F.I.F.A. – Players’ Status Committee / Commissione per lo Status dei Calciatori – coach disputes / controversie allenatori (2017-2018) – fifa.com – atto non ufficiale – Decision of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee passed in Zurich, Switzerland, 23 January 2018

Decision of the Single Judge

of the

Players’ Status Committee

passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 23 January 2018,

by

Mr Geoff Thompson (England),

Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee,

on the claim presented by the coach

Coach A, Country B

as “Claimant”

against the club

Club C, Country D

as “Respondent”

regarding an employment-related contractual dispute

between the parties

I. Facts of the case

1. On 1 July 2016, the coach of Country B, Coach A (hereinafter: the Claimant), and the club of Country D, Club C (hereinafter: the Respondent), signed an employment contract (hereinafter: the contract) valid as of the date of signature until 31 December 2017, for the position of head coach of the Respondent’s first team.

2. Pursuant to article 7.1 and 7.2 of the contract, the Respondent was to pay the following fixed-remuneration:

 EUR 4,200,000 net as total salary for the Claimant and his staff, payable on the 10th of the following month;

 EUR 300,000 net as sign-on fee, payable to the Claimant within fourteen working days after the signing of the contract.

3. Art. 7 further provides for bonuses due to the Claimant as follows:

 “In the league to win or draw matches with other teams, [the Claimant] will have the corresponding bonus set up before the game”;

 “if at the end of year 2017, [the Respondent] is successfully promoted to the League of Country D, [the Claimant] and his staff team will receive important promotion bonus”;

 “Game bonus is paid within 10 days after the game finishes”.

4. As per art. 9 of the contract, the Respondent shall provide the Claimant and his family, for each season, with a total of six business class round trip flight tickets between the Claimant’s hometown and Country D.

5. Article 12.3 and 12.5 of the contract respectively provides that “The contract may be cancelled by reaching agreement between [the parties] through negotiation” and “If the contract is terminated by [the Respondent] without a just cause, [the Respondent] shall pay [the Claimant] full amount of the remaining salary under this contract as compensation”.

6. Art. 14 of the contract states that “This contract shall not contain any contents against law of Country D. Any dispute will be resolved by consultation on a maximum terms of 15 days. If it cannot be resolved both sides has the right to send it to the Football Association of Country D or FIFA to adjudicate.”

7. On 21 and 26 July 2016, the parties discuss about the non-payment of the sign-on fee by the Respondent and its offer to pay through an account in Country D not being accepted by the Claimant due to tax issues with the tax authorities of Country B.

8. On 26 July 2016, the Respondent informs the Claimant of the payment of the sign-on fee from its “official account” in Country D named “Company E” as well as the payment of the “Individual Income Tax” (IIT) of the sign-on fee in Local Taxation Office of Country D.

9. On 9 September 2016, the Claimant contacts the Respondent regarding the payment of his salary for July and August in currency of Country D on his bank account in Country D, arguing that the said amounts “cannot be transformed by [him] in foreign currency (Euro) and sent to Country B […] all of this because [he] cannot document to the bank that taxes have been paid by the club in Country D with the domestic rate between 40/42%”. The Claimant also reminds the Respondent that as a tax-resident in Country B, he needs to be provided with an IIT number and evidence that taxes at rate 40/42% have been paid in Country D for the amounts already transferred to him and also for the future ones.

10. On 21 September 2016, by means of the document named “Foreign Football Coach Tax Report”, the Respondent confirmed having paid “[the Claimant’s] full taxes in City of Country D, Country D” and that “due to the tax policy in Country D, we will have his declaration of tax report at end of October 2016.”

11. On 14 October 2016, the Claimant reiterates his request to be provided with an IIT number in order to send his salaries to Country B and to document the tax authorities of Country B. The Claimant also insists that the taxation rate to be paid by the Club is statutorily fixed to approximately 40% in Country D. The Claimant also requests the regularisation of the payment of the taxes relating to the sign-on fee paid from Country D. The Claimant finally agrees to grant the Respondent with an additional deadline until 15 November 2016 in order to provide the declaration of tax report.

