F.I.F.A. – Players’ Status Committee / Commissione per lo Status dei Calciatori – coach disputes / controversie allenatori (2016-2017) – fifa.com – atto non ufficiale – Decision 22 November 2016

Decision of the Single Judge of the of the Players’ Status Committee

passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 22 November 2016,

by

Mr Geoff Thompson (England),

Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee,

on the claim presented by the coach

Coach A, country B,

as “Claimant”

against the club

Club C, country D

as “Respondent”

regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties.

I. Facts of the case

1. On 26 October 2015, the Coach A from country B (hereinafter: the Claimant) and the Club C from country D (hereinafter: the Respondent) signed an employment contract (hereinafter: the contract) valid as of the date of signature until 25 June 2016, for the position of coach of the club’s first team.

2. As per art. III of the contract, the Respondent had to cover the cost of the international American school for the Claimant’s children and provide him and his family with a maximum of four Business class air-tickets.

3. Pursuant to article IV of the contract, the Claimant was to receive a total fixed-remuneration amounting to USD 2,160,000 net, broken-down as follows:

 USD 270,000 net as sign-on fee;

 USD 1,890,000 net as total salary, payable at the end of each month.

4. Article V (General Provisions) of the contract provided a “penalty for the termination of this contract, by the 1st party [i.e. the Respondent], during the next 8 (Eight) months is established in the amount remaining to be paid until the end of the contract.

In case of non-payment by the 1st party [i.e. the Respondent] of 3 or more months’ salary the 2nd party [i.e. the Claimant] will be entitled to cancel the contract but he will maintain the right to receive the payment of the remaining amounts.

If the 1st party [i.e. the Respondent] terminates the contract before its due date then it shall provide a Business class air tickets for the 2nd party [i.e. the Claimant] and his family back to his country.

In case the 2nd party [i.e. the Claimant] terminates the contract prematurely, then he shall bear air-ticket cost for himself and his family unless the contract was terminated for a breach of the contract due to the first party [i.e. the Respondent].”

5. The contract stated that “In case of any dispute between the two parties (Football Association of country D) and Federation International Football Association (FIFA) are the appropriate governing body to settle the dispute”.

6. On 11 February 2016, the Respondent announced on its official Twitter account that the parties agreed to put an end to the contract, and subsequently, on 18 February 2016, that Mr E was named new head coach of the club.

7. On 13, 18, 19, 20 and 21 February 2016, the Claimant wrote to the Respondent in order to underline that he was still bound by a valid employment contract with it, that no termination agreement had been signed by the parties yet, nor the Respondent had sent any termination letter to him, and that the message posted on its official Twitter account was not correct and was misleading. Moreover, the Claimant reminded the Respondent that he remained at its disposal as per the contract as well as that he reserved his rights to seek compensation because of the damages caused by his current situation. Finally, the Claimant urged the Respondent to comply with its contractual and economic obligations as per the contract, failing which he would terminate the contract and refer the matter to the relevant judicial body of FIFA (note: letters on file).

8. On 22 February 2016, the parties concluded a termination agreement, which stipulated inter alia the following:

“D. The Coach [i.e. the Claimant] has fulfilled all his contractual duties and obligations to the Club [i.e. the Respondent] (…). There are no contestations or complaints against the Coach, his behaviour and his conduct in and off the pitch”;

“E. The club [i.e. the Respondent] is in breach of its financial obligations vis-à-vis the Coach [i.e. the Claimant]. In fact, with reference to art. IV of the employment contract, the sole amount of the signing on fee, November 2015’s monthly salary (i.e. 270.000 $) was paid to the Coach”.

9. The termination agreement further stipulated that “the Club [i.e. the Respondent] expressly acknowledges that it has to pay to the Coach [i.e. the Claimant]:

- A Remaining amount of 270,000 $ NET related to the overdue salary of the month of December 2015;

- The amount of 75,000 € NET which corresponds to 84,564 $ as reimbursement for the fees for the international American school for the coach’s children;

- A compensation for the premature termination of the Employment Contract considering the serious image damages suffered by the coach for loss of sport opportunities which is mutually established by the Parties in 1,130,000 $ NET.

