F.I.F.A. – Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2015-2016) – controversie di lavoro – ———- F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber (2015-2016) – labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 17 June 2016, in the following composition: Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman Carlos González Puche (Colombia), member Theodore Giannikos (Greece), member on the claim presented by the club, Club A, country B as Claimant against the player, Player C, country B as Respondent 1 and the club, Club D, country E as Respondent 2 regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties I.

F.I.F.A. - Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2015-2016) - controversie di lavoro – ---------- F.I.F.A. - Dispute Resolution Chamber (2015-2016) - labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 17 June 2016, in the following composition: Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman Carlos González Puche (Colombia), member Theodore Giannikos (Greece), member on the claim presented by the club, Club A, country B as Claimant against the player, Player C, country B as Respondent 1 and the club, Club D, country E as Respondent 2 regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties I. Facts of the case 1. On 17 October 2013, the player from country B, Player C (hereinafter: the Respondent 1), born on 3 May 1986, and the club from country B, Club A (hereinafter: the Claimant), signed a document titled “Sports Agreement” (hereinafter: the Sports Agreement) valid as from 17 October 2013 until 17 October 2018. 2. In accordance with the Sports Agreement, the Claimant obliged itself, inter alia: - “to provide medical insurance to [the Respondent 1] during the [Sports Agreement] term; - to pay an amount of USD 10,000 to [the Respondent 1] for each season during the term of [Sports Agreement]; - In addition, [the Claimant] will pay a monthly salary to [the Respondent 1] of USD 1000 during the term of this [Sports Agreement].”. 3. Moreover, according to the Sports Agreement, the Respondent 1 “irrevocably acknowledges that it has delegated to [the Claimant] exclusively the right to negotiate on his behalf any potential transfer whether in country B or abroad with any club that might be interested in signing the player at any point in time. In case of breach of the above provision by [the Respondent 1], the latter will be considered in breach of this entire agreement subjecting [the Respondent 1] to compensate [the Claimant] financially and morally for the damages caused”. 4. According to art. 7 of the Sports Agreement, “The Football Association of country B will be the only reference to hear any disputes related to the interpretation or the execution of this agreement”. 5. According, to the information in the Transfer Matching System (TMS), the Respondent 1 signed an employment contract with the Club D from country E (hereinafter: the Respondent 2), valid as from 23 July 2014 until 15 June 2015, according to which he was entitled to receive a salary of USD 125,000 payable as follows:  “40% from the total amount of the contract will be paid upon of completing the contract procedures…;  30% from the total amount will be paid as a monthly salary….;  30% from the total amount of the contract will be paid at the end of the above mentioned period.”. 6. On 27 September 2014, the Claimant lodged a claim in front of FIFA against the Respondent 1 maintaining that the latter is to be held liable for breach of contract without just cause, and requesting the payment of compensation in the following amounts: - USD 200,000 “for the cost of replacing the player with a player of similar value for the coming 4 seasons”; - USD 187,500 ”for the fee of permanent transfer of [the Respondent 1] being 50% of the contractual value of the deal between the player and [the Respondent 2], based on the value of the loan request made to [the Claimant] in August; - USD 150,000 for the overall damage suffered…; - CHF 6,000 as legal fees. 7. The Claimant further claimed that the Respondent 2 shall be held jointly and severally liable for the payment of compensation, as it induced the Respondent 1 to terminate the Sports Agreement unilaterally. 8. Moreover, the Claimant requested sporting sanctions to be imposed on the Respondent 1 and the Respondent 2. 9. In its claim, the Claimant sustained that at the end of the 2013/2014 season, it suspected that “something was going on and it had received information that [the Respondent 2] was inducing [the Respondent 1] amongst other two from [the Claimant]”. 10. The Claimant held that, on 1 August 2014, it sent a letter to the Respondent 2 “notifying it that it came to its knowledge that contracts with [the Respondent 1] were already signed and [the Respondent 1] was told to stay with [the Respondent 2] and not to train nor join [the Claimant] hence induced by [the Respondent 2] to terminate his valid contract with [the Claimant]”. Additionally, the Claimant urged the Respondent 2 “to allow [the Respondent 1] to return to his original club with which, an agreement that binds [the Respondent 1] for further 4 years is still valid”. 