12. On 10 November 2016, the parties agree on an annex to the contract (hereinafter: the annex), concerning the total salary of the Claimant individually, whereby it is stated that “the amount of competence of [the Claimant] is EUR 3,200,000 net” and that “for any eventual dispute, the parties declare to accept […] the appeal to the judicial authority of FIFA and the TAS”.

13. On the same date, the parties conclude an agreement regarding the sign-on fee (hereinafter: the agreement), providing the following:

“2. On 26 July 2016, [the Company E] made a bank transfer of EUR 300,000 from Country D in favour of [the Claimant].

3. That in Country D cannot be paid the taxes on transferred sums from the Company E in Country D and then [the Claimant] in Country B should pay a tax of about EUR 130,000.

Now therefore the parties agree:

a) [the Claimant] will return the EUR 300,000 to the Company E in Country D.

b) the club agree, at the same time, to transfer to [the Claimant] the sum of EUR 300,000 in his accounts in Country B accompanied by the document certifying the payment of taxes related to that amount.

c) For any eventual dispute the parties declare to accept as provided in the contract of 1st July 2016. That is the use of the Judicial Authorities of FIFA and TAS. It should be noted that the amount of competence of [the Claimant] is EUR 300,000 net.”

14. On 13 December 2016, the Respondent informs the Claimant that it could only pay the sign-on fee at the end of January 2017 and thus asks the Claimant “don’t hurry to send us back the 300,000 euros form your account to Country D, we are going to inform you in advance then you can send us back.”

15. Between 8 and 10 February 2017, the parties additionally agree that upon the refund of the amount paid to the Claimant from Country D, 1) the Respondent will pay, within thirty days, the relevant amount to the bank account in Country D of the Claimant, from Country D 2) and the Respondent will provide the Claimant with documentation of the payment of taxes relating to such amount.

16. On 10 February 2017, the Claimant refunds the amount of EUR 300,000 from his bank account in Country B to the bank account of the Company E in Country D.

17. On 19 March 2017, the Respondent informs the Claimant that, considering that “the team failed to achieve the desired results”, it decided that:

“1. [The Claimant] no longer serve as Head Coach of [the Respondent’s] team. Daily training and all the competitions will be organised by the coaching team of Country D.

2. The club will initiate the contract cancellation procedures with [the Claimant] and will terminate the working contracts signed by both parties through friendly negotiation with [the Claimant] and [his] lawyer as soon as possible.

3. The club will continue to pay the accommodation for [the Claimant] in Country D until March 31, 2017.”

18. On the same date, the Claimant acknowledges receipt of the Respondent’s decision and announces that a draft of a termination agreement will follow shortly.

19. On 21, 25 and 28 March 2017, the Claimant underlines the termination without just cause from the Respondent and urges the latter to “sign the draft termination agreement already sent and pay, within a term of 15 days, the sum of EUR 1,777,778 net equal to the remaining amount of the contract due to the coach”. The Claimant further reminds the Respondent that all amounts of the contract are in euros and net of any taxes. The Claimant also requests a flight ticket in business class to go back to his hometown.

20. On 5 April 2017, following the Claimant’s departure from Country D, the Respondent requires him to return to Country D. The Respondent also wants to “clarify” that, by means of the letter dated 19 March 2017, it intended to “suspend his coaching duty and hoped to begin the discussion with [him] about how to terminate his working contract by mutual agreement. The club does not terminate his working contract by that letter. Until now, his working contract remains valid since no mutual agreement of termination has been reached by both parties. [The Claimant] shows no respect to his working contract by leaving Country D without approval and without informing the club”.

