F.I.F.A. – Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2015-2016) – controversie di lavoro – ———- F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber (2015-2016) – labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 2 July 2015, in the following composition: Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman Theodore Giannikos (Greece), member Joaquim Evangelista (Portugal), member on the matter between the club, Club A, country B as Claimant / Counter-Respondent and the player, Player C, country D, as Respondent I / Counter-Claimant and the club, Club E, country D, as Respondent II regarding an employment-related dispute between the parties I.

F.I.F.A. - Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2015-2016) - controversie di lavoro – ---------- F.I.F.A. - Dispute Resolution Chamber (2015-2016) - labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 2 July 2015, in the following composition: Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman Theodore Giannikos (Greece), member Joaquim Evangelista (Portugal), member on the matter between the club, Club A, country B as Claimant / Counter-Respondent and the player, Player C, country D, as Respondent I / Counter-Claimant and the club, Club E, country D, as Respondent II regarding an employment-related dispute between the parties I. Facts of the case 1. On 4 June 2009, the club from country B, Club A (hereinafter: the Claimant / Counter-Respondent or Club A), and the player from country D, Player C (hereinafter: the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant or the player), born on 18 March 1987, signed an employment contract (hereinafter: the contract) valid as from 1 July 2009 until 30 June 2014, i.e. 5 years. 2. According to the contract, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent and the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant agreed upon the following: a) “Article 1. The player agrees […] to provide his services in the teams of [the Claimant / Counter-Respondent] […].” b) “Article 2. [the Claimant / Counter-Respondent] […] undertakes to pay the [p]layer […]: a) Salary […] Sport Season 2013/2014 EUR 1,675,000 net equal to EUR 2,997,287.11 gross b) Variable part […] Sport Season 2013/2014: EUR 100,000 net equal to EUR 176,938.32 gross at the first attendance match – EUR 200,000 net equal to EUR 356,909.03 gross at the fifth attendance match – EUR 225,000 net equal to EUR 401,901.71 gross at the seventh attendance match – EUR 300,000 net equal to EUR 538,879.72 gross at the tenth attendance match.” c) “Art. 3. […] the parties acknowledge and undertake to fully respect the provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement in force (its text and its enclosures), including, not comprehensively, the following provisions: […] arts 11.1-11.14 (defaults, penalty clauses, reprimands, fines, reductions of remuneration, exclusion from training and preparation, termination) […]. Furthermore, the parties undertake to observe the future Collective Bargaining Agreements.” d) “Art. 4. The resolution of all disputes regarding the interpretation, execution or termination of the contract or other documents, as well as all disputes anyhow ascribable to the relationship between the club and the player, shall be addressed to the Arbitration Tribunal, which shall rule in the way of, within the time of and in conformity with the provisions of the related regulations, which are an enclosure of the Collective Bargaining Agreement.” e) “Art. 5. […] the parties undertake […] to accept the full and definitive effectiveness of any decision made by the Football Federation of country B, its organs and delegates in matters anyhow ascribable to the performance of the federative activity, including the related technical or disciplinary disputes, as well as the decisions of the Arbitration Tribunal, declaring, in particular, to accept without exception the arbitration clause as per art. 30 of the Statutes of the Football Federation of country B” 3. The relevant Collective Bargaining Agreement sets forth, inter alia, the following: a) Art. 7.1.: “[Training] In any case, the player has the right to participate in training […] with the first team, subject to the provisions referred to below in art. 11.” b) Art. 11.: “[Defaults and penalty clauses] The player who has not fulfilled his contractual obligations towards the Company, or the obligations arising from Federal Regulations and federal or state law, that are relevant, or supplementary to, his contractual regulations, may be subject to the following sanctions, graduated in relation to the seriousness of his conduct: […] d) temporary exclusion from training […] with the first team; […] In case of temporary exclusion of the player from training […] with the first team when the conduct and situations outlined are not such as to allow, without objective immediate damage to the Company, the participation of the player in […] training sessions with the first team, the Company itself, upon written notification to the player for objections, may order provisionally and directly the exclusion from said training, provided that it simultaneously forward to the player and to the Arbitration Tribunal, through a summary procedure, its proposal to impose sanctions […]. In the same procedure, the player may request his reinstatement in training with the first team […], in which case the Arbitration Tribunal, if the conditions are fulfilled, shall take the measures listed in art. 12 against the Company. […]” c) Art. 12.: “[Actions to protect the rights of the player] In the event of a breach of art. 7.1., the player may warn the Company in writing, requesting it to comply with said provision. If the Company fails to comply spontaneously within a deadline of 3 (three) days after receipt of the formal warning, the player may refer to the Arbitration Tribunal to obtain, upon his choice, his reinstatement into training with the first team or the termination of the agreement. In both cases, the player has also the right to compensation in no less than 20% (twenty percent) of the fixed part of the annual gross salary.” d) Art. 21: “Arbitration clause. Arbitration proceedings. 