11. In this respect, the Claimant maintained that the Respondent 2 asserted that “their ITC will be given and they will be able to play in the League of country E and that [the Claimant] cannot do anything to stop them”. 12. Subsequently, the Claimant affirmed that, at the end of August 2014, it received a request from the Respondent 2 in order to transfer the Respondent 1 on a loan basis for the 2014/2015 season, which according to the Claimant stipulated a “yearly value” for the Respondent 1 of USD 125,000. 13. In this respect, the Claimant argued that after it rejected the Respondent 2’s offer, the Respondent 2 and the Respondent 1 concluded an employment contract. The Claimant affirmed that this is a clear breach of art. 17 of FIFA’s Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players. 14. The Claimant stressed that the same situation arose with two other members of its squad, which has caused a substantial technical damage to it. 15. In addition, the Claimant maintained that “the time [the Respondent 1] trained with it, the fact that [the Respondent 1] has 4 years to play for it until October 2018, and the loss of a potential transfer fee” should be taken into account in the consideration for the compensation which the Claimant is claiming. 16. Moreover, the Claimant asserted that the Respondent 2 played a role in inducing the Respondent 1 to breach the Sports Agreement, as “there is no way [the Respondent 2] can deny its knowledge that [the Respondent 1] was under contractual obligations with [the Claimant],…and cannot pretend [the Respondent 1] was a free agent, since otherwise why would [the Respondent 2] sent a request for a transfer on loan basis at the end of August…?”. 17. Furthermore, the Claimant held that sporting sanctions should be imposed on the Respondent 1 and the Respondent 2, “especially with the aggravating fact of the “theft” of 3 main players in one go, all induced by [the Respondent 2].”. 18. In his reply to the Claimant’s claim, the Respondent 1 explained that, in 2001, he signed a document that registered him with the Claimant “for life” (note: free translation from French. The Respondent 1 referred to the term “Signature a Vie”). The Respondent 1 further asserted that in 2008, he was registered with Club F on the same basis and eventually, in 2012 returned to the Claimant, which again registered him “for life”. In this respect, the Respondent 1 stressed that when he started to play with the Claimant’s first team, he did it based on said registration “for life” but without contract. In particular, the Respondent 1 questioned how a player can play without a contract if he is considered as professional. 19. In continuation, the Respondent 1 alleged that, on 17 October 2013, the Claimant forced him to sign the “Sports Agreement”, making the transfer of his brother, Player G, to the Respondent 2 subject to its signature. 20. The Respondent 1 further pointed out that the document signed on 17 October 2013 is titled “Sports Agreement” and does not indicate that it is a “labour contract, a professional contract or a contract as a professional”. In addition, he questioned whether the remuneration stipulated in the Sports Agreement is enough for him to be considered a professional in accordance with art. 2 of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players. In this regard, the Respondent 1 submitted a copy of his contract with the Respondent 2, and argued that the Sports Agreement should have complied with the formalism the contract signed with the Respondent 2 in order to be considered as a professional contract. 21. Furthermore, the Respondent 1 explained that the Claimant accepted to loan him to the Respondent 2 provided that it would receive 50% of the value of the contract signed between the Respondent 1 and the Respondent 2. In this respect, the Respondent 1 sustained that he proposed to give 25% of said value to the Claimant, but the latter refused, which, according to the Respondent 1, constituted the reason behind his departure to the Respondent 2. 22. Moreover, the Respondent 1 alleged that the compensation claimed by the Claimant is clearly disproportionate. 23. Finally, the Respondent 1 maintained that his contract with the Respondent 2 was mutually terminated on 12 January 2015 due to the financial difficulties in country E. 24. The Claimant submitted its replica, in which it insisted on its previous arguments and request for relief. 25. In respect to the Respondent 1’s reply, the Claimant argued that the Respondent 1’s reference to “Signature a Vie” or “Life time signature”, is irrelevant to the matter at hand, since the type of signature and/or the Respondent 1’s registration is an activity regulated by the Football Association of country B, to which neither the Claimant, nor the Respondent 1, “could have a say therein”. 