F.I.F.A. – Players’ Status Committee / Commissione per lo Status dei Calciatori – coach disputes / controversie allenatori (2020-2021) – fifa.com – atto non ufficiale – Decision 29 July 2020
Decis ion of the
Bureau of the Play ers ' S tatus Committee
pas sed on 29 July 2020,
regarding an employment-related dispute concerning the Coach A
COMPOSITION:
Raymond Hack (South Africa), Chairman
José Luis Andrade (Portugal), member
Stefano La Porta (Italy), member
CLAIMANT:
Coach A, Country A
Represented by
RESPONDENT:
Football Association B, Country B
I. FACTS
1. According to the Country A coach (hereinafter: the Coach or the Claimant), on 5 October
2019, he received a message from the Football Association B (hereinafter: the Football
Association or the Respondent) with, inter alia, the following conditions:
“PRIMERA.OBJETO
El Seleccionador, Coach A se compromete a prestar sus servicios Como Seleccionador
Absoluto para la Football Association B en calidad de Primer Entrenador de la selección
absoluta masculina de la Football Association.
(…)
SEGUNDO. PLAZO DE DURACIÓN
Este contrato tendrá vigencia desde el día de la fecha de la firma hasta el 30 de
septiembre de 2021.
(…)
TERCERA. RETRIBUCIÓN ECONÓMICA
Como retribución económica por los servicios prestados por el Entrenador, la Football
Association se compromete a abonarle todas las cantidades netas que a continuación se
especifican (…)
3.1. Salario base
La cantidad neta de 72.000 EUROS (6.000€) al mes en concepto de mensualidad,
abonadas por meses vencidos, a pagar dentro de los primeros diez (10) días de cada mes.
(…)
SEXTA. RESOLUCIÓN
Este contrato se resolverá por las siguientes causas:
Por cumplimiento del plazo temporal pactado. En este caso el Seleccionador no tendrá
derecho a percibir del Club indemnización alguna al haber cumplido ambas partes lo
pactado en el contrato en el tiempo establecido para ello.
Por resolución unilateral de la Football Association:
La Football Association podrá dar por terminado el Contrato con el Seleccionador en
cualquier momento de la duración del mismo, debido a que la naturaleza de este
Contrato es la base de una relación de confianza mutua.
En caso de resolución unilateral por parte de la Football Association por cualquier causa,
incluida la del punto b) 1, el Seleccionador tendrá derecho a percibir como indemnización
el salario base que hubiese percibido hasta la terminación del plazo contractual
inicialmente pactado y que no hubiera percibido ya al momento de la resolución.
(…)
DÉCIMA. LEGISLACIÓN APLICABLE
Este contrato se rige por las clausulas estipuladas en el mismo y en su defecto por la
legislación del Country B y por la normativa de la CAF y la FIFA.
DUODÉCIMA.FUERO
Para cualquier duda o controversia que pudiera surgir, en relación al cumplimiento e
interpretación del presente contrato, ambas partes se someten expresamente al arbitraje
de los Órganos Jurisdiccionales de la Football Association, en especial la Comisión de
Apelación, sin perjuicio del posterior recurso a los órganos correspondientes de la CAF y
la FIFA y la apelación, en su caso, a la corte de arbitraje del TAS/CAS con sede en Lausana.
Free translation into English:
"FIRST. OBJECT
The Coach accepts to provide his services as Senior Coach for the Football Association as
Head Coach of the men's senior team of the Football Association.
(...)
Second. VALIDITY PERIOD
This contract will be effective from the day of the date of signature until 30 September
2021.
(...)
Third. ECONOMIC REMUNERATION
The Football Association undertakes to pay all net amounts as specified below as a
remuneration for the services provided by the Coach, (...)
3.1. Base salary
The net amount of EUR 72,000 (EUR 6.000 per month) paid in arrears, to be paid within
the first ten (10) days of each month.
(...)
Sixth. Termination
This contract will be terminated for the following reasons:
For the fulfillment of the agreed time period. In this case, the Coach will not be entitled
to receive compensation from the Club at any time as both parties have complied with
the agreement within the established.
By unilateral termination from the Football Association:
The Football Association may terminate the Contract with the Coach at any time during
the duration of the Contract, insofar the nature of this Agreement a relationship of
mutual trust.
