F.I.F.A. – Players’ Status Committee / Commissione per lo Status dei Calciatori – coach disputes / controversie allenatori (2017-2018) – fifa.com – atto non ufficiale – Decision of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee passed in Zurich, Switzerland, 11 July 2017

Decision of the Single Judge

of the Players’ Status Committee

passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 11 July 2017,

by

Geoff Thompson (England)

Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee,

on the claim presented by the coach

Coach A, Country B

as “Claimant / Counter-Respondent”

against the club

Club C, Country D

as “Respondent / Counter-Claimant”

regarding an employment-related

contractual dispute between the parties.

I. Facts of the case

1. On 5 December 2015, the Coach of Country B, Coach A (hereinafter: the Claimant / Counter-Respondent or the coach) lodged a claim with FIFA against the Club of Country D, Club C (hereinafter: the Respondent / Counter-Claimant or the club) for breach of contract and requested from the latter the payment of USD 763,636.36 as outstanding salaries, plus 5% interest p.a. as follows: on USD 190,909.09 as of 1 August 2015; on USD 190,909.09 as of 1 September 2015; on USD 190,909.09 as of 1 October 2015 and on USD 190,909.09 as of 1 November 2015.

2. In addition, the coach requested from the club the payment of USD 1,336,363.64 as compensation for having allegedly terminated their contractual relationship without just cause, plus 5% interest p.a. “since the submission of the present claim”.

3. The coach based his claim on a document entitled “Memorandum of Understanding” (hereinafter: the second contract) which he had allegedly concluded with the club on 8 June 2015 (cf. point I.14 below), after having been previously employed with the club for the 2014/2015 season.

4. According to the relevant document, which is on file and seems to have been signed by both the club and the coach, the club had hired the coach and “his technical staff for the season 2015-2016 starting from 1 July 2015” and had undertaken to pay a “salary package” of USD 2,800,000 as follows: USD 700,000 as signing on fee and “the rest monthly salary for the coach and his technical staff”.

5. In addition, it was specified that in case of an early termination of the contract by the club “before 01 January 2016”, the latter had to pay “3 months salary and a fine of 1 months salary” and “if the club decide to terminate the contract after the 01 January than the club will pay 3 months salary” (hereinafter: the compensation clause).

6. Equally, it was stated in the second contract that the coach “will not attend the start of the new season if the remaining bonus of the season 2014-2015 and the signing fee of the new season 2015-2016 is not paid before he fly back to Country D”.

7. As argued by the coach, although the club had paid the signing fee in full, it never proceeded with the payment of his first, second and third salaries before dismissing him without just cause at the end of October 2015.

8. In this respect, the coach provided FIFA with a letter dated 30 October 2015 (hereinafter: the second termination letter), by means of which the club “terminated the contract of Coach A and his staff with immediate effect”.

9. As mentioned in the same correspondence, the club thanked “Coach A and his staff for the significant contribution he has made to the club and express our gratitude for his hard work and commitment”.

10. According to the coach, he had tried to talk to the president of the club “in order to solve whatever situation that had led (..) to (..) such a decision, but this was in vain” as he was asked to “leave immediately the club and the country because the new coach with his team was already contacted and on their way to Country D.”

11. In continuation, the coach contested the validity of the compensation clause, arguing that the provision in question had been stipulated only in favour of the club “and therefore did not provide for the same rights for the parties”. Hence, the coach deemed that the compensation payable to him corresponded to the remaining value of the second contract.

12. In its response dated 31 January 2016, the club rejected the coach’s claim in its entirety and lodged a counterclaim against him.

13. In this respect, the club contested the validity of the second contract arguing that the claim of the coach was based on a forged document.

14. According to the club, the parties had only concluded one written employment agreement related to the 2014/2015 season (hereinafter: the first contract), as the coach had allegedly refused to sign a new contract for the following season “despite being asked (..) to do so”.

15. The club provided FIFA with a copy of the first contract, dated 1 November 2014 and valid for “one football season”, which bears the signature of both parties. The document in question provided for the coach to receive from the club the total amount of USD 1,300,000 as follows: USD 450,000 as signing fee and USD 850,000 “as salaries distributed in the 8 months of this contract”.

16. Furthermore, the first contract specified that in case of early termination by either party, a one-month written notice had to be respected and a three months’ salary penalty would fall due (hereinafter: the termination clause).