26. The Claimant sustained that the Sports Agreement signed between the Respondent 1 and the Claimant should be considered an employment contract. In this respect, the Claimant argued the following: - In the preamble of the Sports Agreement, the Respondent 1 declared his intention to be engaged as a football player; - The Respondent 1 signed a written contract, with a validity of 5 years, therefore in line with applicable regulations; - The contract contains a remuneration of or around USD 22,000 p.a., therefore, the amounts are superior to the reasonable cost the Respondent 1 would incur, considering that the Claimant is providing medical insurance throughout the validity of the contract; - The remuneration of the contract is considered a high remuneration. In this respect, the Claimant argued that the minimum salary in country B is not more than USD 500 per month. 27. Moreover, the Claimant held that the Respondent 1’s argument in respect to him signing the contract under pressure and/or duress has to be rejected, as the Respondent 1 failed to submit any proof of his allegations. The Claimant further argued that every country and every league has its own dynamics and economics, and in consequence, the Respondent 1’s argument that his contract with the Claimant is not a professional one, while the one with the Respondent 2 is, based on the difference in the remuneration, should also be rejected. 28. Furthermore, the Claimant stressed that: - “It never agreed to an extension of the loan agreement; - …It was clear that at the end of it [the Respondent 1] is to return to his original club; - The ITC request does not mean [the Respondent 1] is free to terminate his agreement during the protected period without consequences; - The grant of a temporary ITC…does not release [the Respondent 1] from its liabilities towards [the Claimant]; - The grant of a temporary ITC does not mean in any case that [the Respondent 2] did not “steal” [the Respondent 1]…; - The fact remains that [the Respondent 1] breached his contract with [the Claimant] and [the Respondent 2] clearly induced [the Respondent 1] to terminating the contract…”. 29. In his duplica, the Respondent 1 argued that the fact that the Football Association of country B recognised the possibility to register a player “for life” evidences that football in country B has to be deemed amateur and not professional. 30. In addition, the Respondent 1 sustained that the Claimant failed to carry the burden of proof regarding its assertion that he was entitled to a “high remuneration”. 31. In continuation, the Respondent 1 pointed out that he did not leave the club on a loan basis and therefore rejected the Claimant’s assertion regarding an alleged extension of the loan. 32. Even though invited to submit its position as to the Claimant’s claim, the Respondent 2 failed to do so although being informed that in the absence of a reply, a decision would be taken on the basis of the documentation and information on file. 33. According to the information in the Transfer Matching System (TMS), on 19 September 2014, the Respondent 2 was authorized by FIFA to provisionally register the Respondent 1, after the decision taken by the Single Judge of FIFA’s Players’ Status Committee on 16 September 2014. II. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. First, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter also referred to as Chamber or DRC) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the matter at hand. In this respect, it took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 27 September 2014. Consequently, the Rules governing the procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (edition 2014; hereinafter: Procedural Rules) are applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 of the 2014 and 2015 editions of the Procedural Rules). 2. Subsequently, the members of the Chamber referred to art. 3 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed that in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 in combination with art. 22 lit. a) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, edition 2015, the Dispute Resolution Chamber is competent to deal with the matter at stake, which concerns an employment-related dispute with an international dimension between a club from country B, a player from country B and a club from country E and where there has been an ITC request and a claim from an interested party in relation to said ITC request. 