In the event of a unilateral termination by the Football Association for any reason,
including point (b) 1, the Coach shall be entitled to receive as compensation the base
salary which he would have received until the end of the contractual term initially agreed
and which he had not already received at the time of the decision.
(...)
Tenth. APPLICABLE LAW
This contract is governed by the clauses stipulated therein and, if not, by the laws of
Country B and by the regulations of CAF and FIFA.
Twelfth. JURISDICTION
For any doubt or controversy that may arise, in connection with the performance and
interpretation of this contract, both parties shall expressly refer to arbitration by the
Courts of the Football Association and, in particular, to its the Appeal Commission,
without prejudice to a subsequent appeal before the relevant bodies of CAF and FIFA, as
well as to an appeal, where appropriate, to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (TAS/CAS),
based in Lausanne.
2. On 15 October 2019, the Claimant sent an email to the Respondent with the following
contents:
“Te escribo porque tras haber aceptado el cargo como seleccionador nacional de Country
B hace una semana, y al estar trabajando desde el lunes 7 de octubre de 2019 al frente
del combinado nacional, aún no hemos firmado el contrato que me habéis propuesto y
enviado.
Como sabes ya hemos dirigido al combinado nacional en dos encuentros, uno de ellos en
City C ante Country D ante la presencia de la FIFA. De igual forma estuvimos concentrados
varios días en Country A y Country E junto con el presidente de la Football Association B.
Te llamaba con la intención de conocer cuándo se va a resolver esta situación.”
Free translation into English
"I am writing to you because having accepted the position as national coach of Country
B a week ago, and after working since Monday, October 7, 2019 as the Head of the
national team, we have not yet signed the contract that you have proposed and sent me.
As you know, we have already managed the national team in two matches, one of them
in City C against Country D in the presence of FIFA. Likewise, we were meeting during
several days in Country A and Country E together with the President of the Federation.
I was calling you with the intention of knowing when this situation is going to be solved."
3. On 25 October 2019, the Claimant received a letter from the Respondent with the
following contents:
“Estimado Coach A,
Te remitimos la presente para confirmarte que por parte de la Football Association damos
por terminadas las negociaciones para tu eventual incorporación como Seleccionador
nacional masculino absoluto.
Desde Football Association B queremos agradecerte tu disposición, así como tu ayuda
durante el último partido amistoso que celebramos, con un magnífico resultado y aunque
finalmente no hayamos podido ponernos de acuerdo en todos los detalles y no hayamos
firmado el contrato, esperamos poder cruzar nuestros caminos en el futuro”.
Free translation into English
"Dear Coach A,
We send you this letter to confirm that on behalf of the Football Association, we have
decided to terminate the negotiations leading to your possible hiring as the senior coach
of the national men's team.
On behalf of the Football Association we want to thank you for your availability, as well
as for your help during the last friendly match we held, which ended with a great result.
Although we have finally not been able to agree on all the details and have not signed
the contract, we hope to be able to cross our paths in the future."
4. On 30 October 2019, the Coach sent the following correspondence to the Respondent:
“En respuesta a su comunicación del pasado 25 de octubre, en la que me informaban de
su decisión de resolver la relación contractual que me unía a la Football Association B, les
comunico lo siguiente:
Las partes mantenían una relación contractual que expiraba el 30 de septiembre de
2021.
La resolución de la relación contractual se da por decisión unilateral de la Football
Association B.
Desde que asumí el puesto he venido realizando las funciones típicas del cargo de
Seleccionador Nacional Masculino Absoluto, habiendo incluso dirigido el encuentro
con la selección de Country D el pasado 13 de octubre, donde fui anunciado como
tal.
En función de lo anterior, les hago partícipes de mi intención de reclamar por la
indemnización que en virtud de la relación contractual existente entre ambos me
corresponde. Concretamente les remito a la cláusula sexta del contrato:
“SEXTA. RESOLUCIÓN
1) En caso de resolución unilateral por parte de la Football Association B por cualquier
causa, incluida la del punto b) 1, el Seleccionador tendrá derecho a percibir como
indemnización el salario base que hubiese percibido hasta la terminación del plazo
contractual inicialmente pactado y que no hubiera percibido ya al momento de la
resolución.”
