and for this reason, it moved him to the squad of the youth team in July 2012. In October 2012, due to his good behavior he was reintegrated in the first team, however, according to the Respondent, in November 2012 the Claimant again proved a lack of commitment in training. On 4 December 2012, he was absent and allegedly left country P, which the Respondent considers to be a serious breach of the contract. 23. The Respondent further states that the unilateral termination of the contract by the Claimant is null and void. According to the Respondent, the only possibility to unilaterally terminate a contract is to submit a motion for termination to the Dispute Resolution Chamber of Sports due to the other party’s fault. For this reason the letter dated 3 December 2012 is “ineffective because of the lack of an appropriate application“, for this reason the contract between the parties is still binding and its termination is the subject of the proceedings initiated by the application of the Respondent of 18th December 2012 for the termination of the contract with the Claimant’s fault. Thus, the Respondent deems that the unexcused absence for training, on 4 December 2012 was a serious breach of the Claimant’s obligations, which gave the Respondent a just cause to terminate the contract with the Claimant on 18 December 2012. 24. In his replica to the Respondent’s position, the Claimant insists on the competence of the DRC, rejects the Respondent’s arguments and maintains his previous position. The Claimant provides a statement from the Union of Footballers of country P dated 15 June 2015 which declares that the NDRC does not meet all the requirements to be considered as a judicial body competent to solve disputes between clubs and professional players. Moreover, the NDRC “is not competent to solve financial dispute between the clubs and the players, which are related to the employment. Such disputes are solved, according to art. 47 of the Statute of Football Association, by Football Arbitration Court, where principle of equal representation is not applied”. 25. In its final comments, the Respondent reiterated its previous arguments and insisted on the competence of the NDRC. Finally, the Respondent deems that the reason why the Claimant wanted to terminate his employment contract is that he wanted his child to be born in country S. 26. Finally, the Claimant informed FIFA that on 8 February 2013, he signed an employment contract with the club, S, for which he earned the total amount of EUR 10,500. On 22 January 2014, the Claimant found new employment with another club, V, for which he earned the total amount of EUR 33,600 until the end of the initial contract duration with B, i.e. until 14 June 2015. II. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter also referred to as DRC or Chamber) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the case at hand. In this respect, the Chamber took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 20 February 2013. Consequently, the 2012 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules) is applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 of the Procedural Rules). 2. Subsequently, the members of the Chamber referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed that in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 and par. 2 in combination with art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2015), the Dispute Resolution Chamber shall adjudicate on employment-related disputes between a club and a player, with an international dimension. 3. Having said that, the DRC stated that it would, in principle, be the competent body to decide on the present litigation involving a player from country S and a club from country P regarding an employment-related dispute. 4. However, the Chamber acknowledged that the Respondent contested the competence of FIFA’s Dispute Resolution Chamber to deal with the present case, stating that any dispute arisen between the parties should be submitted to the Football Court of Arbitration of the Football Association or to the civil courts. 5. The Chamber equally noted that the Claimant rejected such position and insisted on the fact that FIFA had jurisdiction to deal with the present matter because the Football Court of Arbitration of the Football Association does not meet all the requirements to be considered as a judicial body competent to solve disputes between clubs and professional players. Moreover, according to the Claimant, the NDRC “is not competent to solve financial dispute between the clubs and the players, which are related to the employment. Such disputes are solved, according to art. 47 of the Statute of Football Association, by Football Arbitration Court, where principle of equal representation is not applied”. 6. Taking into account the above, the Chamber emphasised that, in accordance with art. 22 lit. b) of the 2012 FIFA Regulations, it is competent to deal with a matter such as the one at hand, unless an independent arbitration tribunal, guaranteeing fair proceedings and respecting the principle of equal representation of players and clubs, has been established at national level within the framework of the association and/or a collective bargaining agreement. With regard to the standards to be imposed on an independent arbitration tribunal guaranteeing fair proceedings, the Chamber referred to the FIFA Circular no. 1010 dated 20 December 2005. In this regard, the members of the Chamber further referred to the principles contained in the FIFA National Dispute Resolution Chamber (NDRC) Standard Regulations, which came into force on 1 January 2008. 