F.I.F.A. – Players’ Status Committee / Commissione per lo Status dei Calciatori – club vs club disputes / controversie tra società – (2019-2020) – fifa.com – atto non ufficiale – Decision 24 July 2019

Decision of the Single Judge

of the Players’ Status Committee

passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 24 July 2019,

by

Roy Vermeer (Netherlands)

Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee,

on the claim presented by the club

Club A, Country B,

as “Claimant”

against the club

Club C, Country D,

as “Respondent”

regarding a contractual dispute between the parties relating to the player

Player E

I. Facts of the case

1. On 5 January 2017, Club A (hereinafter: the Claimant or Club A) and Club C (hereinafter: the Respondent or Club C) signed a transfer agreement for the definitive transfer of the player of Country B, Player E (hereinafter: the player) from the Claimant to the Respondent.

2. In accordance with the transfer agreement, the Respondent was to pay to the Claimant the total amount of EUR 5,000,000 as follows: (i) EUR 2,400,000 at the signing of the transfer agreement; (ii) EUR 1,300,000 on 15 July 2017; (iii) EUR 1,300,000 on 15 January 2018.

3. At art. 3.2 (hereinafter also: the sell-on clause), headed ‘payment of an additional compensation’, the transfer agreement provided that the Respondent “agrees to pay to [the Claimant] an additional transfer compensation as follows: In case a definitive transfer of the player is signed, and the player is transferred from [the Respondent] to another club, allowing [the Respondent] to realize a capital gain, 12% of this value will be transferred to [the Claimant]. The capital gain must be understood as the difference between the amount received (training compensation included) by [the Respondent] from a third-party club as a result of the player’s definitive transfer to that club and the sum of EUR 5,000,000 paid by [the Respondent] in respect of the Club A final transfer compensation, to [the Claimant]. For example, in the event of transfer of the player from [the Respondent] to a third club for a sum EUR 7,000,000 (including training compensation), [the Respondent] would have to pay to Club A an additional compensation of 12% of EUR 2,000,000, that’s to say EUR 240,000”.

4. On 5 January 2017, the player and the Respondent signed an employment contract (hereinafter: the contract), valid as from the date of signature until 30 June 2021.

5. On the same date, the player and the Respondent signed an annex to the contract (hereinafter: the annex).

6. Art. 1 of the annex provided the following: “A los efectos contemplados en el art. 16 del Real Decreto 1.006/85 de 26 Junio, para el supuesto de rescisión unilateral anticipada del presente contrato por parte del jugador antes de la expiración del término pactado, el jugador vendrá obligado a indemnizar al Club C independientemente de la temporada y el momento de la misma en la que lo ejercitase, con la suma de EUR 35,000,000, actualizada al alza con el Incremento de índice de Precios al Consumo (o índice que le sustituyera en el futuro) en su conjunto nacional, contado desde el primer día del mes anterior a su incumplimiento” (free translation: “For the purposes contemplated in art. 16 of Royal Decree 1.006/85 of 26 June, in the event of early unilateral termination of this contract by the player before the expiration of the agreed term, the player will be obliged to compensate [Club C] regardless of the season and the time of the same in which it is exercised, with the sum of EUR 35,000,000, updated upward with the increase in the Index of Consumer Prices (or index that will replace it in the future) as a whole national, counted from the first day of the month prior to its breach”).

7. Art. 3.1 bis of the annex provided the following: “No obstante a lo anterior la partes expresamente acuerdan que, en reconocimiento del especial perjuicio que supone para los clubes el ejercicio unilateral por parte del jugador de la denominada cláusula de rescisión en los días finales en los que el mercado de transferencias de jugadores se encuentra abierto, para proteger el especial perjuicio temporal del Club C en los últimos diez días naturales de casa una de las ventanas de transferencias de jugadores durante el vigor contractual de la presente relación laboral la cantidad indemnizatoria prevista será automáticamente de EUR 40,000,000” (free translation: “Notwithstanding the foregoing, the parties expressly agree that, in recognition of the special harm to clubs caused by the player's unilateral exercise of the so-called rescission clause in the final days on which the transfer market is open, in order to protect the special temporary harm to [the Respondent] in the last ten calendar days of one of the player transfer windows during the contractual validity of this employment relationship, the compensation amount provided for will automatically be EUR 40,000,000”).