3. Furthermore, the Chamber analysed which edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, it confirmed that in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (editions 2014, 2015 and 2016), and considering that the present claim was lodged on 27 September 2014, the 2014 edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: Regulations) is applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance. 4. The competence of the Chamber and the applicable regulations having been established, the Chamber entered into the substance of the matter. In this respect, the Chamber started by acknowledging all the above-mentioned facts as well as the arguments and the documentation submitted by the parties. However, the Chamber emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to the facts, arguments and documentary evidence, which it considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand. In particular, the Chamber recalled that in accordance with art. 6 par. 3 of Annexe 3 of the Regulations, FIFA may use, within the scope of proceedings pertaining to the application of the Regulations, any documentation or evidence generated or contained in the TMS. 5. From the outset, the DRC noted that the Respondent 2 had been given the opportunity to reply to the claim submitted by the Claimant, but that the Respondent 2 had failed to present its response in this respect. In this way, so the Chamber deemed, the Respondent 2 renounced to its right of defence and, thus, accepted the allegations of the Claimant. 6. In view of the allegations and arguments presented by the parties involved in the present matter, the Chamber underlined that in order to be able to establish as to whether, as claimed by Claimant, a breach of contract had been committed by the Respondent 1, it should first of all pronounce itself on the issue of the validity of the Sports Agreement, i.e. whether said document consists in a valid and binding employment contract between the Claimant and Respondent 1. In this regard, the Chamber took note that the Sports Agreement was signed by and between the Claimant and the Respondent 1 on 17 October 2013. 7. In this context, the DRC took note that the Respondent 1 did not challenge having signed the document titled “Sports Agreement” on 17 October 2013. However, the Chamber also noted that the Respondent 1 argued that the Sports Agreement cannot be considered an employment contract, as according to him, the remuneration stipulated therein is not enough for him to be considered a professional. Moreover, the Respondent 1 further sustained that the Sports Agreement does not indicate that it consists in a professional contract. 8. In this respect, the Chamber firstly deemed it important to examine the Sports Agreement that the Claimant had submitted in the present proceedings, and which was not contested by the Respondent 1. 9. In this regard, the members of the Chamber duly noted that the Sports Agreement contained a provision stipulating that the Respondent 1 was entitled to receive from the Claimant an amount of USD 10,000 per season as well as a monthly salary of USD 1,000 and medical insurance. Thus, the Respondent 1 was entitled to receive at least USD 22,000 per year. 10. The DRC also noted that the Claimant sustained that the minimum wage in country B amounts to “not more than USD 500 per months”, which remained uncontested by the Respondent 1. 11. In this context, the Chamber referred to art. 2 par. 2 of the Regulations, which stipulates that “A professional is a player who has a written contract with a club and is paid more for his footballing activity than the expenses he effectively incurs. All other players are considered to be amateurs”. 12. Taking into consideration the criteria set out in art. 2 par. 2 of the Regulations as well as the amounts payable to the player on the basis of the aforementioned Sports Agreement, the members of the Chamber unanimously concluded that it was beyond a doubt that the Respondent 1 was in fact paid more for his footballing activity than the expenses he effectively incurred. Equally, the second element contained in the relevant provision, i.e. the existence of a written contract, is met as established in point II.8 above. 13. The Chamber considered it opportune to stress that a player’s remuneration as per the criteria set out in the above-mentioned art. 2 of the Regulations constitutes the decisive factor in the determination of the status of the player and that the legal nature or the designation or classification of the contract is of no relevance in this regard. This has been confirmed by the CAS in its decision CAS 2006/A/1177, whereby the Panel also emphasised that the definition contained in the mentioned provision is the only ground to establish a player’s status. For the sake of completeness, the Chamber pointed out that according to the said decision the classification of a player made by the association of his club is not decisive to determine the status of a player. And, finally, that the remuneration in question may well fall short of a living wage, but as long as it exceeds the expenses effectively incurred by the player, the criterion of art. 2 of the Regulations is met. 14. On account of the above, the Chamber decided to reject the argument of the Respondent 1 that the Sports Agreement cannot be considered to be a professional employment contract. 15. The Chamber then reviewed the argument of the Respondent 1, who maintained that he was coerced to sign the Sports Agreement, by making the transfer of his brother to the Respondent 2 subject to the signature of the Sports Agreement. 