F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber / Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie – labour disputes / controversie di lavoro (2016-2017) – fifa.com – atto non ufficiale – Decision 2 March 2017

Decision of the

Dispute Resolution Chamber

passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 2 March 2017,

in the following composition:

Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman

Mario Gallavotti (Italy), member

Pavel Pivovarov (Russia), member

Jon Newman (USA), member

Roy Vermeer (Netherlands), member

on the claim presented by the player,

Player A, Country B

as Claimant

against the club,

Club C, Country D

as Respondent

regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties

I. Facts of the case

1. On 15 January 2016, the Player of Country B, Player A, (hereinafter: the Claimant) and the Club of Country D, Club C, (hereinafter: the Respondent), concluded an employment contract (hereinafter: the contract), valid as from 13 January 2016 until 31 December 2017.

2. Pursuant to the contract, the Claimant was entitled, inter alia, to the following remuneration:

- USD 400,000 net for the 2016 season, paid in monthly instalments of USD 33,000 each, from January 2016 to November 2016 and USD 37,000 in December 2016;

- USD 600,000 net for the 2017 season paid in twelve monthly instalments of USD 50,000 each, from January 2017 to December 2017.

3. In respect to the due dates for the monthly salary payments, the contract established that “The salary will be paid for the last month on 20th of this month”.

4. Moreover, the contract stipulated that the Respondent would provide accommodation to the Claimant, where “[the Respondent] shall pay the rent up to 8,000 per month”. Additionally, the contract established that “ [the Respondent] will not take any responsibilities besides a 2000 per month allowance to [the Claimant] if [the Claimant] choices to rent a car for personal drive or other transport propose.”.

5. Furthermore, in accordance with the contract, the Respondent shall provide the Claimant with three business class round trip air tickets Country B – Country D – Country B.

6. The contract established that “if the tickets are not used within the 2015 the ticket provision shall become void and no money compensation will be given in lieu of”. In this regard, the Claimant sustained that “2015” should be considered a clerical error.

7. Art. 8.3 of the contract stipulated that “if [the Claimant] has principal breach…or other breach of the contract up to 3 times or more, [the Respondent] has right to terminate contract with justified reason and [the Claimant] shall pay the damage of breach of the contract. The compensation to damage is calculated as the total amount of USD 1,000,000 in year 2016; USD 2,000,000 in year 2017;…”.

8. According to art. 9.6, “[the Respondent] shall not cancel the contract. Otherwise [the Respondent] should pay 50% of [the Claimant]’s rest salary of the season as compensation except where otherwise specifically described or prescribed in the contract; if [the Respondent] choice to cancel the contract before November 20th 2016 with a formal notification in written form to [the Claimant], [the Respondent] shall pay 50% of [the Claimant]’s annual salary of 2017 to [the Claimant] as compensation. The employment contract is terminated after [the Respondent] cancel the contract in this way”.

9. On the same date, i.e. 15 January 2016, the Claimant and the Respondent signed a document titled “Additional agreement for Employment Contract” (hereinafter: the supplementary contract), in accordance with which the Respondent undertook the obligation to pay the Claimant the following remuneration:

“1. [The Respondent] will pay USD 600,000 to [the Claimant] from January 2016 to December 2016: USD 200,000 will be paid to [the Claimant] when the register processes are finish and [the Respondent] receives ITC from the Football Federation of Country D (before February 29th 2016); the USD 400,000 rest will be paid to [the Claimant] ….according to [the contract]….

2. [The Respondent] shall pay USD 250,000 as the signature fee to [the Claimant] after [the Claimant] registered to [the Respondent] and receives the ITC from the Football Federation of Country D (before February 29th 2016).”.

10. On 18 June 2016, the Respondent terminated the contract with the Claimant by means of a letter addressed to him titled “Notification of Contract Termination” (hereinafter: the termination notice), which reads as follows:

“We [the Respondent], formally inform you that:

1. [The contract] signed between you and [The Respondent] has been terminated since the sending day (i.e. 18 June 2016) of this notification;

2. Please come to [The Respondent] for negotiation on the follow-up issues regarding the termination within three days after your receipt of this notification.

3. …”.