En base a ello, me corresponde percibir de la Federación a la que usted representa la
cantidad 72.000€ por cada año que resta del contrato, sumando un total de 144.000€
hasta el 30 de septiembre de 2021.
Es mi intención evitar un procedimiento contencioso para el cobro de la cantidad
reclamada, por ello les informo de mi disponibilidad de entablar una negociación para el
cobro de la totalidad de la deuda. Si en el plazo prudencial de 5 días no tengo noticias
suyas, le comunico que pondré el asunto en manos de mis representantes legales para
que inicien las acciones que derecho me amparan.”
Free translation into English
"In response to your communication of 25 October, in which I was informed about your
decision to terminate the contractual relationship that bound me to the Football
Association B, I inform you of the following:
The parties had a contractual relationship expiring on 30 September 2021.
The termination of the contractual relationship was performed by a unilateral decision
of the Football Association B.
Since taking up the position I have been performing the standard functions of the
position of Senior Coach of the Men's National Team, having even led the match with the
Country D national team on 13 October [2019], where I was even presented as such.
In view of the foregoing, I inform you of my intention to claim compensation as
contractually agreed. In particular, I refer you to clause six of the contract:
"SIXTH. Termination
In the event of a unilateral termination by the Football Association B for any reason,
including point (b) 1, the Coach shall be entitled to receive as compensation the base
salary which he would have had received until the end of the contractual term initially
agreed and which he had not already received at the time of the decision.
On this basis, I shall receive the amount of EUR 72,000 for each year remaining from the
contract, that is, EUR 144,000 in total, until 30 September 2021.
I have the intention to avoid a litigation in order to collect the claimed amount,
Consequently, I inform you of my availability to enter into a negotiation for the collection
of the entire debt. If I do not hear from you within the reasonable period of time of 5
days, I will instruct my legal representatives to initiate the relevant legal actions”
5. On 13 November 2019, the official website of the Respondent announced that Coach F
became its national Coach.
6. Thereafter, the Coach A concluded an employment contract with Club G, valid as from 30
December 2019 to 30 June 2021, as per which he was entitled to receive a gross monthly
salary of EUR 33,334.
7. On 27 November 2019, the Claimant lodged a claim before FIFA against the Respondent
for breach of contract without just cause, and requested the payment of the following:
- EUR 4,064 as outstanding remuneration from 4 to 25 October 2019, plus 5% interest
p.a. as from 25 October 2019;
- EUR 139,161.29 as compensation for breach of contract, corresponding to the residual
amount of the contract, plus 5% interest p.a. as from 25 October 2019.
8. On 23 January 2020, the Respondent replied to the claim.
9. As a preliminary matter, the Respondent rejected the competence of FIFA, arguing that
the matter should be referred to its “Comisión de Apelación” (in English, Appeal
Committee).
10. As to the substance, the Respondent explained that the Claimant was only proposed to
replace the previous national Coach of Country B, and that his name was proposed by an
intermediary.
11. In this respect, the Respondent stated that said intermediary has no employment
relationship with the Football Association and that she acts on her own behalf. In other
words, according to the Respondent, she lacks any capacity to contract on behalf of the
Football Association.
12. The Respondent further explained that throughout this process at no time there was any
direct contact between the Claimant and any representative of the Football Association
with the capacity to sign on its behalf.
13. As a result, the Respondent argued that the Claimant is not stating the truth when he
alleges that Football Association B’s lawyer sent him a draft contract.
14. However, the Respondent acknowledged that Claimant actually conducted some training
and that he was temporarily given with his position during a match played against
Country D on October 13, 2019.
15. According to the Respondent, the Claimant’s participation in this match was merely
carried out as a test and in order to have a first approach of his working methods.
16. The Respondent stated that, it finally decided to hire Coach F, with whom it carried
parallel negotiations.
17. Therefore, the Respondent insisted that the Claimant never concluded any contract with
the Football Association and that all the facts set out by him “are nothing more than a
sequence of unilateral actions that, under no circumstances, can imply the existence of
an agreement of wills.”
18. In sum, the Respondent made the following requests for relief:
- To declare that no employment relationship has been concluded between the Football
Association B and the Coach A or any of his assistants.
-Consequently, dismiss all the requests made by the Claimant concerning compensation
for the breach without just cause of his alleged employment contract.