21.1 […] the individual employment agreement or sporting services contract shall contain an arbitration clause according to which all disputes related to the interpretation, the performance, and/or the termination of said agreement, or disputes anyhow related to the facts arising from said employment relationship is to be submitted to the jurisdiction of the Arbitration Tribunal […]. 21.2 By executing the agreement, the parties […] undertake to accept unconditionally the jurisdiction and the decisions of the Arbitration Tribunal.” 4. On 1 July 2013, the player terminated the contract, in writing, based on his alleged exclusion from training with the first team of the Claimant / CounterRespondent. 5. On 26 July 2013, the player and the club from country D, Club E (hereinafter: Respondent II or Club E), signed an employment contract. 6. On 14 August 2013, the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee authorised the provisional registration of the player with the Respondent II. 7. On 30 September 2013, Club A lodged, before FIFA, a claim for breach of contract against the player and the Respondent II, requesting a compensation in the amount of EUR 10,189,200 or, alternatively, the amount that the Dispute Resolution Chamber would deem appropriate, plus interest of 5% as from 1 July 2013, minus any sum that may be considered due to the player by Club A for outstanding remuneration. 8. In its claim, Club A explains that it paid EUR 20,200,000, under a buy-out clause for the transfer of the player from the club from country H, Club G, as well as EUR 809,564.23 as subsequent solidarity contribution to the Respondent II, and EUR 14,950,000, corresponding to agent’s fees. 9. In addition, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent states that during the 2012/2013 season a dispute arose between the player and itself and that the player lodged a claim in front of the Arbitration Tribunal of the Football Federation of country B (hereinafter: the Arbitration Tribunal) “to obtain the termination of the contract for just cause”, which was later “dismissed” on 22 July 2013. 10. Subsequently, Club A argues that the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant breached the contract when he terminated it on 1 July 2013 because he did not have just cause to do so. 11. Club A supports the abovementioned asserting that the alleged exclusion from training is the very same reason on which the player’s claim in front of the Arbitration Tribunal was based and that, in turn, such claim was dismissed and the relevant award is binding and may not be revisited by FIFA deciding bodies. Therefore, Club A affirms that “there is a fully binding decision that ruled that the just cause alleged by the player does not exist”. 12. Finally, in connection with the amount claimed as compensation, Club A explains that it corresponds to the sum of the unamortised fees and expenses paid to sign the player for five years, which corresponds to EUR 7,191,912.84 or one fifth of the payments described in point I.8. above, plus the salary of the player for the season 2013/2014 as per the contract. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Club A states to be aware that the salary of the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant according to the contract with the Respondent II could also be taken into consideration, which Club A believes to be more than EUR 2,000,000. 13. On 2 December 2013, the player lodged a counterclaim in front of FIFA for breach of contract against Club A, requesting a compensation for breach of contract and moral damage in the amount of EUR 4,614,900.24, plus interests as from 1 July 2013 until the date of effective payment. 14. The player claims that, after 17 November 2012, he was excluded from training with the professional team of Club A and from all matches. Additionally, he complains having being ordered to train alone. In this respect, the player claims that no reason assisted Club A to do so. 15. In addition, the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant affirms that on 17 January 2013, he sent a notice of cease and desist to Club A in accordance with art. 12.2 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement in order to reinstate him in training with the first team by no later than 20 January 2013. In this regard, the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant stresses that until he terminated the contract –more than five months afterwards– and in spite of his warning, Club A did not modify its conduct. In this sense, the Respondent I / CounterClaimant describes Club A’s conduct as a complete lack of interest in his services, a slander which caused him moral damages and an infringement of art. 328 of the Swiss Code of Obligations. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the player acknowledges that he received his salaries. 16. The Respondent I / Counter-Claimant further explains that, on 22 January 2013, Club A replied to his notice asserting that his exclusion was decided by Club A’s coach on disciplinary and technical grounds. However, the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant affirms that Club A never warned him about these alleged disciplinary and technical grounds. Additionally, the Respondent I / CounterClaimant highlights that the Association of Footballers of country B stated that “the exclusion [from training with the first team] may not be justified upon the non-use of the player’s services –even if there is a technical decision”. 17. In continuation, the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant states that, on 4 March 2013, he lodged a claim in front of the Arbitration Tribunal, requesting the termination of the contract in accordance with art. 12.2 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. According to the player, in spite of his claim having to be handled pursuant the rules of a summary proceeding, he was informed at the end of June 2013 that a decision would be issued after the 2013 summer’s registration window and, therefore, on 1 July 2013 he opted for terminating the contract with just case directly by himself and withdrawing his claim in front of the Arbitration Tribunal. 