17. As further alleged by the club, it had transferred to the coach “in good faith (..) almost the half remuneration paid in advance of the full contract of the season 2015/2016”, i.e. USD 700,000, because it had “reasonably expected the coach to sign a new employment for a fixed term on the same or similar terms as the previous contract”.

18. Pursuant to the club, the relevant advance was paid to the coach in order for the latter to “refund to a bank” a “personal loan in Country B” and then join the team in the “Country F camping where the team has an important commitment for the Cup G 2015 game held in Capital H on 12 August 2015”. According to the club, “since the bank procedure may requires some time for performance” the coach had “failed deliberately to join the team which is considered as an act of an illegal exaction”.

19. Equally, the club maintained having agreed with the coach to “renew the contract for the (..) football season 2015/2016 for the same period under the same the initial terms of the previous employment contract but with the following conditions:

a) To pay (..) an advance of almost one season (i.e. the club pay 700,000 USD) (..) with the same terms monthly salary. (..)

b) To define the Good Cause for the related to business needs and goals and that poor performance to maintain to be in the same position on of table like the previous season and that it shall be a good cause to terminate the relationship between the parties prematurely if the coach failed to manage the club for the fixed objective to be champion as the club should maintain at least the top position in the table.”

20. In view of the aforementioned circumstances, the club was of the opinion that, by means of their actions, the parties had implicitly renewed the first contract for an indeterminate period of time.

21. Consequently, from the club’s point of view the dispute at stake was based on “an indeterminate employment contract where the new relationship between [the parties] is not a renewal nor an extension of the previous employment contract and which has expired on the end of the season 2014/2015 (i.e. 21/5/2015) and the new relationship has started on 20 July 2015”.

22. In continuation, the club alleged having terminated its contractual relationship with the coach in accordance with the provision of the termination clause (cf. point I.16 above).

23. In this respect, the club referred FIFA to a different termination letter as the one provided by the coach in his claim.

24. In the termination letter provided by the club, dated 24 October 2015 (hereinafter: the first termination letter), it is inter alia mentioned that the relationship between the parties was based on the first contract as they had failed to conclude a new one.

25. Finally, the club pointed out that, by paying to the coach the amount mentioned in the termination clause (cf. point I.16 above), it had been entitled to “unilaterally terminate the indeterminate relationship contract (…) either with a valid reason for the incapacity of the coach or pursuant to Art. 335c, Para. 1 of C.O. [i.e. the Swiss Code of Obligations]”.

26. According to the club, the contractual relationship between the parties was terminated with just cause “following the failure of the coach to achieve any of their objectives on the pitch due to the poor performance and the cumulative of bad results”.

27. Lastly, the club contested the coach’s entitlement to receive any further payment arguing that “the disputed relationship is concerning the period from 20 July to 23 October 2015 (..) where the coach is entitled to receive the following:

1. Three monthly salary (3x 106.,250.00 USD) or a total of 318,750.00

2. Compensation of two (..) monthly salary (2x 106,250.00 USD) or a total compensation of 212,500.00 USD for premature termination of the indeterminate second contract pursuant to Art. 335c, Para 1 of C.O.

Consequently, and taking into account that the club has performed a payment of USD 700,000 (..) as Salary advance, I deemed it appropriate that the club is entitled to a refund of excess funds amounting to the following:

700,000.00 USD – (318,750.00 USD + 212,500.00 USD) = 168,750.00 USD”.

28. In his replica dated 18 July 2016, the coach insisted on his claim and rejected the counterclaim as well as allegations of the club.

29. In addition, the coach provided FIFA with the original of the second contract emphasizing that the document in question was valid and binding between the parties.

30. Furthermore, the coach explained that the second contract entitled him to join the club only after having received the relevant signing on fee and therefore, he had not committed any “act of illegal exaction” (cf. points 6 and 18 above).

31. Subsequently, the coach accused the club of having failed to provide evidence indicating that it indeed paid all of his outstanding salaries. Hence, the coach considered that the latter had “acknowledged and accepted that it did not pay [..] the four monthly salaries of July, August, September and October 2015”.

32. As to the two different termination letters on file, the coach explained that, after having received the “absurd and offensive” letter dated 24 October 2015, i.e. the first termination letter, he had contacted the club and requested an explanation. He then allegedly received a “phone call from the president of the club who presented (..) his apologies (..) while confirming his satisfaction with his work” and, later on, unexpectedly, the second termination letter. In the coach’s opinion, it was irrelevant “which one of the terminations letters should be regarded as the binding one, since by both letters Club C’s terminated the employment contract”.