- Order the Claimant to pay the costs of the proceedings, if any.
19. The Claimant was invited to provide a further position in relation to the competence.
20. In this respect, the Claimant insisted in the competence of FIFA and argued that with
regards to the Appeal’s Committee, article 64 par. 3 of the Football Association Statutes
establish that: “la comisión de apelación es competente para tratar las decisiones de la
Comisión Disciplinaria y de la Comisión de Ética que los reglamentos no establezcan como
definitivas en virtud del reglamento correspondiente de la Football Association B.”
Free translation into English: "The appeal commission is competent to deal with the
decisions of the Disciplinary Commission and the Ethics Commission that the regulations
do not establish as final by virtue of the corresponding regulation of the Football
Assocation B."
21. As a result, the Claimant considered that neither of the above organs of the Football
Association B are competent ratione materiae to hear contractual-related disputes
between coaches and clubs/national associations with an international dimension. Their
purview is strictly limited to disciplinary and ethics procedures as it stems from the
Statutes and from the documents submitted by the Respondent. Therefore, according to
the Claimant, “whether the members of these committees are allowed to belong to
another organ of the Football Association is superfluous and irrelevant and this second
argument must be disregarded from the outset. No other tribunal competent to
adjudicate contractual disputes exists within the Football Association B.”
22. In addition, the Claimant referred to the principle of autonomy of arbitration agreements
“as enshrined in article 178 par. 3 of the Swiss Private International Law Act, which states
the following: “La validité d’une conventiond’arbitrage ne peut pas être contestée pour
le motif que le contrat principal ne serait pas valable ou que la convention d’arbitrage
concernerait un litige non-encore né.” [in English: The arbitration agreement cannot be
contested on the grounds that the main contract is not valid or that the arbitration
agreement concerns a dispute which had not as yet arisen.]
23. Therefore, the Claimant argued that “According to the principle of autonomy (or
separability doctrine), the arbitration agreement stands alone regardless of the validity
of the contract in which the agreement is inserted. Thus, in short, a party (i.c. the
Respondent) cannot object to an arbitration clause based on the assertion that the
underlying contract is null and void or that it was never signed.
II. CONSIDERATIONS OF THE PLAYERS' STATUS COMMITTEE
1. First of all, the Bureau of the Players' Status Committee (hereinafter also referred to as
the Bureau or the PSC) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the case at hand.
Taking into account the wording of art. 21 of the 2019 edition of the Rules Governing
the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber
(hereinafter: the Procedural Rules), the aforementioned edition of the Procedural Rules
is applicable to the matter at hand.
2. Subsequently, the Players' Status Committee referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the Procedural
Rules and observed that, in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 in combination with art.
22 lit. c) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, the Players' Status
Committee is competent to deal with employment-related disputes between a club or an
association and a coach of an international dimension.
3. As a result, the Bureau understood that, in principle, it is competent to deal with the
present dispute between a Country A Coach and the Football Association B.
4. However, in this respect, the Players' Status Committee noted that the Respondent
rejected the competence of FIFA on the basis of art. 12 of the contract, which stipulates
the following:
12. JURISDICTION
For any doubt or controversy that may arise, in connection with the performance and
interpretation of this contract, both parties shall expressly refer to arbitration by the
Courts of the Football Association and, in particular, to its the Appeal Commission,
without prejudice to a subsequent appeal before the relevant bodies of CAF and FIFA, as
well as to an appeal, where appropriate, to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (TAS/CAS),
based in Lausanne.
5. Conversely, the Players’ Status Committee took note that the Claimant insisted in the
competence of FIFA.
6. In view of the dissent between the parties, and without yet entering into the examination
of the validity of the alleged contract that is at the basis of the dispute, the Bureau first
wished to specify that, in accordance with art. 22 c) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, it is competent to hear disputes as the one at stake “unless an
independent arbitration tribunal guaranteeing fair proceedings exists at national level”.
7. As a result, the Bureau observed the contents of art. 12 of the alleged contract and noted
that it is clearly drafted, as it refers to the “Appeal Commission” of the Football
Association B, the Bureau considered that, in application of the principle of interpretatio
cessat in claris, that the contents of said jurisdiction clause are sufficiently clear.
