F.I.F.A. – Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2015-2016) – indennità di formazione – ———-F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber (2015-2016) – training compensation – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber (DRC) judge passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 25 September 2015, by Theo van Seggelen (Netherlands), DRC judge, on the claim presented by the club, Club A, country B, as Claimant against the club, Club C, country D as Respondent regarding training compensation in connection with the Player E I.

F.I.F.A. - Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie (2015-2016) - indennità di formazione – ----------F.I.F.A. - Dispute Resolution Chamber (2015-2016) - training compensation – official version by www.fifa.com – Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber (DRC) judge passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 25 September 2015, by Theo van Seggelen (Netherlands), DRC judge, on the claim presented by the club, Club A, country B, as Claimant against the club, Club C, country D as Respondent regarding training compensation in connection with the Player E I. Facts of the case 1. In accordance with the player passport issued by the Football Federation of country B (Football Federation of country B), the player, Player E (hereinafter: the player), born on 10 March 1993, was registered with its affiliated club, Club A (hereinafter: the Claimant), as from 1 January 2010 until 29 May 2014. 2. According to the player passport, the player remained unregistered until 12 March 2015 when he was internationally transferred to the club from country D, Club C (hereinafter: the Respondent). According to the Transfer Matching System (TMS) the player was transferred from the Claimant to the Respondent out of contract permanently. 3. The football season in country B starts on 1 January and ends on 31 December of each year. 4. On 17 June 2015, the Claimant contacted FIFA claiming the payment of its proportion of training compensation in the amount of EUR 132,500 plus 5% interest as from the date training compensation is due, i.e. 11 April 2015 from the Respondent. 5. In particular, the Claimant, held that it mutually terminated the contract with the player in May 2014 and that thereafter the player was registered in March 2015 with the Respondent a category III club. 6. Moreover, the Claimant provided a copy of a settlement agreement (Certificado de Paz y Salvo) signed between the Claimant and the player dated 29 May 2014. According to said settlement agreement the Claimant and the player agreed mutually to terminate the contract originally valid until 28 January 2016. Said agreement also stipulates that both parties have fulfilled their obligations. Said agreement is uploaded on TMS. 7. Clause 1 of said agreement stipulates: “Rescindir de común acuerdo el contrato laboral celebrado entre la Club A y el futbolista Player E cuya vigencia se extiende hasta el día 28 de enero de 2016”. Free translation into English: “rescind with mutual agreement the employment contract signed between Club A and the footballer Player E whose term extends until the 28 January 2016”. 8. Clauses 2 and 3 of the agreement stipulate: “Que el señor Player E, se encuentra a paz y salvo con Club A” and “Que Club A con Nit xxxxxxxxxxx se encuentra a paz y salvo con el Player E por todo concepto laboral, prestacional, contractual y legal”. Free translation into English: “that Mr. Player E has fulfilled all his obligations towards Club A” and “that Club A with Nit xxxxxxxxxxx has fulfilled all its obligations towards the footballer Player E, regarding labour, benefit, contractual and legal”. 9. The Football Federation of country D informed FIFA that the player was registered with the Respondent on 13 March 2015 as a professional. 10. According to the information contained in the TMS, the Respondent belonged to the category III within UEFA (indicative amount of EUR 30,000 per year) during the season when the player was registered with it. 11. On 6 July 2015, the Respondent contested the claim of the Claimant and attached a copy of the settlement agreement dated 29 May 2014. 12. In particular, the Respondent was of the opinion that said agreement establishes that i.) the Claimant has terminated the employment contract without just cause and ii.) the Claimant has confirmed that it will not have any financial claims. Finally, the Respondent mentioned that the player guaranteed that the Claimant would not claim any compensation. II. Considerations of the DRC judge 1. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (DRC) judge (hereinafter also referred to as DRC judge) analysed whether he was competent to deal with the case at hand. In this respect, he took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 17 June 2015. Consequently, the 2015 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: Procedural Rules) is applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 of the 2014 and 2015 Procedural Rules). 2. Subsequently, the DRC judge referred to art. 3 par. 1 and 2 of the Procedural Rules, which states that the DRC judge shall examine its jurisdiction in light of art. 24 par. 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2015). In accordance with art. 24 par. 1 and par. 2 lit. ii. in connection with art. 22 lit. d) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, the DRC judge is competent to decide on the present matter relating to training compensation between clubs belonging to different associations. 