F.I.F.A. – Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2015-2016) – controversie di lavoro – ———- F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber (2015-2016) – labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 18 March 2016, in the following composition: Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman Philippe Piat (France), member Theodore Giannikos (Greece), member on the claim presented by the player, Player A, country B as Claimant against the club, Club C, country D as Respondent regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties I.

F.I.F.A. - Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2015-2016) - controversie di lavoro – ---------- F.I.F.A. - Dispute Resolution Chamber (2015-2016) - labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 18 March 2016, in the following composition: Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman Philippe Piat (France), member Theodore Giannikos (Greece), member on the claim presented by the player, Player A, country B as Claimant against the club, Club C, country D as Respondent regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties I. Facts of the case Facts related to the competence: 1. On 1 July 2013, the player from country B, Player A (hereinafter: the Claimant) and the club from country D, Club C (hereinafter: the Respondent), concluded an employment contract (hereinafter: the contract) valid from the date of signature until 30 June 2016. 2. Art. 19 of the contract reads: 1) “All disputes arising out of or relating to this contract, including disputes as to the meaning or interpretation of any provision of this contract or as to the carrying into effect of any such provision or as to the termination or consequences of termination shall be referred to Dispute Resolution in accordance with Football League of country D’s rules from time to time. 2) The parties warrant that, in accordance with the football rules, any and all disputes of whatsoever shall be determined in accordance with the Football League of country D’s rules and in the Dispute Resolution Tribunals of the Football League of country D rather than before any court or other tribunal as it is a requirement of FIFA and other footballing rules that the internal dispute resolution mechanisms available in football should be utilized by participants in the game save where the football rules do not provide an appropriate tribunal to determine the dispute.”. 3. In his claim, the Claimant sustained that neither the Football League of country D (hereinafter: the FLD) DRC, nor the Football Association of country D (hereinafter: the Football Association of country D) Appeals Board nor the Football Association of country D Arbitration Tribunal are independent arbitration tribunals guaranteeing fair proceedings and respecting the principle of equal representation of players and clubs, for the following reasons: i) The FLD DRC The chairperson is appointed by the FLD Executive Committee and/or the CEO of the FLD. The FLD is a special member of Football Association of country D and its members are clubs. The FLD Executive Committee consists of candidates appointed by the clubs and a nominee to the FLD Executive Committee must be a registered official of a club. Hence, the FLD Executive Committee effectively consists out of club owners, and in consequence, the chairperson is not being appointed and agreed upon consensus by the players’ representatives and the club representatives; The FLD prohibits that a player may approach any administrative forum or court of law, as can be derived from art. 19 par. 2 of the contract; The FLD Constitution stipulates that all disputes must be referred to the FLD DRC within 30 days of dismissal, which is unreasonable and unfair; A party wishing to refer a dispute to the FLD DRC needs to pay 1,000 in addition to the legal fees incurred; the majority of clubs have legal representation thereby placing the player at a disadvantage. ii) Football Association of country D Appeals Board The costs to appeal a case to the Appeals Board is 23,000; The Appeals Board consists of a chairperson and two or more additional members. The Appeals Board is appointed by the Executive Committee of Football Association of country D and does not have any player representatives; The Appeals Board is rather a review procedure since the “record before the Appeals Board shall be confined to the evidence which was presented to the Disciplinary Committee and/or FLD DRC”. iii) Football Association of country D Arbitration Tribunal Thereafter, cases may be appealed to the Football Association of country D Arbitration Tribunal, which is a body established by Football Association of country D and which does not provide equal representation. If an award of the Appeals Board is appealed against, Football Association of country D appoints a Single Arbitrator; The costs to appeal a case to the Football Association of country D Tribunal is 30,000. 4. In its reply to the claim, the Respondent argued that “the matter be referred to the FLD DRC in terms of Article 22 of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, as the FLD DRC is an independent arbitration tribunal established at country D’s level within football administrative framework of Football Association of country D”. 