Therefore, the club shall pay only the total amount of 1,400,000 $ NET plus 75,000 € NET which corresponds to 84,564 $ to the [Claimant], as follows:

- 784,564 $ NET no later than 30 March 2016;

- 700,000 $ NET no later than 15 May 2016.”

10. Art. 6 of the termination agreement provided that “Each party confirms and acknowledges that it has read and understood the present termination agreement, and that this agreement is signed voluntarily and by its duly authorised representatives”.

11. Art. 11 of the termination agreement stated that “In case of delay or non-payment of any of the amounts due under [point I.9 above], the [Claimant] shall be entitled to claim all the remaining amounts indicated in article 5 of the Employment Contract before the relevant sports and ordinary judicial bodies.”

12. As per art. 15 of the termination agreement, “This Agreement shall be governed by, and construed and interpreted in accordance with the FIFA regulations and, additionally, Swiss law in order to fill any gap”.

13. The termination agreement also foresaw that the “club [i.e. the Respondent] shall provide the coach [i.e. the Claimant] and his family with Business class air tickets in order to go back to their home country”.

14. According to the termination agreement, “Disputes arising out of this termination agreement shall be subject, in first instance, to the exclusive jurisdiction of the relevant FIFA competent body, namely the FIFA Players Status Committee, pursuant to the relevant provisions of FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, or of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) in Lausanne, Switzerland”.

15. On 4 April 2016, the Claimant put the Respondent in default of payment of the first instalment of USD 784,564 as foreseen in the termination agreement, as well as the balance for the three flight tickets which were not booked in business class, granting the Respondent ten days to remedy the default, the failure of which would lead the Claimant to take legal actions.

16. On 20 April 2016, the Claimant lodged a complaint before FIFA against the Respondent, claiming that the latter did not comply with its contractual obligations insofar as the coach only received one monthly salary, out of eight. Moreover, the Claimant sustained that the first instalment as foreseen in the termination agreement had not been paid either.

17. Furthermore, the Claimant argued that the incorrect announcement of the mutual termination of the contract on the Respondent’s Twitter account and in the media, the appointment of the new head coach on 18 February 2016 as well as the non-payment of his salary for more than three months, entitled him to terminate the contract with just cause. However, despite the alleged repeated contractual breaches by the Respondent, the Claimant stressed out that he remained at the Respondent’s disposal to perform his duties.

18. In addition, the Claimant underlined that he agreed to sign the termination agreement, subject to the Respondent complying with the schedule of payment foreseen in the said agreement (cf. point I.9 above). In this regard, the Claimant maintained that the Respondent’s alleged failure to pay the instalments as set forth in the termination agreement resulted in the application of art. 11 of such agreement which, according to the Claimant, granted him the right to claim, in addition to the amounts indicated in the termination agreement (cf. point I.9 above), all the remaining amounts as stipulated in art. V of the contract.

19. With regard to the flight tickets in business class to be provided by the Respondent as per the termination agreement (cf. point I.13. above), the Claimant alleged that, on 22 February 2016, the Respondent sent the relevant flight tickets via e-mail. However, the Claimant argued that only two out of the five flight tickets were booked in business class, each of the business flight tickets amounting to 10,093. In particular, the Claimant underlined that the flight tickets in economy class were allocated to two of his children, respectively in the amount of 2,157 and 1,780, and to an alleged member of the coach’s family, Mrs F, in the amount of 2,157.