3. Furthermore, the DRC judge analysed which edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, he confirmed that in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (editions 2014 and 2015), and considering that the player was registered with the Respondent on 13 March 2015, the 2014 edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: the Regulations) is applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance. 4. The competence of the DRC judge and the applicable regulations having been established, the DRC judge entered into the substance of the matter. In doing so, the DRC judge started by acknowledging the above-mentioned facts of the case as well as the documents contained in the file. However, the DRC judge emphasised that in the following considerations he will refer only to the facts, arguments and documentary evidence which he considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand. 5. First of all, the DRC judge took note that the Claimant asserted that it was entitled to receive training compensation from the Respondent in the amount of EUR 132,500 plus 5% interest indicating that the player was registered in March 2015 with the Respondent a category III club. 6. Equally, the DRC judge noted that the Respondent contested the Claimant’s entitlement to claim any training compensation at all. In particular, the Respondent argued that the Claimant has terminated the employment contract signed with the player without just cause and is therefore, not entitled to claim any training compensation as established in art. 2 par. 2 i. of the Annexe 4 of the Regulations. Moreover, the Respondent insisted that the Claimant has waived its entitlement to training compensation by contractually confirming that it will not have any financial claims. Finally, the DRC judge also noted that the Respondent mentioned that the player guaranteed that the Claimant would not claim any compensation. 7. In this respect, the DRC judge emphasised that both parties referred to the settlement agreement dated 29 May 2014 signed between the Claimant and the player, to substantiate their positions. On one hand, the Claimant referred to said agreement and argued to be entitled to its proportion of training compensation being the player’s former club and, on the other hand, the Respondent referred to said agreement to proof that the Claimant terminated the player’s contract without just cause and waived its right to claim training compensation and hence is not entitled to any compensation in connection with the player’s registration. 8. As a consequence of the aforementioned consideration, the DRC judge established that first and foremost he had to analyse the nature of the settlement agreement dated 29 May 2014. In this respect, the DRC judge noted that the heading of said agreement is “Certificado de Paz y Salvo” which corresponds to a certificate of “good standing” or “debt free” certificate, meaning that the obligations between the contractual parties have been fulfilled until the termination of the contract. Moreover, the DRC judge took due note that based on said agreement it is clear that a) the contractual parties are the player and the Clamant, b) the contact was terminated by mutual agreement (cf. point I.7 above) and c) that both parties, i.e. the Claimant and the player are “debt free” from each other (cf. point I.8 above). 9. Also, the deciding authority deemed appropriate to underline that neither did the Respondent refer to a particular clause of the agreement nor provide any other piece of evidence to corroborate its argument that Claimant has terminated the employment contract signed with the player without just cause or has waived its entitlement to training compensation. 10. Finally, the DRC judge noted that anyway said agreement is only legally valid between the player and the Claimant and has no reference to the topic of training compensation. Therefore, the DRC judge conclude that based on the said agreement he cannot establish that the Claimant has waived its right to claim training compensation. The DRC judge finds that the Respondent failed to substantially discharge its burden of proving the alleged i) unjustified termination of the employment contract by the Claimant and ii) the Claimant’s waiver. 11. For all of the above, the DRC judge holds that the Claimant is entitled to training compensation for the Player E. Hence, it is now for the deciding body to decide on the amount of training compensation due by the Respondent to the Claimant. 12. Having established the above, the DRC judge, and hereby referring to the rules applicable to training compensation, started by stating that, as established in art. 20 of the Regulations as well as in art. 1 par. 1 of Annexe 4 in combination with art. 2 of Annexe 4 of the Regulations, training compensation is payable, as a general rule, for training incurred between the ages of 12 and 21, when a player is registered for the first time as a professional before the end of the season of the player’s 23rd birthday or when a professional is transferred between clubs of two different associations before the end of the season of the player’s 23rd birthday. 13. In this respect, the DRC judge recalled that the player was registered with the Claimant as from 1 January 2010 until 29 May 2014 as a professional and, thereafter, the next club with which the player was registered was the Respondent. 