5. In relation, the Respondent held that: The powers vested in the FLD Executive Committee are conferred by the FLD constitution, which governs all the contracts between football players and clubs, and which was agreed by the Claimant after signing the standard FLD contract with it; The Claimant agreed to the restrictions imposed by the FLD DRC by signing a contract with the Respondent, which incorporates the FLD Rules and Constitution, and which at the time, the Claimant had the freedom to elect not to sign; The Respondent further rejected the Claimant’s arguments in relation to the non-competence of the country D’s decision making bodies, requesting the Claimant to submit proof of his allegations. 6. Having been requested to provide all the documentary evidence that could prove that the present matter should be dealt with by the deciding bodies of Football Association of country D, the Respondent stated that “we do state from the outset that we do not question FIFA’s competence in dealing with this matter other than drawing FIFA’s attention that there is an independent arbitrations tribunal guaranteeing fair proceedings and respecting the principal of equal representation of Players and Clubs which has been established at national level within the framework of the country D’s Association” and provided the following documentation: Schedule to the Professional Footballer’s Fixed Term Employment Contract between the Claimant and the Respondent, to which the Standard National League Contract is enclosed; The Respondent’s employee handbook; The FLD constitution; The FLD Rules. 7. In his replica, the Claimant reiterated his previous argumentation regarding the competence issue and pointed out that he is a citizen of country B, therefore the present matter has an international dimension. 8. In its final comments, the Respondent held that either from the perspective of the FIFA statutes or from the perspective of the FLD Constitution, FIFA’s DRC should not be competent to deal with the matter at hand. In this respect, the Respondent sustained the following: - The Claimant is directly bound by the contract, the FLD constitution and his membership to the country D’s Football Players’ Union (hereinafter: the Football Players’ Union of country D) in relation with the collective bargaining agreement concluded between the FLD and the Football Players’ Union of country D, and therefore he had the obligation to refer any labour dispute with the Respondent to the FLD DRC; - The FLD DRC is an independent arbitration tribunal respecting the principle of equal representation as established by FIFA’s Regulations; - The allegation that the cost of 1,000 to refer the claim to the FLD DRC is unfair, is denied. In particular, the Respondent stressed that it is a common practice in country D, where private resolution procedures are adopted; - The Claimant’s complaint about the 30 day time limit to refer a dispute to the FLD DRC is without merit, as it is in line with national legislation and “does not detract from the independence of the FLD DRC”. Also, if a player is late, this rule can be subject to “condonation”; - The FLD DRC is in a far better position to properly determine the principles of country D’s law; - FIFA should remit the claim back to country D, even if it is in principle competent to hear the claim, as there are strong legal and practical considerations; - FIFA’s DRC is a “forum non conveniens”, as a dispute concerning operational requirements is not one that can be resolved on paper, and it would be “extremely expensive to fly witnesses and experts to Zurich”. 9. With its final comments, the Respondent forwarded the collective bargaining agreement, between the FLD and the Football Players’ Union of country D, and an “independent submission” of the FLD, which had been previously provided to FIFA in the employment related dispute of the player, Player E against the club from country D, Club F, confirming that the FLD DRC is an independent arbitration tribunal guaranteeing fair proceedings and respecting the principle of equal representation of players and clubs. In this respect, the FLD enclosed affidavits of the secretary and prosecutor of the FLD. 10. In its submission, the FLD refers to art. 18 par. 1 of the FLD Constitution which apparently stipulates that the FLD DRC “is a tribunal comprising an independent chairperson, a panel of members appointed by the players or their elected representatives and a panel appointed by the Executive Committee. (…)” In this respect, and in addition to the arguments raised by the Respondent, the FLD stressed that : The Claimant is registered with the FLD and therefore directly bound to the FLD Constitution, in particular referring to art. 18 which states that all participants in professional football are required to refer any and all disputes to the FLD DRC; The Claimant is a member of the Football Players’ Union of country D and the FLD and the Football Players’ Union of country D concluded a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) which