F.I.F.A. – Players’ Status Committee / Commissione per lo Status dei Calciatori – club vs club disputes / controversie tra società – (2019-2020) – fifa.com – atto non ufficiale – Decision 27 February 2020

Decision of the Single Judge

of the Players’ Status Committee

passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 27 February 2020,

by

Johan van Gaalen (South Africa)

Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee,

on the matter between the club

KSV Cercle Brugge, Belgium,

represented by Mr Dimitri Dedecker

as Claimant

and the club

Sporting Clube de Portugal, Portugal,

as Respondent

regarding a contractual dispute arisen between the parties

and relating to the player William Silva de Carvalho

I. Facts of the case

1. On 8 June 2012, the Belgian club KSV Cercle Brugge (hereinafter: the Claimant or Cercle) and the Portuguese club Sporting Clube de Portugal (hereinafter: the Respondent or Sporting) concluded a loan agreement (hereinafter: the agreement) related to the player William Silva de Carvalho (hereinafter: the player) from Sporting to Cercle between 1 July 2012 and 30 June 2013 which was “free of any compensation” (cf. par. 3 of the agreement).

2. In addition, clause 4 of the agreement clarified the following:

“1. Cercle keeps the right to its proportion of the FIFA Solidarity Mechanism in case of future transfer of the Player loaned.

2. Cercle will be entitled to 5% of the value effectively received by Sporting in a future transfer of the Player loaned, this amount being not cumulative with similar or other percentages as specified in eventual previous loan agreements.”

3. On 14 December 2018, Cercle lodged a claim with FIFA against Sporting on the basis of clause 4 par. 2 of the agreement arguing that “in the summer transfer window of 2018”, the player had been transferred from Sporting to the Spanish club Real Betis (hereinafter: Betis).

4. According to Cercle, the transfer fee agreed between Betis and Sporting amounted to the sum of EUR 16,000,000 payable as follows: EUR 5,000,000 on 16 July 2018; EUR 5,000,000 on 30 June 2019 and EUR 6,000,000 on 30 June 2020. In this regard, Cercle refers to an e-mail allegedly received from Betis on 29 October 2018 in connection with the payment of solidarity contribution for the player.

5. Cercle further alleged that Betis and Sporting had agreed upon additional “contingent compensations due in case several conditions are fulfilled” but never proceeded to disclose the full content of the agreement and therefore it had remained “ unclear to what amount the total value effectively received by Sporting CL following the transfer of the player may increase”.

6. In view of all the aforementioned, Cercle deemed being entitled to receive from Sporting the sum of EUR 250,000, corresponding to 5% of the first instalment of the transfer fee due by Betis to Sporting for the player.

7. Equally, Cercle argued being additionally entitled to claim from Sporting the sum of EUR 37,500, corresponding to the penalty included in the “invoice terms and conditions” enclosed to an invoice allegedly sent to Sporting on 3 December 2019.

8. Similarly, Cercle requested the payment of 15% interest p.a. on the aforementioned amounts “since the due date of the invoice in accordance with the invoice terms and conditions”.

9. In its reply, Sporting rejected the claim of Cercle arguing that the player was not transferred to Betis and terminated his employment contract on 11 June 2018 instead.

10. According to Sporting, on 13 July 2018, it had entered into a “tripartite agreement” with the player and Betis “pursuant to which (..) the parties intended to settle and close any pending or potential disputes over the unilateral termination of the employment contract by the Player and his registration by Real Betis”.

11. Sporting provided FIFA in this respect with a copy of the aforementioned agreement (hereinafter: the tripartite agreement) in which the following is specified:

“(C) the player was registered with Sporting CP pursuant to a Standard Playing Professional Contract (..); in relation to the Playing Contract, the Player communicated its termination on 11 June 2018 alleging just cause, which Sporting CP does not recognize. (..) (E) By the means of the present agreement, the Player, Sporting CP and Real Betis intend to settle and close any pending or future dispute over the breach of contract by the Player – either in the Courts of Portugal or Dispute Resolution Chamber of FIFA – and the transfer of the federative rights and the right to register the Player by Real Betis. (F) The parties have therefore agreed upon the following terms in respect of the permanent registration of the Player for Real Betis.”