33. In continuation, the coach contested the applicability of the termination clause (cf. point I.16 above) in the dispute at stake as it was included in an expired contract.

34. Equally, the coach contested the club’s entitlement to terminate their contractual relationship on the basis of his alleged poor performances “(which was not poor at all)”, arguing that such a reason was not acceptable in accordance with FIFA’s jurisprudence.

35. In view of all the above, the coach insisted on having been dismissed without just cause by the club.

36. Subsidiarly and in case FIFA would consider the compensation clause as valid, the coach deemed being entitled to receive from the club at least four monthly salary as compensation.

37. Finally, the coach explained having concluded a new employment contract at the end of January 2016. The coach provided FIFA with a copy of the document in question, valid from 25 January 2016 until 31 December 2016, concluded with the Club of Country J, Club K, in accordance with which he was entitled to receive a monthly salary of USD 21,000.

38. Considering all the above, the coach amended his claim by “subsidiarily” requesting from the club the payment of USD 1,226,363.64 as compensation for breach of contract “minus the salary that [he] received from his new employer from 25 January until 31 May 2016”, plus 5% interests p.a. “since the submission of this present claim”.

39. Also “subsidiarily”, the coach requested from the club the payment of USD 109,909.09 as compensation for breach of contract in accordance with the compensation clause.

40. In its final statement on 19 September 2016, the club reiterated the content of its previous submission and contested the allegations of the coach.

41. In addition, the club contested the coach’s entitlement to receive his July 2015 salary, arguing that the latter would have left Country D “on 10 June 2015 (..) and he come back on the end of July 2015”. In this respect, the club also specified that their contractual relationship “was tacitly started on the end of July 2015 for the super game which was held in Capital H on 12 August 2015” and that the coach had “worked from the month of August 2015 until before the last week of October 2015. Accordingly, he has to be paid in accordance with the monthly salary of the last contract (for the season 2014-2015).”

42. Furthermore, the club contested the validity of the second contract under Law of Country D as well as its acceptance as evidence in the dispute at stake.

43. Equally, the club mentioned that because the claim “involved the claimant [i.e. the coach] and his complete staff (..) the dispute involves multi-party jointly claim in the same matter” and therefore “for a formal procedure each party (..) needs to submit an individual claim (..).”

44. Finally, the club contested FIFA’s competence to decide on the matter at stake arguing that the coach was not a member of FIFA in the sense of art. 6 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules.

45. In its final position on the counterclaim, the coach mainly reiterated the content of his previous submissions.

46. In addition, the coach contested the admissibility of the club’s latest statement as it was submitted after the relevant deadline set by FIFA had already expired.

47. Furthermore, the coach contested the applicability of Law of Country D.

II. Considerations of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee

1. First of all, the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee (hereinafter also referred to as: the Single Judge) analysed whether he was competent to deal with the matter at hand. In this respect, the Single Judge referred to art. 21 par. 2 and 3 of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (edition 2017). Consequently, and since the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 5 December 2015, the Single Judge concluded that the 2015 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules) is applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 of the Procedural Rules).

2. Subsequently, the Single Judge referred to art. 3 par. 1 and 2 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed that in accordance with art. 23 par. 1 and 3 in combination with art. 22 lit. c) of the 2016 edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players and despite the allegations of the club to the contrary, he is competent to deal with the matter at sake which concerns an employment-related dispute of an international dimension between a Coach of Country B – which can be a party in front of FIFA as per art. 6 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules – and a Club of Country D. Thus, the coach’s claim is admissible.

3. Furthermore, the Single Judge analysed which edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, he referred, on the one hand, to art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the 2015 and 2016 editions of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, and on the other hand, to the fact that the present claim was lodged with FIFA on 5 December 2015. In view of the foregoing, the Single Judge concluded that the 2015 edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: the Regulations) is applicable to the case at hand as to the substance (cf. art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations).

4. His competence and the applicable regulations having been established, and before entering into the substance of the present matter, the Single Judge took note of the club’s allegation according to which he should not take a decision in the matter at stake as it “involved the Claimant and his complete staff (..)” and therefore “for a formal procedure each party (..) needs to submit an individual claim”.

5. In this respect, the Single Judge referred to the second contract and pointed out that the document in question mentioned the coach and the club as its parties and indicated the coach as recipient of the relevant “salary package”. As a result, from the Single Judge’s point of view, the coach in entitled to lodge a claim in front of FIFA against the club on the basis of the document in question.