21. On 6 April 2017, the Claimant replies and considers that “the allegations included in [the Respondent’s] last communication are groundless” considering that the Respondent terminated the contract unilaterally on 19 March 2017. The Claimant then informs the Respondent that he will refer the matter to FIFA for a formal decision in view of the lack of “friendly negotiation”.

22. On 11 April 2017, the Claimant lodges a complaint against the Respondent before FIFA, claiming that the Respondent unilaterally terminated the contractual relationship with him on 19 March 2017 based on the lack of sporting performance of the Respondent under his management.

23. In this respect, the Claimant insists that the Respondent has never undertaken any disciplinary action against him or warned him about any dissatisfaction from its side. In any event, the Claimant emphasises that poor performance cannot constitute a just cause to terminate a contract.

24. Furthermore, the Claimant points out that, on 25 March 2017, the Respondent appointed a new Head Coach, Head Coach F. In this regard, the Claimant submits a press article in order to support his allegations.

25. Subsequently, the Claimant alludes to the tax issues encountered with the Respondent along the contractual relationship. In particular, the Claimant insists that, considering that he would remain a tax-resident in Country B for the entire duration of the contract, he accepted to sign the contract subject to his remuneration being net, paid in euro, and in view of the Respondent’s obligation to pay the taxes in Country D and provide evidence of such payment to the relevant tax authorities. The Claimant adds that the tax rate in Country D and Country B are equal regarding the relevant remuneration, namely 43%.

26. In this respect, the Claimant files a “Handbook for foreign employees in the Country D”, which was provided to him and the Respondent on 25 July 2016 by a tax advisor of Country D, and which inter alia indicates that:

 the IIT rate is of 40% in the event the monthly taxable income is over 80,000 in the currency of Country D (approx. EUR 10,000);

 “Foreign employees may repatriate their total monthly net salary back to their home country. In order to convert their salary in the currency of Country D into a foreign currency, and then proceed to an international bank transfer, they shall provide [inter alia] the Individual Income Taxes Certificate”.

27. The Claimant stresses that the Respondent never contested such agreement on the payment of the taxes but always made the payments and sent the certifications with some delay. The Claimant in particular refers to the Respondent’s conduct during the first sporting season which proves both financial commitments, i.e. payment of salary to the Claimant and payment of taxes at the rate of 43% to the relevant authorities.

28. In this regard, the Claimant files the “Certificate of payment of taxes to the Country D” issued by the Tax Authority of Country D respectively on 3 November 2016 [certificate a], 9 January 2017 [certificate b], 7 February 2017 [certificate c] and 25 February 2017 [certificate d], and provided by the Respondent for each

monthly salary until January 2017. The relevant certificates indicate the following: CERTIFICATE SALARY AMOUNT OF TAX (IIT) DATE OF PAYMENT

a

July 2016

952,006.47

2.11.2016

a

August 2016

956,132.09

2.11.2016

a

September 2016

956,132.09

2.11.2016 b October 2016 961,404.45 16.11.2016 b November 2016 942,951.18 26.12.2016

c

December 2016

928,452.18

17.01.2017

d

January 2017

950,859.59

17.02.2017

29. Bearing in mind the above, the Claimant thus considers that the total salary for the season 2016 amounts to EUR 1,747,596.38 gross (corresponding to EUR 966,666.67 as net salary paid to the Claimant and 5,695,760.37 in the currency of Country D which equals to EUR 780,929.71 as taxes already paid to the relevant authorities of Country D) and the gross salary for January 2017 amounts to EUR 290,854.37 (corresponding to EUR 161,111.11 as net salary paid to the Claimant and 950,859.73 in the currency of Country D which equals to EUR 129,743.26 as taxes already paid to the relevant authorities of Country D).

30. The Claimant further underlines that the Respondent neither paid his salary for March 2017 nor the taxes for both his salary for February 2017 and the sign-on fee. In this regard, the Claimant acknowledges receipt of the sign-on fee on his bank account in Country D, after the refund of the amount of EUR 300,000 made on 10 February 2017 from his bank account in Country B to the bank account in Country D of the Respondent.