18. With regard to the withdrawal of his claim in front of the Arbitration Tribunal, the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant explains that said body “did not decide on the substance at all but only rejected his claim due to the lack of legal action in light of the withdrawal of [his] claim”. 19. Finally, the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant describes the calculation of the damages he claims from Club A as follows: a) Had the contract been performed until its original expiry date and considering that he played in 16 matches for Club A between 26 August 2012 until 17 November 2012, i.e. less than three months, he asserts that the residual value of the contract corresponds to both the salary and also the variable part of the season 2013/2014, for a total of EUR 4,471,915.89. b) His remuneration under the contract with the Respondent II, which corresponds to 4,564,674 has to be deducted from said amount. In this regard, the player clarifies that the equivalent in euros is EUR 627,015.65. c) Consequently, he claims as compensation for breach of contract the amount of EUR 3,844,900.24. d) In addition, the player argues that he suffered moral damage due to his exclusion from training and the subsequent discrimination he was subject to and quantifies said damage in the equivalent of 20% of the requested compensation for breach of contract. Subsequently, he claims compensation for moral damage in accordance with art. 49 of the Swiss Code of Obligations in the amount of EUR 770,000. e) All in all, the player requests a total compensation in the amount of EUR 4,614,900.24. 20. The Respondent II, in turn, adheres to the position of the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant and asserts that the unilateral termination took effect after the protected period. Moreover, the Respondent II deems the warning of the player to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent being in accordance with art. 12.2 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and sustains that Club A, in its reply to the latter warning, confirmed the exclusion of the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant from training with the first team. In addition, the Respondent II affirms that it did not influence the player to decide on the early termination of the contract, considering that almost a month elapsed between the unilateral termination and the execution of the contract between the player and the Respondent II. 21. Furthermore, the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant and the Respondent II state that, in any case, the compensation claimed by the Claimant / CounterRespondent includes amounts that may not be validly considered to quantify the hypothetical damages of Club A. First, they affirm that the amount of EUR 20,200,000, corresponding to the buy-out clause in the player’s previous employment contract and the amount of EUR 809,564.24 paid as solidarity compensation are to be left aside. Secondly, they consider “unbelievable” that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent pretends to add as part of the acquisition costs of the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant the amount of EUR 14,950,000 that Club A would have paid as agent fees, which amounts to 75% of the buyout clause. 22. Additionally, with regard to said amount of compensation, the Respondent II clarifies that the remuneration of the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant is EUR 627,015.65 and, finally, that the remuneration for the season 2013/2014 under the contract with the Claimant / Counter-Respondent would actually represent savings rather than the amount of its damages arising from the unilateral termination of the contract. 23. In its replica, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent alleges that the FIFA DRC is not competent to hear the player’s counterclaim based on the exclusive jurisdiction of the Arbitration Tribunal as per art. 4 of the contract, as well as per art. 21 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. 24. According to Club A, the Arbitration Tribunal guarantees fair proceedings, respects the principle of equal representation of players and clubs and has been approved by the Players’ Union of country B. In support of the foregoing, Club A quotes arts. 2.1 and 5 of the Rules governing the Arbitration Tribunal provided for by the Collective Bargaining Agreement. 25. Moreover, Club A asserts that the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant confirmed the exclusive jurisdiction of the Arbitration Tribunal when he lodged his claim in front of such commission. In addition, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent sustains that FIFA is also not competent to hear the relevant counterclaim because of the absence of an international dimension. 26. Secondly, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent affirms that FIFA has no competence to deal with the claim of the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant at stake also by virtue of the application of the legal principle of res iudicata in light of the decision of the Arbitration Tribunal. 27. Finally, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent alleges that there is litispendence because on 11 February 2014 the player lodged a civil lawsuit against it before a court from country B with the purpose of collecting some outstanding amounts allegedly owed by Club A. 28. Nevertheless, in case FIFA declared itself competent to decide on the player’s claim, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent asserts that “the player had never been excluded by the team, but had always been provided with the same technical and athletic assistance and guidance as the rest of the team; for some months only had the player not been selected for the participation in the official matches of the team following the technical decisions of the coach, [which] were taken […] because of the non sufficient efforts devoted by the player in following the coach’s instructions and technical-tactical guidance.” 