F.I.F.A. – Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2015-2016) – debiti scaduti – ———- F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber (2015-2016) – overdue payables – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 17 June 2016, in the following composition: Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman Theodore Giannikos (Greece), member Carlos González Puche (Colombia), member on the claim presented by the player, A, country I represented by Mr xxxx as Claimant against the club, B, country X represented by Mr xxxx as Respondent regarding an employment-related dispute between the parties in connection with overdue payables I.

F.I.F.A. - Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2015-2016) – debiti scaduti – ---------- F.I.F.A. - Dispute Resolution Chamber (2015-2016) – overdue payables – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 17 June 2016, in the following composition: Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman Theodore Giannikos (Greece), member Carlos González Puche (Colombia), member on the claim presented by the player, A, country I represented by Mr xxxx as Claimant against the club, B, country X represented by Mr xxxx as Respondent regarding an employment-related dispute between the parties in connection with overdue payables I. Facts of the case 1. On 25 July 2013, the player from country I, A (hereinafter: Claimant), and the club from country X, club B (hereinafter: Respondent), signed an employment contract valid as from the date of signature until 31 May 2014. 2. On 6 January 2014, the parties signed an “Agreement” related to the player’s performance, in accordance with which the parties agreed that the Claimant was to be submitted to an intensive training program in order for him to regain best sportive form within the next 5 months approximately. In accordance with the “Agreement”, the Claimant further agreed to be de-registered by the Respondent from the XY Football Association during said training period and the Respondent undertook to continue to pay the player’s remuneration in accordance with the employment contract. 3. On 31 January 2014, the Claimant and the Respondent signed an agreement by means of which the employment contract was terminated and the Respondent undertook to pay to the Claimant the total amount of EUR 400,000 with cheques in 5 instalments, the last one falling due in July 2014. 4. On 12 July 2015, the Claimant and the Respondent signed a document referred to as “termination agreement” (hereinafter: July 2015 termination agreement), in accordance with which: “The parties agreed to cancel the previous agreement dated 25.7.2013 and the club does have to pay to the player the amount of 800.000 XY only by 5 instalments as follows: “ [payment schedule cf. point I./5. below] “a demonstration of good-faith and gratitude for the great services provided in the last months.” 5. According to the July 2015 termination agreement, the Respondent undertook to pay to the Claimant the amount of XY 800,000 by bank transfers as follows: XY 150,000 on 1 August 2015, XY 150,000 on 1 September 2015, XY 150,000 on 1 October 2015, XY 150,000 on 1 November 2015, XY 200,000 on 1 December 2015. 6. The July 2015 termination agreement further includes the following clauses: a. 1.1: “The Parties hereby agree to the termination of their relationship in relation to the Employment Contract granting each other a full, general and irrevocable relations of Any and all obligations arising under the here from referenced and terminated contracts.” b. 1.3: “The Parties hereby irrevocably waive and renounce any rights, and/or claims they may have against each other to pursue any legal action and/or initiate any judicial or extrajudicial proceeding against each other, whether concerning fees, Assignment of rights …, salaries, wages, bonus, etc. Based on such terminated employment contract.” c. 1.4: “It is hereby established that the parties will not institute, bring or commence any action at law in any court mostly before the arbitration mechanisms of FIFA and/or the Court of Arbitration for Sport, based upon the terminated Employment Contract.” 7. By correspondence dated 15 February 2016, the Claimant put the Respondent in default of payment of the amount of XY 500,000 setting a 10 days’ time limit in order to remedy the default. 8. On 5 March 2016 and completed on 21 March 2016, the Claimant lodged a claim against the Respondent in front of FIFA asking that the club be ordered to pay to him overdue payables in the amount of XY 500,000 corresponding to the last 3 instalments that fell due on 1 October 2015, 1 November 2015 and 1 December 2015, respectively, in accordance with the July 2015 termination agreement. 9. The Claimant further asks to be awarded interest of 5% p.a. on the relevant instalments as from the day following the respective due dates. 10. The Claimant explains that the parties entered into the July 2015 termination agreement, since the Respondent failed to honour the cheques related to the termination agreement of 31 January 2014. The Claimant stated that he returned said cheques to the Respondent with the signature of the July 2015 termination agreement. 