F.I.F.A. – Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2015-2016) – controversie di lavoro – ———- F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber (2015-2016) – labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 13 August 2015, in the following composition: Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman Jon Newman (USA), member Mario Gallavoti (Italy), member on the claim presented by the player, Player A, country B, as Claimant against the club, Club C, country D, as Respondent regarding an employment-related dispute between the parties I.

F.I.F.A. - Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2015-2016) - controversie di lavoro – ---------- F.I.F.A. - Dispute Resolution Chamber (2015-2016) - labour disputes – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 13 August 2015, in the following composition: Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman Jon Newman (USA), member Mario Gallavoti (Italy), member on the claim presented by the player, Player A, country B, as Claimant against the club, Club C, country D, as Respondent regarding an employment-related dispute between the parties I. Facts of the case 1. On 16 July 2013, the player from country B, Player A (hereinafter: the player) and the club from country D, Club C (hereinafter: the club), signed an employment contract valid as from 16 July 2013 until 31 May 2015. 2. In accordance with the contract, the player was inter alia entitled to receive: a. EUR 20,000 per month from 1 September 2013 until 31 May 2014, for a total of EUR 180,000; b. EUR 25,000 per month from 1 August 2014 until 31 May 2015, for a total of EUR 250,000. TOTAL: EUR 430,000 3. On 4 December 2013, the club and the player signed a mutual termination agreement, the terms of which provide for the payment to the player of a total of EUR 60,000, as follows: a. EUR 20,000 on the day of signature of the termination agreement; b. EUR 20,000 on 20 February 2014; c. EUR 20,000 on 30 May 2014. 4. Article 1.3 of the termination agreement stipulates that “the parties hereby irrevocably and renounce any rights, and/or claims they may have against each other to pursue any legal action and/or initiate any judicial or extrajudicial proceeding against each other, whether concerning fees, assignment of rights (i.e. federative or economic), salaries, wages, bonus, etc., based on such terminated employment contract”. 5. On 28 April 2014 and 14 January 2015, the player put the club in default of outstanding remuneration pertaining to the termination agreement for the amount of EUR 40,000. 6. On 15 June 2015, the player lodged a claim in front of FIFA against the club asking: a. primarily, that the termination agreement signed between him and the club be deemed invalid and unenforceable, thereby entitling him to compensation in the amount of EUR 350,000 (cf. point I.8. below; i.e. EUR 430,000 – EUR 80,000), as well as EUR 10,000 in legal fees plus 5% interest p.a. as from 30 May 2014; and, b. subsidiarily, the player claims outstanding remuneration in the amount of EUR 40,000 pertaining to the termination agreement, as well as EUR 60,000 as compensation for damages, in addition to 5% interest p.a. as from 30 May 2014 and EUR 10,000 in legal fees. 7. The player requests that the termination agreement be deemed null and void. In particular, the player claims that he was coerced and pressured into signing the termination agreement. Furthermore, he notes that the amount offered in compensation for the premature termination of the contract, i.e. EUR 60,000, falls far short of the contractually provided remuneration owed to the player had the contract run to its term, i.e. EUR 430,000. He argues that this is inequitable and saved the club EUR 310,000 in salary payments, but cost the player EUR 310,000 in lost earnings. 8. In this respect, should the termination agreement be deemed null and void, the player alleges he would be entitled to compensation amounting to EUR 350,000, in consideration of the acknowledgement that the player was paid three monthly salaries (i.e. EUR 60,000) as well as the first instalment pertaining to the termination agreement (i.e. EUR 20,000). 9. As previously mentioned (cf. point I.6.b. above), the player subsidiarily claims the outstanding amount of EUR 40,000 which is allegedly still owed to him in relation to the termination agreement. The player then claims that in light of the moral and financial prejudice suffered, he should be entitled to receive a further EUR 60,000 plus interest. 10. In its reply, the club argues that the termination agreement is a valid and enforceable document, which was signed by the player of his own free will. It also refers to article 10 of the employment contract, which states “the club and the player may terminate this contract, before its expiring term, by mutual agreement”. In addition, the club refers to the two default notices sent to it by the player (cf. point I.5. above) and the fact that the validity of the termination agreement was not contested, thereby demonstrating that the player tacitly accepted the enforceability of said termination agreement. 11. Furthermore, with regard to the claim that the player was coerced into signing the termination agreement, the club states that it is not the case and, that notwithstanding, the player failed to substantiate his arguments with any documentation. 12. The club acknowledges having only paid the player EUR 20,000 pertaining to the first instalment of the termination agreement. It asks however, that the claim for damages of EUR 60,000 be rejected in light of the fact that it is allegedly groundless and has not been substantiated with any evidence. 13. It further argues that the claim for legal fees should be rejected on the basis of the DRC’s jurisprudence. Finally, it argues the whole claim should be rejected in light of article 1.4 of the termination agreement “it is hereby established that the parties will not institute, bring or commence any action at law in any court mostly before the arbitration mechanisms of FIFA and/or the Court of Arbitration for Sport, based upon the terminated Employment Contract”. II. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. First, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter also referred to as Chamber or DRC) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the matter at hand. In this respect, it took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 15 June 2015. Consequently, the Rules governing the procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (2015 edition; hereinafter: Procedural Rules) are applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 of the Procedural Rules). 