F.I.F.A. – Players’ Status Committee / Commissione per lo Status dei Calciatori – coach disputes / controversie allenatori (2017-2018) – fifa.com – atto non ufficiale – Decision of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee passed in Zurich, Switzerland, 23 January 2018

Decision of the Single Judge

of the Players’ Status Committee

passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 23 January 2018,

by

Geoff Thompson (England)

Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee,

on the claim presented by the coach

Coach A, Country B

as “Claimant”

against the club

Club C, Country D

as “Respondent”

regarding an employment-related

contractual dispute between the parties.

I. Facts of the case

1. On 10 October 2014, the Coach of Country B, Coach A (hereinafter: the Claimant) and the Club of Country D, Club C (hereinafter: the Respondent), entered into an employment contract (hereinafter: the contract) drafted in English and valid as from 11 October 2014 until 15 June 2015.

2. According to art. 3 of the contract, the Claimant was entitled to the following remuneration:

 EUR 12,000 per month in the period October 2014 – June 2015, payable on the 9th of the following month;

 EUR 120,000 bonus if the team wins the Championship of Country D, edition 2014-2015;

 EUR 30,000 bonus if the team ranks 2nd in the Championship of Country D, edition 2014-2015;

 EUR 35,000 bonus if the team ranks 1st or 2nd in the Europa League group, edition 2014-2015 and then EUR 10,000 every time the team goes through each round;

 EUR 1,000 bonus per point if the team ranks 1st at the end of the 2014-2015 season (valid for the points won starting as of 11 October 2014).

3. Art. 3 of the contract further mentions that the above-mentioned amounts “represent net amounts, all the duties (social security and health insurance) and taxes, as well as any other contributions due to the state budgets, are at the club’s charge”.

4. Art. 3 of the contract also states that the Respondent shall supply the Claimant with an apartment, a company car and 8 round-trip flight tickets Capital E-Capital F.

5. Art. 11 of the contract reads as follows: “Any litigation occurred between the parties or in relation to this agreement, including the one referring to its validity, interpretation, enforcement or annulment, shall be amicably settled. Should the parties fail to reach an amicable settlement, then the litigations shall be submitted to the solution of the jurisdictional bodies of Football Federation G, Football League H and FIFA”.

6. The contract does not contain any contractual clause with respect to the early termination of the contract by either of the parties.

7. The parties equally signed a second contract drafted in Language of Country D and which, according to the Claimant, was signed only for registration purposes. According to the Claimant, this second contract contains the exact same provisions as the one drafted in English, save for the date of commencement of the contractual relationship, which is 7 November 2014 in the contract drafted in Language of Country D.

8. On 2 March 2015, the Respondent notified a decision taken by its President of the Board of Directors to the Claimant, whereby the Respondent was effectively terminating the employment relationship.

9. The termination notice reads inter alia as follows:

“(…) regarding the dismissal of the technical collective of trainers of the football team, among them being [the Claimant], too, as Main Coach, considering the fact that, in this moment, the team’s objectives for the season 2014/2015 are endangered – decides to dismiss [the Claimant] – Main Coach, in the tentation to reorganize the technical collective so that the team can achieve the goal of occupying the second rank in this Championship;

The board has established that [the Claimant] did not accomplished the aims in the short and medium term established through his employment contract and endangers seriously the objective for this season”.

10. On 27 March 2015, the Claimant lodged a claim against the Respondent in front of FIFA for breach of contract without just cause and outstanding salaries, making the following requests:

 to order the Respondent to pay him the amount of EUR 24,000 net as outstanding salaries for the months of January and February 2015 plus 5% interest p.a.;

 to order the Respondent to pay him the amount of EUR 36,000 as compensation for breach of contract plus 5% interest p.a.;

 to order the Respondent to pay the entire costs of the proceedings and to reimburse him any and all costs incurred by him.

11. In support of his claim, the Claimant explained that he was notified of the Board’s decision to terminate the contract by email. In his opinion, it is undisputed that the Respondent terminated the contractual relationship by means of such decision, arguing that the team’s objectives for the season 2014/2015 were endangered.

12. In this context, the Claimant referred to “the constant practice and well-established jurisprudence of the FIFA decision-making bodies”, according to which the argument of poor performance and failing to meet the team’s objectives does not, in principle, constitute a valid reason to unilaterally terminate an employment contract.