6. Having established the aforementioned, the Single Judge started his analysis of the case by acknowledging the facts of the case and the arguments of the parties as well as the documents contained in the file. The Single Judge, however, emphasised that in the following considerations he will refer only to the facts, arguments and documentary evidence which he considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand.

7. In this respect, the Single Judge acknowledged that, on 1 November 2014, the coach and the club had concluded an employment contract (hereinafter: the first contract) valid for “one football season”, which provided for the coach to receive from the club the total amount of USD 1,300,000. Furthermore, the Single Judge observed that in accordance with the same document, in case of early termination by either party, a one-month written notice had to be respected and a three months’ salary penalty would fall due.

8. Equally, the Single Judge took note of the coach’s allegations in accordance with which the parties would have concluded an agreement on 8 June 2015 (hereinafter: the second contract), by means of which he was hired together with his technical staff by the club as of 1 July 2015 and was entitled to receive the sum of USD 2,800,000 as follows: USD 700,000 as signing on fee and “the rest monthly salary for the coach and his technical staff”. In the same context, the Single Judge remarked that the second contract included a compensation clause in case of early termination by the club but not one applicable in case of early termination by the coach.

9. In continuation, the Single Judge remarked that, in his claim to FIFA, the coach had accused the club of having terminated their contractual relationship without just cause on 30 October 2015 and of having failed to pay him the first three monthly salaries due under the second contract. The Single Judge also noted that, because of the aforementioned, the coach deemed being entitled to claim from the club the payment of outstanding remuneration in the amount of USD 736,636.36 and of compensation for breach of contract in the sum of USD 1,336,363.64, together with 5% interest p.a..

10. In addition, the Single Judge noticed that, for its part, the club, had rejected the claim of the coach and contested the validity of the second contract arguing that their contractual relationship had always been based on the first contract only. In the same context, the Single Judge took note of the fact that, according to the club, the relevant termination of contract had occurred with just cause following the poor performance of the team and had requested from the coach the reimbursement of the amount of USD 168,750.

11. After having carefully contemplated the submissions of the parties as well as the documentation at his disposal and considering the existence of a disagreement between them as to the validity of the second contract, the Single Judge deemed that the first question to be addressed in the present matter was on which document their contractual relationship was based at the moment of its dissolution.

12. In view of the foregoing, the Single Judge referred to art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules, according to which any party claiming a right on the basis of an alleged fact shall carry the respective burden of proof and stressed that the coach had insisted on having concluded the second contract with the club whereas the latter had accused him of forgery arguing that the document in question had never existed.

13. With the aforesaid considerations in mind, the Single Judge recalled first of all that while the coach had provided FIFA with the original of the second contract, bearing the signature of both parties, the club had failed to submit any evidence in support of the allegation that the parties would have extended the validity of the first contract past the 2014/2015 season. Similarly, the Single Judge emphasized that the club had undisputedly paid to the coach the sum of USD 700,000 and that this exact same amount was due to the latter as signing on fee under the second contract. In this context, the Single Judge also added that no evidence had been provided by the club in support of the allegation that the amount of USD 700,000 would have corresponded to an advance on half of the remuneration due to the coach under the allegedly extended first contract.

14. As a result of all the aforementioned, considering the lack of evidence on file in support of the allegations of the club and, in particular, taking into account that the original of the second contract had been submitted to FIFA by the coach, from the Single Judge’s point of view it had to be assumed that the second contract had been duly concluded by and between the coach and the club, and that the document in question was therefore valid and binding upon them.

15. In continuation and considering that two different termination letters were provided by the parties during the course of the investigation in front of FIFA, the Single Judge established that the second question to be addressed in the present matter was when and how exactly the contractual relationship between the coach and the club had been terminated.

16. In this context, the Single Judge recalled that the coach, although contesting the validity of the first termination letter, had admitted having received said document. Therefore, taking into account the fact that the first termination letter had been drafted prior to the second one, i.e. on 24 October 2015, that its receipt was acknowledged by the coach and that the club thereby had already expressed its clear intention to permanently put an end to its contractual relationship with the coach, the Single Judge came to the conclusion that it had to be assumed that the second contract was terminated by the club by means of the first termination letter on 24 October 2015.

17. Having established the aforementioned, the Single Judge turned his attention to the third question that had to be addressed in the dispute at stake. i.e. the question of whether the termination of contract by the club had occurred with or without just cause.