11. On 28 November 2016, the Claimant lodged a claim in front of FIFA against the Respondent for breach of contract, requesting to be awarded the amount of USD 909,429 plus interest. The Claimant broke down his request for relief as follows:

- USD 70,982 as outstanding remuneration, broken down as follows:

- Salaries of May 2016 and June 2016 in the amount of USD 33,000, each;

- Accommodation for the month of June 2016 in the amount of USD 1,160;

- USD 1,740 as transportation, corresponding to 6 months in the amount of USD 290, each;

- 1 Flight Ticket in the amount of USD 2,082;

- 5% interest p.a. as from 21 May 2016 on the amount of USD 33,000 and 5% interest p.a. as from 21 June 2016 on the amount of USD 37,982.

- USD 838,510 as compensation for breach of contract, broken down as follows:

- Salaries from July 2016 to November 2016 in the amount of USD 33,000, each;

- Salary for December 2016 in the amount of USD 37,000;

- USD 6,960 as accommodation for the 2016 season, corresponding to 6 months in the amount of USD 1,160, each;

- USD 1,740 as transportation for the 2016 season, corresponding to 6 months in the amount of USD 290, each;

- USD 4,164 for two Flight Tickets for the 2016 season, in the amount of USD 2,082 each;

- Salaries from January 2017 to December 2017 in the amount of USD 50,000, each;

- USD 13,920 as accommodation for the 2017, corresponding to 12 months in the amount of USD 1,160, each;

- USD 3,480 as transportation for the 2017 season, corresponding to 12 months in the amount of USD 290, each;

- USD 6,246 for three Flight Tickets for the 2017 season, in the amount of USD 2,082 each;

- In addition, the Claimant requested sporting sanctions to be imposed on the Respondent.

12. In his claim, the Claimant explained that since 19 June 2016, after receiving the termination notice, he was not allowed to train with the Respondent anymore and therefore, on 21 June 2016, via his agent, requested an explanation from the Respondent about this situation. Moreover, the Claimant maintained that he was deregistered on that same date and replaced by another foreign player, therefore, filling the foreign players’ quota in Country D.

13. Subsequently, on 22 June 2016, the translator of the Respondent informed his agent, via email, that the Claimant was, allegedly, already informed back in May 2016 that the Respondent wanted to terminate the contract. Furthermore, the Claimant’s agent was informed that according to the Respondent’s understanding of the contract, “[the Respondent] would pay half amount of the total salary…from June 2016 to December 2016, and half the amount of the total salary from January 2017 to December 2017”. Moreover, in the email it is stated that “.... Under FIFA rules, signature fee to [the Claimant] should be a total fee to [the Claimant] that covers all the contract period. The signature fee we paid to [the Claimant] is for year 2016 and 2017. However, if [the Claimant] leaves [the Respondent] before contract finish, the signature for year 2017 shall be given back to [the Respondent].”.

14. According to the Claimant, on 23 June 2016 and 7 July 2016, via his legal representative FIFPro of Country B, he requested the Respondent to be allowed to train with it, giving the Respondent a 10 days’ deadline and 3 days’ deadline, respectively, to comply or otherwise he would be forced to terminate the contract.

15. On 11 July 2016, the Claimant received an email dated 8 July 2016, from the alleged legal representative of the Respondent, in which the Claimant was informed that the contract had already been terminated by the Respondent on 18 June 2016 and that his repeated intrusions in the trainings of the Respondent had caused “great loss”, and therefore, the Respondent could claim compensation, since from 19 June 2016 he was no longer part of the team.

16. In this respect, on 27 July 2016, the Claimant replied to the Respondent’s letter received on 11 July 2016, and urged the Respondent to reintegrate him to trainings, to register him, to pay him 3 monthly salaries in the total amount of USD 99,000 within 5 days, and to provide him with a confirmation of fulfilment of these requirements by 1 August 2016 at the latest.

17. Afterwards, the Claimant maintained that, for the sake of good order and without prejudice to the termination of the Respondent, he terminated the contract with the Respondent on 1 August 2016.