11. In reply to the claim, the Respondent held that FIFA’s Dispute Resolution Chamber (DRC) has no competence to hear the present matter, as the amount included the July 2015 termination agreement was a simple “demonstration of good-faith and gratitude” and thus a mere “liberality in lieu of a contractual obligation whatsoever.” The Respondent adds that it never undertook to pay the amount as a form of compensation for the early termination of the employment contract. 12. Should the DRC consider itself competent to deal with the present matter, the Respondent rejects the claim referring to clauses 1.1, 1.3 and 1.4 of the July 2015 termination agreement (cf. number I./6. above). 13. According to the Respondent, the Claimant freely agreed with the terms and conditions of the July 2015 termination agreement, the main purpose of which was to mutually release the parties of any contractual obligation. 14. The Respondent further highlights that FIFA has no legal basis to impose any sanction on the club. II. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: Chamber or DRC) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the matter at hand. In this respect, it took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 5 March 2016. Consequently, the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (edition 2015; hereinafter: Procedural Rules) are applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 of the Procedural Rules). 2. Subsequently, the Chamber referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and highlighted that in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 and par. 2 in conjunction with art. 22 lit. b of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2016), it is competent to deal with employment-related disputes with an international dimension. 3. In this respect, the members of the Chamber acknowledged that the Respondent contested this Chamber’s competence to deal with the present matter on the basis of a paragraph inserted in the July 2015 termination agreement, in particular, in the clause which stipulates that the Respondent has to pay to the Claimant the amount of XY 800,000 in 5 instalments, which reads as follows: “a demonstration of good-faith and gratitude for the great services provided in the last months.” 4. According to the Respondent, as can be noted from the aforementioned paragraph, the amount stipulated in the July 2015 termination agreement does not constitute a compensatory payment but is merely a gesture of gratitude to the Claimant. The Respondent thus appears to imply that the present matter does not constitute an employment-related matter. The Chamber, however, disagreed with the Respondent’s viewpoint, since the July 2015 termination agreement evidently was signed in connection with the employment as a player of the Claimant by the Respondent and the related contractual obligations. 5. Consequently, the Chamber rejected the Respondent’s argument and confirmed that, in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 and par. 2 in conjunction with art. 22 lit. b of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2016), it is competent to deal with the matter at stake, which is an employment-related dispute with an international dimension between a player from country I and a club from country X. 6. In continuation, the DRC analysed which regulations should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, it confirmed that in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and par. 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2016), and considering that the present claim was lodged 5 March 2016, the 2015 edition of said regulations (hereinafter: Regulations) is applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance. 7. The competence of the DRC and the applicable regulations having been established, the DRC entered into the substance of the matter. In this respect, the DRC started by acknowledging all the above-mentioned facts as well as the arguments and the documentation on file. However, the Chamber emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to the facts, arguments and documentary evidence, which it considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand. 8. Having said this, the DRC acknowledged that the Claimant and the Respondent signed an employment contract valid as from 25 July 2013 until 31 May 2014, which was prematurely terminated with mutual consent on 31 January 2014. The Chamber noted that, on 12 July 2015, the Claimant and the Respondent signed a document referred to as “termination agreement”, in accordance with which the Claimant was entitled to receive from the Respondent the amount of XY 800,000 in five instalments, which agreement forms the basis of the present dispute. 9. The Claimant lodged a claim against the Respondent in front of FIFA, maintaining that the Respondent has overdue payables towards him in the total amount of XY 500,000 corresponding to the instalments that fell due on 1 October 2015, 1 November 2015 and 1 December 2015, respectively, in accordance with the July 2015 termination agreement. 