F.I.F.A. – Players’ Status Committee / Commissione per lo Status dei Calciatori – coach disputes / controversie allenatori (2017-2018) – fifa.com – atto non ufficiale – Decision of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee passed in Zurich, Switzerland, 17 April 2018

Decision of the Single Judge

of the Players’ Status Committee

passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 17 April 2018,

by

Geoff Thompson (England)

Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee,

on the claim presented by the coach

Coach A, Country B

as “Claimant”

against the

Football Association of Country C

as “Respondent”

regarding an employment-related

dispute between the parties.

I. Facts of the case

1. On 23 March 2015, the coach of Country B, Coach A (hereinafter: the Claimant), the Ministry of Sports and Culture of Country C (hereinafter: the Ministry) and the Football Association of Country C (hereinafter: the Respondent) concluded an employment contract (hereinafter: the first contract), valid from 23 March 2015 until 23 March 2016.

2. On 18 March 2016, the Claimant, the ministry and the Respondent concluded another employment contract (hereinafter: the second contract), valid from 24 March 2016 until 23 March 2018, by means of which the Respondent employed the Claimant as head coach of its senior national team and in accordance with which the Claimant was inter alia entitled to receive as remuneration from the “Employer” the monthly salary of USD 11,000.

3. As mentioned in the contract, “the Employer” had to “provide and pay for accommodation related to any team camps in the city of Country C; and any and all official business undertaken by the employee outside the city of Country C” (cf. clause 8.3 of the second contract) as well as to pay for one return flight ticket “city of Country C – Country B – Country C” in economy class per year and “the tickets for coming to Country C and returning home in Country B at the end of the contract, in economy class” (cf. clauses 9.1. and 9.2. of the second contract).

4. The Claimant was also entitled to receive from the “Employer” “travel allowances of $ 500 for official mission outside the country” (cf. clause 9.3. of the second contract).

5. Equally, the second contract provided for the Claimant to receive the following bonuses:

“(i) Official competitions:

(ii) FIFA World Cup Qualifiers, Football Continental competition, Continental Championship.

US Dollars 2000$ net for a win, nothing on a draw;

(iii) Unofficial competitions & International friendlies,

Tournament D, Tournament E and any other friendly games,

US Dollars 1000$ net for a win, nothing on a draw;

(iv) U23 team

Win friendly game: 700 USD net

Win qualification game: 1,000 USD net

Nothing on a draw;

All bonuses shall be paid within thirty calendar days of the match. (..)”.

6. As specified in clause 20.1. of the second contract, in case of an early termination of the contract by the “Employer”, the latter had to “give one month notice in writing or as an alternative may give one month salary in lieu of notice as way of severance but termination (..) must be due to a breach of clause 20.4. [cf. point I.9 below] and the employer must set out their reasons in full in writing”.

7. Additionally, clause 20.3. of the second contract clarified that “any termination of the Contract by the Employer can only take effect where all payments due to the employee (..) are correct and up to date prior to any termination letter”.

8. In accordance with clause 20.2. of the second contract, in case of an early termination of the contract by the Claimant, the latter had to “give one month notice in writing or as an alternative may give one month salary in lieu of notice as way of severance”.

9. Clause 20.4 of the second contract stated that: “if the employee in the event of a breach of contract or gross misconducts the Employer has the right to terminate the employee’s contract provided that where such termination is based on conduct and capacity. Specifically, where the coach [i.e. the Claimant] in [sic] reasonably found to: (a) poor performance in comparison to his duties (i.e. Losing the four most recent consecutive competitive FIFA registered matches); (b) be guilty of any gross misconduct; (c) disobeys the reasonable and lawful orders of the Football Association of Country C [i.e. the Respondent] or any person given authority over him by the Executive Committee of the Association; (d) Break any of the stipulations or contracts on his part herein contained; (e) if is convicted with serious crime; (f) fail to demonstrate the expertise and skill expected of a National football head Coach”.

10. The second contract does not include a clause related to compensation for breach of contract by either party.

11. In continuation, clause 6.1. of the second contract provided for the Statutes and Constitution of the Respondent to prevail over the second contract “or apply as the case may be” in case of conflict “or in the event of there being no provision in respect of any matter in this contract”.

12. Similarly, in accordance with clause 18 of the second contract, Law of Country C is the applicable law (cf. clause 18.1.) and the Courts of Country C had “exclusive jurisdiction” (cf. clause 18.2.).