12. Equally, the parties to the tripartite agreement agreed upon the following:

“2.1. Real Betis agrees to pay Sporting CP the net amount of € 16.000.000,00 (..) without any withhold of the amounts due concerning solidarity contribution (..) which shall be paid as follows:

€ 5.000.000,00 (..) on or before 16 July 2018;

€ 5.000.000,00 (..) on or before 30 June 2019; and

۬6.000.000,00 (..) on or before 30 June 2020.

2.2. Should any of the payment due in this Agreement not be fully paid in due time, Real Betis shall be liable to pay to Sporting CO interest at the rate of 10% (..) per year.

2.5. Real Betis shall additionally pay to Sporting CP the following sums (“Contingent Compensation”) up to a maximum net value of € 4.000.000,00 (..) without any withhold of the amounts due concerning solidarity contribution (..) – in the following terms:

(a) on each occasion that Real Betis is qualified to the UEFA Champions League until the season following the expiry of the Contract between the Player and Real Betis, it shall pay to Sporting CP the amount of € 500,000.00 (..) within the 30 (..) days, up to a maximum sum of € 1.500.000,00 (..);

(b) on each occasion that Real Betis is qualified to the UEFA Europa League until the season following the expiry of the Contract between the Player and Real Betis, it shall pay to Sporting CP the amount of € 250.000,00 (..) within the 30 (..) days, up to a maximum sum of € 500.000,00 (..);

(c) if the Player is eligible to play for Portugal’s national team in the 2020 UEFA European Championship, the latter shall pay to Sporting CP the amount of € 500.000,00 within 30 (..) days;

(d) if Real Betis wins any official title, it shall pay to Sporting CP the amount of € 1.500.000,00 (..) in the 30 (..) days after the aforementioned event.

2.6. in the event of a future – temporary or definitive – transfer of the Player from Real Betis to a third club, Sporting CP shall additionally have the the right to receive 25% (..) of the net amount received by Real Betis from the buying club (..). The net amount shall be determined by taking the gross amount effectively received by Real Betis and deducting it of any and all expenses deducted concerning (i) training compensation and/or (ii) the solidarity contribution pursuant to the FIFA Regulations.

2.7. Real Betis is entitled to acquire 20% (..) of Sporting CP’s Future Rights in the following terms:

(a) Real Betis has to formally notify Sporting CP of its option to acquire the Future Rights within 90 (..) days of advance notice;

(b) Real Betis shall pay € 5.000.000,00 (..) per cach 10% (..) of the Future Rights, which shall be paid in one net lump sum within 90 (..) days following the formal notice as set above;

(c) Without prejudice of clause 2.5. (a) and (b), and if appropriate according to the previous paragraphs, if Real Betis qualifies for the UEFA Champions’ League, it shall automatically be obliged to acquire 10% of the Future Rights and pay the net amount of € 5.000.000,00 (..) in a lump sum within 90 (..) days. For the avoidance of doubt, such obligation is mandatory one time only.

2.8 Sporting CP’s percentage pursuant to clause 2.6. (25%) or 2.7 (5%) of Real Betis’s transfer receivable shall be paid to Sporting CP within 30 calendar days after each receipt of guaranteed and/or conditional payments of the third club.”

13. From Sporting’s point of view, after having terminated the employment contract the player had become a “’free agent’, meaning he was able to sign an employment contract with any new club without the consent of his previous club”. Hence, Sporting deemed that the object of the subsequent agreement could not have been the transfer of the player.

