F.I.F.A. – Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2015-2016) – controversie di lavoro – ———- F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber (2015-2016) – labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 26 May 2016, in the following composition: Thomas Grimm (Switzerland), Deputy Chairman Wouter Lambrecht (Belgium), member Zola Percival Majavu (South Africa), member Johan van Gaalen (South Africa), member Eirik Monsen (Norway), member on the claim presented by the player, Player A, country B, as Claimant against the club, Club C, country D, as Respondent regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties I.

F.I.F.A. - Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2015-2016) - controversie di lavoro – ---------- F.I.F.A. - Dispute Resolution Chamber (2015-2016) - labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 26 May 2016, in the following composition: Thomas Grimm (Switzerland), Deputy Chairman Wouter Lambrecht (Belgium), member Zola Percival Majavu (South Africa), member Johan van Gaalen (South Africa), member Eirik Monsen (Norway), member on the claim presented by the player, Player A, country B, as Claimant against the club, Club C, country D, as Respondent regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties I. Facts of the case 1. On 23 January 2014, the player from country B, Player A (hereinafter: the Claimant), and the club from country D, Club C (hereinafter: the Respondent) concluded an employment contract (hereinafter: the contract), valid as of the date of signature until 31 July 2016. 2. Pursuant to the contract, the Claimant was entitled to receive the following remuneration: - 2013-14 season: EUR 1,672,730 net payable as follows:  EUR 800,000 as sign-on fee payable upon signature of the contract;  EUR 872,730 as salary payable in seven instalments of EUR 124,675 each from 23 January 2014 until 31 July 2014; - 2014-15 season: EUR 3,300,000 net payable as follows:  EUR 825,000 as down payment payable on 1 August 2014;  EUR 825,000 as down payment payable on 1 January 2015;  Eleven monthly salaries of EUR 150,000 each ; - 2015-16 season: EUR 3,400,000 net payable as follows:  EUR 850,000 as down payment payable on “08/01/2015” [sic];  EUR 850,000 as down payment payable on 1 January 2016;  Eleven monthly salaries of EUR 154,545 each. 3. In addition, the contract provides for further benefits and in particular for a bonus of EUR 100,000 payable to the Claimant in case the Respondent wins the Cup from country D. 4. Art. 10.7 of the contract stipulates that “[i]f the [Respondent] terminated the contract unilaterally, the [Claimant] is entitled to receive salary of Two months”. 5. In continuation art. 10.8 of the contract provides that “[i]n case the [Claimant] terminated the contract from his side only, he has to pay a disciplinary act as per the following: First year termination: The [Claimant] shall pay for the [Respondent] an amount of Euro 1,672,730 (One million six hundred seventy-two thousand seven hundred thirty Euros). Second year termination: the [Claimant] shall pay for the [Respondent] an amount of Euro 3,300,000 (Three million three hundred thousand Euros). Third year termination: the [Claimant] shall pay for the [Respondent] an amount of Euro 3,400,000 (Three million four hundred thousand Euros)”. 6. On 29 July 2014, the Respondent sent an e-mail to the Claimant, stating the following “[b]ecause you refused to receive the notice by hand, we are sending the notice by email. By this, we have officially informed you” and enclosing a document titled “Termination Letter” dated 23 July 2014. Said termination letter reads as follows: “Dear [Claimant], [The Respondent] would like to thank you for your sincere efforts during your employment as professional football player at the club: 1. We regret inform you that employment contract will be terminated, effectively on 27th of July 2014, according to paragraph No. 7 of article No. ten of the concluded contract between you and [the Respondent]. The mentioned paragraph states that if the [Respondent] terminated the contract unilaterally, the [Claimant] is entitled to receive salary of Two months. We also would like to thank you for your cooperation and dedication during your employment period at the club”. 7. On 20 August 2014, the Claimant sent a correspondence to the Respondent, by means of which he rejected the termination of the contract based on art. 10.7 of the contract and, considering that the Respondent terminated the contract without just cause, requested the payment of EUR 6,800,000 as compensation to be paid by 28 August 2014. 8. On 15 September 2014, the Claimant and the club from country B, Club E (hereinafter: Club E), concluded an employment contract, valid as of the date of signature until 31 December 2017 and according to which the Claimant was entitled to receive a monthly salary of 220,000 (approx. EUR 75,000 on 15 September 2014). 9. On 17 September 2014, the Football Federation of country B requested the Claimant’s International Transfer Certificate (ITC) from the Football Association of country D. 10. On 26 September 2014, FIFA, after pointing out that “prima facie, it would appear clear from the documentation provided that the [Claimant]’s previous contract was terminated by the [Respondent] through no fault of the [Claimant]”, decided to grant “[the Claimant’s] request for the special exemption from “the validation exception” in the TMS”. 