31. The Claimant also argues that, as a consequence of the Respondent not providing him with the relevant certificate of payment of taxes, he was prevented from transferring the relevant amounts of his salary for February 2017 and of the sign-on fee from his bank account in Country D to Country B.

32. In this context, the Claimant states that he went back to Country B on 25 March 2017 and provided a flight ticket Country D-Country D- Country B amounting to 18,408 in the currency of Country D.

33. Consequently, the Claimant requests the total amount of EUR 3,782,377.86, plus 5% interest p.a. as of 11 April 2017, broken-down as follows:

 EUR 184,207.77 gross as outstanding salary for March 2017 (pro rata), amounting to EUR 102,037.04 net to be paid to the coach and EUR 82,170.73 to be paid to the tax authorities;

 EUR 2,724,335.93 gross as compensation as per art. 12.5 of the contract – corresponding to the remaining salaries from April to December 2017 (EUR 290,584.37 x 9 months = EUR 2,617,689.33 gross; EUR 1,450,000 net) and pro rata salary for March 2017 (EUR 106,646.60 gross; EUR 59,074.07 net) – amounting to EUR 1,509,074.06 net to be paid to the coach and EUR 1,215,261.87 to be paid to the tax authorities;

 EUR 500,000 as damages for image harm;

 18,408 in the currency of Country D, approx. EUR 2,500, as reimbursement of the flight ticket;

 EUR 129,743 as taxes due for the salary of February 2017;

 EUR 241,590.90 as taxes due for the sign-on fee.

The Claimant further requests that the Respondent pays “25% of all bonuses (pro quota) that will be recognised to the team during the current sporting season, and order the [Respondent] to provide the relevant information and documentation in that regard”.

The Claimant finally requests that the Respondent bears the full costs of the present proceedings.

34. In its reply, the Respondent first of all underscores that it acted in an attempt to negotiate a settlement, as stipulated in art. 12.3 of the contract, which is in line with art. 5 of the law of the Country D on labour-dispute mediation and arbitration.

35. The Respondent further states that the labour law of Country D is applicable to the Claimant, referring to art. 14 of the contract in line with art. 3 of the Regulations on the Management of Employment of Foreigners in Country D.

36. Furthermore, the Respondent disagrees with the concept of “net amount” submitted by the Claimant and holds that during the course of the contractual relationship, the Respondent always paid the IIT directly to the authorities of Country D and provided proof of such to the Claimant, although this formality not being stipulated in the employment contract. The Respondent further stresses that the Claimant has accepted this course of action.

37. According to the Respondent, the Claimant is attempting to recoup an additional 43% on top of the compensation because taxes of Country B are to be paid. In this regard, the Respondent refers to art. 15 of the “Agreement between the Government of the Country B and the Government of the Country D for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income” (Country D, 21 October 1986; hereinafter: Tax Treaty), which enables Country D to impose taxes on salaries paid to foreign employees for work that is performed in Country D.

38. Therefore, the Respondent asserts that as the Claimant’s employment is exercised in Country D, Country B does not have the exclusive right to tax incomes earned by residents of Country B earning employment income in Country D. Consequently, the Respondent alleges that Country D has the legal authority to impose a 43% withholding tax on amounts paid to the Claimant by the Respondent.

39. The Respondent also emphasises that it agrees to pay the relevant IIT in Country D for any amount payable in the future to the Claimant. The Respondent further adds that there is no possible double taxation considering art. 23 of the Tax Treaty which will result in the income tax potentially payable by the Claimant in Country B being reduced by the amount payable in Country D.

40. As per the Claimant’s request for a further EUR 500,000 as damages for image harm, the Respondent considers that the Claimant has not demonstrated any damage to his reputation as he alleges.

41. In this context, the Respondent holds that, on 19 March 2017, it initiated the appropriate procedure in order to terminate the contract by mutual agreement and that the Claimant, in refusing the possibility to pursue negotiations, decided to unilaterally terminate the contract without just cause.