14. Sporting further alleged having entered into the subsequent agreement “in order to achieve certainty and finality in relation to the dispute about the Player’s unilateral termination of his employment contract with Sporting CP, while Real Betis was aware that under article 17.2. of the FIFA Regulations, if the Player was required to pay compensation for termination without just cause, as the new club it would be jointly and severally liable for such payment. Ideed, both the Player and (..) Betis, would be facing considerable uncertainty about being liable to pay to Sporting CP the amount of EUR 45,000,000.00 established as a penalty clause in the Player’s employment contract for the event of his unilateral termination without just cause, while Sporting CP was theoretically also at risk of having to pay compensation to the player under article 17 of the RSTP”.

15. In addition, Sporting clarified that without the subsequent agreement, it would have “taken all appropriate legal actions in order to be fully compensated for the damages arising from the unilateral breach of contract by the Player, as it had done against other players and their respective new clubs under the same circumstances”.

16. In continuation, Sporting argued that, in its opinion, the subsequent agreement could not be interpreted “as or equated to a transfer agreement” not only “given the Player’s free agent status at the time” but also because “for a transfer agreement to take place” it “would have to be willing to transfer the Player to a third club, which was never the case (..). A settlement agreement concluded after the Player unilaterally terminated his employment contract in which the parties agree on the indemnity amount to be paid in compensation for such unilateral breach evidently does not equate to a consented transfer; likewise, the compensation paid in such a context is poles apart from a transfer fee.”

17. Similarly, Sporting considered that “sharing (..) the compensation amount established in the settlement agreement (..) would contravene article 17 par. 2 of the RSTP, according to which ‘entitlement to compensation cannot be assigned to a third party.’”

18. Notwithstanding the aforementioned, Sporting additionally emphasized that even if “it were deemed that the registration of the player, as a free agent, for Real Betis consisted on a transfer for the purposes of clause four of the loan agreement, (..) the Claimant’s right had already expired as the relevant right only applied if a transfer occurred during the loan period. This was a result of the parties’ acceptance that the potential valorization of the player could only be considered a direct result of him playing for Cercle Brugge and attributable to such club if the transfer materialized during the loan period. (..) Cercle Brugge’s right to receive 5% of a future transfer would be valid only during the loan period as a way to remuneratethe Claimant for the appreciation of the Player’s market value during the loan period. (..)”

19. In conclusion, Sporting requested FIFA to reject the claim of Cercle and to condemn the latter to pay the amount of CHF 20,000 as contribution towards the legal costs incurred.

20. In its replica, Cercle requested that Sporting be “obligated to present a copy of the Transfer Agreement between Sporting CP and Real Betis concerning the Player (..) under a penalty of 1.000 EUR per day that the agreement is not produced after notification of the decision of the Players’ Status Committee.”

21. Cercle further contested the allegations of Sporting arguing that the player had de facto been transferred to Betis “thus triggering [its] contractual right (..) to 5% of the value effectively received by Sporting”.

22. Cercle referred to CAS jurisprudence, in particular to the appeals CAS 2010/A/2098 and CAS 2011/A/2356, and pointed out that “the notion of “transfer” does not exclusively encompass a “sale””.

23. Furthermore, Cercle recalled that in accordance with CAS jurisprudence, a transfer is detailed by the following elements:

“(i) The consent of the club of origin to the early termination of its contract with the player;

(ii) The willingness and consent of the acquiring club to acquire the player’s rights;

(iii) The consent of the player to move from one club to the other, and

(iv) the price or value of the transaction.”

24. From Cercle’s point of view, the “elements identifying a transfer” had been “unmistakably fulfilled” in the subsequent agreement as follows:

“(i) By concluding the settlement agreement, Sporting CP consented to the early termination of its contract with the Player;

(ii) The willingness and consent of Real Betis to acquire the Player’s rights also appears from the settlement agreement;

(iii) The player co-signed the tripartite agreement, so his consent to move from Sporting CP to Real Betis is also undeniably established;

(iv) The price or value of the transaction is included in the tripartite agreement: Real Betis agreed to pay Sporting CP the net amount of € 16.000.000,00, as well as several additional contingent sums.”