8. Thereafter, the Bureau went on to examine whether the “Appeal Commission” of the
Football Association B can be considered as an independent arbitration tribunal
guaranteeing fair proceedings exists at national level in the sense of art. 22 c) of the
Regulations
9. In this respect, the Bureau analyzed the documentation gathered during the course of
the investigation, and noted that article 64 par. 3 of the Football Association Statutes
establish that: “la comisión de apelación es competente para tratar las decisiones de la
Comisión Disciplinaria y de la Comisión de Ética que los reglamentos no establezcan como
definitivas en virtud del reglamento correspondiente de la Football Association B.”
Free translation into English: "The appeal commission is competent to deal with the
decisions of the Disciplinary Commission and the Ethics Commission that the regulations
do not establish as final by virtue of the corresponding regulation of the Football
Association."
10. After duly examining the contents of the aforementioned article, the Bureau came to the
unanimous conclusion that, from the documentation on file, it cannot be established
whether the “Appeal Commission” of the Football Association is an arbitration tribunal
dealing with contractual (employment-related) disputes, but that its scope of competence
is only related to disciplinary and ethics issues.
11. In view of the above, the Bureau understood that, since the “Appeal Commission” could
not be understood as an arbitration tribunal dealing with contractual (employmentrelated)
disputes, FIFA and its Players’ Status Committee are competent to hear about the
present dispute, in accordance with is at the basis of the dispute, the Bureau first wished
to specify that, in accordance with art. 22 c) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer
of Players.
12. In addition, and for the sake of completeness, the Bureau further noted that the
Respondent based its argumentation on the basis of art. 12 of the alleged contract, while
it simultaneously contested the validity of the entire agreement. In the opinion of the
Bureau, this argumentation appears to be contradictory, since the Respondent cannot
rely in a specific contractual provision of a contract that it considered as not valid.
13. In continuation, the Players' Status Committee analysed which edition of the Regulations
of the Status and Transfer of Players should be applicable to the present matter. In this
respect, the Players' Status Committee confirmed that in accordance with art. 26 par. 1
and 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, and considering that the
claim was lodged on 27 November 2019, the October 2019 edition of the aforementioned
regulations (hereinafter: the Regulations) is applicable to the matter at hand.
14. With the above having been established, the Bureau entered into the substance of the
matter. In doing so, it started to acknowledge the facts of the case as well as the
documents contained in the file. However, the Bureau emphasized that in the following
considerations it will refer only to facts, arguments and documentary evidence which it
considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand.
15. In this respect, the Bureau noted that, according to the Claimant, he concluded an
employment contract with the Respondent valid as from on 5 October 2019
16. Conversely, the Bureau observed that the Respondent denied having signed any contract
with the Claimant, as it noted that it was merely under negotiations leading to a possible
employment relationship with the latter.
17. In view of the dissent between the parties, the Bureau considered that, at this point, it
shall carefully examine the documentation and evidence provided by the parties during
the course of the investigation.
18. In this respect, the Bureau observed that the Claimant provide with his claim an unsigned
copy of the disputed contract.
19. In relation to said document, the Bureau noted that, in principle, the longstanding
jurisprudence of the Players’ Status Committee strongly favors the submission of a
mutually signed contract as the primary evidentiary basis to establish that the parties
entered into an employment relationship. However, the Bureau also wished to underline
that, in specific and well-determined situations, there are other evidentiary circumstances
that may sufficiently prove the existence of a contractual relationship. The Bureau
recalled in this respect that, indeed, the conclusion of a contract requires a mutual
expression of intent by the parties, and this intend may well be express or implied.
20. In view of the above, the Bureau recalled the main sequence of events that are at the
basis of the present dispute:
- On 5 October 2019, the Claimant received a copy of the alleged contract.
- On 13 October 2019, the Claimant acted as Head Coach of the representative team of
Country B during a friendly match against Country D, and which was held in Country
E.
- On 15 October 2019, the Claimant sent an email to the Respondent, complaining that
the contract was not yet signed, despite having started to work since the previous
week.
- On 25 October 2019, the Claimant received a letter from the Respondent by means of
which the latter terminated the “negotiations”
- On 13 November 2019, the official website of the Respondent announced that Coach
F became its national coach.