13. Furthermore, the Claimant pointed out that such decision to terminate the contract did not refer to any objective criteria while assessing a coach’s performance, together with the fact that the contract did not contain any relevant provision in this respect. Additionally, the Claimant alleged that at the time of termination the team was ranked second in the national championship.

14. The Claimant thus concluded that the Respondent terminated the contract without just cause.

15. In its reply to the Respondent, the club first contested the competence of FIFA to deal with the present matter. In this regard, the Respondent referred to art. 22 lit. c) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players and asserted that the Football Federation of Country D (Football Federation G) and the Football League of Country D (Football League H) dispose of “functioning independent jurisdictional commissions that, according to the applicable regulations, have fully and exclusive competence to hear any dispute or litigation arising between clubs in Country D and the players (sic) under contract with them”.

16. Equally, the Respondent put forward that the Regulations of the Football Federation G provide for a guarantee of a fair trial in front of the bodies of the Football Federation G and the Football League H. The Respondent also pointed out that “the members of the respective committees are not chosen by the parties, they are designated by the sportive forum (…) the members are independent even of the sportive forum that designate them (…)”.

17. Finally, the Respondent mentioned that “the first instance sentence can be appealed against in front of a different Football League H / Football Federation G committee, and the latter’s decision can be attacked in front of the CAS in Lausanne”.

18. The Respondent concluded that the claim submitted by the Claimant was incorrectly lodged in front of FIFA. Moreover, the Respondent alleged that Law of Country D, i.e. the Regulations of Country D and common law, should apply to the present dispute.

19. As to the merits of the matter, the Respondent underlined that the team finished second at the end of the 2013-2014 Championship of Country D, first tier (Liga 1), and that it was only natural that it should try to obtain at the least the same classification, if not a better one, in the following season.

20. The Respondent went on to explain that the Claimant sat on the team’s bench as coach for 15 games, between 19 October 2014 and 1 March 2015, period in which the team scored a number of only 4 victories, 8 draws and suffered 3 defeats. “Thus, out of a maximum of 45 points, the team obtained only 20 points, insufficient for any team aspiring to a top place on the chart at the end of the season”.

21. As a conclusion, the Respondent held the view that it was forced to proceed to the termination in view of the aforementioned circumstances. It is the Respondent’s opinion that the termination cannot be considered to have been without just cause, but should rather be seen as an attempt to improve the team’s results.

22. In his replica, the Claimant rejected the club’s position as to FIFA’s alleged lack of jurisdiction. Indeed, the Claimant stated that the contract clearly provides for the jurisdiction of FIFA to resolve any disputes that may arise in the employment relationship. Therefore, the Claimant contended that he had every right to select to resort to FIFA’s judicial bodies for the resolution of the present dispute.

23. Equally, the Claimant maintained that, contrary to the Respondent’s allegations, FIFA Regulations apply in the present matter.

24. Finally and as to the merits, the Claimant referred once again to the constant practice and well-established jurisprudence of the FIFA decision-making bodies, and submitted that a player or a coach’s performance in principle does not constitute a valid reason to unilaterally terminate an employment contract.

25. The Claimant pointed out that the Respondent does not contest that at the time of termination the latter club was ranked second in the national championship. He added that neither the decision of 2 March 2015 nor the contract define the goals and objectives of the club or the obligations of the Claimant with respect to the Respondent’s ranking and achievements during the season. In this connection, the Claimant pointed out that the Respondent had never warned him nor complained to him prior to the termination of the contract.

26. Therefore, the coach maintained his claim fully.

27. In its final position, the Respondent alleged that it had made the following payments to the Claimant and provided some partial payment receipts in this connection:

 53,232, equivalent to EUR 12,000, payment made by the company, Company J (hereinafter: the company) on behalf of the club on 7 November 2015;

 53,858, equivalent to EUR 12,000, payment made by the company on behalf of the Respondent on 16 January 2015;

 54,022, equivalent to EUR 12,000, payment made by the company on behalf of the Respondent on 20 January 2015;

 EUR 12,000 on 23 November 2015;

 54,384, equivalent to EUR 12,000, payment made by the Football League of Country D on behalf of the Respondent on 22 January 2016.

28. Invited by FIFA to provide his comments as to the allegations of the Respondent regarding some payments made to him, the Claimant contested the contents of the Respondent’s latest submission, arguing that not all documents were translated into an official language of FIFA and some documents were only partly legible.