42. As a result, on 7 July 2017, the Respondent lodges a counterclaim against the Claimant before FIFA, requesting to be paid a compensation equivalent to three monthly salary in the total amount of EUR 483,333.

43. Alternatively, in the event the Claimant’s claim is accepted, the Respondent deems that such compensation should be limited to three monthly salaries, as mandatorily provided for by art. 47 of the Labour Contract Law of Country D. The Respondent further emphasises that such amount should not be grossed-up so that the Respondent satisfies its tax obligation in Country D.

44. Regardless of the decision, the Respondent also requests that the Claimant pays the amount of 10,000 as legal fees and bears all procedural costs.

45. In his replica, the Claimant mainly maintains that only FIFA Regulations apply to the matter at stake and that art. 14 does not establish law of Country D as being agreed by and between the parties. As a result, the Claimant also stresses that compensation to be paid for breach of contract should not rely on law of Country D but rather on art. 12.5 of the contract.

46. Moreover, the Claimant holds that, following the opening of the present proceedings, the Respondent provided the Claimant with the certificate of payment of the taxes at the rate of 43% on the sign-on fee of EUR 300,000 and for the salary of February 2017.

47. The Claimant further insists that even though the Respondent agreed to pay 43% withholding tax on any amount payable in the future, in light of the club’s behaviour leading to the termination of the contract, the Claimant reiterates his request to be awarded compensation in gross so that he can proceed himself with the payment of the relevant taxes in Country B. The Claimant also recalls that he is tax-resident in Country B for the year 2017 and is taxable in Country B for any amount received regarding the matter at hand.

48. As to the request for additional damages, the Claimant asserts that the image damages suffered by the Claimant are serious and provides, in this respect, several e-mails, which appear to be negotiations for future sponsorship agreements with different companies, including in Country D.

49. In this regard, the Claimant underlines that following the termination of the contract by the Respondent on 19 March 2017, all the above-mentioned offers received during the duration of the contract were suddenly interrupted by the other party which, according to the Claimant, was due to the loss of his reputation.

50. In view of the aforementioned, the Claimant reiterates his claim and rejects the Respondent’s counter-claim and additional requests.

51. In its duplica, the Respondent mainly upholds its position as well as its counter-claim, and particularly insists on the fact that the Claimant accepted from the outset that the withholding of taxes be made in Country D even though he had kept, already at that time, his tax residency in Country B.

52. Referring to the Claimant’s request for additional damages, the Respondent argues that the relevant documentation provided by the Claimant in this regard only constitutes a preliminary stage of negotiation whereby no concrete amount was discussed that could constitute a financial loss. The Respondent also adds that there is no evidence provided by the Claimant regarding the reasons of the alleged non-materialisation of these discussions.

53. Upon FIFA’s request, the Claimant confirms that he has remained unemployed since the termination of the contract by the Respondent.

II. Considerations of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee

1. First of all, the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee (hereinafter also referred to as: the Single Judge) analysed whether he was competent to deal with the matter at hand. In this respect, he took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 11 April 2017. Consequently, the Single Judge concluded that the 2017 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules) is applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 of the Procedural Rules).

2. Subsequently, the Single Judge referred to art. 3 par. 1 and 2 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed that in accordance with art. 23 par. 1 and 4 in combination with art. 22 lit. c) of the 2018 edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, he is competent to deal with the matter at stake which concerns an employment-related dispute between a coach of Country B and a club of Country D.

3. Furthermore, the Single Judge analysed which edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, he referred, on the one hand, to art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the 2018 edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, and on the other hand, to the fact that the present claim was lodged with FIFA on 11 April 2017. In view of the foregoing, the Single Judge concluded that the 2016 edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: the Regulations) is applicable to the case at hand as to the substance (cf. art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations).