provides that all disputes be referred to the FLD DRC; The FLD DRC has 4 panel members plus an independent chairperson; 2 members are appointed by the Football Players’ Union of country D and 2 members are appointed by the Executive Committee of the FLD; The independent chairperson is appointed by the Executive Committee of the FLD “on behalf of all registered players and club”, and is an advocate of the High Court of country D and has no affiliation to any member or player of the FLD. The FLD DRC always sits as a panel of 3 comprised of the independent chairperson, a member chosen by the players and a member chosen by the clubs; As to the 1,000, it is common practice in country D for the parties to bear the costs thereof. In any event, 1,000 is a nominal amount. Facts related to the substance of the case: 11. The contract established an option to extend its duration until 30 June 2017. The relevant clause reads as follows: “Option: You and Club C have granted each to the other, an irrevocable option to renew this contract for a further period of a year. Should either party elect to exercise this option which shall be in your and our entire discretion that party will notify the other by way of a letter handed to you or addressed to your address as communicated to us by and set out above by no later than 31 May 2016. In the event of the option being exercised your contract will automatically be renewed for the further period ending upon the date set out above on identical terms and conditions save that your remuneration will be that set out for the extended period and the extended termination date will apply. [Date of Termination if Club C exercises the option (extended termination date) 30 June 2017”.]. 12. According to the contract, the Claimant was entitled, inter alia, to the following amounts: The gross monthly remuneration was established in the contract as follows: - 38,000 per month for the period from 1 July 2013 until 30 June 2014; - 43,000 per month for the period from 1 July 2014 until 30 June 2015; - 48,000 per month for the period from 1 July 2015 until 30 June 2016; - 55,000 per month for the “option” period from 1 July 2016 until 30 June 2017. The contract also established an Image Rights Fee payable to the Claimant as follows: - 300,000 gross for the 2013/2014 season and payable as follows: 100,000 payable in “August 2013”; 100,000 payable in “December 2013”; 100,000 payable in “May 2014”. - 340,000 gross for the 2014/2015 season and payable as follows: 120,000 payable in “August 2014”; 120,000 payable in “December 2014”; 100,000 payable in “May 2015”. - 400,000 gross for the 2015/2016 season and payable as follows: 140,000 payable in “August 2015”; 140,000 payable in “December 2015”; 120,000 payable in “May 2016”. - 450,000 gross for the 2016/2017 “option” season and payable as follows: 150,000 payable in “August 2016”; 150,000 payable in “December 2016”; 150,000 payable in “May 2017”. Two return air tickets per season from country D to country B “for him and wife”. 13. On 26 August 2014, the Claimant lodged a claim against the Respondent before FIFA for breach of the contract without just cause. The Claimant requested the payment of the following amounts: Outstanding Image Rights Fee in the amount of 100,000, plus interest as from the due date; Compensation in the aggregate of 2,899,000, plus interest as from the due dates, as follows: - 473,000 in relation to the salaries from 1 August 2014 until 30 June 2015, corresponding to 43,000 each; - 576,000 in relation to the salaries from 1 July 2015 until 30 June 2016, corresponding to 48,000 each; - 660,000 in relation to the salaries for the “option” period from 1 July 2016 until 30 June 2017, 55,000 each; - 340,000 in relation to the image rights for the 2014/2015 season; - 400,000 in relation to the image rights for the 2015/2016 season; - 450,000 in relation to the image rights for the “option” period of the 2016/2017 season. The Claimant also requested six return economy class air tickets in the route country D – country B, corresponding to the 2014/2015, 2015/2016 and 2016/2017 seasons. The Claimant requested sporting sanctions to be imposed on the club. 14. The Claimant argued that in a meeting with the General Manager of the Respondent, which according to the Claimant took place on 12 May 2014, he was informed that the Respondent placed him on the transfer list and that “he should start looking for employment elsewhere”. Subsequently, the Claimant stated that he went on a seasonal break with the consent of the Respondent, returning on 15 June 2014, and took part in the pre-season activities for the 2014/2015 season. 15. The Claimant sustained that he was contacted by the General Manager of the Respondent on several occasions, namely 6 July 2014, 7 July 2014, 10 July 2014, 14 July 2014, 18 July 2014, and that he was told that “he was not performing”, and that he did not fit in the plans of the coach, and therefore, there was no future for him with the Respondent. 16. Moreover, according to the Claimant, on 22 July 2014, he had another meeting with the General Manager of the Respondent, where he was told that his contract would be terminated, as he did not fit in the new coach’s plans. 