16. In this respect, the Chamber recalled the contents of art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural rules, according to which any party claiming a right on the basis of an alleged fact shall carry the burden of proof. In this regard, the Chamber deemed that the Respondent 1 had not presented any conclusive evidence, which would demonstrate the coercion to sign the Sports Agreement. Moreover, the Chamber was eager to refer to its longstanding and wellestablished jurisprudence and emphasised that a party signing a document of legal importance without knowledge of its precise contents, as a general rule, does so on its own responsibility. 17. Subsequently, the Chamber noted that the Respondent 1 held that the Sports Agreement cannot be considered an employment contract. In this regard, the DRC noted that the Respondent 1 argued that the Sports Agreement lacks the formalities of an employment contract, as opposed to the contract signed with the Respondent 2. 18. Having stated the aforementioned, the Chamber highlighted that, in order for an employment contract to be considered as valid and binding, apart from the signature of both the employer and the employee, it should contain the essentialia negotii of an employment contract, such as the parties to the contract and their role, the duration of the employment relationship and the remuneration payable by the employer to the employee, i.e. respectively, the Claimant and the Respondent 1. 19. After a careful study of the document titled “Sports Agreement”, the Chamber concluded that all such essential elements are included in the pertinent employment contract. In particular, the members of the Chamber referred to the fact that the contract establishes that the Respondent 1 has to render his services as a football player to the Claimant during a fixed period of time, and that, in exchange, the Claimant has to pay to the Respondent 1 a staggered remuneration. 20. On account of the above and on the basis of the applicable Regulations, the Chamber came to the firm conclusion that the arguments of the Respondent 1, cannot be upheld and that the document titled “Sports Agreement” signed by and between the Claimant and the Respondent 1, on 17 October 2013, was a valid employment contract binding the parties as from said date until 17 October 2018. 21. Having so found, the Chamber followed its analysis and turned its attention to the question of the alleged breach of contract without just cause by the Respondent 1. 22. In this respect, the Chamber was eager to highlight that based on the parties’ respective statements and the documentation available on file, it was undisputed that the Respondent 1 signed an employment contract with the Respondent 2 covering the same period of time as the employment contract the Respondent I signed with the Claimant. By acting as such, the Chamber concurred that the Respondent 1 had acted in breach of the employment contract concluded with the Claimant and is therefore to be held liable for said breach. 23. Given these circumstances, the Chamber recalled that, according to art. 18 par. 5 of the Regulations, if a player enters into an employment contract with different clubs for the same period of time, the provisions of Chapter IV of the Regulations regarding the maintenance of contractual stability between professionals and clubs shall apply (cf. art. 18 par. 5 of the Regulations). 24. In continuation, the members of the Chamber referred to item 7. of the “Definitions” section of the Regulations, which stipulates inter alia that the protected period comprises “three entire seasons or three years, whichever comes first, following the entry into force of a contract, where such contract is concluded prior to the 28th birthday of the professional, or two entire seasons or two years, whichever comes first, following the entry into force of a contract, where such contract is concluded after the 28th birthday of the professional”. In this regard, the Chamber pointed out that given the facts of the present case, the unjustified breach of contract by the Respondent 1 had obviously occurred within the applicable protected period. 25. The DRC established that, in accordance with art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the Respondent 1 is liable to pay compensation to the Claimant. Furthermore, in accordance with the unambiguous contents of article 17 par. 2 of the Regulations, the Chamber established that the Respondent 1’s new club, i.e. the Respondent 2, shall be jointly and severally liable for the payment of compensation. In this respect, the Chamber was eager to point out that the joint liability of the Respondent 1’s new club is independent from the question as to whether the new club has induced the contractual breach. This conclusion is in line with the well-established jurisprudence of the Chamber and has been repeatedly confirmed by the CAS. Notwithstanding the aforementioned, the Chamber recalled that according to art. 17 par. 4 sent. 2 of the Regulations, it shall be presumed, unless established to the contrary, that any club signing a professional who has terminated his contract without just cause has induced that professional to commit a breach. In any event, the Chamber determined that it would attend to the question of the possible inducement to breach of contract by the Respondent 2 at a later stage of its deliberations, i.e. after having discussed the issue of the compensation due to the Claimant. 