11. On 1 October 2014, the Claimant and the Respondent signed a document drafted in English and Arabic and titled “Amicable Professional Football Player Contract Termination And Financial Settlement” (hereinafter: the settlement agreement), which states, inter alia, the following: “Since the two parties agreed to terminate the contract between them amicably according to the following terms: 1. The [Claimant] acknowledges and declares that he had received all his financial entitlements from the [Respondent] and he shall not demand any further financial entitlements after signing this agreement. 2. The [Respondent] acknowledges and declares that they do not have any further demands from the [Claimant] after signing this agreement. 3. This agreement is a final financial settlement between the two parties and neither party shall violate the provisions and terms of this agreement. 4. The [Respondent] undertakes to send the ITC of the [Claimant] immediately after signing this agreement to the club desirous of Transferring the [Claimant]. (…) 5. The [Respondent] acknowledges that the Arabic version of this agreement matches the English version. In case of any variation between the two versions, the English version shall apply”. 12. On the same date, the Claimant, Mr F acting as Club E’s legal counsel, and Mr G, a Claimant’s friend, jointly declared before the Embassy of country B in country D, inter alia, that: “The [Claimant] (…) was surprised at the terms and conditions of said ‘Settlement Agreement’ stipulating that the authorization for the issuance and submission of the international transfer certificate was subject to the waiver from receiving any compensation, remuneration and awards under the employment contract as terminated unilaterally by [the Respondent] without cause, in accordance with the provisions of the ‘Termination Letter’. With no option against the threat of not being allowed to exercise his profession as a whole before [Club E] for the next months, the [Claimant] was coerced by the representative of [the Respondent], into signing the ‘Settlement Agreement’, otherwise he would not take the required measures to complete the international transfer of the [Claimant], in accordance with FIFA Regulations which provide for the matter at hand”. 13. On the same date, i.e. 1 October 2014, the Football Association of country D delivered the ITC to the Football Federation of country B. 14. On 18 September 2015, the Claimant lodged a claim in front of FIFA against the Respondent for breach of contract requesting the following : - EUR 100,000, plus 5% interest as of 26 April 2014, as outstanding bonuses for winning the Cup from country D 2014; - EUR 6,700,000, plus 5% interest as of 29 July 2014, as compensation corresponding to the residual value of the contract; - sporting sanctions to be imposed on the Respondent. 15. In his claim, the Claimant, referring to the statement made before the Embassy of country B in country D, asserts that “[he] entered into the [settlement agreement] under duress and inter alia forced by unacceptable outraged badfaith from the [Respondent]”. In this respect, the Claimant outlines that it would make no sense to address a formal notification to the Respondent refusing the conditions of termination provided for in its letter dated 23 July 2014 and then, a few weeks later, sign a settlement agreement waiving millions of Euros. According to the Claimant, the Respondent, taking advantage of his situation and in particular of the fact that the registration period for the 2014 Championship of country B was about to expire on 3 October 2014, forced him to sign the settlement agreement by making the release of the ITC through TMS by the Football Association of country D subject to said signature. In this regard, the Claimant emphasises that unlike FIFA Regulations, Football Federation of country B Regulations do not provide for the possibility of registering a player outside the registration period. Accordingly, the Claimant argues that the Respondent misused TMS and therefore violated art. 9 of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players. In view of the above, the Claimant concludes that the settlement agreement should be deemed null and void and that the Respondent, unilaterally and without just cause, terminated the contract on 29 July 2014. 16. In continuation, the Claimant alleges that the Respondent failed to pay him the bonus of EUR 100,000 stipulated in the contract for having won the Cup from country D 2014. 17. Having stated the above, the Claimant focuses on the compensation payable. In this respect, the Claimant rejects the application of art. 10.7 of the contract on the grounds that it is potestative, ambiguous and non-reciprocal. In light of the foregoing, and considering the Respondent’s bad faith as well as the fact that the breach occurred during the protected period, the Claimant claims the amount of EUR 6,700,000 as compensation for breach of contract corresponding to the residual value of the contract. 18. In its reply to the claim, the Respondent first emphasises that the Claimant did not support his assertion regarding the alleged coercion he was victim of by any relevant evidence. In particular, the Respondent challenges the accuracy of the facts related in the joint statement before the Embassy of country B in country D as well as the impartiality of the persons that made it. 19. In continuation, the Respondent explains that in spite of the termination notice, and due to the constraints imposed by the Claimant’s signature of an employment contract with Club E as well as by the Football Federation of country B Regulations regarding the registration of players, the parties entered into negotiations in order to formalise the end of their contractual relationship and eventually signed the settlement agreement. In this regard, the Respondent recalls the jurisprudence of the Dispute Resolution Chamber, according to which any party signing a document of legal importance without knowledge of its precise content does so on its own responsibility. 