17. The Claimant held that on 23 July 2014, he received a letter from the Respondent titled “Notice of Termination of Employment” wherein he was communicated that the employment contract was terminated with immediate effect and that the remuneration for the months of July, August and September 2014 were going to be made in one payment on or before 31 July 2014. 18. On 24 July 2014, the Claimant sent a letter to the Respondent. In the letter, the Claimant acknowledged reception of the “Notice of Termination Agreement” and informed the Respondent that he did not agree with the termination. 19. Furthermore, the Claimant sustained that, on 29 July 2014, the Respondent handed him a document titled “Termination of Employment Agreement” and informed him that if he did not sign this mentioned document, he would then not receive any amounts. 20. The Claimant held that on 30 July 2014, he sent a letter to the Respondent, in which he stated that “the settlement agreement is in full and final settlement of all claims and I cannot sign it because it does not give me what I am fully entitled to…. I therefore beg you pay to me what is due to me. Me and my family is really struggling. I reserve my rights.”. 21. The Claimant declared that he received his last salary on 5 August 2014, corresponding to the month of July 2014. 22. In its reply, the Respondent rejected the Claimant’s claim. In this regard, the Respondent stated that the player refused to accept the payment corresponding to the Image Rights Fee for May 2014, offered to him on 29 July 2014. 23. Furthermore, the Respondent denied having had the alleged meetings with the Claimant, dated 12 May 2014, 6 July 2014, 7 July 2014, 10 July 2014, 14 July 2014, 18 July 2014 and 22 July 2014 and further denied having given consent to the Claimant to go on a seasonal break. 24. The Respondent also denied handing the “Termination of Employment Agreement” on 29 July 2014 and denied having informed the Claimant that if he did not sign this mentioned document, he would then not receive any amounts. 25. Moreover, the Respondent sustained that the Claimant was handed a copy of the Respondent’s handbook, and which according to the Respondent, the Claimant signed. 26. The Respondent denied that the Claimant’s contract has been terminated for reasons of “not fitting in the plans of the coach”, and argued that the player’s dismissal “was effected on operational reasons as such was a justifiable retrenchment that is fair and in compliance with fair procedure in terms of country D’s Labour laws which apply to the FLD fixed term contract between the Claimant and the Respondent…”. 27. The Respondent further referred to Rule 37.18 of the FLD Rules which provides that: “A club may terminate a player’s contract at any time for reasons that are fair and in compliance with fair procedure consistent with country D’s law” and argued that it had complied with the requirements and procedures stated for the dismissal of the Claimant in terms of country D’s law. In consequence, the Respondent sustained that the contract was not terminated unilaterally but through a consultative process and effected in terms of fair procedure. In relation, the Respondent explained the following: On 10 July 2014, “the player was issued with section 189 notice”; On 14 July 2014, the Claimant attended a meeting in which he was consulted by the Respondent on the issues raised in the above mentioned notice; On 18 July 2014, the Claimant received a notice to attend a further consultative process; On 22 July 2014, the Claimant attended a meeting with the Respondent, where he was informed that a decision was made to terminate his contract based on operational requirements; On 23 July 2014, the Claimant was issued with a letter of termination. 28. Finally, the Respondent requested the following: - “the matter be referred to the FLD DRC”; - “[The Claimant] be ordered to accept the amount of 100,000 which is due and payable by [the Respondent]…in respect of [the Claimant’s] image rights…”; - “it be ordered that the termination of [the Claimant’s] FLD contract…was effected in accordance with a fair procedure…”; - “[the Claimant’s] case be dismissed with costs.”. 29. In his unsolicited comments, the Claimant repeated his initial position in which he held that his contract was terminated without just cause and stated that taking into account the Respondent’s reply, the Respondent admitted that the image rights fee for May 2014 is still outstanding. The Claimant further sustained, while referring to an alleged letter from the Respondent to the CEO of the country D’s Football League, that his contract was terminated “under the guise of a retrenchment with the aim of registering another foreign player”. 30. The Claimant declared that he did not receive a copy of the Respondent’s handbook, as argued by the Respondent, but that “he was only requested to sign the handbook in a hurry”. In this respect, the Claimant argued that the Respondent’s handbook does not form part of the contract and it “may not regulate how and when the contract may be terminated”. 