F.I.F.A. – Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2015-2016) – debiti scaduti – ———- F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber (2015-2016) – overdue payables – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 26 May 2016, in the following composition: Thomas Grimm (Switzerland), Deputy Chairman Johan van Gaalen (South Africa), member Eirik Monsen (Norway), member Wouter Lambrecht (Belgium), member Zola Percival Majavu (South Africa), member on the claim presented by the player, A, country S as Claimant against the club, B, country R as Respondent regarding an employment-related dispute between the parties in connection with overdue payables I.

F.I.F.A. - Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2015-2016) – debiti scaduti – ---------- F.I.F.A. - Dispute Resolution Chamber (2015-2016) – overdue payables – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 26 May 2016, in the following composition: Thomas Grimm (Switzerland), Deputy Chairman Johan van Gaalen (South Africa), member Eirik Monsen (Norway), member Wouter Lambrecht (Belgium), member Zola Percival Majavu (South Africa), member on the claim presented by the player, A, country S as Claimant against the club, B, country R as Respondent regarding an employment-related dispute between the parties in connection with overdue payables I. Facts of the case 1. On 6 February 2015, an insolvency procedure was opened against the club from country R, B (hereinafter; the Respondent) by the xx Tribunal. 2. The decision of the xx Tribunal was provided by the Respondent and set the following deadlines: 1 April 2015: deadline to register the proof of claims; 15 April 2015: deadline for the settlement of possible claims and to complete the “table of claims”. 3. On 17 September 2015, the player form country S, A (hereinafter; the Claimant) and the Respondent entered into an employment contract valid as of the date of its signature until 30 June 2016. 4. According to the contract, the Claimant was entitled to receive from the Respondent, inter alia, a monthly salary of EUR 3,800. 5. Clause 17.3 of the contract reads as follows: “The disputes arising from the performance of this contract shall be settled in the following procedural order: 17.3.1 Amicably; 17.3.2 By deferring the dispute to the legal body of the xy Football Federation (…), of the Professional Football League (…), of the County Football Association (…), FIFA, UEFA as the case may be”. 6. On 6 January 2016, the parties concluded a termination agreement whereby the Respondent recognized having a debt towards the Claimant of EUR 15,200 payable in two equal instalments of EUR 7,600 on 1 February 2016 and 15 July 2016. The termination agreement is signed by the Claimant and, on behalf of the Respondent, by a “special administrator”. 7. On 7 March 2016, the Claimant put the Respondent in default of payment of EUR 7,600 as per the payment due on 1 February 2016 in accordance with the termination agreement setting a time limit of 10 days in order to remedy the default. 8. On 31 March 2016, the Claimant lodged a claim against the Respondent in front of FIFA requesting the amount of EUR 7,600 as per the payment due on 1 February 2016 in accordance with the termination agreement as well as 5% interest on said amount. 9. In its reply to the claim, the Respondent questioned the competence of FIFA to deal with the present matter in view of the fact that it is under insolvency proceedings. In this respect, the Respondent argued that it is “currently governed under the exclusive provisions of the xxxx Insolvency Act no. 85/2014” and that thus, the only competent body to decide on the dispute is the xxx Tribunal in accordance with art. 41 of the Insolvency Act 85/2014. The Respondent further argued that the provisions of said insolvency act are mandatory and of public order. 10. The Respondent held that the Claimant was fully aware of its situation when he concluded the employment contract and therefore, he implicitly decided to submit to the jurisdiction of the national courts. 11. Furthermore and with reference to the Swiss Private International Law Act, the Respondent argued that its legal nature, its legal capacity, its capacity to act, its liability for the debts and the consequences of its insolvency procedure are to be determined exclusively by Law of country R. 12. In this context, the Respondent stressed that, in any case, in accordance with Law of country R, the Claimant should have lodged his claim in front of the only competent bodies, i.e. the xxx Tribunal and that “no payment to any creditor is possible without the previous authorization of the Syndic Judge”. According to the Respondent, as the Claimant did not submit any “payment request” to the Respondent’s “judicial trustee”, the Respondent “is legally prevented from performing any payment”. II. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. First, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter also referred to as the Chamber or DRC) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the case at hand. In this respect, it took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 31 March 2016. Consequently, the 2015 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter; the Procedural Rules) is applicable to the matter at hand (cf. article 21 of the Procedural Rules). 