26. In this context, the Chamber lent emphasis on the primacy of the principle of the maintenance of contractual stability, which represents the backbone of the agreement between FIFA/UEFA and the European Commission signed in March 2001. This agreement and its pillars represent the core of the former as well as of the 2014 edition of the Regulations, which all stakeholders – including player and club representatives – agreed upon in 2001. 27. Above all, the Chamber was eager to point out that the measures provided for by the above Regulations concerning in particular compensation for breach of contract without just cause serve as a deterrent aimed at discouraging the early termination of employment contracts by either contractual party and that a lack of a firm response by the competent deciding authorities would represent an inappropriate example towards all the football actors. 28. In this respect, awarding compensation in favour of the damaged party has proven to be an efficient means and has always found a widespread acceptance since it guarantees that the fundamental principle of the respect of the contracts is duly accounted for. 29. Above all, it was emphasised that the criteria contained in art. 17 of the Regulations are applied with the principle of reciprocity for clubs and players, signifying that both clubs and professionals who are seen to have committed a breach of contract without just cause will in all cases be subject to pay compensation and, under specific circumstances, also be subject to the imposition of sporting sanctions. 30. Having stated the above, the Chamber focused its attention on the calculation of the amount of compensation for breach of contract in the case at stake. In doing so, the members of the Chamber firstly reiterated that, in accordance with art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the amount of compensation shall be calculated, in particular and unless otherwise provided for in the contract at the basis of the dispute, with due consideration for the law of the country concerned, the specificity of sport and further objective criteria, including in particular the remuneration and other benefits due to the Respondent 1 under the existing contract and/or the new contract(s), the time remaining on the existing contract up to a maximum of five years as well as the fees and expenses paid or incurred by the former club (amortised over the term of the contract) and whether the contractual breach falls within a protected period. The DRC recalled that the list of objective criteria is not exhaustive and that the broad scope of criteria indicated tends to ensure that a just and fair amount of compensation is awarded to the prejudiced party. 31. In application of the relevant provision, the Chamber held that it first of all had to clarify whether the pertinent employment contract contained any clause, by means of which the parties had beforehand agreed upon a compensation payable by the contractual parties in the event of breach of contract. In this regard, the Chamber established that no such compensation clause was included in the employment contract at the basis of the matter at stake. 32. As a consequence, the members of the Chamber determined that the prejudice suffered by the Claimant in the present matter had to be assessed in application of the other parameters set out in art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations. In this regard, the DRC emphasised beforehand that each request for compensation for contractual breach has to be assessed by the Chamber on a case-by-case basis taking into account all specific circumstances of the respective matter, as well as the Chamber’s specific knowledge of the world of football and its experience gained throughout the years. 33. Consequently, in order to estimate the amount of compensation due to the Claimant in the present case, the Chamber turned its attention to the remuneration and other benefits due to the Respondent 1 under the contract and the new contract(s), which criterion was considered by the Chamber to be essential. In this context, the members of the Chamber deemed it important to emphasise that the wording of art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations allows the DRC to take into consideration both the contract and the new contract(s) in the calculation of the amount of compensation, thus enabling the Chamber to gather indications as to the economic value attributed to a player by both his former and his new club(s). 