31. In its duplica, the Respondent submitted arguments only in respect to the competence issue. 32. According to the information in the Transfer Matching System (TMS), on 29 September 2014, the Claimant signed a contract with the club from country B, Club G, valid until “2015”, according to which he was entitled to receive a monthly salary of 500. II. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter also referred to as DRC or Chamber) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the case at hand. In this respect, the Chamber took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 26 August 2014. Consequently, the 2014 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules) is applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 of the 2014 and 2015 editions of the Procedural Rules). 2. Subsequently, the DRC referred to art. 3 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed that in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 and 2 in combination with art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2015) the DRC would, in principle, be competent to deal with the matter at stake, which concerns an employment-related dispute with an international dimension between a player from country B and a club from country D. 3. In this respect, the Chamber was eager to emphasize that, contrary to the information contained in FIFA’s letter dated 10 March 2016, by means of which the parties were informed of the composition of the Chamber, the member H and the member I refrained from participating in the deliberations in the case at hand, due to the fact that the member H has the same nationality as the Respondent and that, in order to comply with the prerequisite of equal representation of club and player representatives, also the member I refrained from participating and thus the Dispute Resolution Chamber adjudicated the case in presence of three members in accordance with art. 24 par. 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players. 4. However, the Chamber acknowledged that the Respondent contested the competence of FIFA’s deciding bodies alleging that the Claimant should have addressed his claim to the FLD DRC in country D, in relation with art. 19 par. 2 of the contract. 5. On the other hand, the Chamber noted that the Claimant insisted on the competence of the FIFA DRC to adjudicate on the claim lodged by him against the Respondent, and sustained that the FLD DRC is not an independent arbitration tribunal guaranteeing fair proceedings and respecting the principle of equal representation of players and clubs. 6. Taking into account all the above, the Chamber emphasised that in accordance with art. 22 lit b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players it is competent to deal with a matter such as the one at hand, unless an independent arbitration tribunal, guaranteeing fair proceedings and respecting the principle of equal representation of players and clubs, has been established at national level within the framework of the association and/or a collective bargaining agreement. With regard to the standards to be imposed on an independent arbitration tribunal guaranteeing fair proceedings, the Chamber referred to the FIFA Circular no. 1010 dated 20 December 2005. Equally, the members of the Chamber referred to the principles contained in the FIFA National Dispute Resolution Chamber (NDRC) Standard Regulations, which came into force on 1 January 2008. 7. In this respect, the DRC turned its attention to the principle of equal representation of players and clubs and underlined that this principle is one of the very fundamental elements to be fulfilled, in order for a national dispute resolution chamber to be recognised as such. Indeed, this prerequisite is mentioned in the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, in the FIFA Circular no. 1010 as well as in art. 3 par. 1 of the NDRC Regulations, which illustrates the aforementioned principle as follows: “The NDRC shall be composed of the following members, who shall serve a four-year renewable mandate: a) a chairman and a deputy chairman chosen by consensus by the player and club representatives (…); b) between three and ten player representatives who are elected or appointed either on proposal of the players’ associations affiliated to FIFPro, or, where no such associations exist, on the basis of a selection process agreed by FIFA and FIFPro; c) between three and ten club representatives (…).” In this respect, the FIFA Circular no. 1010 states the following: “The parties must have equal influence over the appointment of arbitrators. This means for example that every party shall have the right to appoint an arbitrator and the two appointed arbitrators appoint the chairman of the arbitration tribunal (…). Where arbitrators are to be selected from a predetermined list, every interest group that is represented must be able to exercise equal influence over the compilation of the arbitrator list”. 