13. Clause 19 of the second contract further established that “all dispute arisen out of or in connection with this contract which cannot be settled in an amicable manner within thirty (30) days shall be referred to courts of the Country C and to the Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) or the Courts of the Country C[sic]”

14. By means of a correspondence dated 18 August 2016 (hereinafter: the termination letter), the ministry terminated the second contract “as provided in the part 20.4 paragraph (a) [cf. point I.9 above] where it is stipulated that “This contract can be terminated by the Employer if the National Head Coach manifests poor performance in comparison to his duties” because you have not been able to fulfil all expectations defined in the part 3 of your Employment contract. The Employer is ready to honour what is provided in part 20.1. [cf. point I.6 above] and the notice shall take effect upon reception date”.

15. On 30 January 2017, the Claimant lodged a claim in front of FIFA against the Respondent for breach of contract and requested – after amending its claim on 10 February 2017 – the payment of the total amount of USD 269,872.15 as compensation, plus 5% interest p.a. as of 19 August 2016.

16. In his claim, the Claimant first insisted on the competence of FIFA to decide on the matter at stake on the basis of art. 22 c) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players as well as of clause 19 of the second contract. In this respect, the Claimant held the non-applicability of the provision included in clause 18.2. of the second contract (cf. point I.12 above) stressing that art. 59 par. 2 of the FIFA Statutes prohibited the “recourse to ordinary courts of law” in “football related disputes». The Claimant also alleged that no independent arbitration tribunal guaranteeing fair proceedings existed in Country C.

17. As to the substance of the case, the Claimant explained that, in August 2016, before the termination letter was issued, several letters had been exchanged between the parties in connection with, inter alia, the allegation made by the Respondent that the performance of the team had declined, an allegation which the coach always denied.

18. According to the Claimant, during the 17 months in which he had been employed by the Respondent, the team’s performance had considerably improved.

19. The Claimant further alleged having reminded the federation on several occasions about its failure to comply with several contractual obligations, which might have “harmed the ability of the team to better prepare for the important Football Continental competition qualification matches”. The following contractual obligations are mentioned by the Claimant in this regard: “provide budget to (i) employ an Assistant Coach with specialisation in Strength & Conditioning and Football Specific Fitness training, (ii) employ a Performance Analyst, and (iii) purchase performance analysis and scouting software (..)”. In this context, the Claimant referred to clause 10.9 of the agreement which states the following duties of the Respondent: “provide the employee with the means and budget to appoint additional staff to, and secure additional resources for, the Technical Team as outlined in Schedule A, attached to the Contract”. As specified in Schedule A of the agreement, the Respondent had to “ 1. provide a budget of US $5000 per month, plus housing for the employment of an Assistant Coach with a specialisation in Strength & Conditioning and Football Specific training. (..) The appointment of this person shall be at the Head Coaches discretion (..). 2. Provide a budget of US $2000 per month, plus housing for the employment of a Performance Analyst. (..) The appointment of this person shall be at the Head Coaches discretion (..). 3. Provide a budget of US $6000 per year, available at the beginning of each year of this Contract, for the purchase of Performance Analysis and Scouting software/licence. The decision on appropriate software package shall rest with the Head Coach”.

20. The Claimant also explained that he contested the termination letter and tried in vain to reach an amicable settlement of the dispute with the Respondent

21. In continuation, the Claimant maintained that, when the second contract was terminated, several of his salaries had been outstanding. As a result of this and considering that the relevant salaries were only paid to him after the termination letter had been issued, the Claimant, referring to clause 20.3. of the second contract (cf. point I.7 above) deemed that the relevant termination of the contract had “not taken effect”.

22. The following payments were allegedly made in this context by the Respondent: USD 1,000, corresponding to the partially outstanding salary of April 2016, on 21 October 2016; “the difference in exchange rate due to the payment in currency of Country C instead of USD in the amount of USD 621 was paid on 28 September 2016”, corresponding to the June 2016 salary; “the payment for one month notice period in the amount of USD 11,000 was paid on 29 September 2016”; “the pro rata salary for August 2016 in the amount of USD 6,600 was paid on 21 October 2016”.

23. In addition, the Claimant pointed out that because on 18 August 2016, “only 3 competitive FIFA registered matches had been played within the period of the 2016 contract” the relevant requirement of clause 20.4. (a) of the second contract (cf. point I.9 above) had not been met and, therefore, the termination of contract by the Respondent had occurred without just cause.