18. Along with his claim, the Claimant confirmed having received the “advance payment” of USD 200,000, the “sign-on fee” of USD 250,000, as well as his salaries from January 2016 until April 2016. The Claimant declared that he did not receive any of the flight tickets and that he had to buy a ticket for himself. The Claimant declared that he is calculating the price per flight-ticket as USD 2,082, according to “the cheapest ticket”.

19. Moreover, the Claimant held not having received any transportation allowance at all during the employment relationship and that his accommodation fee was not paid since the day of the termination. The Claimant held that as his rental contract was valid until 31 December 2017, he had to pay compensation to his landlord for the early termination of the rental contract, and that therefore, he paid accommodation until August 2016. The Claimant further sustained that as from May 2016, he did not receive any remuneration from the Respondent.

20. Furthermore, the Claimant argued that the contract has been terminated unilaterally, without just cause by the Respondent, despite that he had granted it several opportunities to continue the labour relationship. The Claimant maintained that the Respondent’s intention was to get rid of him.

21. Finally, the Claimant held that art. 9.6 of the contract (cf. point I.8. above) should not be considered valid, since it is “one-sided and contradictory”.

22. Since no correspondence had been received from the Respondent in response to the claim of the Claimant, by means of a letter sent on 24 January 2017, the FIFA administration informed the parties that the investigation-phase of the matter at hand was closed.

23. On 8 February 2017, via its appointed legal representative, the Respondent replied to the claim of the Claimant. The Respondent inter alia argued that the above-mentioned correspondence from FIFA dated 24 January 2017, was the first and only notification it received in connection with the present matter. Furthermore, the Respondent maintained that since September 2016 it “is suffering a profound internal reform which ended by not only changing its management level personnel but also moving its base from Stadium E to District F and it is likely that, due to the intense period [the Respondent] has been living during said changes, it did not properly receive the corresponding FIFA notifications.”. The Respondent submitted several arguments as to the substance of the claim.

24. The player confirmed having signed an employment contract with the Club of Country G, Club H, on 2 September 2016 valid until 31 May 2017, according to which he was entitled to receive, inter alia, a total sum of 111,933, in 9 monthly installments of 12,437. In addition, in accordance with this contract, the player was supposed to receive a total sum of 95,400, in 9 monthly installments of 10,600 and 8,000 per month, as accommodation. This contract was mutually terminated by the parties on 17 January 2017. Furthermore, the player confirmed that, on 23 January 2017, he signed an employment contract with the Club of Country J, Club K, valid until 31 May 2017, according to which he is entitled to receive, inter alia, a total sum of EUR 25,729. Additionally, the player is entitled to receive a total amount of EUR 2,169 as “personal expenses”. The contract stipulated that these personal expenses include, but are not limited to house rental. Moreover, the player declared that he received a further EUR 20,000 from Club K.

II. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber

1. First, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter also referred to as Chamber or DRC) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the matter at hand. In this respect, it took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 28 November 2016. Consequently, the 2015 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules) are applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 of the 2015 and 2017 editions of the Procedural Rules).

2. Subsequently, the members of the Chamber referred to art. 3 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed that in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 in combination with art. 22 lit. b of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2016) the Dispute Resolution Chamber is competent to deal with the matter at stake, which concerns an employment-related dispute with an international dimension between a Player of Country B and a Club of Country D.

3. The competence of the Chamber having been established, the Chamber analysed which edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, it confirmed that, in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2016), and considering that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 28 November 2016, the 2016 edition of the aforementioned regulations (hereinafter: the Regulations) is applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance.

4. The competence of the Chamber and the applicable regulations having been established, the Chamber entered into the substance of the matter. In this respect, the Chamber started by acknowledging all the above-mentioned facts as well as the arguments and the documentation submitted by the parties. However, the Chamber emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to the facts, arguments and documentary evidence, which it considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand. In particular, the Chamber recalled that in accordance with art. 6 par. 3 of Annexe 3 of the Regulations, FIFA may use, within the scope of proceedings pertaining to the application of the Regulations, any documentation or evidence generated or contained in the Transfer Matching System (TMS).

5. In this respect, the Chamber recalled that the parties signed an employment contract on 15 January 2016, valid as from 13 January 2016 until 31 December 2017. Furthermore, it was observed by the DRC that, on the same date, the parties signed the supplementary contract.