8. Pursuant to art. 3.2 of the annex: ”La cantidad indemnizatoria prevista en el párrafo 3.1 anterior (y su incremento al alza por la incidencia del IPC o por el cierre de Mercado) es entendida como una cantidad neta de cualquier deducción aplicable, tales como obligaciones fiscales o tributarias, cargos bancarios, o mecanismo de solidaridad e indemnización por formación FIFA, que en caso de ser de aplicación serán cantidades adicionales al mencionado importe económico” (free translation: “The indemnity amount provided for in paragraph 3.1 above (and its increase due to the incidence of the CPI or the closing of the Market) is understood as a net amount of any applicable deduction, such as tax or fiscal obligations, bank charges, or solidarity mechanism and FIFA training compensation, which if applicable will be additional amounts to the aforementioned economic amount”).

9. According to to art. 3.4 of the annex: “la cantidad indemnizatoria prevista en el párrafo 3.1 anterior (y su incremento al alza la incidencia del IPC o por el cierre de Mercado), será también la cantidad que habrá de abonar el jugador si rescindiera unilateralmente su contrato federativo, de acuerdo con lo establecido en el artículo 17 del Reglamento FIFA sobre el Estatuto y la Transferencia de Jugadores, lo que se estipula expresamente en este contrato, a los efectos de la indemnización que los órganos de FIFA y/o del TAS/CAS hayan de decidir y que ambas partes pactan de total mutuo acuerdo, conociendo y siendo conscientes, especialmente el jugador, de la cuantía acordada entre las mismas, que acepta por la apuesta económica y deportiva y el esfuerzo que, con el este contrato, realiza el Club C” (free translation: ”the amount of compensation provided for in paragraph 3.1 (and its increase due to the increase in the incidence of the CPI or the closing of the Market), will also be the amount that the player will have to pay if he unilaterally terminates his federative contract, in accordance with article 17 of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, which is expressly stipulated in this contract, to the effects of the compensation that the organs of FIFA and/or TAS/CAS have to decide and that both parties agree on by mutual agreement, knowing and being aware, especially the player, of the amount agreed between them, that he accepts for the economic and sports bet and the effort that, with this contract, [the Respondent] makes”).

10. On 12 July 2018, the club of Country D, Club F (hereinafter: Club F) deposited the total amount of EUR 35,910,000 in League X’s accounts. Subsequently, the player joined Club F.

11. On 17 July 2018, the Claimant put the Respondent in default of the payment of the amount of EUR 3,708,000, representing 12% of the ‘capital gain’ allegedly made by the Respondent as a consequence of the transfer of the player to Club F, in accordance with art. 3.2 of the transfer agreement signed between the Claimant and the Respondent on 5 January 2017.

12. On 18 July 2018, the Respondent replied to the Claimant’s default notice, arguing that the latter did not have a right to the effects of the sell-on clause since “it was [the player] that decided to breach the contract and leave [the Respondent]. [The Respondent] did not “sign any transfer” or “transferred the player” as mentioned in the contract but rather was deprived of the player. […] the rescission clause is a penalty one for breach of contract, which includes the sporting loss of a player but definitively is not a transfer.”

13. On 30 July 2018 and 21 August 2018, the Claimant put the Respondent in default of the payment of EUR 3,708,000, granting it 30 days to remedy the alleged default.

14. On 5 November 2018, the Claimant lodged a claim against the Respondent in front of FIFA, requesting the total amount of EUR 3,708,000 plus 5% interest p.a. as from 8 September 2018, i.e. “date of the end of the deadline provided by [the Claimant] to [the Respondent] in its default letter dated 21 August 2018”, until the date of effective payment.