25. In addition, Cercle argued that the existence of a transfer was also indicated by the payment of solidarity contribution by Betis as well as by “the FIFA TMS and GPX system”. In this respect, Cercle provided an invoice allegedly sent to Betis in connection with the “Solidarity Contribution William Carvalho” as well as an alleged payment receipt, written in Flemish, for the amount “+35.958,90” in which the name of Betis can be seen. Cercle also enclosed to its claim an email allegedly received from Betis on 29 October 2018 in connection with the payment of solidarity contribution for the player (cf. point I.4 above).

26. Subsequently, Cercle accused Sporting of having failed to provide “any evidence” that the player had indeed terminated the employment contract.

27. In continuation, Cercle contested the allegation that its rights under clause 4 of the agreement would have expired emphasizing inter alia that the relevant clause did not include “any period of validity or due date, nor does it determine that the said future transfer must”.

28. Similarly, Cercle pointed out that it had never been the “intent of the parties to limit the duration of the clause to the duration of the Agreement”. In this respect, Cercle provided FIFA with an exchange of correspondence between the parties which had occurred between 6 March 2017 and 2 May 2017 as well as with an email allegedly received from Sporting on 14 June 2014.

29. In view of all the aforementioned, Cercle requested FIFA to grant all amounts claimed and additionally request Sporting to “bear any and all additional costs of the proceedings that the Players’ Status Committee may deem appropriate to levy as a result of consideration of the case in question.”

30. In its duplica, Sporting mainly reiterated the content of its previous submission.

31. In particular, Sporting rejected once again the allegation that the player would have been transferred to Betis, pointing out that the player had terminated his employment contract.

32. Equally, Sporting emphasized once again that the only purpose of the subsequent agreement was “to settle and close any pending or potential disputes over the unilateral termination of the employment contract by the Player” and the amount agreed to be paid by Betis did not “constitute a transfer fee (i.e. compensation for the assignment of the Player’s registration rights), but instead the indemnity amount to be paid in settlement of the Player’s unilateral breach of contract.”

33. With regard to Cercle’s reference to CAS jurisprudence, Sporting contested the latter’s interpretation of the award 2010/A/2098 pointing out that if “on one hand, the Panel” had acknowledged that a transfer could take place “in situations outside the scope of a “sale” of the economic rights of the Player, such as the unilateral termination by the Player of his sports employment contract with one club and his registration – as free agent – by another club (..)” on “the other hand (..) the Panel’s clear intention to identify the particular case of the sell-on clauses, such as the fourth clause of the loan agreement, as a case on which the effectiveness of the sell-on clause relies condition of the Player being transferred inside the scope of a contract and therefore it determined that:

- The unilateral termination of an employment contract by a Player does not equate to a transfer, and

- The consequent indemnity amount to be paid to his old club cannot be deemed as a transfer fee for the purposes of a sell-on clause.”

34. From Sporting’s point of view, in casu, the matter had been completely outside its control as the player had “simply communicated his unilateral termination alleging just cause (..) and walked away from the club irrespective of any consent, past or present, from Sporting.”

35. Hence, the subsequent agreement could not, in Sporting’s opinion, be considered as a transfer of the player to Betis.

36. In support of its allegation, Sporting mentioned another CAS award (CAS/A/4204) in accordance with which the Panel had recognized that after an employment contract was terminated, the relevant player had become a free agent “which meant he could sign a new sport employment contract with another club and the sell-on clause that had been agreed with the previous club would not apply.”

37. In view of all the aforementioned, Sporting deemed that the “triggering condition for Cercle Brugge’s claimed right – a future transfer” had not occurred and therefore the latter’s claim was to be considered as baseless.

38. In continuation, Sporting stressed once again that the “sharing of the compensation amount established in the settlement agreement [i.e. the subsequent agreement] (..) would contravene article 17 par. 2 of the RSTP”.

39. Finally, Sporting emphasized once again that it considered that Cercle’s right under clause 4 of the agreement had expired.

II. Considerations of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee

1. First of all, the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee (hereinafter: the Single Judge) analysed which Procedural Rules were applicable to the matter at hand. In this respect, he referred to the wording of art. 21 of the 2019 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules) as well as to the fact that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 14 December 2018 and decided on 27 February 2020. Therefore, the Single Judge concluded that the 2019 edition of the Procedural Rules is applicable to the matter at hand.