24. Equally, the Claimant mentioned that, by offering him a second contract, the Respondent clearly indicated that it was satisfied with his performance.

25. Finally, the Claimant added that, in accordance with the CAS jurisprudence, “poor performance of an employee has never been considered a reason for just cause to terminate an employment contract because the employee’s only duty is to provide his working time to the employer, however, he does not owe a result.”

26. In view of all the aforementioned, the Claimant deemed that the second contract was terminated without just cause by the Respondent and, as a result, he was entitled to claim, based on the FIFA regulations and, subsidiarily, on law of Country C, the total amount of USD 269,872.15, corresponding to:

- USD 213,362.15 as his salary until the end of the second contract, i.e. from “19.08.2016 – 23.03.2018”, i.e. USD 264,000 due for the entire duration of the contract (24 x USD 11,000) – USD 50,627.85 already received;

- USD 24,000 corresponding to an estimation of the bonuses due until the end of the second contract, considering USD 48,000 as the maximum amount due between 1 September 2016 and 1 March 2018 and “a sensitive ratio of expected wins for the remainder of the contract based on his track record so far while being employed by the Respondent”, of 50%;

- USD 10,500, corresponding to an estimation of the expenses due until the end of the second contract, i.e. 1 October 2016 - USD 500 “Travel Allowance August Friendly Game”; 1 October 2016 - USD 500 “Travel Allowance September Football Continental competition Game v Country F”; 1 November 2016 - USD 500 “Travel Allowance for October Friendly Games (if played away)”; 1 December 2016 - USD 500 “Travel Allowance for November Friendly Games (if played away)”; 1 January 2017 - USD 500 “Travel Allowance for Tournament D 2016 in Nov/Dec”; 1 January 2017 - USD 1,500 “Annual Return Flight Allowance for Year 1 of Contract”; 1 April 2017 - USD 500 “Travel Allowance for March Friendly Game (if played away)”; 1 July 2017 - USD 500 “Travel Allowance June Football Continental competition qualifier”; 1 July 2017 - USD 500 “Travel Allowance June Continental Championship qualifier”; 1 September 2017 USD 500 “Travel Allowance for August Continental Championship qualifier”; 1 October 2017 - USD 500 “Travel Allowance for September Friendly Games (if played away)”; 1 November 2017 - USD 500 “Travel Allowance for October Friendly Games (if played away)”; 1 December 2017 – USD 500 “Travel Allowance for November Friendly Games (if played away)”; 1 January 2018 – USD 500 “Travel Allowance for Tournament D 2017 in Nov/Dec”; 1 January 2018 – USD 1,500 “Annual Return Flight Allowance for Year 2 of Contract”; 24 March 2017 – USD 1,000 “End of contract Flight Allowance”. In this context, the Claimant clarified that, in accordance with the second contract the “expenses are considered a part of the salary (..) they are not a reimbursement for actual expenses”. Similarly, the Claimant explained that “the assumption of away games (..) are reasonable based on experience in the past”;

- USD 22,000 as compensation for “unjust termination” in accordance with Law of Country C, corresponding to two monthly salaries.

27. The claim of the Claimant was sent to the Respondent by DHL on 13 June 2017 and received by the latter on 15 June 2017. FIFA granted the Respondent a deadline of 20 days to reply, i.e. until 5 July 2017 (Wednesday).

28. The response of the Respondent was received by FIFA on 12 July 2017. According to the documentation on file, such response was posted by the Respondent by DHL on 6 July 2017, i.e. after the 20 days deadline given by FIFA to reply had already expired on 5 July 2017.

29. The parties were informed about the content of art. 9 par. 3 of the Rules Governing the Procedure of the Players’ Status Committee and of the Dispute Resolution Chamber on 15 November 2017, when the investigation in the relevant proceedings was closed.

30. Asked about his labour situation as of 19 August 2016, the Claimant informed FIFA on 12 February 2018 that, between 19 July and 23 October 2017 he had worked for the club of Country G, Club H, earning the total amount of EUR 17,500 gross. The Claimant further specified that “This is the only income the Claimant has received since departing with the Football Association of Country C. He is currently without job”.

II. Considerations of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee

1. First of all, the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee (hereinafter also referred to as: the Single Judge) analysed whether he was competent to deal with the matter at hand. In this respect, the Single Judge referred to art. 21 par. 2 and 3 of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (edition 2017 and 2018). Consequently, and since the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 30 January 2017, the Single Judge concluded that the 2017 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules) is applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 of the Procedural Rules).