15. The Claimant further requested that the procedurals cost be at the expense of the Respondent and that FIFA declare that the latter expressly agreed to the transfer of the player to Club F.

16. More specifically, the Claimant argued that it only agreed to lower the amount of the player’s transfer compensation in exchange of a sell-on clause providing for an amount equivalent to 12% of the ‘capital gain’ made by the Respondent on a future transfer of the player.

17. Furthermore, according to the Claimant, the Respondent proved his bad faith by arguing, in reply to the various default notices, that it never consented to the transfer of the player but that, in application of art. 16.1 of the Royal Decree 1.006/85 (i.e. the Real Decreto), it did not have any other choice. However, in this regard, the Claimant argued that the Respondent ”obtained [its] consent by negotiating in the transfer agreement of 5 January 2017 a clause imposing an obligation on it which it knew fully well that it could divert from it to its sole benefit, since it could consider itself released from that obligation by substituting the transfer fee for the payment of buyout clause”.

18. The Claimant further maintained that, in any case, the definition of ‘capital gain’ provided in the transfer agreement implies that any amount that the Respondent received in relation to the player from a third party had to be taken into account.

19. Moreover, the Claimant added that the fact that Club F added EUR 900,000 to the amount of EUR 35,000,000 provided for at art. 1 of the annex to the player’s employment contract clearly demonstrates that there had been negotiations between Club F and the Respondent concerning the transfer of the player.

20. Lastly, the Claimant argued that the amount provided at art. 1 of the annex to the player’s employment contract, i.e. EUR 35,000,000, was far from reflecting the real value of the player and that, in any case, the latter could have not paid the buyout clause himself. In the Claimant’s opinion, only a club could have paid a sum of that significance. Thus, the Claimant concluded that the said amount was established as a transfer fee.

21. In reply to the claim, the Respondent argued that the sell-on clause could only be triggered by the transfer of the player following the signature of a transfer agreement and that, in the case at hand, Club F unilaterally executed a buy-out clause in accordance with Country D law.

22. The Respondent further argued that Club F, following Country D law and League X’s regulations, delivered the ‘execution deed’ and the payment to League X, which, afterwards, transferred it to the Respondent.

23. Moreover, the Respondent claimed that it did not enter into any negotiations with Club F concerning the transfer of the player.

24. Furthermore, the Respondent quoted CAS 2010/A/2098 Club C v. Club G, explaining that, in light of the content of the recalled award, “the execution of a buy-out clause under Country D law is not a transfer as it is known in the football world”.

25. Regarding the Claimant’s allegations that Club F paid more than what was provided for in the employment contract, i.e. EUR 35,900,000 instead of EUR 35,000,000, the Respondent explained that the contract adds an inflation amount that is calculated as a result of Country D’s consumer price index and clarified that the final amount paid to it was actually EUR 35,910,000.

26. Moreover, the Respondent argued that the Claimant had to substantiate with evidence any allegation of bad faith it had brought up with its submission. In any case, the Respondent added that, had the Claimant wanted to include for the application of the sell-on fee clause the execution of a buy-out clause, it should have added it to the wording of the transfer agreement.

27. In addition, the Respondent requested that, when rendering the present decision, the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee expressly states that the player was not transferred to Club F “within the meaning of the Transfer Agreement” and that, therefore, the Respondent does not owe the 12% sell-on fee as claimed by the Claimant. Independently of the final decision, the Respondent requested that the Claimant pay CHF 10,000 for the Respondent’s legal costs and fees, as well as all the procedural costs.

28. In its replica, the Claimant reiterated its previous argument and underlined that “it is therefore clear that discussions have taken place between Club F and [the Respondent] to agree on this additional amount of EUR 900,000, regardless of the reasons for its payment”.

29. In its last submission, the Respondent reiterated its position and added that, in reality, it had “no idea as to why Club F paid this amount as there were no discussion between the clubs”.

II. Considerations of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee

1. First of all, the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee (hereinafter: Single Judge) analysed which edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber is applicable to the matter at hand. In this respect, he referred to art. 21 of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (edition 2018) as well as to the fact that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 5 November 2018. Consequently, the Single Judge concluded that the 2018 edition of said Procedural Rules is applicable to the matter at hand (hereinafter: Procedural Rules).