7. While analysing whether it was competent to hear the present matter, the Dispute Resolution Chamber considered that it should, first and foremost, analyse whether the employment contract at the basis of the present dispute actually contained a jurisdiction clause. 8. Having said this, the members of the Chamber turned their attention to art. 7. par. 4 of the contract (cf. point I.8. above), which stipulates that “Subject to provisions in Clause 3 paragraph 3, any disputes arising from the execution of this Agreement shall be settled amicably, and in cases of a lack of agreement, will be settled by a court proper for the jurisdiction of XY, except when valid law regulations stipulate others as an exclusive proper for the jurisdiction”. The Chamber further noted that art. 7. par. 6 further stipulates that “(…) Moreover, each party has the right to refer the matter in question to the FIFA’s Claimants Status Committee or FIFA’s Dispute Resolution Chamber. “ 9. In view of the aforementioned clauses, the members of the DRC were of the opinion that art. 7. par. 4 and 7. par. 6 of the employment contract do not make clear reference to one specific national dispute resolution chamber in the sense of art. 22 lit. b) of the aforementioned Regulations and even provides for the possibility of lodging a dispute in front of FIFA. Therefore, the members of the Chamber deem that said clauses can by no means be considered as clear arbitration clauses in favor either of the civil courts or the Football Court of Arbitration of the Football Association of country P. 10. Having established that the first criterion for the recognition of the competence of a national decision-making body is not fulfilled in the present matter, the Chamber deemed unnecessary to examine any further points which would need to be assessed before concluding to the competence of a national deciding body. 11. In view of the above, the Chamber established that the Respondent’s objection to the competence of FIFA to deal with the present matter had to be rejected and that the DRC is competent, on the basis of art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, to consider the present matter as to the substance. 12. Subsequently, the members of the Chamber analysed which edition of the Regulations should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, the Chamber confirmed that, in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations (editions 2012, 2014 and 2015) and considering that the claim in front of FIFA was lodged on 20 February 2013, the 2012 edition of said Regulations is applicable to the present matter as to the substance. 13. The competence of the Chamber and the applicable regulations having been established, the Chamber entered into the substance of the matter. In this respect, the Chamber started by acknowledging all the above-mentioned facts as well as the arguments and the documentation submitted by the parties. However, the Chamber emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to the facts, arguments and documentary evidence, which it considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand. 14. In this respect, the members of the Chamber acknowledged that it was undisputed by the parties that they signed an employment contract valid as from 14 June 2010 until 14 June 2015, according to which the Claimant was entitled to receive the monies described in points I.2. to I.7. above. 15. The Chamber further observed that the Claimant held that he had unilaterally terminated the contract with the Respondent on 3 December 2012 invoking just cause, and that he subsequently lodged a claim in front of FIFA against the Respondent seeking payment of the amount of EUR 512,087 plus interest, corresponding to the amounts detailed in point I. 17. above. On the other hand, the Chamber duly noted that the Respondent held that the Claimant’s unilateral termination of the contract was null and void and that the contract was effectively terminated by the Respondent on 18 December 2012 following a proceeding initiated in front of the Resolution Chamber of Sports because of the Claimant’s absence at training on 4 December 2012. 16. As a consequence of the above, the Chamber duly noted that it first had to examine which is the date to be considered as the date on which the contract was terminated. Whereas the Claimant held that the relevant date is 3 December 2012, the Respondent held that the termination occurred on 18 December 2012, first because of the fact that the only way to terminate a contract is to submit a motion for termination in front of the Resolution Chamber of Sports and secondly, due to the reason that the Claimant failed to participate to the training on 4 December 2012. After having taken into account all the circumstances of the present matter, in particular the fact that the Claimant provided a copy of a fax report proving the transmission of his termination letter of 3 December 2012 to the Respondent and in view of the absence of any clause in the contract which stipulates a specific procedure to terminate it, the members of the DRC found that the contract must be considered as terminated by the Claimant on 3 December 2012, after having put the Respondent in default three times and given a last seven days deadline to the Respondent in his correspondence of 23 November 2012 in order to pay its contractual debts. 