18. In this regard, the Single Judge stressed that the club had admitted having dismissed the coach due to “poor performance” and “cumulative bad results” of the team. As a result and in accordance with his well-established jurisprudence which establishes that the absence of sporting results cannot, as a general rule, constitute per se a reason to terminate a contractual relationship with just cause, the Single Judge decided that the termination of contract by the club had occurred without just cause.

19. After having established the foregoing, the Single Judge went on analysing the consequences of the breach of contract without just cause committed by the club.

20. Nevertheless, before entering the analysis of the consequences of the unjust breach of contract on the part of the club, the Single Judge deemed it appropriate to first assess whether any outstanding remuneration was still due by the club to the coach. In this regard, the Single Judge underlined that the coach had requested from the club the payment of the amount of USD 763,636.36, corresponding to his first, second and third salaries as per the second contract, together with an interest of 5% per year. Besides, the Single Judge recalled that the club had not contested having failed to pay to the coach such claimed amount.

21. In view of the aforementioned, considering the request of the coach as well as the content of the second contract with regard to the latter’s monthly remuneration and taking into account the legal principle of pacta sunt servanda, which in essence means that agreements must be respected by the parties in good faith, the Single Judge resolved that the club, in order to fulfil its obligations established in the second contract has to pay to the coach the outstanding amount of USD 763,636.36.

22. Additionally and with regard to the coach’s request for interest, the Single Judge, in accordance with his well-established jurisprudence, decided that the club has to pay to the coach interest as follows: 5% p.a. over the amount of USD 190,909.09 from 1 August 2015 until the date of effective payment; 5% p.a. over the amount of USD 190,909.09 from 1 September 2015 until the date of effective payment; 5% p.a. over the amount of USD 190,909.09 from 1 October 2015 until the date of effective payment and 5% p.a. over the amount of USD 190,909.09 from 1 November 2015 until the date of effective payment.

23. Having established the aforementioned and turning his attention to the compensation payable to the coach by the club following the termination without just cause of contract by the latter, the Single Judge reverted to the content of the compensation clause quoted inserted in the second contract (cf. point I.5 above) and pointed out that the relevant provision only concerned a possible termination of contract by the club and did not regulate the eventuality of a termination of contract by the coach. Furthermore, the Single Judge noted that such clause allowed the club to terminate the contract at any time, by paying to the coach at the maximum 4 monthly salaries. As a result, the Single Judge deemed that the clause in question was disproportionate, arbitrary and to the benefit of the club only, in particular considering the point in time where the contract was terminated by the club in the present dispute, i.e. 24 October 2015. Thus, the Single Judge concluded that such clause could not be applied and that the amount of compensation due to the coach had to be assessed in accordance with other criteria.

24. Equally, the Single Judge observed that between 25 January and 31 December 2016, the coach had been employed by the Club of Country J Club K, for a monthly salary of USD 21,000. From the Single Judge’s point of view, it was fair and reasonable to take into account such amount when calculating the sum due as compensation for breach of contract to the coach.

25. In addition, the Single Judge took note of the fact that, in accordance with the information contained in the Tranfer Matching System (TMS), the 2015/2016 season started on 14 August 2015 and ended on 31 May 2016 in Country D.

26. Considering all of the aforementioned and, in particular, bearing in mind the unjustified termination of contract by the club, as well as taking into account the specific request of the coach, the Single Judge, in accordance with his well-established jurisprudence, concluded that it was fair and reasonable that the club paid to the coach the remaining value of the second contract minus the amount earned by the coach from Club K. Hence, the Single Judge calculated that in casu the amount of USD 1,252,363.64, corresponding to the sum of USD 1,336,363.64 as salary between November 2015 and May 2016 under the second contract, minus the amount of USD 84,000 earned from Club K for the relevant period of time, constituted a reasonable and justified amount of compensation for breach of contract. In view of the above, the Single Judge concluded that the amount of USD 1,252,363.64 should be paid by the club to the coach.

27. Equally and with regard to the coach’s request for interest, the Single Judge, in accordance with his well-established jurisprudence, decided that the club has to pay to the coach 5% interest p.a. on the amount of USD 1,252,363.64 as from 5 December 2015, i.e. the date of the coach’s claim, until the date of effective payment.