2. Subsequently, the Single Judge confirmed that, on the basis of art. 3 par. 1 and par. 2 of the Procedural Rules in connection with art. 23 par. 1 and par. 4 as well as art. 22 lit. f) of the 2019 edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, he is competent to deal with the matter at stake since it concerns a dispute between two clubs affiliated to different associations.

3. In continuation, the Single Judge analysed which edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players is applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, he referred to art. 26 par. 1 and par. 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2019) and to the fact that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 5 November 2018. In view of the foregoing, the Single Judge concluded that the June 2018 edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: Regulations) is applicable in the matter at hand as to the substance.

4. His competence and the applicable regulations having been established, and entering into the substance of the matter, the Single Judge started by acknowledging the above-mentioned facts as well as the arguments and the documentation submitted by the parties. However, the Single Judge emphasized that in the following considerations he will refer only to the facts, arguments and documentary evidence, which he considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand.

5. The Single Judge acknowledged that, on 5 January 2017, the Claimant and the Respondent signed a transfer agreement for the definitive transfer of the player from the Claimant to the Respondent, in turn of a transfer fee of EUR 5,000,000.

6. Moreover, the Single Judge took into account that, according to art. 3.2. of the transfer agreement, “in case a definitive transfer of the player is signed, and the player is transferred from [the Respondent] to another club, allowing [the Respondent] to realize a capital gain, 12% of this value will be transferred to [the Claimant]. The capital gain must be understood as the difference between the amount received (training compensation included) by [the Respondent] from a third-party club as a result of the player’s definitive transfer to that club and the sum of EUR 5,000,000” which the Respondent had paid to the Claimant in the context of the player’s transfer.

7. The Single Judge further noted that, in accordance with art. 1 of the annexe to the employment contract signed between the player and the Respondent, “in the event of early unilateral termination of this contract by the player before the expiration of the agreed term, the player will be obliged to compensate [the Respondent] regardless of the season and the time of the same in which it is exercised, with the sum of EUR 35,000,000, updated upward with the increase in the Index of Consumer Prices (or index that will replace it in the future) as a whole national, counted from the first day of the month prior to its breach”.

8. In addition, the Single Judge observed that, during the course of the proceedings, it was proved that a payment in the amount of EUR 35,910,000 was performed towards League X by Club F. Furthermore, the Single Judge noted that it remained undisputed that the said amount was subsequently transferred to the Respondent.

9. In continuation, the Single Judge took into account that, according to the Claimant, as a consequence of the player’s transfer from the Respondent to Club F, which followed the payment of EUR 35,910,000 performed by Club F on 12 July 2018, the sell-on clause envisaged at art. 3.2 of the transfer agreement between the Claimant and the Respondent of 5 January 2017 had been triggered. Consequently, the Claimant deemed that it was entitled to 12% of the ‘capital gain’ made by the Respondent, i.e. – according to its calculations – EUR 3,708,000.

10. Furthermore, the Single Judge noted that, according to the Respondent, no transfer had occurred with Club F, as the latter had simply executed the buyout clause provided in the player’s employment contract, in accordance with Country D law, leaving the Respondent without any saying in it. Therefore, according to the Respondent, the sell-on clause contained in the transfer agreement with the Claimant had not been triggered.

11. To sum up, the Single Judge observed that the parties, substantially did not dispute that: (a) the player ultimately joined Club F from the Respondent; (b) the amount of EUR 35,910,000 was eventually transferred to the Respondent; (c) the employment contract provided for a buyout clause in the amount of EUR 35,000,000; (d) the transfer agreement signed on 5 January 2017 between the Claimant and the Respondent provided for a sell-on clause in the amount equivalent to 12% of the ‘capital gain’ obtained by the Respondent from a future transfer of the player; (e) the aforementioned ‘capital gain’ had to be considered as the difference between the amount received by the Respondent and EUR 5,000,000 originally paid by the latter to the Claimant as a consequence of the transfer agreement of 5 January 2017.