34. In this regard, the DRC established, on the one hand, that the employment contract between the Claimant and the Respondent 1, signed on 17 October 2013, had been set to run as from that date and expire on 17 October 2018. Since the breach occurred on 23 July 2014, the total value of his employment agreement with the Claimant for the remaining contractual period, i.e. 51 months, amounts to USD 93,500. On the other hand, the members of the Chamber established that the value of the new employment contract concluded between the Respondent 1 and the Respondent 2 amounts to a total of USD 531,250 for the period from the unilateral termination of the contract by the Respondent 1 until its contractual expiry, i.e. from August 2014 to October 2018. On the basis of the aforementioned financial contractual elements, the Chamber concluded that the average of remuneration between the contracts concluded by the Respondent 1 respectively with the Claimant and the Respondent 2 over the relevant period amounted to USD 312,375. 35. Having stated the above, the DRC recalled that the remuneration paid to him by the Respondent 1’s new club(s) is particularly relevant insofar as it reflects the value attributed to his services by his new club at the moment the breach of contract occurs and possibly also provides an indication towards the Respondent 1’s market value at that time. In this regard, the DRC took due note that the Respondent 1 appeared to have increased his income considerably by concluding an employment contract with the Respondent 2. 36. Consequently, on account of the above-mentioned considerations, the Chamber decided that the Respondent 1 must pay the amount of USD 312,375 to the Claimant as compensation for breach of contract. Furthermore, the Respondent 2 is jointly and severally liable for the payment of the relevant compensation (cf. point II.25 above). 37. In continuation, the Chamber focused on the further consequences of the breach of contract in question and, in this respect, addressed the question of sporting sanctions against the Respondent 1 in accordance with art. 17 par. 3 of the Regulations. The cited provision stipulates that, in addition to the obligation to pay compensation, sporting sanctions shall be imposed on any player found to be in breach of contract during the protected period. Furthermore, the Chamber recalled, once again, that art. 18 par. 5 of the Regulations, which deals with the consequences of entering into more than one contract covering the same time period, clearly states that a player shall be subject to the provisions of Chapter IV of the Regulations regarding the maintenance of contractual stability between professionals and clubs. 38. With regard to the quoted provision, the Chamber emphasised that a suspension of four months on a player’s eligibility to participate in official matches is the minimum sporting sanction that can be imposed for breach of contract during the protected period. This sanction, according to the explicit wording of the relevant provision, can be extended in case of aggravating circumstances. In other words, the Regulations intend to guarantee a restriction on the player’s eligibility of four months as the minimum sanction. Therefore, the relevant provision does not provide the possibility for the deciding body to reduce the sanction under the fixed minimum duration in case of mitigating circumstances. 39. In this regard, the Chamber recalled that the breach of contract by the Respondent 1 had occurred during the applicable protected period. Consequently, the Chamber decided that, by virtue of art. 17 par. 3 of the Regulations, the Respondent 1 had to be sanctioned with a restriction of four months on his eligibility to participate in official matches. 40. Finally, the members of the Chamber turned their attention to the question of whether, in view of art. 17 par. 4 of the Regulations, the Respondent 1’s new club, i.e. the Respondent 2, must be considered to have induced the Respondent 1 to unilaterally terminate his contract with the Claimant without just cause during the protected period, and therefore shall be banned from registering any new players, either nationally or internationally, for two entire and consecutive registration periods. 41. In this respect, the Chamber recalled that, in accordance with the aforementioned provision, it shall be presumed, unless established to the contrary, that any club signing a professional player who has terminated his previous contract without just cause has induced that professional to commit a breach. 42. Moreover, in consideration of the entire circumstances of the matter at hand, in particular the timeline of events as well as the difference in remuneration between the agreement and the contract signed between the Respondent 1 and the Respondent 2, the Chamber deemed that it had no other option but to consider that the reason for which the Respondent 1 acted in breach of the agreement was the fact that he had entered into an employment relationship with the Respondent 2. 