17. In continuation, the Chamber underlined that it had to examine whether or not the Claimant had had a just cause to terminate the contract with the Respondent on 3 December 2012. 18. In this respect, the members of the Chamber deemed it appropriate to recall the basic principle of burden of proof, as stipulated in art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules, according to which a party claiming a right on the basis of an alleged fact shall carry the respective burden of proof. 19. In view of the above, the DRC deemed that, in the present case, the Respondent carried the burden of proof of proving the payment of the Claimant’s remuneration or to have had any valid reasons not to pay the Claimant in accordance with the contract. 20. In this context, the members of the Chamber first observed that the Respondent could not provide any documentary evidence proving to have paid any of the amounts claimed by the Claimant. Moreover, the Chamber observed that, on 27 July 2012, the Respondent explicitly acknowledged that it did not pay the Claimant’s bonuses in relation to the UEFA Europa League (cf. point I.11. above), which fell due in July and August 2011 as well as his salary of May 2012, which appears to have been paid in the meantime. Furthermore, the Respondent claimed that the Claimant’s salary of June 2012 was retained due to his alleged poor performance (cf. point. I.11. above). 21. As a result, the Chamber analysed whether the Respondent had any valid reasons not to have paid the Claimant the remuneration due as per the contract. The DRC observed that the Respondent stressed that the Claimant did not train with commitment, was moved to the youth team in July 2012 (cf. point I.22. above) and therefore his salary of June 2012 must be withheld. 22. In this context, the Chamber underlined that the Respondent could not provide any evidence of any fine imposed on the Claimant or of any disciplinary violations of the Claimant or of his notification of or participation in any disciplinary proceedings, due to an alleged lack of commitment or to insufficient performance. In fact, the Claimant’s salary for June 2012 appears to have been paid in the meantime, since the Claimant does not claim it. 23. In this context, and irrespective of the foregoing consideration, the Chamber wished to point out that the imposition of a fine, or any other available financial sanction in general, shall not be used by clubs as a means to set off outstanding financial obligations towards players. Consequently, the Chamber decided to reject the Respondent’s argument in this connection. 24. In addition to a partial acknowledgement of the debt (cf. point I.11. and II.20. above), the Respondent did not present any proof of payment of the Claimant’s salaries from July to November 2012, neither did it dispute their non-payment. 25. Taking into consideration all previous deliberations as well as the fact that the salaries were payable on the 10th day of the following month, as per art. 5 par. 1. and par. 3 of the contract (cf. point I.3. above), the Chamber concluded that the total amount of EUR 60,795 was outstanding at the time of the termination of the contract by the Claimant, corresponding to four monthly salaries (July to October 2012) as well as EUR 12,795 as bonuses. 26. In this context, the Chamber concluded that the Respondent had seriously neglected its contractual obligations towards the Claimant in a continuous and constant manner, i.e. the Respondent had failed to remunerate the Claimant for a substantial period of time regarding a significant amount of money. As a consequence, the Chamber established in accordance with its well established jurisprudence that the Claimant had terminated the employment contract with just cause on 3 December 2012 and that, consequently, the Respondent is to be held liable for the early termination of the employment contract with the Claimant. 27. Bearing in mind the previous considerations, the Chamber went on to deal with the consequences of the early termination of the employment contract with just cause by the Claimant. 28. First of all, the members of the Chamber concurred that the Respondent must fulfill its obligations as per employment contract in accordance with the general legal principle of “pacta sunt servanda”. Consequently, the Chamber decided that the Respondent is liable to pay to the Claimant the remuneration that was outstanding at the time of the termination i.e. the amount of EUR 60,795, consisting of the monthly salaries of July to October 2012 (EUR 48,000) as well as EUR 12,795 as bonuses. 29. As a result, the Chamber determined that the Respondent has to pay the Claimant the amount of EUR 60,795 as outstanding remuneration. Considering the Claimant’s claim for interest, the Chamber also ruled that the Respondent must pay 5% interest p.a. on the aforementioned amount as from 20 February 2013, i.e. the date on which the present claim was lodged. 30. In continuation, the Chamber decided that, taking into consideration art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the Claimant is entitled to receive from the Respondent compensation for breach of contract in addition to any outstanding remuneration on the basis of the relevant employment contract. 