4. The competence of the Single Judge and the applicable regulations having been established, and entering into the substance of the matter, the Single Judge started by acknowledging the above-mentioned facts as well as the documentation contained in the file. However, the Single Judge emphasised that, in the following considerations, he will refer only to the facts, arguments and documentary evidence which it considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand.

5. In this respect and in a first instance, the Single Judge acknowledged that, on 1 July 2016, the Claimant and the Respondent concluded an employment contract valid as from the date of signature until 31 December 2017, and which financial terms were amended on 10 November 2016 by means of an annex and an agreement signed by both parties. On this point, the Single Judge took note that the parties agreed upon the payment by the Respondent to the Claimant of a total amount of EUR 3,200,000 net, including a monthly salary of EUR 161,111 net.

6. Subsequently, the Single Judge took note that, on the one hand, the Claimant argued that the Respondent unilaterally terminated the employment relationship with him, based on poor sporting results of the Respondent’s team under his and his staff’s supervision. Therefore, the Claimant claimed to be entitled to receive, inter alia, compensation for breach of contract from the Respondent.

7. In continuation, the Single Judge observed that, for its part, the Respondent contested the Claimant’s claim, sustaining that it had initiated the appropriate procedure in order to terminate the contract by mutual agreement and that, by refusing the possibility to pursue negotiations, the Claimant was the party liable for the termination of the contractual relationship. Consequently, the Respondent lodged a counter-claim against the Claimant, requesting compensation for breach of contract.

8. At this point, the Single Judge deemed it important to refer to art. 17 par. 1 and 3 of the Procedural Rules, according to which an advance of costs (cf. art. 18 of the Procedural Rules) is payable for proceedings before the Players’ Status Committee and the single judge by the claimant or counter-claimant when the claim or counter-claim is lodged. Moreover, art. 17 par. 5 of the Procedural Rules states that if a party fails to pay the advance of costs when submitting a claim or counterclaim, the FIFA administration shall allow the party concerned ten days to pay the relevant advance and advise that failure to do so will result in the claim or counter-claim not being heard.

9. In casu, the Single Judge observed that the Respondent lodged a counter-claim, however failed to proceed with the payment of the relevant advance of costs in this regard, even after having been invited by the FIFA administration to do so on 21 August 2017.

10. Therefore, and referring to art. 17 of the Procedural Rules, the Single Judge decided that the Respondent’s counter-claim cannot be heard and could therefore not be admitted to the file.

11. Having established the above, the Single Judge noted that, considering the divergent position of the parties, he considered that he first of all had to examine whether the contract had been terminated by the Claimant or by the Respondent and whether such termination had occurred with or without just cause.

12. To this end, the Single Judge noted that the Respondent sent a letter to the Claimant dated 19 March 2017, by means of which the Respondent informed the Claimant that “the team failed to achieve the desired results […]. [The Claimant] no longer serve as Head Coach of the [Respondent’s] team. […]”. The Single Judge also took note that, on 5 April 2017, the Respondent contacted the Claimant, inter alia in order to “clarify” that, by means of the letter dated 19 March 2017, it intended to “suspend his coaching duty”, and “not terminate his working contract”.

13. In this context, the Single Judge wished to stress first that the argument of the Respondent that the letter of 19 March 2017 did not constitute a termination of the contract clearly does not stand. Indeed, the mentioned letter is, beyond argument, to be considered as a termination letter sent by the Respondent aiming at unilaterally putting an end to the contractual relationship with the Claimant. In this regard, the Single Judge was of the opinion that the Respondent’s letter dated 5 April 2017 was addressed to the Claimant in the sole attempt to remedy the situation created by its unilateral termination of the contract on 19 March 2017.

14. Having determined that the Respondent, in fact, terminated the contract on 19 March 2017, the Single Judge recalled that, according to the well-established jurisprudence of the Players' Status Committee, only a breach or misconduct which is of a certain severity justifies the termination of a contract. In other words, only when there are objective criteria which do not reasonably permit to expect a continuation of the employment relationship between the parties, a contract may be terminated prematurely.