8. On account of the above, the Chamber went on to examine the documentation presented by the Respondent and noted that the Respondent confirmed that the chairperson of the FLD DRC is appointed by the Executive Committee of the FLD. Equally, the Chamber noted that it can be established from the documentation provided by the parties that the FLD is an organisation consisting exclusively of clubs. As such, the members of the Chamber concluded that the chairperson of the FLD DRC is effectively appointed by the clubs and thus not by consensus by player and club representatives. Therefore, the Chamber was unanimous in its conclusion that the FLD DRC does not respect the principle of equal representation of players and clubs. 9. In addition, the Chamber noted that it is acknowledged by both parties that for proceedings conducted in front of the FLD DRC, Football Association of country D Appeals Board and the Football Association of country D Arbitration Tribunal, costs apply varying between 1,000 and 30,000. The Chamber finds that the imposition of these costs are not in accordance with art. 32 of the NDRC Regulations. 10. As a consequence of the above-mentioned elements, the Chamber agreed that it could not be concluded that the FLD DRC is indeed an independent arbitration tribunal guaranteeing fair proceedings and respecting the principle of equal representation of players and clubs. 11. On account of all the above, the Chamber established that the Respondent’s objection towards the competence of FIFA to deal with the present matter has to be rejected, and that the Dispute Resolution Chamber is competent, on the basis of art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, to consider the present matter as to the substance. 12. Furthermore, the Chamber analysed which edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, it confirmed that, in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (editions 2014 and 2015), and considering that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 26 August 2014, the 2014 edition of the aforementioned regulations (hereinafter: the Regulations) is applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance. 13. Having established the above, the members of the Chamber turned to the Claimant’s claim in respect to “Image Rights Fees”. 14. In this regard, the Chamber had to establish whether, for formal reasons, it was competent to deal with this specific component or not. In fact, it appears that this part of the claim could possibly not be considered due to the Chamber lacking competence to deal with disputes related to image rights. 15. While analysing whether it was competent to hear this part of the claim, the Chamber wished to highlight that the image rights fee established in the contract in the matter at stake, appears to be separate to the employment-related elements, which, in the opposite case, may have led the Chamber to believe that it was not in fact an image rights fee but rather a separate concept to the employment contract, i.e. directly linked to the services of the Claimant as a player. 16. As a general rule, the DRC tends to consider the concept of image rights as non employment-related and does not have the competence to deal with it on the basis of art. 22 of the Regulations. However, such conclusion might be different if specific elements of the contract suggest that it was in fact meant to be part of the actual employment relationship. Such elements, like, for instance, stipulations regarding bonuses, the use of a car, accommodation, which are typical for employment contracts and not for image rights agreements, do not appear to be included in the image rights fee which is part of the Claimant’s petition. 17. Consequently, bearing in mind the above as well as art. 22 lit. b of the Regulations, which stipulates that the Chamber is competent to hear employment-related disputes (emphasis added), the Chamber decided that it cannot deal with the Claimant’s claim pertaining to Image Rights. 18. The competence of the Chamber and the applicable regulations having been established, the Chamber entered into the substance of the matter. In this respect, the Chamber started by acknowledging all the above-mentioned facts as well as the arguments and the documentation submitted by the parties. However, the Chamber emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to the facts, arguments and documentary evidence, which it considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand. In particular, the Chamber recalled that in accordance with art. 6 par. 3 of Annexe 3 of the Regulations, FIFA may use, within the scope of proceedings pertaining to the application of the Regulations, any documentation or evidence generated or contained in the TMS. 19. First of all, the members of the Chamber acknowledged that it was undisputed by the parties that they had signed an employment contract valid as from 1 July 2013 until 30 June 2016, under which the Claimant was entitled to 38,000 per month for the period from 1 July 2013 until 30 June 2014, 43,000 per month for the period from 1 July 2014 until 30 June 2015, 48,000 per month for the period from 1 July 2015 until 30 June 2016 and two return air tickets per season from country D to country B. In this moment, the DRC recalled that, as mentioned before, it was not competent to deal with the Claimant’s claim pertaining to Image Rights. Moreover, the Chamber took note that said contract established an option to extend it until 30 June 2017. 