2. Subsequently, the members of the Chamber referred to art. 3 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed that in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 in combination with art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2015), the Dispute Resolution Chamber shall adjudicate on employment-related disputes between a club and a player that have an international dimension. 3. As a consequence, the Dispute Resolution Chamber would, in principle, be competent to decide on the present litigation which involves a player from country S and a club from country R regarding an employment-related dispute. 4. However, the Chamber acknowledged that the Respondent contested the competence of the Chamber to adjudicate on the present affair alleging that, in view of its insolvency proceedings, law from country R is applicable and prevails over any other law and therefore, the dispute falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the xxx Tribunal. According to the Respondent, the xxx Tribunal is declared competent as a consequence of the club being under insolvency proceedings. 5. Having established the above and in analysing its competence, the Chamber acknowledged all of the above-mentioned facts as well as all the arguments and documentation contained in the file. However, the Chamber emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to the facts, arguments and documentary evidence which it considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand. 6. In this respect, the members of the DRC first wished to stress that when deciding a dispute before the DRC, FIFA’s regulations prevail over any national law chosen by the parties. In this regard, the Chamber emphasized that the main objective of the different FIFA Regulations is to create a standard set of rules to which all the actors within the football community are subject to and can rely on. This objective would not be achievable if the DRC would have to apply the national law of a specific party on every dispute brought to it. Therefore, the Chamber deemed that it is not appropriate to apply the principles of a particular national law to a dispute brought before it but rather the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, general principles of law and, where existing, the Chamber’s wellestablished jurisprudence. 7. With the above-mentioned in mind, the Chamber turned its attention to the Respondent’s argument that not the DRC is competent to adjudicate on the present affair but rather the xxxx Tribunal. With reference to art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, the DRC deemed it vital to outline that one of the basic conditions that needs to be met in order to establish that another organ than the DRC is competent to settle an employment-related dispute between a club and a player of an international dimension, is that the jurisdiction of the relevant national arbitration tribunal or national court derives from a clear reference in the employment contract or from a collective bargaining agreement applicable to the parties. 8. Therefore, while analysing whether it was competent to hear the present matter, the DRC considered that they should first analyse whether the document at the basis of the present dispute, i.e. the termination agreement, contained a clear and exclusive jurisdiction clause in favour of the xxxx Tribunal. 9. With the above-mentioned considerations in mind and after a thorough analysis of the termination agreement, the members of the Chamber concluded that the latter did not contain any jurisdiction clause in favour of the xxx Tribunal or any other national body. Therefore, the members of the Chamber came to the unanimous conclusion that, in the present matter, one of the indispensable requirements in order to determine that another body than the DRC is competent to deal with an international employment-related dispute is not met. 10. As an additional remark and for the sake of completeness only, the Chamber wished to stress that it is comforted with its conclusion as the employment contract signed by the parties on 17 September 2015, i.e. seven months after the initiation of the insolvency proceedings against the Respondent, contained an arbitration clause in favour, inter alia, of FIFA. As a consequence, the Chamber considered that the line of argumentation of the Respondent in combination with the facts of the present matter is inconsistent and hence cannot be upheld. The Chamber found that it made little sense that the contract contained a reference to football dispute resolution if indeed, as the Respondent claims, any potential dispute involving it should have been submitted to the xxxx Tribunal in light of the insolvency proceedings. 11. On account of all the above, the Chamber established that the Respondent’s objection towards the competence of FIFA to deal with the present matter has to be rejected, and that the Dispute Resolution Chamber is competent, on the basis of art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, to consider the present matter as to the substance. 12. Subsequently, the Chamber analysed which regulations should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, it confirmed that in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and par. 