2. Subsequently, the Single Judge referred to art. 3 par. 1 and 2 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed that in accordance with art. 23 par. 1 and 3 in combination with art. 22 lit. c) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (editions 2016 and 2018), he shall adjudicate on an employment-related dispute between a club or an association and a coach that has an international dimension.

3. As a consequence, the Single Judge is the competent body to decide on the present litigation involving a coach of Country B and the Football Association of Country C regarding the possible breach of an employment contract.

4. In continuation, the Single Judge analysed which edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, he referred, on the one hand, to art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the 2016 and 2018 editions of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, and on the other hand, to the fact that the present claim was lodged with FIFA on 30 January 2017. In view of the foregoing, the Single Judge concluded that the 2016 edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: the Regulations) is applicable to the case at hand as to the substance (cf. art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations).

5. His competence and the applicable regulations having been established, and entering into the substance of the matter, the Single Judge started his analysis by acknowledging the facts of the case and the arguments of the parties as well as the documents contained in the file.

6. In this respect, the Single Judge acknowledged that, on 18 March 2016, the Claimant, the Ministry and the Respondent had concluded an employment contract valid from 24 March 2016 until 23 March 2018, which provided for the Claimant to receive from the Ministry and the Respondent a monthly salary of USD 11,000 as well as several bonuses depending on the results of the team. In the same context, the Single Judge also took into account the fact the Ministry and the Respondent had to “provide and pay for accommodation related to any team camps in city of Country C; and any and all official business undertaken by the employee outside city of Country C” as well as to pay for one return flight ticket “city of Country C – Country B – Country C” in economy class per year and “the tickets for coming to Country C and returning home in Country B at the end of the contract, in economy class”. Furthermore, the Single Judge noted that the Claimant was also entitled to receive from the “Employer” “travel allowances of $ 500 for official mission outside the country”.

7. Equally, the Single Judge observed that the contractual relationship between the parties was terminated on 18 August 2016 by means of a correspondence signed by the Ministry as well as by the Respondent, in which it was clarified that the relevant termination had been caused by the poor performances of the Claimant.

8. Subsequently, the Single Judge remarked that, in his claim to FIFA, the Claimant had accused the Respondent of having terminated their contractual relationship without just cause. The Single Judge also noted that, because of the aforementioned, the Claimant deemed being entitled to claim from the Respondent the payment of compensation for breach of contract in the total amount of USD 269,872.15, plus 5% interest p.a. as of 19 August 2016.

9. In addition, the Single Judge noticed that, for its part, the Respondent, in spite of having been invited to do so, failed to present its response to the claim of the Claimant within the relevant time-limit. As a result, the Single Judge decided not to take into account the late reply of the Respondent and established that, in accordance with art. 9 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules, he shall take a decision upon the statements and documents presented by the Claimant only.

10. In view of all the aforementioned and after having carefully contemplated the submissions of the Claimant as well as the documentation at his disposal, the Single Judge deemed that the first question to be addressed in the present matter was whether the second contract was terminated with or without just cause by the Respondent on 18 August 2016.

11. For the sake of completeness of his analysis and before assessing the justice of the termination of the contract by the Respondent, the Single Judge deemed it important to point out that, in spite of the wording of clause 20.3 of the contract, which stipulated that “any termination of the Contract by the Employer can only take effect where all payments due to the employee (..) are correct and up to date prior to any termination letter”, and of the uncontested fact that the Claimant’s outstanding remuneration was only paid to him after the termination, the latter is considered as effective, as the Respondent’s clear intention was to put an end to the contractual relationship with the Claimant as from 18 August 2016.

12. Having said that, the Single Judge recalled that, in accordance with the termination letter of 18 August 2016, the second contract was terminated on the basis of the alleged poor performance of the Claimant. Hence, the Single Judge deemed that he had to examine whether such reason put forward by the Respondent to terminate the second contract could justify the termination of the contractual relationship between the parties by the latter or not. In this context, he also took note of the wording of clause 20.4 of the second contract, in particular of its letter a), which appears to allow the termination of the contract by the employer with just cause, in case of “poor performance” of the employee.

13. To that end, the Single Judge referred to his well-established jurisprudence which establishes that the absence of sporting results cannot, as a general rule, constitute per se a reason to terminate a contractual relationship with just cause. Consequently, clause 20.4 a) of the contract, being contrary to the longstanding jurisprudence of the Players’ Status Committee, cannot be considered as valid. As a result, the Single Judge decided that the termination of the contract by the Respondent had in casu occurred without just cause.