14. In view of the above, the DRC judge concurred that the player’s last club prior being registered with the Respondent on 13 March 2015 as a professional was the Claimant. Consequently, the DRC judge decided that the Respondent shall, in principle, pay training compensation in accordance with art. 20 of the Regulations to the Claimant. 15. Turning its attention to the calculation of training compensation, the DRC judge referred to art. 5 par. 1 and 2 of Annexe 4 to the Regulations, which stipulates that, as a general rule, to calculate the training compensation due to a player’s former club, it is necessary to take the costs that would have been incurred by the new club if it had trained the player itself. 16. In continuation, the DRC judge recalled that the player was born on 10 March 1993 and the football season in country B starts on 1 January and ends on 31 December of each year. 17. On account of the above, the DRC judge considered that the Claimant is, thus, entitled to receive training compensation for the period as from 1 January 2010, season of the player’s 17th birthday, until 29 May 2014, season of the player’s 21st birthday. 18. Equally, the DRC judge recalled that the Football Federation of country D informed FIFA that the player was registered with the Respondent on 13 March 2015 as a professional and that according to the information contained in the TMS, the Respondent belonged to the category III (indicative amount of EUR 30,000 per year) at that time. 19. Furthermore, and considering art. 3 par. 1 sent. 2 of Annexe 4 of the Regulations, which stipulates that the amount payable is calculated on a pro rata basis according to the period of training that the player spent with each club, the DRC judge concluded that the effective period of time to be considered in the matter at stake corresponds to 4 full seasons, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 and 5 months of the 2014 season. 20. In view of all of the above, the DRC judge decided to accept the Claimant’s claim and held that the Respondent is liable to pay the amount of EUR 132,500 to the Claimant as training compensation in relation to registration of the player as a professional with the Respondent. 21. Moreover, taking into consideration the Claimant’s claim as well as art. 3 par. 2 of Annexe 4 of the Regulations, the DRC judge decided that the Respondent has to pay interest at 5% p.a. over the amount payable as training compensation as of 12 April 2015 until the date of effective payment. 22. Lastly, the DRC judge referred to art. 25 par. 2 of the Regulations in conjunction with art. 18 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules, according to which, in proceedings before the DRC judge relating to disputes regarding training compensation and the solidarity mechanism, costs in the maximum amount of CHF 25’000 are levied. The relevant provision further states that the costs are to be borne in consideration of the parties’ degree of success in the proceedings and that, in accordance with Annexe A of the Procedural Rules, the costs of the proceedings are to be levied on the basis of the amount in dispute. 23. In respect of the above, the DRC judge held that the amount to be taken into consideration in the present proceedings is EUR 132,500 related to the claim of the Claimant. Consequently, the DRC judge concluded that the maximum amount of costs of the proceedings corresponds to CHF 15,000 (cf. table in Annexe A). 24. As a result, and taking into account the particularities of the present matter as well as the degree of success, the DRC judge determined the costs of the current proceedings to the amount of CHF 10,000 and shall be borne by the Respondent. III. Decision of the DRC judge 1. The claim of the Claimant, Club A, is accepted. 2. The Respondent, Club C, has to pay to the Claimant, within 30 days as of the date of notification of the present decision, the amount of EUR 132,500 plus 5% interest p.a. on said amount as of 12 April 2015 until the date of effective payment. 3. If the aforementioned sum plus interest is not paid within the stated time limit, the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to FIFA’s Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision. 4. The final costs of the proceedings in the amount of CHF 10,000 are to be paid by the Respondent, within 30 days of notification of the present decision as follows: 4.1.The amount of CHF 7,000 has to be paid to FIFA to the following bank account with reference to case nr. xxxxxxxxxx: UBS Zurich Account number 366.677.01U (FIFA Players’ Status) Clearing number 230 IBAN: CH27 0023 0230 3666 7701U SWIFT: UBSWCHZH80A 4.2.The amount of CHF 3,000 has to be paid directly to the Claimant. 5. The Claimant is directed to inform the Respondent immediately and directly of the account number to which the remittance is to be made and to notify the DRC judge of every payment received. ***** Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy): According to art. 67 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives). The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following: Court of Arbitration for Sport Avenue de Beaumont 2 1012 Lausanne Switzerland Tel: +41 21 613 50 00 Fax: +41 21 613 50 01 e-mail: info@tas-cas.org www.tas-cas.org For the DRC judge: Markus Kattner Acting Secretary General