10. In this context, the DRC took particular note of the fact that, on 15 February 2016, the Claimant put the Respondent in default of payment of the aforementioned amount of XY 500,000, setting a 10 days’ time limit in order to remedy the default. 11. Consequently, the DRC concluded that the Claimant had duly proceeded in accordance with art. 12bis par. 3 of the Regulations, which stipulates that the creditor (player or club) must have put the debtor club in default in writing and have granted a deadline of at least ten days for the debtor club to comply with its financial obligation(s). 12. Subsequently, the DRC took into account that, as to the substance of the matter, the Respondent held that in conformity with articles 1.1, 1.3 and 1.4 of the July 2015 termination agreement, which were freely agreed upon by the Claimant, the claim of the Claimant must be rejected. According to the Respondent, the main purpose of these terms was to mutually release the parties of any contractual obligation. 13. After careful study of the relevant articles, the DRC concluded that the terms and conditions contained therein are solely related to obligations arising from the employment contract that was signed by and between the parties and do not affect the Claimant’s entitlements in accordance with the July 2015 termination agreement. Therefore, the members of the Chamber decided to reject the Respondent’s respective argumentation. 14. In continuation, the Chamber took into account that the Respondent has not contested the Claimant’s allegation that the final 3 instalments totalling XY 500,000 have not been paid by the Respondent. 15. On account of the aforementioned considerations, the DRC established that the Respondent failed to remit the Claimant’s remuneration in the total amount of XY 500,000 corresponding to the instalments falling due on 1 October 2015, 1 November 2015 and 1 December 2015, respectively, in accordance with the July 2015 termination agreement. 16. In addition, the DRC established that the Respondent had delayed a due payment for more than 30 days without a prima facie contractual basis. 17. Consequently, the DRC decided that, in accordance with the general legal principle of pacta sunt servanda, the Respondent is liable to pay to the Claimant overdue payables in the total amount of XY 500,000. 18. In addition, taking into consideration the Claimant’s request, the Chamber decided to award the Claimant interest at the rate of 5% p.a. on the outstanding instalments as of the day following the day on which they fell due. 19. In continuation, taking into account the consideration under number II./16. above, the Dispute Resolution Chamber referred to art.12bis par. 2 of the Regulations which stipulates that any club found to have delayed a due payment for more than 30 days without a prima facie contractual basis may be sanctioned in accordance with art. 12bis par. 4 of the Regulations. 20. The Chamber established that in virtue of art. 12bis par. 4 of the Regulations it has competence to impose sanctions on the Respondent. Therefore, bearing in mind that the Respondent duly replied to the claim of the Claimant and in the absence of the circumstance of repeated offence, the DRC decided to impose a warning on the Respondent in accordance with art. 12bis par. 4 lit. a) of the Regulations. 21. In this respect, the DRC wished to highlight that a repeated offence will be considered as an aggravating circumstance and lead to more severe penalty in accordance with art. 12bis par. 6 of the Regulations. III. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber 1. The claim of the Claimant, A, is admissible. 2. The claim of the Claimant is accepted. 3. The Respondent, club B, has to pay to the Claimant, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision, overdue payables in the amount of XY 500,000 plus 5% interest p.a. until the date of effective payment as follows: a. 5% p.a. on the amount of XY 150,000 as from 2 October 2015; b. 5% p.a. on the amount of XY 150,000 as from 2 November 2015; c. 5% p.a. on the amount of XY 200,000 as from 2 December 2015. 4. In the event that the amount plus interest due to the Claimant is not paid by the Respondent within the stated time limit, the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision. 5. The Claimant is directed to inform the Respondent immediately and directly of the account number to which the remittance is to be made and to notify the Dispute Resolution Chamber of every payment received. 6. A warning is imposed on the Respondent. ***** Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy): According to article 58 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives). The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following: Court of Arbitration for Sport Avenue de Beaumont 2 1012 Lausanne Switzerland Tel: +41 21 613 50 00 Fax: +41 21 613 50 01 e-mail: info@tas-cas.org www.tas-cas.org For the Dispute Resolution Chamber: Marco Villiger Deputy Secretary General Encl: CAS directives