2. Subsequently, the Single Judge analysed which edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players is applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, he referred, on the one hand, to art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the 2018 editions of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players and, on the other hand, to the fact that the claim was lodged in front of FIFA on 14 December 2018. In view of the foregoing, the Single Judge concluded that the June 2018 edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (hereinafter: the Regulations) is applicable to the case at hand as to the substance.

3. Furthermore, the Single Judge confirmed that, on the basis of art. 3 par. 1 and par. 2 of the Procedural Rules in connection with art. 23 par. 1 and par. 4 as well as art. 22 lit. f) of the Regulations, he was competent to deal with the present matter since it concerned a dispute between two clubs affiliated to two different associations.

4. The competence of the Single Judge and the applicable regulations having been established, and entering into the substance of the matter, the Single Judge started by acknowledging the above-mentioned facts as well as the arguments and the documentation submitted by the parties. The Single Judge emphasised, however, that in the following considerations he will refer only to the facts, arguments and documentary evidence, which he considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand.

5. First of all, the Single Judge acknowledged that it was undisputed between the parties that on 8 June 2012 they concluded a loan agreement for the player from Sporting to Cercle, for the period of 1 July 2012 until 30 June 2013, “free of any compensation” and including the following provision as clause 4 par. 2: “Cercle will be entitled to 5% of the value effectively received by Sporting in a future transfer of the Player loaned, this amount being not cumulative with similar or other percentages as specified in eventual previous loan agreements.”

6. Subsequently the Single Judge noted that on the one hand the Claimant understands that clause 4 par. 2 of the loan agreement was triggered when the player was “transferred” in July 2018 from the Respondent to Betis, for the total amount of EUR 16,000,000, payable in instalments. Thus, the Claimant deems to be entitled to claim 5% of the first instalment (fallen due at the moment the present claim was lodged), i.e. EUR 250,000, as well as EUR 37,500 as a penalty and 15% interest p.a. on the aforementioned amounts, in accordance with the “invoice terms and conditions” enclosed to an invoice allegedly sent to Sporting on 3 December 2019.

7. On the other hand, the Single Judge noted that the Respondent deems that the Claimant’s claim must be fully rejected, as the conditions for clause 4 par. 2 of the agreement to be triggered did not occur. In particular, the Respondent explains that – contrary to what the Claimant affirms – the player was not transferred to Betis, but he rather terminated the employment contract with Sporting allegedly without just cause. In order to avoid legal proceedings for breach of contract, with possible consequences for any of the parties, the player, the Respondent and Betis entered into a tripartite agreement, stipulating that Betis should pay the Respondent the amount of EUR 16,000,000 for settling their issues related to the departure of the player. In the Respondent’s opinion, the tripartite agreement however cannot be considered as a transfer agreement. Furthermore, the Respondent deems that such clause would only be triggered in case the player would be effectively transferred to a third club during the loan with the Claimant, which was not the case.

6. Having established the above, the Single Judge established that the main issue to be solved in the present case was to determine whether the conditions of clause 4 par. 2 of the loan agreement had actually been triggered. In this respect, the Single Judge decided that in order to answer that question he would first have to analyse whether the tripartite agreement could indeed be considered as a transfer agreement – as claimed by the Claimant – or rather not – as alleged by the Respondent.

7. In view of the foregoing, the Single Judge deemed it appropriate to refer to the jurisprudence of the CAS. In this respect, the Single Judge pointed out that a transfer agreement shall contain the following elements: (i) The consent of the club of origin to the early termination of its contract with the player; (ii) The willingness and consent of the acquiring club to acquire the player’s rights; (iii) The consent of the player to move from one club to the other, and (iv) the price or value of the transaction.