20. In addition, the Respondent alleges that several clauses were included in the settlement agreement upon the Claimant’s demand, which demonstrates his consent to the latter agreement. In particular, the Respondent outlines that its commitment to send “immediately” the ITC was aimed at ensuring the compliance with the deadlines established in the Football Federation of country B Regulations. The Respondent further states that the clause making the English version prevail over the Arabic one was included as a protection for the Claimant. 21. Furthermore, the Respondent sustains that the issuance of the ITC was not made subject to any condition whatsoever and thus, it did not act in violation of art. 9 of the Regulations. 22. Finally, the Respondent underlines that the Claimant waited for almost one year before challenging the validity of the settlement agreement, which created legitimate expectations that he would not exercise his alleged right. Therefore, the Respondent concludes that in virtue of the principle of venire contra factum proprium, the Claimant is now estopped from invoking such alleged right in judicial proceedings. 23. In his replica, the Claimant first stresses that the fact that almost one year has elapsed is irrelevant since he had two years to lodge the relevant claim as per art. 25 par. 5 of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players. 24. In addition, the Claimant asserts that the Respondent was dissatisfied with his sporting performance and that is the reason why it decided to put an end to the contractual relationship. In this regard, the Claimant rejects the Respondent’s allegation that the parties negotiated to formalise the end of their contractual relationship, emphasising that there was no need to do so inasmuch as said relationship had already been unilaterally and unambiguously terminated by the Respondent on 29 July 2014. In this respect, the Claimant further points out that the content of his correspondence dated 20 August 2014 as well as the content of the FIFA letter dated 26 September 2014 (cf. point I.10 above), make clear that, in his mind, there was no room for a settlement agreement. 25. Furthermore, the Claimant, while stressing the morality and the professional expertise of Mr F, argues that the joint statement made before the Embassy of country B must be considered as a valid and conclusive evidence as per art. 12 par. 1 of the FIFA Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber. 26. In continuation, the Claimant questions why would he have signed a document by means of which he would have waived all his financial rights, whereas the Respondent initially, when it terminated the contract on 29 July 2014, committed to pay a compensation. 27. The Claimant further sustains that the immediate issuance of the ITC is not a benefit but a right for any player. Conversely, the Claimant declares that the Respondent attempted to use the settlement agreement as a way to avoid the liabilities resulting from its decision made in July 2014. 28. The Claimant alleges that, by stating that the ITC would be released “after signing this agreement”, the settlement agreement violates art. 9 par. 1 of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, which provides that “the ITC shall be issued (…) without any condition”. 29. Finally, the Claimant outlines that the jurisprudence of the DRC referred to by the Respondent is not applicable in case a document is signed under duress. 30. In its duplica, apart from reiterating its previous allegations, the Respondent explains that the Claimant could have requested the Football Federation of country B to register him on the basis of art. 8.2 par. 6 of Annexe 3 of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players and then, in case the latter Association would have rejected to do so, contest said decision before the relevant national authority. Furthermore, the Respondent points out that the fact the Claimant travelled from country D to country B demonstrates that the signature of the settlement agreement was the result of prior negotiations between the Respondent and the Claimant. 31. On 3 August 2015, the Claimant and the club from country H, Club I, concluded an employment contract valid as of the date of signature until 30 June 2017 and according to which he is entitled to a remuneration of EUR 4,000,000 for the 2015-16 season. II. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. First, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter also referred to as Chamber or DRC) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the matter at hand. In this respect, it took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 18 September 2015. Consequently, the 2015 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules) are applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 of the Procedural Rules). 