12. In light of the parties’ conflicting position and considering the abovementioned undisputed facts, the Single Judge concluded that the main issue in the matter at stake was to determine whether Club F’s execution of the payment of the buyout clause contained in the player’s employment contract triggered the sell-on clause contained in the transfer agreement between the Claimant and the Respondent.

13. In this respect, the Single Judge noted that the Respondent relied on a specific award rendered by the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) on 29 November 2010, i.e. CAS 2010/A/2098 Club C v. Club G.

14. The Single Judge deemed it worth recalling, first of all, the Panel’s cursory look at the raison d’être of sell-on clauses carried out in said award, as it is safe to assume that its findings are generally accepted in the football world and undisputed between the parties of the present matter. According to the Panel, the purpose of sell-on clauses “is to “protect” a club (the “old club”) transferring a player to another club (the “new club”) against an unexpected increase, after the transfer, in the market value of the player’s services; therefore, the old club receives an additional payment in the event the player is “sold” from the new club to a third club for an amount higher than that one paid by the new club to the old club”.

15. That said, the Single Judge preliminary pointed out that, according to the Panel in the Club C v. Club G case, the factor triggering the sell-on clause in the transfer agreement underlying that very dispute was a subsequent “resale” of the player, which – for the ease of reasoning – the Panel equated to a simple sale.

16. Furthermore, in that occasion, the Panel observed that “in the context of a “sale” contract, a transfer, being object and purpose of the parties’ consent, can actually be made in two ways: (i) by way of assignment of the employment contract; and (ii) by way of termination of the employment agreement with the old club and signature of a different employment agreement with the new club. In both cases, the old club expresses its agreement (to the assignment or to the termination of the old employment contract, as the case may be) against the receipt of a payment – which substitutes for the loss of the player’s services; the new club accepts the assignment of the existing employment contract or consents to enter into a new contract with the player; and the player consents to move to the new club”.

17. Moreover, the Single Judge noted that, according to the Panel, “a transfer of a player can also take place outside the scheme of a (“sale”) contract, in the event that the player moves from a club to another following the termination of the old employment agreement […]”.

18. Against this background, bearing in mind that the transfer agreement at the basis of that dispute had a sell-on fee triggered in case of a “resale” of the player by Club C to a third club, the Panel in the said award recognised that, to the extent that the sell-on clause in that case refers to a “resale”, it applies only to subsequent transfers of the player to a new club which are based on a contract.

19. In continuation, the Single Judge recalled that, in such specific scenario, the Panel concluded that “no evidence ha[d] been given to prove that, where the parties indicated in the Transfer Agreement the “resale” as the triggering element for the additional payment under the Sell-On Clause, their common and actual intention was to refer to any other form of “transfer” […] outside of a contractual (“sale”) scheme”.

20. Bearing in mind the foregoing, the Single Judge pointed out that:

(i) contrary to the CAS 2010/A/2098 case, whereby the underlying sell-on clause explicitly referred to a “resale” of the player, the sell-on clause at the basis of the present dispute solely refers to a “definitive transfer of the player […] from [the Respondent] to another club, allowing [the Respondent] to realize a capital gain”;

(ii) as pointed out by the Panel in CAS 2010/A/2098 case, a transfer of a player can occur outside the contractual scheme of a sale.

21. That having been clarified, the Single Judge was of the opinion that, in order to shed light on the sell-on clause’s meaning, he should look at its literal tenor as first means to interpret the parties’ real intention. In this respect, he noted that such clause does not seem to explicitly require the contractual scheme of a sale, “resale”, or any other determined contractual scheme in order for the 12% sell-on clause to be triggered.