20. Consequently, the Claimant requested the total amount of USD 3,111,564, plus 5% interest p.a. as of 20 April 2016, broken-down as follows:

 USD 1,890,000 as the “remaining amount” of the contract corresponding to the outstanding salaries from December 2015 to February 2016 as well as the remaining salaries from March to June 2016, as per art. V of the contract and art. 11 of the termination agreement;

 USD 1,130,000 as compensation foreseen in the termination agreement for “the premature termination” of the contract;

 USD 84,564 corresponding to the fees for the international school of the coach’s children, as established in the termination agreement;

 24,185, corresponding to approx. USD 7,000, as balance for the flight tickets in business class for the coach’s family (i.e. 16,249 for the children + 7,936 for Mrs F).

The Claimant further requested that the Respondent bore the full costs of the present proceedings according to FIFA Procedural Rules.

21. In its reply, the Respondent first of all argued that the “penalty clause” (i.e. art. V of the contract) was unenforceable since it should be considered too excessive, one-sided and not liquidated. Moreover, the Respondent alleged that, by signing the termination agreement, and agreeing to mitigate the amounts originally as foreseen in the contract, the Claimant renounced his right for any payment in accordance with such penalty clause.

22. In addition, the Respondent interpreted art. 11 of the termination agreement as, in case of delay or non-payment of any of the amounts due in the termination agreement, the termination agreement should be null and void and the Claimant shall claim all remaining amounts indicated in art. V of the contract. In other words, the parties have no rights under the rescinded termination agreement and the parties are restored to their original rights as provided in the terms of the contract.

23. In any event, the Respondent underlined that the termination agreement was null and void since it had been signed by a representative of the Respondent who had not been authorised in law, nor possessed the delegated power to conclude the termination agreement, because of the Respondent’s administrative dissolution based on its 2/3 resigned members of the boards. The Respondent further stressed that the terms of the termination agreement, especially the clause relating to the compensation for “premature termination” of the contract, were drafted by the Claimant in bad faith and manipulated by the latter to obtain any unlawful provision contrary to the real approach of the said termination agreement, i.e. to respect the payments schedule without the Respondent making concessions. Therefore, the Respondent deemed that the termination agreement shall be rescinded based on fraud.

24. The Respondent also refuted the Claimant’s allegations pertaining to the publications on Twitter and informed that it did not have an official Twitter account, nor did it terminate the contract on the said social network, as alleged by the Claimant. The Respondent albeit referred to a meeting held on 11 February 2016 with the Claimant in order to reach an agreement to terminate the contractual relationship due to poor performances and in order to avoid any further bad results.

25. Besides, the Respondent asserted that the Claimant’s claim for compensation as to “the premature termination” of the contract, as foreseen in the termination agreement, was in fact a damage clause and therefore should not be awarded.

26. Alternatively, in the event FIFA deemed that art. V of the contract shall be enforceable, the Respondent “preserved [its] right to cease paying any of the coach’s salary”, taking into account that the latter had stopped to provide his services as head coach, without the termination by the Respondent of his contract. Moreover, the Respondent alleged that the compensation for breach of contract should be calculated in accordance with art. 77 of country D’s law, which stated that “the club’s liability to the employee shall be limited in this regard to an amount equal to two (2) months of his current wages”.

27. In view of the aforementioned, the Respondent considered that the Claimant was entitled to the outstanding salary from December 2015 to February 2016 and a compensation for breach of contract corresponding to two monthly salaries; this is, in total USD 1,350,000 not including the school fees.

28. In this context, the Respondent requested the present proceedings to be suspended in order to allow the parties to proceed with the mediation after the election of the new members of the board of the Respondent.

29. In his replica, the Claimant emphasised that the lack of performance is not a just cause for a club to unilaterally terminate the contract and that, in any event, the Respondent had acknowledged that it had no complaints against the Claimant, his behaviour or his conduct on and off the pitch, as per lit. D of the termination agreement.

30. Furthermore, the Claimant referred to the Respondent’s Twitter account, which allegedly still states last changes of the Respondent, for instance the presentation of the new head coach, Mr G, on 25 June 2016. The Claimant also referred to the description of the account itself which reads as “Official Account of Club C of country D” and which contains the direct link to the official twitter account of the Respondent in country D’s language.