21. In relation to the aforementioned sequence of events, the Bureau understood that the
reception of a copy of the alleged contract on 5 October 2019 followed by the
participation of the Coach A in a friendly match on 13 October 2019, is a sufficient
indication of a contractual relationship having been formed.
22. Moreover, the Bureau observed that, from the documentation on file, that at no point
the Coach was properly informed or advised that the aforementioned sequence of
events had to be understood as part of any negotiation until the moment when the
Respondent referred to it under said term via its letter of 25 October 2019.
23. In this respect, the Bureau further wished to underlined that, in contract law, there is
an implied agreement of good faith. Accordingly, the parties are generally presumed
to deal with each other in an honest and fair manner, with the aim of not harming
the rights of the other party.
24. In view of the above, and with the aforementioned sequence of events in mind, the
Bureau concluded with the support of the majority of its members, that the Claimant
and the Respondent could rely in good faith that he was bound by a valid and binding
contract with the Respondent. The Bureau understood that the effectivity of said
contract can be observed by the aforementioned conclusive behavior.
25. As a result, the Bureau established, in accordance with the documentation on file, that
the aforementioned contract was valid as from 5 October 2019, i.e. when he received
the contract from the Respondent until 30 September 2021.
26. After establishing the validity of the contract, the Bureau went on to examine its
termination, as alleged by the Claimant, and to decide on the consequences thereof.
27. In doing so, the Bureau recalled that it has remained undisputed that the Respondent
sent a correspondence to the Claimant on 25 October 2019, by means of which it
decided to “interrupt the negotiations”.
28. Thus, considering that the parties were already under an employment contract since 5
October 2019, the Bureau considered that said letter could only be understood as a
unilateral termination of the contract.
29. Within this context, the Bureau was eager to emphasise that only a breach or
misconduct which is of a certain severity justifies the termination of a contract. In other
words, only when there are objective criteria, which do not reasonably permit to
expect a continuation of the employment relationship between the parties, a contract
may be terminated prematurely. Hence, if there are more lenient measures which can
be taken in order for an employer to ensure the employee’s fulfillment of his
contractual duties, such measures must be taken before terminating an employment
contract. A premature termination of an employment contract can only ever be an
ultima ratio measure.
30. On account of the above, and after duly examining the contents of the correspondence
of 25 October 2019, the Bureau observed that the Respondent failed to provide any
substantive motivation to justify the unilateral termination of the contract. As a result,
the Bureau considered that the Respondent terminated the contract without just cause
and it is consequently liable to pay compensation to the Claimant.
31. In continuation, the Bureau focused its attention on the calculation of the amount of
compensation for breach of contract in the case at stake. In doing so, the members of
the Bureau firstly recapitulated that, in accordance with the jurisprudence of the
Players’ Status Committee, the amount of compensation shall be calculated, in
particular and unless otherwise provided for in the contract at the basis of the dispute,
with due consideration for the law of the country concerned, the specificity of sport
and further objective criteria, including, in particular, the remuneration and other
benefits due to the Claimant under the existing contract and/or the new contract, the
time remaining on the existing contract up to a maximum of five years.
32. In application of the relevant provision, the Bureau held that it first of all had to clarify
as to whether the pertinent employment contract contains a provision by means of
which the parties had beforehand agreed upon an amount of compensation payable
by the contractual parties in the event of breach of contract. In this regard, the Bureau
observed that the contract established the following conditions for the payment of
compensation under the scenario of a unilateral termination by the Respondent:
By unilateral termination from the Football Association B:
The Football Association may terminate the Contract with the Coach at any time
during the duration of the Contract, because the nature of this Agreement is the basis
of a relationship of mutual trust.
In the event of a unilateral resolution by the Football Association for any reason,
including point (b) 1, the Coach shall be entitled to receive as compensation the base
salary which he had received until the end of the contractual term initially agreed and
which he had not already received at the time of the decision.
33. Bearing in mind the foregoing, the Bureau proceeded with the calculation of the
monies payable to the Coach under the terms of the employment contract until 30
September 2021.
34. In this regard, the Bureau noted that, following clause 3.2. of the contract, the
Claimant was entitled to a total remuneration of EUR 72,000 per year, in monthly
salaries of EUR 6,000 each and payable in arrears on the 10th days of the following
months.