29. Furthermore, the Claimant argued that the Respondent had failed to submit evidence as to the nature of the alleged payments. According to the Claimant, there was no explanation on the bank transfer receipts, let alone in the Respondent’s submission, as to whether the payments correspond to the outstanding amounts requested or whether they correspond to previously owed amounts, which the Claimant strongly suggests since the dates on which the payments were made are dates mostly before the filing of the claim.

30. The Claimant further underlined that the Respondent appeared to claim that the requested salaries of January and February 2015 were fully paid on 16 and 20 January 2015, i.e. before they were even due, and that the requested compensation was paid in three different installments corresponding to monthly salaries on 7 and 23 November 2015, and 22 January 2016. The Claimant thus held that it makes no sense that the club fully paid up the said requested amounts before they were even due under the contract.

31. The Claimant concluded that the Respondent was knowingly trying to mislead the Players’ Status Committee by presenting receipts of payments made under the contract for previously outstanding salaries.

32. Finally, the coach maintained that there is no evidence whatsoever in the submitted documents regarding any of the three alleged payments made on 16 and 20 January 2015 and on 7 November 2015.

33. As far as the two payments of 22 January 2016 and 23 November 2015 are concerned the Claimant admitted that the Respondent had successfully executed only one of these payments to him, namely the one executed on 23 November 2015, and provided the respective confirmation from his bank.

34. Consequently, the Claimant admitted having received one payment made on 23 November 2015 but denied having received all others.

35. The Claimant informed FIFA that following the termination of the contract by the Respondent, he had remained unemployed until 15 June 2015.

II. Considerations of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee

1. First of all, the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee (hereinafter: the Single Judge) analysed whether he was competent to deal with the present matter. In this respect, he took note that the matter was submitted to FIFA on 27 March 2015. Consequently, the 2014 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules) is applicable to the matter in hand (cf. art. 21 par. 2 and 3 of the Procedural Rules).

2. Subsequently, the Single Judge referred to art. 3 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed that in accordance with art. 23 par. 1 and 3 in combination with art. 22 lit. c) of the 2018 edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, he would in principle be competent to deal with the matter at stake, which concerns an employment-related dispute of an international dimension between a Coach of Country B and a Club of Country D.

3. That being said, the Single Judge duly noted that the Respondent had challenged his competence in the present matter, arguing that FIFA should not hear the present matter as the Football Federation of Country D (Football Federation G) and the Football League of Country D (Football League H) dispose of “functioning independent jurisdictional commissions that, according to the applicable regulations, have fully and exclusive competence to hear any dispute or litigation arising between clubs in Country D and the players (sic) under contract with them”.

4. Equally, the Respondent put forward that the Regulations of the Football Federation G provide for a guarantee of a fair trial in front of the bodies of the Football Federation G and the Football League H. The Respondent also pointed out that “the members of the respective committees are not chosen by the parties, they are designated by the sportive forum (…) the members are independent even of the sportive forum that designate them (…)”.

5. Finally, the Respondent mentioned that “the first instance sentence can be appealed against in front of a different Football League H / Football Federation G committee, and the latter’s decision can be attacked in front of the CAS in Lausanne”.

6. On the other hand, the Single Judge noted that the Claimant insisted on the competence of FIFA to adjudicate on the claim lodged by him against the Respondent.

7. Taking into account all the above, the Single Judge emphasised that in accordance with art. 22 lit. c) of the 2014 edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players it is competent to deal with a matter such as the one at hand, unless an independent arbitration tribunal guaranteeing fair proceedings exists at national level.

8. In relation to the above, the Single Judge also outlined that one of the basic conditions that needs to be met in order to establish that another organ than the Players’ Status Committee, including its Single Judge, is competent to settle an employment-related dispute between a club (or an association) and a coach of an international dimension, is that the jurisdiction of the relevant national arbitration tribunal derives from a clear reference in the employment contract.

9. Therefore, while analysing whether it was competent to hear the present matter, the Single Judge considered that it should, first and foremost, analyse whether the employment contract at the basis of the present dispute contained a clear jurisdiction clause.

10. In this respect, the Chamber recalled that art. 11 of the employment contract stipulates the following: “Any litigation occurred between the parties or in relation to this agreement, including the one referring to its validity, interpretation, enforcement or annulment, shall be amicably settled. Should the parties fail to reach an amicable settlement, then the litigations shall be submitted to the solution of the jurisdictional bodies of Football Federation G, Football League H and FIFA”.

11. Having examined the relevant provision, the Single came to the conclusion that art. 11 does not constitute a clear and exclusive jurisdiction clause in favour of one specific court of arbitration tribunal in Country D, since it refers to “the jurisdictional bodies of Football Federation G, Football League H”.