28. In view of all the aforementioned, the Single Judge concluded that the claim of the coach is accepted and that the following payments are to be made to the coach by the club:

- outstanding remuneration in the amount of USD 763,636.36, plus interest, as follows: 5% p.a. over the amount of USD 190,909.09 from 1 August 2015 until the date of effective payment; 5% p.a. over the amount of USD 190,909.09 from 1 September 2015 until the date of effective payment and 5% p.a. over the amount of USD 190,909.09 from 1 October 2015 until the date of effective payment, as well as

- compensation for breach of contract in the amount of USD 1,252,363.64, plus 5% interest p.a. on said amount as from 5 December 2015 until the date of effective payment

29. Finally and with regard to the counter-claim lodged by the club against the coach, taking into account that the claim of the coach is accepted, the Single Judge established that the counter-claim of the club had to be rejected.

30. Lastly, the Single Judge referred to art. 25 par. 2 of the Regulations in combination with art. 18 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules, according to which in the proceedings before the Players’ Status Committee and the Single Judge, costs in the maximum amount of CHF 25,000 are levied. The costs are to be borne in consideration of the parties’ degree of success in the proceedings and are normally to be paid by the unsuccessful party.

31. In this respect, the Single Judge reiterated that the claim of the coach is accepted and that the club is the party at fault and that the counter-claim of the club is rejected. Therefore, the Single Judge decided that the club has to bear the entire costs of the current proceedings in front of FIFA.

32. Furthermore and according to Annexe A of the Procedural Rules, the costs of the proceedings are to be levied on the basis of the amount in dispute. Consequently and taking into account that the total amount at dispute in the present matter is higher than CHF 200,001, the Single Judge concluded that the maximum amount of costs of the proceedings corresponds to CHF 25,000.

33. In conclusion and in view of the numerous submissions that had to be analysed in the present matter but taking into account that the present decision was taken by the Single Judge and not by the Players’ Status in corpore, the Single Judge determined the costs of the current proceedings to the amount of CHF 20,000.

34. Consequently, the amount of CHF 20,000 has to be paid by the club in order to cover the costs of the present proceedings.

III. Decision of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee

1. The claim of the Claimant / Counter-Respondent, Coach A, is admissible.

2. The claim of the Claimant / Counter-Respondent, Coach A, is accepted.

3. The Respondent / Counter-Claimant, Club C, has to pay to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent, Coach A, within 30 days as from the date of notification of the present decision, outstanding remuneration in the amount of USD 763,636.36, plus interest, as follows:

a. 5% p.a. over the amount of USD 190,909.09 from 1 August 2015 until the date of effective payment;

b. 5% p.a. over the amount of USD 190,909.09 from 1 September 2015 until the date of effective payment;

c. 5% p.a. over the amount of USD 190,909.09 from 1 October 2015 until the date of effective payment;

d. 5% p.a. over the amount of USD 190,909.09 from 1 November 2015 until the date of effective payment.

4. The Respondent / Counter-Claimant, Club C, has to pay to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent, Coach A, within 30 days as from the date of notification of the present decision, compensation for breach of contract in the amount of USD 1,252,363.64, plus 5% interest p.a. on said amount as from 5 December 2015 until the date of effective payment.

5. If the aforementioned sums, plus interest as established above, are not paid within the aforementioned deadline, the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to FIFA’s Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision.

6. The counter-claim of the Respondent / Counter-Claimant, Club C, is rejected.

7. The final costs of the proceedings in the amount of CHF 20,000 are to be paid by the Respondent / Counter-Claimant, Club C. Considering that the latter already paid an advance of costs in the amount of CHF 4,000 at the start of the present proceedings, the Respondent / Counter-Claimant, Club C, has to pay the remaining amount of CHF 16,000 within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision, as follows:

7.1. The amount of CHF 11,000 has to be paid to FIFA to the following bank account with reference to case nr. XXX:

UBS Zurich

Account number 366.677.01U (FIFA Players’ Status)

Clearing number 230

IBAN: CH27 0023 0230 3666 7701U

SWIFT: UBSWCHZH80A

7.2. The amount of CHF 5,000 has to be paid directly to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent, Coach A.

8. The Claimant / Counter-Respondent, Coach A, is directed to inform the Respondent / Counter-Claimant, Club C, immediately and directly of the account number to which the remittances under points 3., 4. and 7.2. above are to be made and to notify the Players’ Status Committee of every payment received.

Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy):

According to art. 58 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives).

The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following:

Court of Arbitration for Sport

Avenue de Beaumont 2

1012 Lausanne

Switzerland

Tel: +41 21 613 50 00

Fax: +41 21 613 50 01

e-mail: info@tas-cas.org

For the Single Judge of

the Players’ Status Committee

_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Coach A, Country B / Club C, Country D 17

Marco Villiger

Chief Legal & Integrity Officer

Encl. CAS Directives