35. Therefore, from 10 November 2019 (i.e. when the first salary became due) until 10
October 2021 (i.e. when the last salary would be due), the coach would have earned
the total amount of 138,000, i.e. 23*6000.
36. In continuation, the Bureau verified as to whether the Claimant had signed an
employment contract with another club during the relevant period of time, by means
of which he would have been enabled to reduce his loss of income. According to the
constant practice of the Players’ Status Committee, such remuneration under a new
employment contract shall be taken into account in the calculation of the amount of
compensation for breach of contract in connection with the player’s general
obligation to mitigate his damages.
37. In this respect, the Bureau noted that, on 30 December 2019, the coach concluded a
new employment contract, valid as from 30 December 2019 to 30 June 2021, as per
which he was entitled to receive a gross monthly salary of EUR 33,334, i.e. a
significantly higher salary than the one he was entitled to with the Respondent.
38. Therefore, the Bureau established that the Claimant fully mitigated his damages after
30 December 2019. Nevertheless, the Bureau considered that this was not the case for
the months during which he remained unemployed, i.e. November and December
2019.
39. As a result, and after duly taking the mitigating factors, the Bureau decided that the
amount of payable compensation shall amount to the earnings that the coach would
have expected to earn from the Respondent during the period in which he remained
unemployed, i.e. November and December 2019, during which he would have received
the total amount of EUR 12,000 and corresponding to two instalments of EUR 6,000
each.
40. Consequently, on account of all of the above-mentioned considerations and the
specificities of the case at hand, the Bureau decided that the Respondent must pay the
amount of EUR 12,000 to the Claimant as compensation for breach of contract, which
it considered as reasonable and justified on the basis of the relevant contractual
provisions as well as in the light of the mitigating circumstance at hand.
41. In addition, and taking into account the Claimant’s request as well as the longstanding
jurisprudence in this respect, the Bureau decided to award 5% interest p.a. on said
amount as from the date of the claim until the date of effective payment.
42. In this respect, the Bureau of the Players' Status Committee referred to the Covid-19
Football Regulatory Issues – FAQ, published on 11 June 2020 which establish that,
given the current circumstances, for any claim lodged prior to 10 June 2020 which has
yet to be decided, the maximum amount of the procedural costs shall be equivalent to
any advance of costs paid.
43. Thus, given that, at the beginning of the proceedings, the Claimant paid the amount
of CHF 4,000 as an advance of costs, and given the outcome of the matter, the Bureau
decided that the Respondent shall pay said amount of CHF 4,000 as procedural costs.
44. Finally, the Bureau concluded its deliberations by rejecting any further request made
by the parties.
III. DECISION OF THE PLAYERS' STATUS COMMITTEE
1. The claim of the Claimant, Coach A, is admissible.
2. The claim of the Claimant is partially accepted.
3. The Respondent has to pay to the Claimant within 30 days as from the date of notification
of this decision compensation in the amount of EUR 12,000 plus interest of 5% p.a. as from
27 November 2019 until the date of effective payment.
4. Any further claim of the Claimant is rejected.
5. In the event that the amount due to the Claimant in accordance with the abovementioned
number 3. plus interest is not paid by the Respondent within the stated time
limit, the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to the FIFA Disciplinary
Committee for consideration and a formal decision.
6. The Claimant is directed to inform the Respondent immediately and directly of the
account number to which the remittances are to be made and to notify the Single Judge
of the Players’ Status Committee of every payment received.
7. The final costs of the proceedings in the amount of CHF 4,000 are to be paid by the
Respondent to FIFA (cf. note relating to the payment of the procedural costs below).
For the Players' Status Committee:
Emilio García Silvero
Chief Legal & Compliance Officer
NOTE RELATED TO THE APPEAL PROCEDURE:
According to article 58 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before
the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) within 21 days of receipt of the notification of this
decision.
NOTE RELATED TO THE PUBLICATION:
FIFA may publish this decision. For reasons of confidentiality, FIFA may decide, at the request of a
party within five days of the notification of the motivated decision, to publish an anonymised or
a redacted version (cf. article 20 of the Procedural Rules).
CONTACT INFORMATION:
Fédération Internationale de Football As sociation
FIFA-Strasse 20 P.O. Box 8044 Zurich Switzerland
www.fifa.com | legal.fifa.com | psdfifa@fifa.org | T: +41 (0)43 222 7777