29. Club A further asserts that, with the exception of the player’s agent, all the witnesses called by the parties in front of the Arbitral Tribunal confirmed that “the player had not been excluded by the team nor made subject to any degradation; the player was not lined up during the team’s matches only because the player himself did not behave in a professional manner and did not devote his best efforts to help the team; the coach [several times] tried to convince the player to change his attitude vis-à-vis [Club A] and the teammates, but such attempts revealed to be unsuccessful; the player did not even participate in the official events of [Club A], without giving notice.” 30. Besides, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent argues that, considering that it invested about EUR 35 million to secure the services of the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant, it had no interest in excluding him from the team but, instead, it tried anything possible to convince the player to behave professionally and participate with enthusiasm in the activity of the team and, although he was not lined up, the player was provided with suitable technical assistance and guidance and sufficient means to train and to regain an adequate fitness. 31. In connection with Club A’s allegation as to FIFA’s lack of competence, the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant highlights that the Claimant / CounterRespondent opted for lodging its claim in front of FIFA and he accepted FIFA’s competence when he submitted his reply brief and lodged his counterclaim. 32. In this sense, the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant clarifies that the withdrawal of his claim lodged in front of the Arbitral Tribunal must be understood only in connection with his right to have a judicial declaration as to the termination of the contract in advance but not also regarding his right to unilaterally terminate it out-of-court, which he did on 1 July 2013 in accordance with art. 14 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, art. 337 of the Swiss Code of Obligations and 2119 of the Civil Code from country B. Hence, there is no legal basis for either the argument of res iudicata or litispendence, although he acknowledges that the Arbitral Tribunal formally rejected his claim. 33. The Respondent I / Counter-Claimant asserts that it is undisputed by the parties that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent excluded him from training with the first team because, after sending his notice of cease and desist, Club A replied stating that “the non-participation of the player in the training sessions with the first team is not only motivated by disciplinary but also technical reasons […].” Therefore, Club A would have acknowledged the exclusion of the player from training with the first team. 34. Besides the Claimant / Counter-Respondent’s reply to his notice of cease and desist, the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant submitted witness statements signed by his wife and brother in support of his allegation of exclusion from training with the first team. 35. In continuation, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent highlights that its reply to the player’s notice of cease and desist may not be considered as an acknowledgement of his alleged exclusion from training with the first team because said reply states that “the player has never been subject to any exclusion” but only that the player was not fielded in official matches due to technical reasons. Furthermore, Club A sustains that the player added the words “training session” in the Spanish translation of its reply in order to attempt to support his allegation of an infringement of art. 7.1 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement by the Claimant / Counter-Respondent. 36. As to the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant’s and the Respondent II’s witness statements, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent argues that those are not reliable because they can only report what the player told the witnesses and are contradicted by the witnesses heard in front of the Arbitral Tribunal. 37. Finally, the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant informed FIFA that he signed an employment contract with: a) the Respondent II, valid as from 26 July 2013 until 30 June 2015, for a total remuneration of 4,564,674 for the season 2013/2014. b) Club I, valid as from 10 June 2014 until 30 June 2017, for a weekly remuneration of 400, from 10 June 2014 until 30 June 2014, and a first instalment of 650,000 of his signing-on fee, payable on 30 June 2014. II. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter also referred to as Chamber or DRC) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the case at hand. In this respect, it took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 30 September 2013. Consequently, the 2012 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: Procedural Rules) is applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 of the Procedural Rules). 2. The Dispute Resolution Chamber further referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and took note that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent challenged its competence to deal with the counterclaim of the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant. In this respect, the DRC noted that the Claimant / CounterRespondent bases its reasoning on four arguments. First, the club alleges that the player lodged a claim against in front of the court from country B and that, therefore, in accordance with the principle of lis pendens, the DRC should declare itself not competent to deal with the player’s counterclaim. Then, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent asserts that a decision rejecting the player’s claim has been already passed by the Arbitration Tribunal and that consequently the principle of res iudicata prevents FIFA from hearing the counterclaim. Finally, the club sustains that the dispute lacks of international dimension and that, in any case, the Arbitration Tribunal would be the competent body. 3. Having noted the foregoing, the members of the Chamber entered into the analysis of said arguments. In doing so, the Chamber first recalled the content of art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules according to which any party claiming a right on the basis of an alleged fact shall carry the burden of proof and outlined that in the scope of the present procedure, the Claimant / CounterRespondent did not submit any element evidencing that a claim lodged by the player would be pending before the court from country B. In view of the above, the Chamber decided to dismiss the club’s first argument. 