12. On the contrary, the Single Judge emphasised that art. 11 of the contract even makes a clear reference to the jurisdictional bodies of FIFA.

13. On account of all the above, the Single Judge established that the Respondent’s objection towards the competence of FIFA to deal with the present matter has to be rejected, and that the Single Judge is competent, on the basis of art. 22 lit. c) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, to consider the present matter as to the substance. Equally, the Singe Judge determined that the FIFA Regulations are applicable to the matter at hand.

14. Furthermore, the Single Judge analysed which edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, he confirmed that in accordance to art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the 2018 edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players and considering that the present claim was lodged with FIFA on 27 March 2015, the 2014 edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: the Regulations) is applicable to the present matter as to the substance.

15. His competence and the applicable regulations having been established, and entering into the substance of the matter, the Single Judge started by acknowledging the above-mentioned facts as well as the arguments and the documentation submitted by the parties. However, the Single Judge emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to the facts, arguments and documentary evidence, which it considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand.

16. In this regard, the Single Judge first recalled that the parties had signed two employment contracts, one on 10 October 2014, drafted in English, and another one drafted in Language of Country D, which the Claimant insists was signed for registration purposes only. The Single Judge was, at this stage, eager to emphasise that the Respondent did not contest the fact that the second contract drafted in Language of Country D was signed only for registration purposes. Therefore, the Single Judge understood that only the contract drafted in English (hereinafter: the contract) was enforceable between the parties and should be the only one to take into account for the assessment of the present matter.

17. In continuation, the Single Judge acknowledged that the contract was to run from 11 October 2014 until 15 June 2015 and that the Claimant would be entitled to the following remuneration:

 EUR 12,000 per month in the period October 2014 – June 2015, payable on the 9th of the following month;

 EUR 120,000 bonus if the team wins the Championship of Country D, edition 2014-2015;

 EUR 30,000 bonus if the team ranks 2nd in the Championship of Country D, edition 2014-2015;

 EUR 35,000 bonus if the team ranks 1st or 2nd in the Europa League group, edition 2014-2015 and then EUR 10,000 every time the team goes through each round;

 EUR 1,000 bonus per point if the team ranks 1st at the end of the 2014-2015 season (valid for the points won starting as of 11 October 2014).

18. The Single Judge further noted that it remained uncontested that on 2 March 2015, the Respondent notified a decision taken by its President of the Board of Directors to the Claimant, whereby the Respondent was effectively terminating the employment relationship. The letter in question mentioned that the said early termination occurred for the following reasons:

“(…) regarding the dismissal of the technical collective of trainers of the football team, among them being [the Claimant], too, as Main Coach, considering the fact that, in this moment, the team’s objectives for the season 2014/2015 are endangered – decides to dismiss [the Claimant] – Main Coach, in the tentation to reorganize the technical collective so that the team can achieve the goal of occupying the second rank in this Championship;

The board has established that [the Claimant] did not accomplished the aims in the short and medium term established through his employment contract and endangers seriously the objective for this season”.

19. As a consequence of the early termination of the contract, the Claimant lodged a claim for outstanding salaries and breach of contract, whereby he essentially claimed that the Respondent did not have a just cause to terminate the contract based on an alleged poor performance and failing to meet the team’s objectives. The Claimant highlighted that this is consistent with the jurisprudence of FIFA’s deciding bodies and that the contract did not contain any provision with regard to specific objectives he would have had to reach as coach.

20. The Respondent, on its part, argued that it had had a just cause to terminate the contract, precisely because the Claimant had, allegedly, failed to reach the team’s objectives for the season 2014/2015. The Respondent added that it was forced to proceed to the termination in view of the circumstances and that the decision to dismiss the Claimant should rather be seen as an attempt to improve the team’s results.

21. Irrespective of the arguments put forward by the Respondent, the latter, in its final position, alleged having made the following payments to the Claimant, without further explanation:

 53,232, equivalent to EUR 12,000, payment made by the company, Company J (hereinafter: the company) on behalf of the club on 7 November 2015;

 53,858, equivalent to EUR 12,000, payment made by the company on behalf of the Respondent on 16 January 2015;

 54,022, equivalent to EUR 12,000, payment made by the company on behalf of the Respondent on 20 January 2015;

 EUR 12,000 on 23 November 2015;

 54,384, equivalent to EUR 12,000, payment made by the Football League of Country D on behalf of the Respondent on 22 January 2016.