2. Subsequently, the members of the Chamber referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed that in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 in combination with art. 22 lit. b of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2015) the Dispute Resolution Chamber is competent to deal with the matter at stake, which concerns an employment-related dispute with an international dimension between a player from country B and a club from country D. 3. Furthermore, the Chamber analysed which regulations should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, it confirmed that in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2015), and considering that the present claim was lodged on 18 September 2015, the 2015 edition of said regulations (hereinafter: Regulations) is applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance. 4. The competence of the Chamber and the applicable regulations having been established, the Chamber entered into the substance of the matter. In this respect, the Chamber started by acknowledging all the above-mentioned facts as well as the arguments and the documentation submitted by the parties. However, the Chamber emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to the facts, arguments and documentary evidence, which it considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand. 5. In this regard, the members of the Chamber acknowledged that the Claimant and the Respondent signed an employment contract valid as from 23 January 2014 until 31 July 2016 and that, on 29 July 2014, the Respondent terminated the contractual relationship with the Claimant in accordance with art. 10.7 of the contract. The DRC further observed that on 1 October 2014, the Claimant and the Respondent signed a settlement agreement. 6. The Chamber then reviewed the claim of the Claimant, who maintains that “he entered into the [settlement agreement] under duress” and therefore requests it to be deemed null and void and the Respondent to be held liable for the termination of the contract without just cause on 29 July 2014. In particular, the Chamber took note of the Claimant’s allegation that the Respondent took advantage of the fact that the registration period for the 2014 Championship of country B was about to expire on 3 October 2014, and made the release of the ITC through TMS by the Football Association of country D subject to the signature of the settlement agreement. 7. At this stage, the members of the DRC turned their attention to elements put forward by the Claimant in support of his assertion that he was coerced to sign the settlement agreement. In doing so, the DRC first observed that the Claimant submitted a joint statement made in front of the Embassy of country B by him, a friend of him and his new club’s legal counsel. In this regard, the Chamber deemed it fit to outline that the interests that the declarants have in the dispute put in doubt the impartiality of their statements and therefore, after making reference to art. 12 par. 3 and par. 6 of the Procedural Rules, according to which any party claiming a right on the basis of an alleged fact shall carry the burden of proof and the evidence shall be considered with free discretion respectively, concluded that said statement was not likely to demonstrate that the Claimant had signed the settlement agreement under duress. In this respect, the Chamber was eager to point out that the Embassy of country B certified the relevant statement “without judging the merits of the contents of this declaration”. 8. In continuation, the Chamber focused on the Claimant’s argument as to the restrictive rules regarding the players’ registration in country B. In this respect, after recalling the regulatory framework established by FIFA regarding the provisional registration of players, the DRC deemed it important to emphasise that the Claimant did not even attempt to request the urgent intervention of FIFA prior to taking the initiative of signing the settlement agreement, thereby showing a lack of diligence and taking a risk, the consequences of which he has to bear. 9. Moreover, the Chamber was eager to emphasise that a party signing a document of legal importance without knowledge of its precise contents, as a general rule, does so on its own responsibility. 10. Furthermore, and for the sake of completeness, the members of the Chamber highlighted that the Claimant had waited for almost one year before lodging a claim in front of FIFA, apparently manifesting by doing so his satisfaction with the situation. 11. In view of the above, and referring to art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules, the Chamber deemed that the Claimant had not presented any documentation which would demonstrate the nullity of the settlement agreement and, consequently, concluded that said document constituted a valid and binding document by means of which the Claimant waived any claim he might have or have had against the Respondent. 12. On account of the above, the Chamber decided to reject the claim of the Claimant in its entirety. III. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber The claim of the Claimant, Player A, is rejected. ***** Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy): According to article 58 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives). The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following: Court of Arbitration for Sport Avenue de Beaumont 2 1012 Lausanne Switzerland Tel: +41 21 613 50 00 Fax: +41 21 613 50 01 e-mail: info@tas-cas.org www.tas-cas.org For the Dispute Resolution Chamber: Marco Villiger Deputy Secretary General Encl. CAS directives