4. In continuation, the Chamber turned its attention to the decision rendered by the Arbitration Tribunal on 22 July 2013. In this respect, the Chamber observed that said body did not reject the player’s claim as to the substance but actually closed the procedure due to the withdrawal of the player’s relevant claim. Consequently, the DRC held that the order passed by the Arbitration Tribunal on 22 July 2013 does not prevent it from deciding upon the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant’s counterclaim in virtue of the principle of res iudicata. 5. Subsequently, the members of the Chamber outlined that the club mistakenly referred to criteria stipulated in art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, whereas its competence in the matter at stake is actually based on art. 24 par. 1 in combination with art. 22 lit. a) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2015) since the matter concerns a dispute between a club and a player as well as his new club in relation to the maintenance of contractual stability where there has been an ITC and a claim from an interested party regarding the payment of compensation for breach of contract. In view of the foregoing, the Chamber concluded that it was competent to deal with the Respondent I / CounterClaimant’s counterclaim. 6. In continuation, the Chamber analysed which regulations should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, it confirmed that in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2015), and considering that the original claim in the present matter was lodged on 30 September 2013, the 2012 edition of said regulations (hereinafter: Regulations) is applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance. 7. Furthermore, the DRC wished to point out that when deciding a dispute before the DRC, FIFA’s regulations prevail over any national law chosen by the parties. In this regard the Chamber emphasised that the main objective of the FIFA regulations is to create a standard set of rules to which all the actors within the football community are subject to and can rely on. This objective would not be achievable if the DRC would have to apply the national law of a specific party on every dispute brought to it. 8. The competence of the Chamber and the applicable regulations having been established, entering into the substance of the matter, the members of the Chamber started by acknowledging the facts as well as the documentation contained in the file. However, the Chamber emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to facts, arguments and documentary evidence which it considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand. 9. In this respect, the DRC acknowledged that, on 4 June 2009, the parties signed an employment contract, valid as from 1 July 2009 until 30 June 2014 and that the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant terminated the contract in writing on 1 July 2013. 10. In this regard, the Chamber took note that the Respondent I / CounterClaimants considers having had just cause to terminate the contract since the Claimant / Counter-Respondent excluded him from training with the first team in violation of its contractual obligations. On the other hand, the Chamber observed that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent asserts that the player had never been prevented from training but was merely not fielded in games. 11. Having established the aforementioned, the Chamber deemed that the underlying issue in this dispute, considering the claim and counterclaim respectively lodged by the parties, was to determine whether the employment contract had been unilaterally terminated with or without just cause by the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant, and which party was responsible for the early termination of the contractual relationship in question. 12. At this stage, the Chamber deemed it of utmost importance to highlight that the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant expressly acknowledged that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent fully complied with its financial obligations until the termination of the contract. 13. In continuation, the Chamber subsequently went on to deliberate as to whether the reason put forward by the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant in order to justify the termination, i.e. the alleged exclusion from training, can be considered as a just cause for him to prematurely terminate the employment relationship. 14. In this context, the DRC firstly observed that the Respondent I / CounterClaimant submitted, in support of his assertions, various witness statements made by his wife and his brother. In this regard, the Chamber deemed it fit to outline that the status of the witnesses put in doubt the impartiality of their statements and therefore, after making reference to art. 12 par. 3 and par. 6 of the Procedural rules, according to which any party claiming a right on the basis of an alleged fact shall carry the burden of proof and the evidence shall be considered with free discretion, respectively, concluded that the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant did not satisfactorily carry the burden of proof regarding his exclusion from training. 