8. After thoroughly analysing the content of the tripartite agreement, the Single Judge was of the opinion that all of the aforementioned elements are indeed present, as the consent of both clubs and the player is given as well as the amount attributed to such move. The fact that the original intention of the parties in concluding the tripartite agreement might have been the result of a joint effort to settle any possible legal proceedings does not invalidate the element of the free will of the parties. Furthermore, according to the information contained in the TMS, the move of the player from Sporting to Betis was entered as an engagement against payment. Thus, the Single Judge concluded that for the purposes of the present claim, the tripartite agreement is to be considered as a transfer agreement.

9. This conclusion is corroborated by the fact that Betis, the player’s new club, paid solidarity mechanism to the Claimant based on the player’s transfer from Sporting, in accordance with art. 21 and Annexe 5 of the Regulations.

10. Having established that the tripartite agreement was equivalent to a transfer agreement, the Single Judge went on to analyse whether the loan agreement indeed contained a time limitation to the activation of clause 4 par. 2 as alleged by the Respondent. In this respect, the Single Judge noted that no such limitation was made and that in order for clause 4 par. 2 of the agreement to be triggered the subsequent transfer of the player to a new club does not necessarily need to occur during the loan with the Claimant. Therefore, this argument of the Respondent cannot be upheld.

11. On account of the above, the Single Judge held that it was beyond doubt that the Claimant and the Respondent had agreed upon a percentage of 5% due to the Claimant in case of a future transfer to a third club, which indeed happened in July 2018, as the player moved from Sporting to Betis, for the total amount of EUR 16,000,000. In this respect, the Single Judge noted that such amount was payable in instalments and that, by the time the Claimant lodged its claim, only the first instalment of EUR 5,000,000, payable on 16 July 2018, had fallen due and was claimed by Cercle. Consequently, the Single Judge held that, in accordance with the basic legal principle of pacta sunt servanda, which in essence means that agreements must be respected by the parties in good faith, the Respondent has to fulfill its contractual obligations towards the Claimant. Therefore, and taking into account the claim of the Claimant, the Single Judge decided that the Respondent has to pay to the Claimant the outstanding amount of EUR 250,000 corresponding to 5% of EUR 5,000,000, as per clause 4 par. 2 of the loan agreement in combination with the tripartite agreement.

12. Having established the above, the Single Judge went on to examine the second request of the Claimant, i.e. a penalty of EUR 37,500 and 15% interest p.a. on the due amounts, in accordance with the “invoice terms and conditions” enclosed to an invoice allegedly sent to Sporting on 3 December 2019. In this respect, the Single Judge noted that such claim of the Claimant lacked any contractual basis, as the claimed penalty and interest were only provided for in an invoice unilaterally issued by the Claimant. Therefore, such claim of the Claimant must be rejected.

13. Thus, the Single Judge concluded that the claim of the Claimant was partially accepted and that the Respondent must pay to the Claimant the amount of EUR 250,000 plus interest of 5% p.a. as from 17 July 2018.

14. Furthermore, taking into account the consideration under number II./2. above, the Single Judge referred to par. 1 and 2 of art. 24bis of the Regulations, which stipulate that, with its decision, the pertinent FIFA deciding body shall also rule on the consequences deriving from the failure of the concerned party to pay the relevant amounts of outstanding remuneration and/or compensation in due time.

15. In this regard, the Single Judge pointed out that, against clubs, the consequence of the failure to pay the relevant amounts in due time shall consist of a ban from registering any new players, either nationally or internationally, up until the due amounts are paid and for the maximum duration of three entire and consecutive registration periods.

16. Therefore, bearing in mind the above, the Single Judge decided that, in the event that the Respondent does not pay the amounts due to the Claimant within 45 days as from the moment in which the Claimant, following the notification of the present decision, communicates the relevant bank details to the Respondent, a ban from registering any new players, either nationally or internationally, for the maximum duration of three entire and consecutive registration periods shall become effective on the Respondent in accordance with art. 24bis par. 2 and 4 of the Regulations.

17. The Single Judge recalled that the above-mentioned ban will be lifted immediately and prior to its complete serving upon payment of the due amounts, in accordance with art. 24bis par. 3 of the Regulations.