14. After having established the foregoing, the Single Judge went on analysing the consequences of the breach of contract without just cause committed by the Respondent. In this respect, the Single Judge reverted to the content of the second contract in order to identify whether the parties had agreed beforehand and in writing upon a valid clause stipulating the amount of compensation payable to the Claimant in case of breach of contract by the Respondent.

15. In this sense, the Single Judge took note of clause 20.2 of the second contract, which established that in case of an early termination of the contract by the “Employer”, the latter had to “give one month notice in writing or as an alternative may give one month salary in lieu of notice as way of severance but termination (..) must be due to a breach of clause 20.4. and the employer must set out their reasons in full in writing”.

16. Considering the previous considerations made in point II.13 above as to the invalidity of clause 20.4 of the second contract and the fact that clause 20.2 is directly connected to it, establishing in principle the payment of 1 monthly salary as compensation in case of termination by the Respondent based on the bad performance of the Claimant, the Single Judge concluded that such clause, for being linked to an invalid clause (20.4) and for establishing a clear disadvantage for the employee, cannot be considered to determine the amount of compensation due to the Claimant. Thus, the Single Judge concluded that the amount of compensation due to the Claimant by the Respondent for having breached the second contract had to be assessed in accordance with other criteria and in particular with the jurisprudence of the Players’ Status Committee.

17. In this respect, the Single Judge first established that the residual value of the second contract, from the date of termination until the original expiry date, according to the Claimant, amounted to USD 213,362.15 (cf. point I.26 above). Equally, the Single Judge verified as to whether the Claimant had signed a new employment contract after having been dismissed by the Respondent on 18 August 2016, by means of which he would have been enabled to reduce his loss of income. According to his constant practice, such remuneration under a new employment contract would be taken into account in the calculation of the amount of compensation for breach of contract in connection with the coach’s general obligation to mitigate his damages.

18. The Single Judge noted in this respect that, according to the Claimant´s own declaration, he had worked for the club of Country G, Club H, between 19 July and 23 October 2017, earning the total amount of EUR 17,500. In this context, the Single Judge further calculated that the sum of EUR 17,500 corresponded to approximately USD 20,205 on 19 July 2017.

19. In addition, the Single Judge recalled that the Claimant had admitted having already received from the Respondent the sum of USD 11,000 on 29 September 2016 as compensation in accordance with clause 20.1 of the second contract.

20. Considering all of the aforementioned and, in particular, considering the unjustified termination of contract by the Respondent, as well as taking into account the specific request of the Claimant and the fact that the latter had acknowledged having already received the amount of USD 11,000 from the Respondent as partial compensation after the termination of the contract had occurred as well as bearing in mind that the Claimant had earned the sum of approximately USD 20,205 between July and October 2017 with his new employer, the Single Judge, in accordance with his well-established jurisprudence, concluded that it was fair and reasonable that the Respondent should pay to the Claimant the amount of USD 182,000 as compensation for breach of contract.

21. Having established the aforementioned, the Single Judge turned his attention to the Claimant’s request to be awarded the additional amount of USD 24,000, corresponding to an estimation of the bonuses that he could have received from the Respondent until the end of the second contract, had his contractual relationship with the latter not been prematurely terminated.

22. In this regard, the Single Judge emphasized that, from his point of view, the payment and the amount of the aforementioned bonuses were linked to matches that were to take place in the future, i.e. after the termination of the second contract and, therefore, were fully hypothetical. Consequently, in accordance with his well-established jurisprudence, the Single Judge decided that such request of the Claimant had to be rejected.

23. In continuation and as to the Claimant’s additional request related to the payment of USD 10,500, corresponding to an estimation of the expenses that the Respondent would have had to pay him until the end of their contractual relationship, the Single Judge emphasized that, in accordance with the second contract and contrary to the allegation of the Claimant, this amount was also a hypothetical financial assessment of the Claimant’s future travel expenses, had the contract not been terminated prematurely. Therefore, the Single Judge decided to also reject this third request of the Claimant.

24. Nevertheless and in accordance with his well-established jurisprudence, taking into account clause 9.2. of the second contract, the Single Judge established that the Respondent had to pay to the Claimant the value of his flight ticket to return home after the termination of contract. In this respect, and on the basis of the information provided by FIFA Travel, the Single Judge concluded that the Respondent must pay to the Claimant as part of the compensation the additional amount of CHF 1,300, corresponding to the price of one one-way economy ticket Country C-Country B.