15. In addition, the Chamber emphasised that the player had not on a single occasion requested the club to comply with its obligations between 17 January 2013 and 1 July 2013, which does not correspond to the pro-active attitude expected from a diligent player who considers that the counter-party is acting in breach of its obligations. In this respect, the Chamber was of the opinion that this fact rather demonstrates that the Respondent I / Counter-Respondent was satisfied with his situation at the club. 16. Accordingly, and taking into account the above-mentioned considerations, the Chamber concluded that the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant did not have just cause to unilaterally terminate the employment contract on 1 July 2013 and that, consequently, the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant is to be held liable for the early termination of the contract without just cause. 17. Consequently, the Chamber determined that the counterclaim lodged by the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant should be fully rejected. 18. In light of the foregoing, the DRC established that, in accordance with art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant is liable to pay compensation to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent. Furthermore, in accordance with the unambiguous content of article 17 par. 2 of the Regulations, the Chamber established that the Respondent I / CounterClaimant’s new club, i.e. the Respondent II, shall be jointly and severally liable for the payment of compensation. In this respect, the Chamber was eager to point out that the joint liability of the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant’s new club is independent from the question as to whether the new club has induced the contractual breach. This conclusion is in line with the well-established jurisprudence of the Chamber and has been repeatedly confirmed by the Court of Arbitration for Sport. 19. Having stated the above, the Chamber focused its attention on the calculation of the amount of compensation for breach of contract in the case at stake. In doing so, the members of the Chamber firstly reiterated that, in accordance with art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the amount of compensation shall be calculated, in particular and unless otherwise provided for in the contract at the basis of the dispute, with due consideration for the law of the country concerned, the specificity of sport and further objective criteria, including in particular the remuneration and other benefits due to the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant under the existing contract and/or the new contract(s), the time remaining on the existing contract up to a maximum of five years as well as the fees and expenses paid or incurred by the former club (amortised over the term of the contract) and whether the contractual breach falls within a protected period. The DRC recalled that the list of objective criteria is not exhaustive and that the broad scope of criteria indicated tends to ensure that a just and fair amount of compensation is awarded to the prejudiced party. 20. In application of the relevant provision, the Chamber held that it first of all had to clarify whether the pertinent employment contract contained any clause, by means of which the parties had beforehand agreed upon a compensation payable by the contractual parties in the event of breach of contract. In this regard, the Chamber established that no such compensation clause was included in the employment contract at the basis of the matter at stake. 21. As a consequence, the members of the Chamber determined that the prejudice suffered by the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant in the present matter had to be assessed in application of the other parameters set out in art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations. In this regard, the DRC emphasised beforehand that each request for compensation for contractual breach has to be assessed by the Chamber on a case-by-case basis taking into account all specific circumstances of the respective matter, as well as the Chamber’s specific knowledge of the world of football and its experience gained throughout the years. 22. Consequently, in order to estimate the amount of compensation due to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent in the present case, the Chamber firstly turned its attention to the remuneration and other benefits due to the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant under the existing contract and the new contract(s), which criterion was considered by the Chamber to be essential. In this context, the members of the Chamber deemed it important to emphasise that the wording of art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations allows the DRC to take into consideration both the existing contract and the new contract(s) in the calculation of the amount of compensation, thus enabling the Chamber to gather indications as to the economic value attributed to a player by both his former and his new club(s). 23. In this regard, the DRC established, on the one hand, that the employment contract between the Claimant / Counter-Respondent and the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant, signed on 4 June 2009, had been set to expire on 30 June 2014. Since the breach occurred on 1 July 2013, i.e. at the beginning of the 2013-14 season, the total value of his employment agreement with the Claimant / Counter-Respondent for the remaining contractual period of one season appeared to amount to approximately EUR 3,000,000. Nevertheless, and considering that the player did not render his services from January 2013 until June 2013, the Chamber deemed it fair to take half of this amount, i.e. EUR 1,500,000, as basis for the calculation. On the other hand, the members of the Chamber established that the value of the new employment contract concluded between the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant and the Respondent II amounts to a total of EUR 627,000 for the period from the unilateral termination of the contract by the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant until its contractual expiry, i.e. from July 2013 to 30 June 2014. On the basis of the aforementioned financial contractual elements, the Chamber concluded that the average of remuneration between the contracts concluded by the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant respectively with the Claimant / CounterRespondent and the Respondent II over the relevant period amounted to EUR 1,063,500. 