15. In the same vein, the Single Judge underlined that reasons such as mismanagement of the team are of a highly subjective nature and could thus not be seen, in principle, as valid grounds to terminate the contract. Furthermore, the Single Judge was eager to recall the well-established jurisprudence of the Players’ Status Committee, according to which the absence of sporting results cannot, as a general rule, constitute per se a reason to terminate a contractual relationship with just cause.

16. In view of the above, the Single Judge came to the conclusion that none of the reasons put forward by the Respondent as to why it prematurely terminated the contract could justify such termination. On account of the above, the Single Judge decided that the Respondent did not have a just cause to unilaterally terminate the employment relationship between the parties on 19 March 2017 and, therefore, the Respondent is to be held liable for the early termination of the employment contract without just cause.

17. The Single Judge continued his deliberations by examining the consequences of such unilateral termination without just cause by the Respondent.

18. First and foremost, the Single Judge decided that, taking into consideration the longstanding jurisprudence of the Players’ Status Committee, the Claimant was entitled to receive compensation for the Respondent’s breach in the contractual relationship with the Claimant.

19. In this respect, the Single Judge first turned his attention to the remuneration and other benefits due to the Claimant under the existing contract. The Single Judge pointed out that the contract signed between the Claimant and the Respondent was to run for another ten months, i.e. until December 2017, after the termination of the contract occurred on 19 March 2017. Furthermore, the Single Judge understood that for this relevant period, the Claimant was entitled to receive a total salary of EUR 1,611,111. Consequently, the Single Judge concluded that the amount of EUR 1,611,111 served as the basis for the final determination of the amount of compensation for breach of contract.

20. In continuation, the Single Judge noted that, at the time of the decision, the Claimant had not found any new employment since 19 March 2017 which would have enable him to mitigate his damages.

21. Consequently, in accordance with the constant practice of the Players’ Status Committee, the Single Judge decided that the Respondent had to pay the amount of EUR 1,611,111 to the Claimant, which was considered by the Single Judge to be a reasonable and justified amount as compensation for breach of contract.

22. For the sake of completeness, and referring to the Respondent’s argument that any payable compensation should be limited to three monthly salaries, as mandatorily provided for by art. 47 of the Labour Contract Law of Country D, the Single Judge emphasised that when deciding a dispute before the Players’ Status Committee, FIFA’s regulations prevail over any national law allegedly applicable to the contractual relationship of the parties. In this regard, the Single Judge emphasised that the main objective of the FIFA regulations is to create a standard set of rules to which all the actors within the football community are subject to and can rely on. This objective would not be achievable if the Single Judge would have to apply the national law of a specific party on every dispute brought to it.

23. Furthermore, as to the Claimant’s request to be awarded such compensation in a gross amount in order to proceed with the payment of the relevant taxes in Country B, the Single Judge considered that he was not in a position to decide upon the parties’ obligations under the relevant tax law vis-à-vis the relevant tax authorities. As such, the Single Judge did not consider himself in a position to make the gross up of any amounts. Nevertheless, in the Single Judge’s view, the Respondent is liable for the payment of the above-mentioned compensation net of any taxes, as per the Respondent’s previous conduct and the clear wording of the contract and the annex.

24. With regard to the Claimant’s claim for reimbursement of the flight ticket, the Single Judge alluded to art. 9 of the contract, and in accordance with its respective jurisprudence and the evidence on file, the Single Judge granted the Claimant the amount of 18,408 in the currency of Country D as reimbursement of one flight ticket to go back to Country B.

25. In addition, as per the Claimant’s claim for interest and in accordance with his longstanding jurisprudence, the Single Judge granted the Claimant interest at the rate of 5% p.a. as of 11 April 2017 on the respective amount of EUR 1,611,111 and 18,408 in the currency of Country D.