43. In light of the aforementioned and given that Respondent 2 did not provide any argumentation and documentation as to its possible non-involvement in the Respondent I’s decision to unilaterally terminate his employment contract with the Claimant, the DRC concluded that the Respondent 2 had not been able to reverse the presumption contained in art. 17 par. 4 of the Regulations and that, accordingly, the latter had induced the Respondent 1 to unilaterally terminate his employment contract with the Claimant. 44. In addition, the members of the Chamber wished to point out that in spite of being aware of the existence of a contract between the Claimant and the Respondent 1, fact that was confirmed by the loan offer for the Respondent 1 sent by the Respondent 2 to the Claimant at the end of August 2014, the Respondent I disregarded this information and went ahead with the Respondent 1’s registration process. 45. In view of the above, the Chamber decided that in accordance with art. 17 par. 4 of the Regulations, the Respondent 2 shall be banned from registering any new players, either nationally or internationally, for the two next entire and consecutive registration periods following the notification of the present decision. On account thereof, in accordance with the fourth sentence of art. 17 par. 4, the club shall be able to register new players, either nationally or internationally, only as of the next registration period following the complete serving of the relevant sporting sanction. 46. In conclusion, the DRC decided that the claim of the Claimant is partially accepted and that the Respondent 1 has to pay to the Claimant USD 312,375 as compensation for the unilateral termination of the contract without just cause during the protected period. In this respect, the DRC also determined that the Respondent 2 is jointly and severally responsible for the payment of the abovementioned amount of compensation to the Claimant. 47. Furthermore, the Chamber decided that the Respondent 1 shall be sanctioned with a restriction of four months on his eligibility to participate in official matches. 48. And finally, the Chamber established that the Respondent 2 shall be banned from registering any new players, either nationally or internationally, for the two next entire and consecutive registration periods following the notification of the present decision. 49. Moreover, as regards the claimed legal fees, the Chamber referred to art. 18 par. 4 of the Procedural Rules as well as to its long-standing and wellestablished jurisprudence, in accordance with which no procedural compensation shall be awarded in proceedings in front of the Dispute Resolution Chamber. Consequently, the Chamber decided to reject the Claimant’s request relating to legal fees. 50. The Dispute Resolution Chamber concluded its deliberations in the present matter by establishing that any further claims lodged by the Claimant are rejected. III. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. The claim of the Claimant, Club A, is partially accepted. 2. The Respondent I, Player C, is ordered to pay to the Claimant within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision, compensation for breach of contract in the amount of USD 312,375. 3. The Respondent II, Club D, is jointly and severally liable for the payment of the aforementioned compensation. 4. If the aforementioned amount is not paid within the above-mentioned time limit, interest at the rate of 5% p.a. will fall due as of expiry of the aforementioned time limit and the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision. 5. The Claimant is directed to inform the Respondent 1 and the Respondent 2 immediately and directly of the account number to which the remittance is to be made and to notify the Dispute Resolution Chamber of every payment received. 6. A restriction of four months on his eligibility to play in official matches is imposed on the Respondent 1. This sanction applies with immediate effect as of the date of notification of the present decision. The sporting sanctions shall remain suspended in the period between the last official match of the season and the first official match of the next season, in both cases including national cups and international championships for clubs. 7. The Respondent 2 shall be banned from registering any new players, either nationally or internationally, for the two next entire and consecutive registration periods following the notification of the present decision. 8. Any further claims lodged by the Claimant are rejected. ***** Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy): According to art. 58 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives). The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following: Court of Arbitration for Sport Avenue de Beaumont 2 1012 Lausanne, Switzerland Tel: +41 21 613 50 00 Fax: +41 21 613 50 01 e-mail: info@tas-cas.org / www.tas-cas.org For the Dispute Resolution Chamber: Marco Villiger Deputy Secretary General Encl. CAS directives