22. The clause at stake rather seems to require only that the player is transferred to a third club and that the Respondent makes a ‘capital gain’ out of the said transfer. It appeared to the Single Judge that both circumstances undisputedly occurred in the case at hand, since:

a. the player was transferred from the Respondent to Club F following the payment of EUR 35,910,000 that the former uncontestably received from the latter;

b. as a consequence, the Respondent made a ‘capital gain’ of EUR 30,910,000, i.e. a profit net of the amount of EUR 5,000,000 it had originally paid for the player in the context of his transfer from the Claimant on 5 January 2017.

23. Moreover, the Single Judge looked at the part of art. 3.2 of the transfer agreement which read that the clause would be triggered “in case of a definitive transfer of the player is signed”. In this respect, the Single Judge noted that transfers are not “signed” but rather concluded or executed.

Therefore, in the Single Judge’s opinion, with regards to this expression, the real intention of the parties could not be other than to subject the operation of the sell-on clause to a transfer of the player being concluded.

24. Although confident of the exhaustiveness of the foregoing line of reasoning, for the sake of completeness, the Single Judge deemed it worth to recall, once more, the very purpose of sell-on clauses. In the reality of the transfer market, whereby the value of players undergoes unforeseeable fluctuations, clubs agree to include such clauses in order to ‘protect’ themselves against an uncertain or hardly predictable significant increase in the value of a player that, at a certain stage, they decide, or have the necessity, to sell to another club.

25. Against this background, the Single Judge also recalled that the football market shows that clubs sometimes follow the practice of including buyout clauses in the employment contracts they sign with players.

26. In light of the foregoing, the Single Judge was of the opinion that, although in some occasions the inclusion of such buyout clauses in football employment contracts seems to be the direct consequence of a state law provision, the substance of the transaction underneath their execution and the purpose that such clauses serve must be always kept in mind. In this respect, the Single Judge wished to emphasise that the reality and the substance of the transactions should prevail on discussions about forms or schemes of transfers.

27. Moreover, the Single Judge thought important to bear in mind that, although formally speaking these buyout clauses seem to require that the player pays the related amount himself, in reality most of the times, if not always, their amount is, as a matter of fact, not payable by a physical person. As it happens, players do not trigger buyout clauses by paying the, often enormous, amounts themselves. The clubs wanting to secure their services do so on their behalf.

28. In other words, buyout clauses, regardless of how they are drafted, constitute de facto an anticipated acceptance of a future possible transfer of a player against the relevant predetermined amount.

29. In light of all the above considerations, the Single Judge concluded that, as the transfer of the player from the Respondent to Club F had undisputedly occurred, the Claimant was entitled to 12% of the net profit made by the Respondent in relation to it, in accordance with art. 3.2. of the transfer agreement signed between the parties on 5 January 2017.

30. The foregoing having been established, the Single Judge noted that, although entitled to 12% of the ‘capital gain’ made by the Respondent from the transfer of the player to Club F, the Claimant limited its requests to the amount of EUR 3,708,000.

31. Consequently, the Single Judge decided that, in accordance with the general legal principle of pacta sunt servanda, the Respondent is liable to pay to the Claimant the amount of EUR 3,708,000 in accordance with clause 3.2 of the transfer agreement.

32. In addition, taking into account the Claimant’s request, the Chamber decided that the Respondent must pay to the Claimant 5% interest p.a. on the said amount as of the date of 8 September 2018, as requested, until the date of effective payment.

33. Lastly, the Single Judge referred to art. 25 par. 2 of the Regulations in combination with art. 18 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules, according to which in the proceedings before the Players’ Status Committee and the Single Judge, costs in the maximum amount of CHF 25,000 are levied. The costs are to be borne in consideration of the parties’ degree of success in the proceedings and are normally to be paid by the unsuccessful party.

34. In this respect, the Single Judge highlighted that the claim is accepted and that the Respondent is the party at fault. Therefore, the Single Judge decided that the Respondent has to bear the costs of the current proceedings in front of FIFA.

35. Furthermore and according to Annexe A of the Procedural Rules, the costs of the proceedings are to be levied on the basis of the amount in dispute. Consequently and taking into account that the total amount at dispute in the present matter is higher than CHF 200,000, the Single Judge concluded that the maximum amount of costs of the proceedings corresponds to CHF 25,000.