31. In this context, the Chamber outlined that, in accordance with said provision, the amount of compensation shall be calculated, in particular and unless otherwise provided for in the contract at the basis of the dispute, with due consideration for the law of the country concerned, the specificity of sport and further objective criteria, including, in particular, the remuneration and other benefits due to the Claimant under the existing contract and/or the new contract, the time remaining on the existing contract up to a maximum of five years, and depending on whether the contractual breach falls within the protected period. 32. In application of the relevant provision, the Chamber held that it first of all had to clarify whether the pertinent employment contract contained any clause, by means of which the parties had beforehand agreed upon a compensation payable by the contractual parties in the event of breach of contract. In this regard, the Chamber established that no such compensation clause was included in the employment contract at the basis of the matter at stake. 33. Having recalled the aforementioned, and in order to evaluate the compensation to be paid by the Respondent, the members of the Chamber took into account the remuneration due to the Claimant in accordance with the employment contract as well as the time remaining on the same contract, along with the professional situation of the Claimant after the early termination occurred. In this respect, the Chamber concluded that the remaining value of the contract as from its early termination by the Claimant on 3 December 2012 until the regular expiry of the contract on 14 June 2015 amounts to EUR 451,000 and that such amount shall serve as the basis for the final determination of the amount of compensation for breach of contract. 34. In continuation, the Chamber verified as to whether the Claimant had signed an employment contract with another club during the relevant period of time, by means of which he would have been enabled to reduce his loss of income. According to the constant practice of the DRC, such remuneration under a new employment contract shall be taken into account in the calculation of the amount of compensation for breach of contract in connection with the player’s general obligation to mitigate his damages. 35. The Chamber remarked that the Claimant had found new employment with two different clubs, where he earned the total amount of EUR 44,100 for the period between November 2012 and 14 June 2015 (cf. points I.26. above). 36. Consequently, in accordance with the constant practice of the Dispute Resolution Chamber and the general obligation of the player to mitigate his damages, the remuneration as indicated in the new employment contracts shall be taken into account in the calculation of the amount of compensation for breach of contract. 37. In view of all of the above, the Chamber decided that the Respondent must pay the amount of EUR 406,900 to the Claimant, which is considered by the Chamber to be a reasonable and justified amount as compensation for breach of contract. 38. In addition, taking into account the Claimant’s request, the Chamber decided that the Respondent must pay to the Claimant interest of 5% p.a. on the amount of compensation for breach of contract as of the date on which the claim was lodged, i.e., 20 February 2013, until the date of effective payment. 39. In conclusion, the DRC decided that the Respondent is liable to pay to the Claimant outstanding remuneration in the amount of EUR 60,795 as well as the amount of EUR 406,900 corresponding to compensation for breach of contract without just cause, plus 5% interests p.a. on both amounts as from the date of claim, i.e. 20 February 2013. 40. The Dispute Resolution Chamber concluded its deliberations in the present matter by establishing that any further request filed by the Claimant is rejected. ***** III. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. The claim of the Claimant, A, is admissible. 2. The claim of the Claimant is partially accepted. 3. The Respondent, B, has to pay to the Claimant, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision, outstanding remuneration in the amount of EUR 60,795 plus 5% interest p.a. as from 20 February 2013 until the date of effective payment. 4. The Respondent has to pay to the Claimant, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision, compensation for breach of contract in the amount of EUR 406,900 plus 5% interest p.a. as from 20 February 2013 until the date of effective payment. 5. In the event that the amounts due to the Claimant in accordance with the abovementioned numbers 3. and 4. are not paid by the Respondent within the stated time limits, the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision. 6. Any further claim lodged by the Claimant is rejected. 7. The Claimant is directed to inform the Respondent immediately and directly of the account number to which the remittances are to be made and to notify the Dispute Resolution Chamber of every payment received. ***** Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy): According to art. 67 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives). The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following: Court of Arbitration for Sport Avenue de Beaumont 2 1012 Lausanne Switzerland Tel: +41 21 613 50 00 / Fax: +41 21 613 50 01 e-mail: info@tas-cas.org www.tas-cas.org For the Dispute Resolution Chamber: Markus Kattner Acting Secretary General Encl. CAS directives