22. The Single Judge finally took note of the Claimant’s comments following the Respondent’s aforementioned allegations. In this regard, the Claimant held that the Respondent had not proven that the alleged payments were effectively made nor that they corresponded to the amounts claimed, while highlighting that the payment receipts provided were either partially translated or legible, or that, regarding the payments allegedly made on 16 January 2015, 20 January 2015 and on 7 November 2015, the Respondent had not provided any payment receipt. Notwithstanding, the Claimant confirmed having received the payment made on 23 November 2015 in the amount of EUR 12,000.

23. Having recalled the aforementioned, the Single Judge went on to establish whether the unilateral termination of the contract by the Respondent had occurred with or without just cause. In doing so, the Single Judge emphasised once again that, according to the Respondent’s own statement, such termination had occurred because of the Respondent’s dissatisfaction with the team’s sporting results. In this regard, the Single Judge was eager to recall its well-established jurisprudence, according to which the absence of sporting results cannot, as a general rule, constitute per se a reason to terminate a contractual relationship with just cause.

24. In view of the foregoing, the Players’ Status Committee concluded that the agreement had been unilaterally terminated without just cause by the Respondent on 2 March 2015 as unsatisfactory results, which are of a highly subjective nature, could not justify unilaterally terminating the relevant employment contract. Equally, the Single was eager to stress that the premature termination of an employment contract should only be an ultima ratio measure.

25. The Single Judge continued its deliberations by examining the consequences of such unilateral termination without just cause by the Respondent. In doing so, the Single Judge first reverted to the Claimant’s claim for outstanding salaries, namely the Claimant requested EUR 24,000 net as outstanding salaries for the months of January and February 2015 plus interest, as well as EUR 36,000 as compensation for breach of contract plus interest.

26. It is at this point that the Single Judge addressed the Respondent’s allegations with regard to some payments made to the Claimant (cf. points I.27 and II.20 above). According to the Respondent’s statement, the latter would have made various payments to the Claimant between 16 January 2015 and 22 January 2016, i.e. over the course of one year, with some payments allegedly made prior to the contract termination and some afterwards, including during the course of the proceedings pending in front of FIFA, and totaling EUR 60,000.

27. In this context, the Single Judge was eager to recall the rule of burden of proof mentioned under art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules, according to which a party claiming a right on the basis of alleged facts carries the burden of proof. Thus, the Single Judge held that the Respondent carried the burden to prove that the alleged payments were effectively made towards the Claimant and if so, that they indeed corresponded to the amounts claimed.

28. In this regard, the Single Judge paid close attention to the supporting documents which the Respondent provided in support of its allegations and noted that these were rather vague and only partially translated into one of the official languages of FIFA. While recalling that he could only take into account documents duly translated into one of the four official languages of FIFA (English, Spanish, French or German; cf. art. 9 par. 1 e) of the Procedural Rules), the Single Judge underlined that the documents provided by the Respondent appeared to correspond to some payment orders without confirmation of debit. What is more, the respective payment orders were made on random dates that did not match the contractual terms whatsoever; thus, the Single Judge could not establish with certainty to which part of the Claimant’s remuneration these amounts should be allocated. Finally, the Single Judge observed that, with respect to some alleged payments having been made on 7 November 2015 and 16 January 2015, the Respondent had not provided any supporting documents at all.

29. Notwithstanding the above, the Single Judge was eager to stress that the Claimant had admitted having received one payment out of the ones the Respondent alleged having made to him, that is, the payment dated 23 November 2015 in the amount of EUR 12,000.

30. In light of all the above, and having carefully studied the entire documentation presented to him as well as the parties’ respective positions, the Single Judge could only ascertain that the Respondent had made a payment in the amount of EUR 12,000 to the Claimant, payment which the Claimant confirmed having received. Therefore, the Single Judge decided to deduct the amount of EUR 12,000 from the amount of EUR 24,000, which the Claimant claimed as outstanding remuneration.

31. As a consequence, and in light with the principle of pacta sunt servanda, the Respondent is liable to pay the Claimant the amount of EUR 12,000 as outstanding remuneration. Furthermore, and according to the constant practice of the Single Judge as well as the Claimant’s respective request, interest of 5% p.a. shall apply on the aforesaid amount as of the date of the claim, i.e. 27 March 2015, until the date of effective payment.