20. In continuation, the DRC also took note that it is uncontested by the Respondent that the contractual relationship between the parties to the present dispute was terminated by the Respondent on 23 July 2014, when the Respondent submitted its termination letter to the Claimant. 21. In this regard, the Chamber took due note that the Claimant argued that the Respondent had unilaterally terminated the contractual relationship without just cause, sustaining that his contract was terminated “under the guise of a retrenchment with the aim of registering another foreign player”. 22. The Chamber further took note of the argumentation of the Respondent, which insisted on having terminated the employment relation with the Claimant with just cause, as it argued that the contract was not terminated unilaterally but through a consultative process which was effected in terms of fair procedure and only due to “operational requirements”. In this regard, the Respondent held that it had complied with the requirements and procedures stated for the dismissal of the Claimant in terms of country D’s law. In this regard, the Respondent referred, in order to substantiate its defence, to Rule 37.18 of the FLD Rules which provides that: “A club may terminate a player’s contract at any time for reasons that are fair and in compliance with fair procedure consistent with country D’s law”. 23. Having established the aforementioned, the Chamber deemed that the underlying issue in this dispute, considering the claim of the Claimant and the allegations of the Respondent, was to determine whether the employment contract had been unilaterally terminated with or without just cause by the Respondent, and which party was responsible for the early termination of the contractual relationship in question. The DRC also underlined that, subsequently, if it were found that the employment contract was breached by one of the parties without just cause, it would be necessary to determine the consequences for the party that caused the unjust breach of the relevant employment contract. 24. In view of the above, the Chamber subsequently went on to deliberate as to whether a dismissal due to operational requirements under a consultative process, effected in terms of fair procedure, in accordance with Rule 37.18 of the FLD Rules, which is invoked by the Respondent in its defence, can be considered as a just cause for the Respondent to prematurely terminate the employment relationship. 25. As stated above, according to Rule 37.18 of the FLD Rules “A club may terminate a player’s contract at any time for reasons that are fair and in compliance with fair procedure consistent with country D’s law”. 26. In this respect, the Chamber held that it could not accept said article as being valid, as it provides for a unilateral termination right without any compensation to the benefit of the club only. Therefore, the Chamber decided that the Respondent could not legitimately terminate the contractual relation with the Claimant by making use of Rule 37.18 of the FLD Rules. Consequently, the Chamber rejected the Respondent’s argument in this respect. 27. Considering the foregoing, the Chamber decided that there was no just cause to unilaterally terminate the employment relationship between the Claimant and the Respondent and that, therefore, the Respondent had breached the employment contract without just cause. 28. Having established that the Respondent is to be held liable for the early termination of the employment contract, the Chamber focused its attention on the consequences of such termination. Taking into consideration art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the Chamber decided that the Claimant is entitled to receive from the Respondent an amount of money as compensation for breach of contract in addition to any outstanding payments on the basis of the relevant employment contract. 29. In this respect, the Chamber acknowledged that according to the documentation on file and the Claimant’s own admissions and request for relief, there was no outstanding salaries at the date of termination, taking into account the Chamber is not competent to deal with the Claimant’s claim with respect to Image Rights. 30. In continuation, the Chamber focused its attention on the calculation of the amount of compensation for breach of contract in the case at stake. In doing so, the members of the Chamber firstly recapitulated that, in accordance with art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the amount of compensation shall be calculated, in particular and unless otherwise provided for in the contract at the basis of the dispute, with due consideration for the law of the country concerned, the specificity of sport and further objective criteria, including, in particular, the remuneration and other benefits due to the Claimant under the existing contract and/or the new contract, the time remaining on the existing contract up to a maximum of five years, and depending on whether the contractual breach falls within the protected period. 