6. In continuation, the members of the Chamber noted that the Claimant lodged a claim against the Respondent maintaining that the Respondent should be held liable for breach of contract. In this respect, the Claimant held that the Respondent terminated the contract without just cause on 18 June 2016 by means of the termination notice described in point I.10. above. Furthermore, it was duly noted by the DRC that the Claimant, subsequently, on 1 August 2016, sent his own termination notice while explaining that this was done for the sake of good order and without prejudice to the Respondent’s termination, maintaining that he had just cause to terminate the relevant contract. Consequently, the Claimant asks to be awarded with his outstanding dues as well as with the payment of compensation for breach of the employment contract.

7. The Respondent, for its part, submitted its reply on 8 February 2017, i.e. after the closure of the investigation-phase of the present matter. In this regard, the Chamber observed that the Respondent held that it only received FIFA’s correspondence dated 24 January 2017, by means of which the parties were informed that no correspondence had been received from the Respondent in reply to the claim lodged by the Claimant and that, in consequence, the investigation-phase of the matter at hand was closed, while explaining that since September 2016 it was undergoing management changes, including its address, reason why “it is likely that,…., it did not properly receive the corresponding FIFA notifications.”.

8. In this regard, the Chamber emphasized that the FIFA administration sent, via DHL, the claim to the address referred to in the contract at the basis of this dispute, which is the same address that appears as contact information of the Respondent in TMS, the same address of other employment contracts uploaded by the Respondent in TMS, the same address according to a google translation of the Respondent’s own official website, the same address as the one where FIFA’s correspondence dated 24 January 2017 was sent to and the same address of the Respondent in accordance with the power of attorney enclosed to the Respondent’s reply. Accordingly, the DRC considered that by proceeding with the notification of the claim in accordance with the information available to it, which was confirmed by different sources, the FIFA administration acted with diligence. In particular, the Chamber wished to emphasize that in any case it was the Respondent’s responsibility to update its contact details. Consequently, the Chamber decided to reject the Respondent's argumentation and established that the claim was duly notified to the Respondent on 12 December 2016 according to the proof of receipt of DHL, providing it with a deadline until 13 January 2017 to present its position to the claim.

9. With the above-mentioned consideration in mind, in line with art. 9 par. 4 of the Procedural Rules as well as the Chamber’s constant jurisprudence in this regard, the DRC decided not to take into account the reply of the Respondent and established that, in accordance with art. 9 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules, it shall take a decision upon the basis of those documents on file that were provided prior to the closure of the investigation-phase, in casu, upon the statements and documents presented by the Claimant.

10. Having established the aforementioned, the Chamber deemed that the underlying issue in this dispute was to first determine which party terminated the contract, and then to determine if said termination was done with or without just cause. The DRC also underlined that, subsequently, it would be necessary to determine the financial consequences for the party that is to be held liable for the early termination of the pertinent employment contract.

11. In this respect, the DRC deemed it crucial to outline that it remained uncontested that the Respondent terminated the contract on 18 June 2016 by means of its termination notice.

12. Having said that, the Chamber turned its attention to the content of the termination notice, which does not provide any reason or justification for the unilateral and premature termination of the contract.

13. On account of the above, the Chamber decided that the Respondent had no just cause to unilaterally terminate the employment relationship between the Claimant and the Respondent and, therefore, concluded that the Respondent had terminated the employment contract without just cause on 18 June 2016 and that, consequently, the Respondent is to be held liable for the early termination of the employment contact without just cause.

14. Subsequently, for the sake of completeness, the Chamber stressed that the termination of the contract by the Claimant on 1 August 2016 is rendered moot.

15. In continuation, having established that the Respondent is to be held liable for the early termination of the employment contract without just cause, the Chamber focused its attention on the consequences of such termination. Taking into consideration art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the Chamber decided that the Claimant is entitled to receive from the Respondent an amount of money as compensation for breach of contract in addition to any outstanding payments on the basis of the relevant employment contract.

16. At this stage, the DRC recalled that the Claimant acknowledged payments from the Respondent stipulated in both the contract and the supplementary contract. Furthermore, the DRC also recalled that in accordance with the contract, the Claimant’s salary was payable on the 20th day of the following month.