18. Lastly, the Single Judge referred to art. 25 par. 2 of the Regulations in combination with art. 18 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules, according to which, in proceedings before the Players’ Status Committee including its Single Judge, costs in the maximum amount of CHF 25’000 are levied. The relevant provision further states that the costs are to be borne in consideration of the parties’ degree of success in the proceedings (cf. art. 18 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules).

19. In respect of the above, and taking into account that the claim of the Claimant is partially accepted, the Single Judge decide that the costs of the proceedings are to be split between the Claimant and the Respondent.

20. Furthermore and according to Annexe A of the Procedural Rules, the costs of the proceedings are to be levied on the basis of the amount in dispute. On that basis, the Single Judge held that the amount to be taken into consideration in the present proceedings is EUR 287,500. Consequently, the Single Judge concluded that the maximum amount of costs of the proceedings corresponds to CHF 25,000.

21. In conclusion and considering the specific circumstances of the case, the Single Judge determined the costs of the current proceedings to the amount of CHF 25,000, CHF 7,000 of which are payable by the Claimant and CHF 18,000 by the Respondent.

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III. Decision of the Single Judge of the Players’ Status Committee

1. The claim of the Claimant, KSV Cercle Brugge, is partially accepted.

2. The Respondent, Sporting Clube de Portugal, has to pay to the Claimant the amount of EUR 250,000 plus 5% interest p.a. as from 16 July 2018 until the date of effective payment.

3. Any further claim lodged by the Claimant is rejected.

4. The Claimant is directed to inform the Respondent, immediately and directly, preferably to the e-mail address as indicated on the cover letter of the present decision, of the relevant bank account to which the Respondent must pay the amount plus interest mentioned under point 2. above.

5. The Respondent shall provide evidence of payment of the due amount plus interest in accordance with point 2. above to FIFA to the e-mail address psdfifa@fifa.org, duly translated, if need be, into one of the official FIFA languages (English, French, German, Spanish).

6. In the event that the amount due plus interest in accordance with point 2. above are not paid by the Respondent within 45 days as from the notification by the Claimant of the relevant bank details to the Respondent, the Respondent shall be banned from registering any new players, either nationally or internationally, up until the due amount is paid and for the maximum duration of three entire and consecutive registration periods (cf. art. 24bis of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players).

7. The ban mentioned in point 6. above will be lifted immediately and prior to its complete serving, once the due amount is paid.

8. In the event that the aforementioned sum is still not paid by the end of the ban of three entire and consecutive registration periods, the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to FIFA’s Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision.

9. The final costs of the proceedings in the amount of CHF 25,000 are to be paid to FIFA as follows:

9.1. The amount of CHF 7,000 has to be paid by the Claimant. In view of the fact that the Claimant has already paid the amount of CHF 5,000 as advance of costs, only CHF 2,000 has to be paid by the Claimant.

9.2. The amount of CHF 18,000 has to be paid by the Respondent.

9.3. The aforementioned costs shall be paid to the following bank account, with

reference to case nr. 18-02621/tle:

UBS Zurich

Account number 366.677.01U (FIFA Players’ Status)

Clearing number 230

IBAN: CH27 0023 0230 3666 7701U

SWIFT: UBSWCHZH80A

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Note related to the publication:

The FIFA administration may publish decisions issued by the Players’ Status Committee or the Dispute Resolution Chamber. Where such decisions contain confidential information, FIFA may decide, at the request of a party within five days of the notification of the motivated decision, to publish an anonymised or a redacted version (cf. article 20 of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber).

Note related to the appeal procedure:

According to art. 58 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS.

The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following:

Court of Arbitration for Sport

Avenue de Beaumont 2

1012 Lausanne - Switzerland

Tel: +41 21 613 50 00

Fax: +41 21 613 50 01

e-mail: info@tas-cas.org

For the Single Judge of the

Players’ Status Committee:

Emilio García Silvero

Chief Legal & Compliance Officer