25. Subsequently and as to the Respondent’s request to be paid the additional amount of USD 22,000 as compensation in accordance with Law of Country C, the Single Judge recalled that no evidence had been provided by the Claimant in this regard. As a consequence and in line with art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules, which established that any party deriving a right from an alleged fact shall carry the burden of proof, the Single Judge decided that this request of the Claimant had to be rejected due to lack of proof or any contractual basis.

26. Finally and with regard to the Claimant’s claim for interest, the Single Judge, in accordance with his well-established jurisprudence, decided that the Respondent has to pay to the Claimant 5% interest p.a. on the amount of USD 182,000 and on the amount of CHF 1,300 as from 30 January 2017, i.e. the date of the Claimant’s claim, until the date of effective payment.

27. In view of all the aforementioned, the Single Judge concluded that the claim of the Claimant is partially accepted and that the Respondent has to pay to the Claimant compensation for breach of contract compensation for breach of contract in the amount of USD 182,000 and CHF 1,300 plus 5% interest p.a. on said amounts as from 30 January 2017.

28. Lastly, the Single Judge referred to art. 25 par. 2 of the Regulations in combination with art. 18 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules, according to which in the proceedings before the Players’ Status Committee and the Single Judge, costs in the maximum amount of CHF 25,000 are levied. The costs are to be borne in consideration of the parties’ degree of success in the proceedings and are normally to be paid by the unsuccessful party.

29. In this respect, the Single Judge reiterated that the claim of the Claimant is partially accepted and that the Respondent is the party at fault. Therefore, the Single Judge decided that the Claimant and the Respondent have to bear the costs of the current proceedings in front of FIFA.

30. Furthermore and according to Annexe A of the Procedural Rules, the costs of the proceedings are to be levied on the basis of the amount in dispute. Consequently and taking into account that the total amount at dispute in the present matter is higher than CHF 200,001, the Single Judge concluded that the maximum amount of costs of the proceedings corresponds to CHF 25,000.

31. In conclusion and in view of the amount of documentation that had to be analysed in the present matter but taking into account that the present decision was taken by the Single Judge and not by the Players’ Status in corpore, the Single Judge determined the costs of the current proceedings to the amount of CHF 25,000.

32. Consequently, both the Claimant has to pay the amount of CHF 5,000 and the Respondent has to pay the amount of CHF 20,000 in order to cover the costs of the present proceedings.

III. Decision of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee

1. The claim of the Claimant, Coach A, is partially accepted.

2. The Respondent, Football Association of Country C, has to pay to the Claimant, Coach A, within 30 days as from the date of notification of the present decision, compensation for breach of contract in the amount of USD 182,000 and CHF 1,300 plus 5% interest p.a. on said amounts as from 30 January 2017 until the date of effective payment.

3. If the aforementioned amounts, plus interest as established above, are not paid within the aforementioned deadline, the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to FIFA’s Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision.

4. Any other claims lodged by the Claimant, Coach A, are rejected.

5. The final costs of the proceedings in the amount of CHF 25,000 are to be paid by both parties, within 30 days as from the date of notification of the present decision, as follows:

5.1. The amount of CHF 5,000 has to be paid by the Claimant, Coach A. Considering that the latter already paid an advance of costs in the amount of

CHF 5,000 at the start of the present proceedings, the Claimant, Coach A, is exempted from paying the aforementioned costs of the proceedings.

5.2. The amount of CHF 20,000 has to be paid by the Respondent, Football Association of Country C, to FIFA to the following bank account with reference to case nr. XXX:

UBS Zurich

Account number 366.677.01U (FIFA Players’ Status)

Clearing number 230

IBAN: CH27 0023 0230 3666 7701U

SWIFT: UBSWCHZH80A

6. The Claimant, Coach A, is directed to inform the Respondent, Football Association of Country C, immediately and directly of the account number to which the remittances under point 2. above are to be made and to notify the Players’ Status Committee of every payment received.

*****

Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy):

According to art. 58 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives).

The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following:

Court of Arbitration for Sport

Avenue de Beaumont 2

1012 Lausanne

Switzerland

Tel: +41 21 613 50 00

Fax: +41 21 613 50 01

e-mail: info@tas-cas.org

_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Coach A, Country B / Football Association of Country C 15

For the Single Judge of the

Players’ Status Committee

Omar Ongaro

Football Regulatory Director

Encl. CAS directives