17. In light of the above, taking into account the due date for the payment of salaries and the date of termination, i.e. 18 June 2016, the amounts requested by the Claimant as outstanding remuneration, in particular the salaries of May 2016 and June 2016, were not yet due at the time of termination, but can be considered within the calculation of compensation.

18. In continuation, the Chamber focused its attention on the calculation of the amount of compensation payable to the Claimant by the Respondent in the case at stake. In doing so, the members of the Chamber firstly recapitulated that, in accordance with art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the amount of compensation shall be calculated, in particular and unless otherwise provided for in the contract at the basis of the dispute, with due consideration for the law of the country concerned, the specificity of sport and further objective criteria, including in particular, the remuneration and other benefits due to the Claimant under the existing contract and/or the new contract, the time remaining on the existing contract up to a maximum of five years, and depending on whether the contractual breach falls within the protected period.

19. In application of the relevant provision, the Chamber held that it first of all had to clarify as to whether the pertinent employment contract contained a provision by means of which the parties had beforehand agreed upon an amount of compensation payable by the contractual parties in the event of breach of contract. In this context, the members of the Chamber first recalled the content of art. 8.3 of the contract which stipulated that “if [the Claimant] has principal breach…or other breach of the contract up to 3 times or more, [the Respondent] has right to terminate contract with justified reason and [the Claimant] shall pay the damage of breach of the contract. The compensation to damage is calculated as the total amount of USD 1,000,000 in year 2016; USD 2,000,000 in year 2017…”.

20. With this in mind, the Chamber recalled the content of art. 9.6 of the contract, which established that “[the Respondent] shall not cancel the contract. Otherwise [the Respondent] should pay 50% of [the Claimant]’s rest salary of the season as compensation except where otherwise specifically described or prescribed in the contract; if [the Respondent] choice to cancel the contract before November 20th 2016 with a formal notification in written form to [the Claimant], [the Respondent] shall pay 50% of [the Claimant]’s annual salary of 2017 to [the Claimant] as compensation. The employment contract is terminated after [the Respondent] cancel the contract in this way”.

21. The members of the Chamber duly analysed the contents of the above-mentioned provisions, and acknowledged that the aforementioned art. 8.3 of the contract provides that, upon the termination of the contract with just cause by the Respondent, the Claimant’s obligation to pay compensation amounts to USD 1,000,000 during the 2016 season and USD 2,000,000 during the season 2017, whereas art. 9.6 of the contract, provides that upon a termination of the contract without just cause by the Respondent, the Respondent’s obligation to pay compensation would amount to 50% of the Claimant’s salary and in case the contract is terminated by the Respondent before 20 November 2016, the compensation would amount to 50% of the Claimant’s salary for the 2017 season. The Chamber wished to point out that the wording of these clauses is not crystal clear.

22. Along these lines, the Chamber considered that art. 8.3 and art. 9.6 of the contract do not grant the same rights to the parties, since art. 9.6 of the contract provided for a method where the Respondent could influence the amount to be paid as compensation depending on the date it decides to terminate the contract, whereas, art. 8.3 of the contract stipulated that the Respondent would be entitled to precise amounts as compensation without the Claimant having the possibility to influence said amounts, in case the breach would be attributable to the Claimant.

23. Based on the above-mentioned considerations, the members of the Chamber agreed that art. 9.6 of the contract is to the benefit of the Respondent, i.e. it lacks proportionality as it does not grant the same rights to the Claimant as to the Respondent and that, therefore, said clause cannot be taken into consideration in the determination of the amount of compensation. In accordance with jurisprudence from the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), the respect of contractual freedom cannot in any way go to the detriment of the principle of a proportionate repartition of the rights of the parties.

24. On account of the foregoing, the Chamber decided that art. 9.6 of the contract could not be taken into consideration in the determination of the amount of compensation payable by the Respondent.

25. As a consequence, the members of the Chamber determined that the amount of compensation payable by the Respondent to the Claimant had to be assessed in application of the other parameters set out in art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations. The Chamber recalled that said provision provides for a non-exhaustive enumeration of criteria to be taken into consideration when calculating the amount of compensation payable.