31. In application of the relevant provision, the Chamber held that it first of all had to clarify whether the pertinent employment contract contained any clause, by means of which the parties had beforehand agreed upon a compensation payable by the contractual parties in the event of breach of contract. In this regard, the Chamber established that no such compensation clause was included in the employment contract at the basis of the matter at stake. 32. Subsequently, and in order to evaluate the compensation to be paid by the Respondent, the members of the Chamber took into account the remuneration due to the Claimant in accordance with the employment contract as well as the time remaining on the same contract, along with the professional situation of the Claimant after the early termination occurred. In this respect, the Chamber pointed out that the Claimant asserted that the contract was to run until 30 June 2017. In this respect, the DRC took note that the contract established an option to the parties to extend its duration until 30 June 2017 33. In this respect, the Chamber was unanimous in its decision that, as it remained undisputed that the contract was terminated before both parties could provide their respective consent to agree on the contract renewal, 30 June 2016 should be considered as the end date of the contract, as originally agreed by the parties. 34. Bearing in mind the foregoing as well as the claim of the Claimant, the Chamber proceeded with the calculation of the monies payable to the player under the terms of the employment contract until 30 June 2016. Consequently the Chamber concluded that the amount of 1,049,000 (i.e. salary as from August 2014 until June 2016 under the contract) serves as the basis for the determination of the amount of compensation for breach of contract. 35. In continuation, the Chamber remarked that, according to the information in the TMS, following the early termination of the employment contract at the basis of the present dispute, the Claimant had found new employment with the club from country B, Club G, in accordance with which he would be remunerated with a monthly salary of 500, corresponding to 1,554. Consequently, in accordance with the constant practice of the Dispute Resolution Chamber and the general obligation of the Claimant to mitigate his damages, such remuneration under the new employment contract shall be taken into account in the calculation of the amount of compensation for breach of contract. 36. In view of all of the above, the Chamber decided that the Respondent must pay the amount of 1,030,350 to the Claimant as compensation for breach of contract without just case, which is considered by the Chamber to be a reasonable and justified amount as compensation. 37. Equally, as regards the Claimant’s claim pertaining to air tickets, on the basis of the information provided by FIFA Travel and referring to the relevant terms of the employment contract, the Chamber decided that the Respondent must pay to the Claimant the amount of USD 1,280 for two air tickets city J to city K as compensation for breach of contract. 38. In conclusion, the DRC decided that the Respondent is liable to pay the total amounts of 1,030,350 and USD 1,280 corresponding to compensation for breach of contract without just cause. 39. In addition, taking into account the Claimant’s request, the Chamber decided that the Respondent must pay to the Claimant interest of 5% p.a. on the amounts of compensation as of the date on which the claim was lodged, i.e. 26 August 2014, until the date of effective payment. 40. The Dispute Resolution Chamber concluded its deliberations in the present matter by establishing that any further claim lodged by the Claimant is rejected. III. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. The claim of the Claimant, Player A, is partially accepted insofar as it is admissible. 2. The Respondent, Club C, has to pay to the Claimant, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision, compensation for breach of contract in the amounts of 1,030,350 and USD 1,280, plus 5% interest p.a. on said amounts as from 26 August 2014 until the date of effective payment. 3. In the event that the aforementioned sums plus interest are not paid within the stated time limit, the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision. 4. Any further claim lodged by the Claimant is rejected. 5. The Claimant is directed to inform the Respondent immediately and directly of the account number to which the remittances under point 2. above are to be made and to notify the Dispute Resolution Chamber of every payment received. ***** Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy): According to art. 67 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives). The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following: Court of Arbitration for Sport Avenue de Beaumont 2 1012 Lausanne Switzerland Tel: +41 21 613 50 00 / Fax: +41 21 613 50 01 e-mail: info@tas-cas.org www.tas-cas.org For the Dispute Resolution Chamber: Marco Villiger Deputy Secretary General Encl. CAS directives