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2015), and considering that the present claim was lodged on 31 March 2016, the 2015 edition of said regulations (hereinafter; Regulations) is applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance. 13. In this context, the members of the Chamber acknowledged that it had remained uncontested by the Respondent that it failed to pay the Claimant the amount of EUR 7,600 due on 1 February 2016 as per the termination agreement. In this regard, and in view of the consideration of point II./6. ut supra, the Chamber rejected the defence of the Respondent in the sense that it was not obliged to pay off its debt with the Claimant as the latter had, allegedly, not met the requirements established by Law of country R in order to collect his receivable. 14. As a result, the members of the Chamber concurred that the Respondent must fulfil its obligations as per the termination agreement in accordance with the general legal principle of pacta sunt servanda. Consequently, the Chamber decided that the Respondent is liable to pay to the Claimant the total amount of EUR 7,600. 15. In addition, taking into account the Claimant’s request, the DRC decided that the Respondent must pay to the Claimant interest of 5% p.a. as of the date of the claim, i.e. 31 March 2016. 16. Furthermore, the DRC took particular note of the fact that, on 7 March 2016, the Claimant had put the Respondent in default of payment of the aforementioned amount, setting a time limit of 10 days in order to remedy the default. 17. Consequently, the Chamber concluded that the Claimant had duly proceeded in accordance with art. 12bis par. 3 of the Regulations, which stipulates that the creditor (player or club) must have put the debtor club in default in writing and have granted a deadline of at least ten days for the debtor club to comply with its financial obligation(s) and that the Respondent had thus delayed a due payment for more than 30 days without a prima facie contractual basis. 18. In this respect, and taking into account the considerations under number II./15 and II./16. above, the DRC referred to art.12bis par. 2 of the Regulations which stipulates that any club found to have delayed a due payment for more than 30 days without a prima facie contractual basis may be sanctioned in accordance with art. 12bis par. 4 of the Regulations. 19. The Chamber established thus that in virtue of the aforementioned article, it has competence to impose sanctions on the Respondent. In this context, the members of the Chamber highlighted that on 18 May 2016 (xxxxx), the Respondent had already been found to have delayed a due payment for more than 30 days without a prima facie contractual basis and without the Respondent having responded to the relevant claim, as a result of which, a fine was imposed on the Respondent by the Dispute Resolution Chamber (DRC) judge. Consequently, the Chamber established that, for the second time, the Respondent has delayed a due payment for more than 30 days without a prima facie contractual basis. 20. Moreover, the DRC emphasised and took into account, that the Respondent has been found by the Dispute Resolution Chamber as well as the DRC judge responsible for not complying with its financial obligations towards players on various occasions in the recent past. Along these lines, the DRC referred to art. 12bis par. 6 of the Regulations, which establishes that a repeated offence will be considered as an aggravating circumstance and lead to more severe penalty. 21. Bearing in mind the considerations under numbers II./18. and II./19. above, the DRC decided that in the event that the Respondent does not pay the amount due to the Claimant within the 30 days following the notification of the present decision, a ban from registering any new players, either nationally or internationally, for the next entire registration period following the notification of the present decision shall become effective on the Respondent in accordance with art. 12bis par. 4 lit. d) of the Regulations. ***** III. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. The claim of the Claimant, A, is accepted. 2. The Respondent, club B, has to pay to the Claimant, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision, overdue payables in the amount of EUR 7,600 plus 5% interest p.a. as of 31 March 2016 until the date of effective payment. 3. In the event that the amount due to the Claimant is not paid by the Respondent within the stated time limit, the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision. 4. The Claimant is directed to inform the Respondent immediately and directly of the account number to which the remittance is to be made and to notify the Dispute Resolution Chamber of every payment received. 5. In the event that the amount due to the Claimant is not paid by the Respondent within the stated time limit, the Respondent shall be banned from registering any new players, either nationally or internationally, for the next entire registration period following the notification of the present decision. ***** Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy): According to article 58 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives). The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following: Court of Arbitration for Sport Avenue de Beaumont 2 1012 Lausanne Switzerland Tel: +41 21 613 50 00 Fax: +41 21 613 50 01 e-mail: info@tas-cas.org www.tas-cas.org For the Dispute Resolution Chamber: Marco Villiger Deputy Secretary General Encl. CAS directives