24. The members of the Chamber then turned to the further essential criterion relating to the fees and expenses paid by the Claimant / Counter-Respondent for the acquisition of the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant’s services insofar as these have not been amortised over the term of the relevant contract. The Chamber recalled that a transfer compensation of EUR 20,200,000 had been paid by the Claimant / Counter-Respondent to the club from country H, Club G for the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant‘s transfer, documentation of which has been presented by the Claimant / Counter-Respondent. According to article 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, this amount shall be amortised over the term of the relevant employment contract. As stated above, the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant was still bound to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent for one further year of contract when he terminated the relevant employment contract, which was signed by the parties with a view to remain contractually bound for a total period of five seasons. As a result of the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant’s breach of contract in July 2013, the Claimant / CounterRespondent has thus been prevented from amortising the amount of EUR 4,040,000, relating to the transfer compensation that it paid in order to acquire the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant’s services, which Club A spent with the intention to benefit from the player’s services for the period of time that would then be established by means of the contract of employment. 25. Equally, the Chamber observed that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent was held liable to pay an amount of EUR 809,564.23 as solidarity contribution in connection with the transfer of the player. In this regard, the DRC outlined that like the transfer compensation, said amount shall be amortised over the term of the relevant employment contract. In view of the above, the Chamber concluded that due to the player’s breach of the contract, Club A has been prevented from amortising the amount of EUR 161,912, relating to the solidarity contribution that it paid in relation to the Respondent I / CounterClaimant’s transfer. 26. The Chamber then focused on the agent fees that the Claimant / CounterRespondent alleged having incurred in connection with the signing of the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant. In this regard, the members of the Chamber pointed out that according to article 17 par. 1 of the Regulations agent fees may be included as one of the criteria to be taken into account in the calculation of compensation. In this respect, the members of the Chamber analysed the document submitted by Club A in relation the payment of the agent fees and observed that said fees were to be paid proportionally over the five years of the contract and, additionally, that in case of termination of the relevant employment contract before its original expiry, the Claimant / Counter-Respondent’s obligation to pay the agent fees would cease. Consequently, the Chamber concluded that Club A did not pay any amount as agent fee in connection with the last season of the contract and that the amounts that it paid during the previous seasons had already been amortised when the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant terminated the contract on 1 July 2013. 27. Consequently, on account of all of the above-mentioned considerations, the Chamber decided that the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant must pay the amount of EUR 5,265,000 to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent as compensation for breach of contract. In addition and with regard to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent’s request for interest, the Chamber decided that the Claimant / Counter-Respondent is entitled to 5% interest p.a. on said amount as of 30 September 2013 until the date of effective payment. Furthermore, the Respondent II is jointly and severally liable for the payment of the relevant compensation. 28. The Dispute Resolution Chamber concluded its deliberations in the present matter by establishing that any further claim lodged by the Claimant / Counter-Respondent is rejected. III. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. The claim of the Claimant / Counter-Respondent, Club A, is partially accepted. 2. The Respondent I / Counter-Claimant, Player C, is ordered to pay to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision, compensation for breach of contract in the amount of EUR 5,265,000 plus 5% interest p.a. on said amount as from 30 September 2013 until the date of effective payment. 3. The Respondent II, Club E, is jointly and severally liable for the payment of the aforementioned compensation. 4. The counterclaim of the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant is admissible. 5. The counterclaim of the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant is rejected. 6. In the event that the amount due to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent in accordance with the above-mentioned point 2 is not paid within the stated time limit, the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision. 7. The Claimant / Counter-Respondent is directed to inform the Respondent I / Counter-Claimant and the Respondent II immediately and directly of the account number to which the remittance is to be made and to notify the Dispute Resolution Chamber of every payment received. 8. Any further claim lodged by the Claimant / Counter-Respondent is rejected. ***** Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy): According to art. 67 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives). The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following: Court of Arbitration for Sport Avenue de Beaumont 2 1012 Lausanne, Switzerland Tel: +41 21 613 50 00 Fax: +41 21 613 50 01 e-mail: info@tas-cas.org / www.tas-cas.org For the Dispute Resolution Chamber: Markus Kattner Acting Secretary General Encl. CAS directive