26. Regarding the Claimant’s request for “25% of all bonuses (pro quota) that will be recognised to the team during the current sporting season”, the Single Judge stressed that the payment and the amount of such bonuses are linked to matches to be played in the future, i.e. after the termination of the relevant contract, and, therefore, are fully hypothetical. Consequently, the Single Judge decided to reject such claim.

27. Equally, with regard to the Claimant’s request for damages in the amount of EUR 500,000 for image harm, the Single Judge was of the opinion that such request was not supported by conclusive evidence to grant such amount to the Claimant. As such, and on the basis of art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules, the Single Judge dismissed this part of the Claimant’s claim.

28. Finally, the Single Judge referred to art. 25 par. 2 of the Regulations in combination with art. 18 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules, according to which, in proceedings before the Players’ Status Committee, including its Single Judge, costs in the maximum amount of CHF 25,000 are levied. The relevant provision further states that the costs are to be borne in consideration of the parties’ degree of success in the proceedings.

29. In respect of the above and taking into account that the claim of the Claimant has been partially accepted, the Single Judge concluded that both parties had to bear the costs of the current proceedings before FIFA. Furthermore and according to Annexe A of the Procedural Rules, the costs of the proceedings are to be levied on the basis of the amount in dispute. On that basis, the Single Judge held that the amount to be taken into consideration in the present proceedings was over CHF 200,001. Consequently, the Single Judge concluded that the maximum amount of costs of the proceedings corresponds to CHF 25,000.

30. As a conclusion, in view of the circumstances of the present matter, the Single Judge determined the costs of the current proceedings amounting to CHF 25,000. Consequently, the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee decided that the amount of CHF 12,500 has to be paid by the Claimant and the amount of CHF 12,500 by the Respondent in order to cover the costs of the present proceedings.

III. Decision of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee

1. The claim of the Claimant, Coach A, is partially accepted.

2. The Respondent, Club C, has to pay to the Claimant, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision, compensation for breach of contract in the amount of EUR 1,611,111 net of any taxes, plus 5% interest p.a. on the said amount as from 11 April 2017 until the date of effective payment.

3. The Respondent has to reimburse to the Claimant, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision, the amount of 18,408 in the currency of Country D, plus 5% interest p.a. on the said amount as from 11 April 2017 until the date of effective payment.

4. If the aforementioned amounts, plus interest as established above, are not paid within the aforementioned deadline, the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to FIFA’s Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision.

5. Any further claims lodged by the Claimant are rejected.

6. The counterclaim of the Respondent is inadmissible.

7. The final costs of the proceedings in the amount of CHF 25,000 are to be paid, within 30 days as from the notification of the present decision, as follows:

7.1 The amount of CHF 12,500 by the Claimant to FIFA. Given that the Claimant has already paid the amount of CHF 5,000 as advance of costs at the start of the present proceedings, the Claimant shall pay the additional amount of CHF 7,500 as costs of the proceedings.

7.2 The amount of CHF 12,500 by the Respondent to FIFA.

7.3 The abovementioned amounts as foreseen in points 7.1 and 7.2 have to be paid to FIFA to the following bank account with reference to case nr. XXX:

Coach A, Country B / Club C, Country D

17

UBS Zurich

Account number 366.677.01U (FIFA Players’ Status)

Clearing number 230

IBAN: CH27 0023 0230 3666 7701U

SWIFT: UBSWCHZH80A

8. The Claimant is directed to inform the Respondent immediately and directly of the account number to which the remittances under points 2. and 3. are to be made and to notify the Players’ Status Committee of every payment received.

*****

Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy):

According to art. 58 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives).

The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following:

Court of Arbitration for Sport

Avenue de Beaumont 2

1012 Lausanne - Switzerland

Tel: +41 21 613 50 00

Fax: +41 21 613 50 01

E-Mail: info@tas-cas.org

For the Single Judge of

the Players’ Status Committee:

Omar Ongaro

Football Regulatory Director