26. Bearing in mind the foregoing as well as the claim of the Claimant, the Chamber proceeded with the calculation of the monies payable to the Claimant under the terms of the employment contract until 31 December 2017. Consequently, the Chamber concluded that the amounts of USD 868,000 and 96,000, i.e. remuneration and accommodation, respectively, as from May 2016 until December 2017, serve as the basis for the determination of the amount of compensation for breach of contract.

27. In this regard, the DRC remarked that, after the termination of the contract by the Respondent, the Claimant first concluded a new employment with the Club of Country G, Club H, which was supposed to run as from 8 September 2016 until 31 May 2017. In particular, the members of the DRC observed that this contract was terminated on 17 January 2017, and accordingly, the Claimant earned 115,185 as remuneration, which corresponds to approximately USD 30,000, and 40,000 as accommodation, which corresponds to approximately 73,000. Moreover, the Claimant signed and employment contract with the Club of Country J, Club K, on 23 January 2017 valid until 31 May 2017, according to which he was entitled to receive a sum of EUR 25,729, plus EUR 20,000 which the Claimant confirmed having received from said club, for a total amount of EUR 45,729 as remuneration, which corresponds to approximately USD 47,000, and an amount of EUR 2,169, as accommodation, which corresponds to approximately 16,000.

28. As a result of the difference between the above-mentioned amounts, the members of the Chamber highlighted that the amount due by the Respondent as compensation corresponds to USD 791,000 and 7,000.

29. In conclusion, for all the above reasons, the Chamber decided to partially accept the Claimant’s request and that the Respondent must pay to the Claimant the amounts of USD 791,000 and 7,000 as compensation for breach of contract without just cause, which is considered by the Chamber to be a reasonable and justified amount as compensation.

30. Equally, as regards the Claimant’s claim pertaining to air tickets, referring to the relevant terms of the employment contract, as well as the Chamber’s constant practice in this regard, the Chamber decided that the Respondent must pay to the Claimant the amount of USD 2,082 for one flight ticket back to Country B in the route City L – City M as compensation for breach of contract, taking into account the Claimant’s request, which seems to be in line with the average price in accordance with the information provided by FIFA Travel.

31. In addition, taking into account the Claimant’s request as well as the constant practice of the Dispute Resolution Chamber, the DRC decided that the Respondent must pay to the Claimant interest of 5% p.a. on the amounts of compensation as of the date on which the claim was lodged, i.e. 28 November 2016, until the date of effective payment.

32. Subsequently, the DRC analysed the request of the Claimant corresponding to transportation costs, which in accordance with the relevant contract is subject to the Claimant renting a car or using any other means of transportation. In this respect, taking into account the documentation presented by the Claimant in support of his petition, the DRC concluded that the Claimant had not fully substantiated his claim with pertinent documentary evidence in accordance with art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules. That is, there is no supporting documentation relating to the Claimant’s claim pertaining to transportation costs. Consequently, the DRC decided to reject this part of the Claimant’s claim.

33. The Dispute Resolution Chamber concluded its deliberations in the present matter by establishing that any further claims lodged by the Claimant are rejected.

III. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber

1. The claim of the Claimant, Player A, is partially accepted.

2. The Respondent, Club C, has to pay to the Claimant, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision, compensation for breach of contract in the amounts of USD 793,082 and 7,000, plus 5% interest p.a. on said amounts as from 28 November 2016 until the date of effective payment.

3. In the event that the aforementioned sums plus interest are not paid within the stated time limit, the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision.

4. Any further claim lodged by the Claimant is rejected.

5. The Claimant is directed to inform the Respondent immediately and directly of the account number to which the remittances under point 2. above are to be made and to notify the Dispute Resolution Chamber of every payment received.

*****

Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy):

According to article 58 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives).

Court of Arbitration for Sport

Avenue de Beaumont 2

1012 Lausanne

Switzerland

Tel: +41 21 613 50 00 / Fax: +41 21 613 50 01

e-mail: info@tas-cas.org

For the Dispute Resolution Chamber:

Marco Villiger

Chief Legal & Integrity Officer

Encl. CAS directives