31. As to the Respondent’s allegations regarding the validity of the termination agreement, and the unlawful enforcement of the alleged “penalty clause” as set forth to art. V of the contract, the Claimant argued that all agreements were negotiated, agreed and signed by the parties on the Respondent’s letterhead. In particular, the Claimant pointed out that such agreement was signed by the Respondent’s General Secretary, who had the relevant position at the time of the signature and to date, and who also signed the Respondent’s statement of defence to the present claim in front of FIFA. The Claimant also recalled the content of art. 6 of the termination agreement and, therefore, rejected the said allegations of fraud.

32. With regard to the Respondent’s request for the suspension of the proceedings, the Claimant alleged that the election for the Respondent’s board members had no influence whatsoever on the pending case and, in addition, there was no evidence submitted by the Respondent regarding its alleged dissolution. The Claimant further stressed that there was no interruption of the Respondent’s administrative and sporting activities since it played all the Champions’ League group stage games and reached the final of the Cup and provided, in this regard, a summary of the Respondent’s matches played from February 2016 until the end of the sporting season 2015-2016.

33. Moreover, referring to art. 15 of the termination agreement, the Claimant recalled that the parties agreed upon the applicable law and country D’s law was not included. The Claimant also referred to art. 5 of the contract as to the compensation due for the termination of the contract by the Respondent or termination of the contract with just cause by the Claimant, which corresponds to the residual value of the contract.

34. Finally, the Claimant underlined that the Respondent regularly and intentionally violated the principle of contractual stability in its contractual relationships with clubs, players and coaches. In this regard, the Claimant listed pending cases before the relevant FIFA deciding bodies, Asian Football Confederation bodies and CAS, whereby the club is the “debtor party” in default.

35. In this context, the Claimant upheld his claim in full.

36. In spite of having been invited to do so, the Respondent did not submit any additional comments.

37. Upon FIFA’s request, the Claimant confirmed that, on 10 June 2016, he signed a contract with the club from country H, Club I, valid as of the date of signature until 31 December 2018, i.e. 30 months. The contract states that the Claimant is entitled to a fixed-remuneration of EUR 416,667 per month, equivalent to USD 473,500.

II. Considerations of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee

1. First of all, the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee (hereinafter also referred to as: the Single Judge) analysed whether he was competent to deal with the matter at hand. In this respect, he took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 20 April 2016. Consequently, the Single Judge concluded that the 2015 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules) is applicable to the matter in hand (cf. art. 21 of the Procedural Rules).

2. Subsequently, the Single Judge referred to art. 3 par. 1 and 2 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed that in accordance with art. 23 par. 1 and 4 in combination with art. 22 lit. c) of the 2016 edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, he is competent to deal with the matter at stake.

3. Furthermore, the Single Judge analysed which edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, he referred, on the one hand, to art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the 2016 edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, and on the other hand, to the fact that the present claim was lodged with FIFA on 20 April 2016. In view of the foregoing, the Single Judge concluded that the 2015 edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: the Regulations) is applicable to the case at hand as to the substance (cf. art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations).

4. The competence of the Single Judge and the applicable regulations having been established, and entering into the substance of the matter, the Single Judge started by acknowledging the above-mentioned facts as well as the documentation contained in the file. However, the Single Judge emphasised that, in the following considerations, he will refer only to the facts, arguments and documentary evidence which it considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand.

5. In this respect and in a first instance, the Single Judge acknowledged that, on 26 October 2015, the Claimant and the Respondent concluded an employment contract valid as from the date of signature until 25 June 2016.