36. In conclusion and in view of the fact that, although lengthy submissions had to be analysed in the present matter, the case at hand was adjudicated by the Single Judge and not by the Players’ Status Committee in corpore, the Single Judge determined the costs of the current proceedings to the amount of CHF 20,000.

37. Consequently, and in view of the requests of the Claimant are entirely accepted, the Respondent has to pay the amount of CHF 20,000 in order to cover the costs of the present proceedings.

38. Furthermore, taking into account the consideration under number II./3. above, the Single Judge referred to par. 1 and 2 of art. 24bis of the Regulations, which stipulate that, with its decision, the pertinent FIFA deciding body shall also rule on the consequences deriving from the failure of the concerned party to pay the relevant amounts of outstanding remuneration and/or compensation in due time.

39. In this regard, the Single Judge pointed out that, against clubs, the consequence of the failure to pay the relevant amounts in due time shall consist of a ban from registering any new players, either nationally or internationally, up until the due amounts are paid and for the maximum duration of three entire and consecutive registration periods.

40. Therefore, bearing in mind the above, the Single Judge decided that, in the event that the Respondent does not pay the amounts due to the Claimant within 45 days as from the moment in which the Claimant, following the notification of the present decision, communicates the relevant bank details to the Respondent, a ban from registering any new players, either nationally or internationally, for the maximum duration of three entire and consecutive registration periods shall become effective on the Respondent in accordance with art. 24bis par. 2 and 4 of the Regulations.

41. Finally, the Single Judge recalled that the above-mentioned ban will be lifted immediately and prior to its complete serving upon payment of the due amounts, in accordance with art. 24bis par. 3 of the Regulations

III. Decision of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee

1. The claim of the Claimant, Club A, is accepted.

2. The Respondent, Club C, has to pay to the Claimant the total amount of EUR 3,708,000, plus interest at a rate of 5% p.a. on the said amount as of 8 September 2018 until the date of effective payment.

3. The Claimant is directed to inform the Respondent, immediately and directly, of the relevant bank account to which the Respondent must pay the amount mentioned under point 2. above.

4. The Respondent shall provide evidence of payment of the due amount in accordance with point 2. above to FIFA to the e-mail address psdfifa@fifa.org, duly translated, if need be, into one of the official FIFA languages (English, French, German, Country D).

5. In the event that the amount due plus interest in accordance with point 2. above is not paid by the Respondent within 45 days as from the notification by the Claimant of the relevant bank details to the Respondent, the Respondent shall be banned from registering any new players, either nationally or internationally, up until the due amount is paid and for the maximum duration of three entire and consecutive registration periods (cf. art. 24bis of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players).

6. The ban mentioned in point 5. above will be lifted immediately and prior to its complete serving, once the due amount is paid.

7. In the event that the aforementioned sum plus interest is still not paid by the end of the ban of three entire and consecutive registration periods, the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to FIFA’s Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision.

8. The final costs of the proceedings in the amount of CHF 20,000 are to be paid by the Respondent, within 45 days as of notification of the present decision as follows:

8.1 The amount of CHF 15,000 has to be paid by the Respondent to FIFA to the following bank account with reference to case no. XX-XXXXX/XXX

UBS Zurich

Account number 366.677.01U (FIFA Players’ Status)

Clearing number 230

IBAN: CH 27 0023 0230 3666 7701U

SWIFT: UBSWCHZH80A

8.2 The amount of CHF 5,000 has to be paid directly to the Claimant.

9. In the event the aforementioned amount of costs is not paid within the stated time limit, the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to FIFA’s Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision.

*****

Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy):

According to art. 58 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives).

The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following:

Court of Arbitration for Sport

Avenue de Beaumont 2

1012 Lausanne

Switzerland

Tel: +41 21 613 50 00

Fax: +41 21 613 50 01

e-mail: info@tas-cas.org

For the Single Judge of the

Players’ Status Committee:

Emilio García Silvero

Chief Legal & Compliance Officer

Encl. CAS directives