2. Subsequently, the members of the Chamber referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed that in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 in combination with art. 22 lit. b of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (2015 edition) the Dispute Resolution Chamber is competent to deal with the matter at stake, which concerns an employment-related dispute with an international dimension between a player from country B and a club from country D. 3. Furthermore, the Chamber analysed which regulations should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, it confirmed that in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (2015 edition), and considering that the present claim was lodged on 15 June 2015, the 2015 edition of said regulations (hereinafter: Regulations) is applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance. 4. The competence of the Chamber and the applicable regulations having been established, the Chamber entered into the substance of the matter. In this respect, the Chamber started by acknowledging all the aforementioned facts as well as the arguments and the documentation submitted by the parties. The Chamber however emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to the facts, arguments and documentary evidence, which it considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand. 5. In this respect, the members of the Chamber recalled that the parties had signed an employment contract valid from 16 July 2013 until 31 May 2015. 6. Furthermore, the members of the Chamber acknowledge that the Claimant signed a termination agreement on 4 December 2013 providing for the payment of a total of EUR 60,000 to the Claimant. The Chamber also acknowledged that said document contained a declaration stating that the Claimant would have no other possible claims in relation to the terminated employment contract. 7. In continuation, the Chamber noted that the Claimant alleged that said document was signed by him under pressure and coercion and claims that the document should therefore be deemed null and void, entitling the Claimant to claim compensation for breach of contract by the Respondent based on the employment contract of 16 July 2013. Furthermore, the members of the Chamber acknowledged that the Claimant subsidiarily asserted that he had not been paid EUR 40,000 in relation to the termination agreement. 8. On the other hand, the Respondent is of the firm opinion that the document in question was signed by the player without any type of coercion, noting that the Claimant had provided no substantiating evidence, and consequently rejects the claim lodged against it. 9. In this regard, referring to art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules, in accordance with which any party claiming a right on the basis of an alleged fact shall carry the burden of proof, the DRC took into account that the player failed to present any documentary evidence in support of his allegation that he had been coerced by the Respondent into signing the aforementioned document. Consequently, the DRC decided that the Claimant’s allegations in this regard cannot be accepted. Thus, the termination agreement should be considered as a valid and binding document signed by both the Claimant and the Respondent. 10. The DRC was however eager to emphasise that the Respondent did not dispute that certain payments due in relation to the termination agreement had not been paid, but asserted that the Claimant’s claim should be rejected on the basis of the waiver contained in article 1.4 of the agreement (cf. point I.13 above). In this respect, the Chamber pointed out that such a waiver refers exclusively to the employment contract, but does not forbid the Claimant from claiming any amounts from the termination which remained unpaid, thus the members of the Chamber concluded that this argument of the Respondent must be rejected. 11. In view of all of the above, in particular taking into account that the Respondent had not contested that the relevant sums due in relation to the termination agreement had remained unpaid, the members of the Chamber decided that in accordance with the general legal principle of pacta sunt servanda, the Respondent must fulfil its contractual obligations towards the Claimant and is therefore to be held liable to pay the Claimant the amount of EUR 40,000, corresponding to the payments due on 20 February and 30 May 2014. 12. In continuation, with regard to the Claimant’s request for interest and the constant practice of the DRC, the members of the Chamber decided that the Claimant is entitled to receive interest at the rate of 5% p.a. on the amount of EUR 20,000 from 30 May 2014 until the date of effective payment, and 5% p.a. on the amount of EUR 20,000 from 31 May 2014 until the date of effective payment. 13. Subsequently, the DRC analysed the request of the Claimant corresponding to compensation for moral damages in the amount of EUR 60,000. In this regard, the Chamber deemed it appropriate to point out that the request for said compensation presented by the Claimant had no legal or regulatory basis and pointed out that no corroborating evidence had been submitted that demonstrated or quantified the damage suffered, therefore the members of the Chamber agreed that such a request be rejected. 14. In addition, with regards to the claimed legal expenses, the Chamber referred to art. 18 par. 4 of the Procedural Rules as well as to its long-standing and wellestablished jurisprudence in accordance with which no procedural compensation shall be awarded in proceedings in front of the Dispute Resolution Chamber. Consequently, the Chamber decided to reject the Claimant’s request relating to legal expenses. 15. Finally, the members of the Chamber concluded their deliberation in the present matter by rejecting any further claim of the Claimant. III. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. The claim of the Claimant, Player A, is partially accepted. 2. The Respondent, Club C, has to pay to the Claimant, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision, the amount of EUR 40,000 plus 5% interest p.a. until the date of effective payment as follows: a. 5% p.a. as of 30 May 2014 on the amount of EUR 20,000; b. 5% p.a. as of 31 May 2014 on the amount of EUR 20,000. 3. In the event that the aforementioned sums plus interest are not paid within the stated time limit, the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to FIFA’s Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision. 4. Any further claim lodged by the Claimant is rejected. 5. The Claimant is directed to inform the Respondent immediately and directly of the account number to which the remittance is to be made and to notify the Dispute Resolution Chamber of every payment received. ***** Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy): According to art. 67 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives). The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following: Court of Arbitration for Sport Avenue de Beaumont 2 1012 Lausanne Switzerland Tel: +41 21 613 50 00 Fax: +41 21 613 50 01 e-mail: info@tas-cas.org www.tas-cas.org For the Dispute Resolution Chamber: Markus Kattner Acting Secretary General Encl. CAS directives