6. Equally, the Single Judge took note that, on 22 February 2016, the parties signed an agreement regarding the termination of the contract and, in particular, agreed upon the payment by the Respondent of the total amount of USD 1,484,564 payable in two instalments, i.e. respectively USD 784,564 by 30 March 2016 and USD 700,000 by 15 May 2016.

7. Referring to said termination agreement, the Single Judge drew its attention to the fact that the Respondent challenged its validity considering that it had been signed by a representative of the club who had not been authorised in law and had been drafted by the Claimant in bad faith and manipulated by the latter to obtain unlawful provisions.

8. On the other hand, the Single Judge observed that the Claimant held that the relevant termination agreement was valid, mainly referring to its art. 6, according to which “Each party confirms and acknowledges that it has read and understood the present termination agreement, and that this agreement is signed voluntarily and by its duly authorised representatives”.

9. On account of the above, the Single Judge was eager to underline that the above-mentioned agreement bears the signature of both parties, in particular the General Secretary of the Respondent who also signed the statement of defence of the Respondent in front of FIFA. In this respect, the Single Judge deemed that the Respondent was thus fully aware of the content of the agreement at the time of the signature and should not have agreed to sign a document should it restrict its rights. In other words, the Single Judge deemed that the Respondent could not, after having concluded the agreement, contest the content of said agreement.

10. Therefore, taking into account art. 6 of the termination agreement, the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee readily accepted that the parties had indeed mutually agreed upon the termination of the contract by means of the said document signed on 22 February 2016, and that the total amount of USD 1,484,564 foreseen in the relevant termination agreement was thus to be paid by the Respondent, the first instalment of which falling due on 30 March 2016.

11. In this respect, the Single Judge observed that it had remained uncontested by the Respondent that the amount set forth in the termination agreement had remained unpaid. The Single Judge further noted that, on 4 April 2016, the Claimant put the Respondent in default for the non-payment of the first instalment, default notice which remained unanswered by the Respondent.

12. In view of the above, the Single Judge concluded that he did not find any valid reason or any sufficient evidence for the non-payment of the total amount of USD 1,484,564 and, therefore, it could be established that the Respondent had failed to pay to the Claimant the amount as agreed upon between the parties in the termination agreement. At this point, the Single Judge went on to deliberate the consequences of the failure of payment by the Respondent.

13. To this end, the Single Judge referred to art. 11 of the termination agreement which stipulates that “In case of delay or non-payment of any of the amounts due under [point I.9 above], the [Claimant] shall be entitled to claim all the remaining amounts indicated in article 5 of the Employment Contract before the relevant sports and ordinary judicial bodies.”

14. In this regard, the Single Judge was of the opinion that such clause implied that in case of a breach of the supplementary agreement, i.e. in case of non-payment of the relevant instalments within the stated time-limit, the employment contract becomes enforceable again and, therefore, the Claimant should be entitled to claim amounts, however solely based on the employment contract.

15. As a consequence, the Single Judge decided that the Claimant’s request for amounts deriving from the termination agreement should be rejected.

16. Subsequently, the Single Judge concurred that the Respondent had first of all to fulfil its obligations as per the employment contract, in accordance with the general legal principle of pacta sunt servanda. Consequently, the Single Judge decided that the Respondent must pay to the Claimant the remuneration that was outstanding at the time of the termination, i.e. 22 February 2016. Based on the allegations and the documentation provided by the Claimant, and as acknowledged by the Respondent in its statement of defence, the Single Judge came to the conclusion that the Respondent was liable for the payment of USD 540,000, corresponding to the outstanding salary for December 2015 and January 2016.

17. With regard to the Claimant’s claim for reimbursement of the fees for the international school of his children, the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee alluded to art. III of the contract, according to which the Respondent contractually agreed to cover such fees as well as the termination agreement, by means of which the Respondent acknowledged the amount of USD 84,564 as being due to the Claimant for the relevant fees. Therefore, the Single Judge decided that the Respondent had to reimburse the Claimant the amount of USD 84,564.