32. The Single Judge continued its deliberations by recalling that the Respondent had terminated the contract without just cause; therefore, the Respondent is liable to pay compensation to the Claimant. In this regard, the Single Judge reverted to the Claimant’s claim for compensation for breach of contract in the amount of EUR 36,000 plus interest. In this regard, the Single Judge, referring to its well-established jurisprudence, came to the conclusion that, in light of the residual value under the employment contract that was breached for the period as of the termination on 2 March 2015 and the normal expiry of the contract on 15 June 201, as well as considering that the Claimant had not been able to find new employment following the termination of the contract without just cause and could therefore not mitigate his damages, the amount of EUR 36,000 is deemed fair and appropriate.

33. Therefore, the Single Judge decided that the Respondent is also liable to pay the Claimant the amount of EUR 36,000 as compensation for breach of contract without just cause. Equally, and in accordance with the Claimant’s request and the constant practice of the Single Judge, the Respondent must pay interest at a rate of 5% p.a. on the aforesaid amount as of the date of the claim, i.e. 27 March 2015, until the date of effective payment.

34. With regard to the Claimant’s request to order the Respondent to reimburse him any and all costs incurred by him, the Single Judge decided to reject such claim in accordance with art. 18 par. 4 of the Procedural Rules and the Single Judge’s respective longstanding jurisprudence in this regard.

35. Furthermore, the Single Judge concluded its deliberations by establishing that any of the Claimant’s further claims are rejected.

36. Lastly, the Single Judge referred to art. 25 par. 2 of the Regulations in combination with art. 18 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules, according to which, in proceedings before the Players’ Status Committee, including its Single Judge, costs in the maximum amount of CHF 25,000 are levied.

37. Considering that the claim of the Claimant has been partially accepted, the Single Judge concluded that both parties have to bear the costs of the current proceedings before FIFA. Furthermore and according to Annexe A of the Procedural Rules, the costs of the proceedings are to be levied on the basis of the amount in dispute. On that basis, the Single Judge held that the amount to be taken into consideration in the present proceedings is EUR 60,000. Consequently, the Single Judge concluded that the maximum amount of costs of the proceedings corresponds to CHF 10,000.

38. In conclusion, in view of the circumstances of the present matter and considering that the case did pose some factual and legal difficulty but was adjudicated by the Single Judge and not by the Players’ Status Committee in corpore, the Single Judge determined the costs of the current proceedings to the amount of CHF 8,000. Furthermore, the Single Judge decided that the amount of CHF 2,000 has to be paid by the Claimant and the amount of CHF 6,000 by the Respondent in order to cover the costs of the present proceedings.

III. Decision of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee

1. The claim of the Claimant, Coach A, is partially accepted.

2. The Respondent, Club C, has to pay to the Claimant, Coach A, within 30 days as from the date of notification of the present decision, outstanding remuneration in the amount of EUR 12,000 plus 5% p.a. on the said amount as from 27 March 2015 until the date of effective payment.

3. The Respondent, Club C, has to pay to the Claimant, Coach A, within 30 days as from the date of notification of the present decision, compensation for breach of contract in the amount of EUR 36,000 plus 5% p.a. on the said amount as from 27 March 2015 until the date of effective payment.

4. If the aforementioned sums plus interest are not paid within the aforementioned deadline, the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to FIFA’s Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision.

5. The final costs of the proceedings in the amount of CHF 8,000 are to be paid by both parties within 30 days as from the date of notification of the present decision as follows:

5.1. The Claimant, Coach A, must pay the amount of CHF 2,000. Considering that the Claimant already paid an advance of costs in the amount of CHF 2,000 at the start of the present proceedings, the Claimant is exempted from paying the aforementioned procedural costs.

5.2. The Respondent, Club C, must pay the amount of CHF 6,000 to the following bank account with reference to case nr. XXX:

UBS Zurich

Account number 366.677.01U (FIFA Players’ Status)

Clearing number 230

IBAN: CH27 0023 0230 3666 7701U

SWIFT: UBSWCHZH80A

6. The Claimant, Coach A, is directed to inform the Respondent, Club C, immediately and directly of the account number to which the remittances under points 2. and 3. above are to be made and to notify the Players’ Status Committee of every payment received.

Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy):

According to article 58 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives).

The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following:

Court of Arbitration for Sport

Avenue de Beaumont 2

1012 Lausanne

Switzerland

Tel: +41 21 613 50 00

Fax: +41 21 613 50 01

e-mail: info@tas-cas.org

For the Single Judge of the

Players’ Status Committee

Omar Ongaro

Football Regulatory Director

Encl. CAS directives