18. As a consequence, the Single Judge concluded that the Respondent was liable to pay the total amount of USD 624,564 to the Claimant, corresponding to the outstanding remuneration as per the employment contract up to 22 February 2016.

19. In addition, taking into consideration the Claimant’s claim for interest and in accordance with his well-established jurisprudence, the Single Judge decided to award the Claimant interest at the rate of 5% p.a. as of 20 April 2016 over the above-established outstanding remuneration.

20. In continuation, the Single Judge decided that, taking into consideration the longstanding jurisprudence of the Players’ Status Committee, the Claimant was entitled to receive compensation for the Respondent’s breach in the contractual relationship with the Claimant.

21. In application of the relevant jurisprudence, the Single Judge held that it first of all had to clarify whether the pertinent employment contract contained any clause, by means of which the parties had beforehand agreed upon a compensation payable by the contractual parties in the event of breach of contract. In this respect, the Single Judge acknowledged that the contract established in its art. V that in case of repeated default of payment by the Respondent or in case of early termination of the contract by the Respondent, the Claimant was entitled to claim the residual value of the contract.

22. In this regard, the Single Judge took note that the Respondent disputed the application of art. V of the contract in order to calculate the relevant compensation and referred to art. 77 of country D’s law which provided that “the club’s liability to the employee shall be limited in this regard to an amount equal to two (2) months of his current wages”.

23. At this point, the Single Judge deemed it of utmost importance to recall that when deciding a dispute before the Players’ Status Committee, FIFA’s regulations prevail over any national law chosen by the parties. In this regard, the Single Judge emphasised that the main objective of the FIFA regulations is to create a standard set of rules to which all the actors within the football community are subject to and can rely on. This objective would not be achievable if the Single Judge would have to apply the national law of a specific party on every dispute brought to it. This should apply, in particular, also to the termination of a contract. In this respect, the Single Judge wished to point out that it is in the interest of football that the termination of a contract is based on uniform criteria rather than on provisions of national law that may vary considerable from country to country. Therefore, the Single Judge deemed that it was not appropriate to apply the principles of a particular national law to the termination of the contract but rather the Regulations, general principles of law and, where existing, the well-established jurisprudence of the Players’ Status Committee’s.

24. As a consequence to the above, the Single Judge was of the opinion that the calculation of any potential compensation would have to be assessed taking into consideration the jurisprudence of the Players’ Status Committee’s.

25. In doing so, the Single Judge first turned his attention to the remuneration and other benefits due to the Claimant under the existing contract. The Single Judge pointed out that the contract signed between the Claimant and the Respondent was to run for another 5 months, i.e. until 25 June 2016, after the termination of the contract occurred. Furthermore, the Single Judge understood that for this relevant period, the Claimant was entitled to receive a total salary of USD 1,350,000. Consequently, the Single Judge concluded that the amount of USD 1,350,000 served as the basis for the final determination of the amount of compensation for breach of contract.

26. In continuation, the Single Judge remarked that the Claimant had found new employment on 10 June 2016, for which he earned a monthly fixed-remuneration in the amount of EUR 416,667, equivalent to USD 473,500.

27. Consequently, in accordance with the constant practice of the Players’ Status Committee and the general obligation of the coach to mitigate his damages, the remuneration as indicated in the new employment contract shall be taken into account, on a pro rata basis, in the calculation of the amount of compensation for breach of contract.

28. In view of all of the above, the Single Judge decided that the Respondent had to pay the amount of USD 1,113,250 to the Claimant, which was considered by the Single Judge to be a reasonable and justified amount as compensation for breach of contract.

29. Furthermore, the Single Judge went on to examine the Claimant’s petition for the payment of the balance for the flight tickets in business class for the Claimant’s family members. Referring to art. III of the contract as well as the documentation submitted by the Claimant, the Single Judge decided to reject part of the Claimant’s request pertaining to the flight ticket of the alleged third family member, Mrs F, emphasising that, as per the clear contractual clause, the Claimant could only be covered four business class air-tickets for him and his family. Consequently, the Single Judge awarded the Claimant the balance for the flight tickets in business class for his children, amounting to 16,249.

30. In addition, as per the Claimant’s claim for interest and in accordance with his longstanding jurisprudence, the Single Judge granted the Claimant interest at the rate of 5% p.a. as of 20 April 2016 on the respective amount of USD 1,113,250 and 16,249.

31. Finally, the Single Judge referred to art. 25 par. 2 of the Regulations in combination with art. 18 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules, according to which, in proceedings before the Players’ Status Committee, including its Single Judge, costs in the maximum amount of CHF 25,000 are levied. The relevant provision further states that the costs are to be borne in consideration of the parties’ degree of success in the proceedings.

32. In respect of the above and taking into account that the claim of the Claimant has been partially accepted, the Single Judge concluded that the both parties had to bear the costs of the current proceedings before FIFA. Furthermore and according to Annexe A of the Procedural Rules, the costs of the proceedings are to be levied on the basis of the amount in dispute. On that basis, the Single Judge held that the amount to be taken into consideration in the present proceedings was over CHF 200,001. Consequently, the Single Judge concluded that the maximum amount of costs of the proceedings corresponds to CHF 25,000.

33. As a conclusion, in view of the circumstances of the present matter, the Single Judge determined the costs of the current proceedings amounting to CHF 25,000. Consequently, the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee decided that the amount of CHF 10,000 has to be paid by the Claimant and the amount of CHF 15,000 by the Respondent in order to cover the costs of the present proceedings.

III. Decision of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee

1. The claim of the Claimant, Coach A, is partially accepted.

2. The Respondent, Club C, has to pay to the Claimant, Coach A, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision, outstanding remuneration amounting to USD 624,564, plus 5% interest p.a. on the said amount as from 20 April 2016 until the date of effective payment.

3. The Respondent, Club C, has to pay to the Claimant, Coach A, within 30 days as from the date of notification of the present decision, compensation for breach of contract in the respective amount of USD 1,113,250 and 16,249, plus 5% interest p.a. on the said amounts as from 20 April 2016 until the date of effective payment.

4. If the aforementioned amounts, plus interests as established above, are not paid within the aforementioned deadline, the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to FIFA’s Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision.

5. Any further claims lodged by the Claimant, Coach A, are rejected.

6. The final costs of the proceedings in the amount of CHF 25,000 are to be paid within 30 days as from the date of notification of the present decision, as follows:

6.1 The amount of CHF 10,000 by the Claimant, Coach A, to FIFA. Given that the Claimant, Coach A, has already paid the amount of CHF 5,000 as advance of costs at the start of the present proceedings, the Claimant, Coach A, shall pay the additional amount of CHF 5,000 as costs of the proceedings.

6.2 The amount of CHF 15,000 by the Respondent, Club C, to FIFA.

6.3 The abovementioned amounts as foreseen in points 6.1 and 6.2 have to be paid to FIFA to the following bank account with reference to case nr. XXXX:

UBS Zurich

Account number 366.677.01U (FIFA Players’ Status)

Clearing number 230

IBAN: CH27 0023 0230 3666 7701U

SWIFT: UBSWCHZH80A

7. The Claimant, Coach A, is directed to inform the Respondent, Club C, immediately and directly of the account number to which the remittances under points 2. and 3. are to be made and to notify the Players’ Status Committee of every payment received.

*****

Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy):

According to art. 58 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives).

The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following:

Court of Arbitration for Sport

Avenue de Beaumont 2

1012 Lausanne - Switzerland

Tel: +41 21 613 50 00

Fax: +41 21 613 50 01

e-mail: info@tas-cas.org

For the Single Judge of the

Players’ Status Committee:

Marco Villiger

Deputy Secretary General

Encl. CAS directives