F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber / Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie – labour disputes / controversie di lavoro (2016-2017) – fifa.com – atto non ufficiale – Decision 19 January 2017

Decision of the

Dispute Resolution Chamber

passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 19 January 2017,

in the following composition:

Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman

Johan van Gaalen (South Africa), member

Wouter Lambrecht (Belgium), member

on the matter between the player,

Player A, Country B

as Claimant / Counter-Respondent I

and the club,

Club C, Country D

as Respondent / Counter-Claimant

and the club,

Club E, Country B

as Counter-Respondent II

regarding an employment-related dispute between the parties

I. Facts of the case

1. On an unknown date, the Player of Country B, Player A (hereinafter: Claimant/Counter-Respondent I or player), and the Club of Country D, Club C (hereinafter: Respondent/Counter-Claimant or club) concluded an employment contract (hereinafter: contract A) valid as of 1 July 2013 until 10 November 2014 “unless earlier terminated pursuance to this contract, or to end of 2014 season”.

2. According to the information contained in the Transfer Matching System (TMS), the 2014 season in Country D ended on 2 November 2014.

3. According to the contract A, the club undertook to pay to the player, inter alia, the following amounts:

- USD 100,000 when player passes the medical test and signs the contract;

- USD 20,000 as monthly salary as of August to November 2013 and January to June 2014;

- USD 50,000 as payment “When begins the second-half of season 2014”;

- USD 20,000 as monthly salary as of July to November 2014.

4. Furthermore, contract A establishes that: “Party A [club] shall provide Party B [player] with clean, healthy, comfortable and convenient accommodation and nutritious meals, of which, the using cost of water, electronic, gas, management cost, heat fee, telephone and other communication facilities shall be borne by Party B [player]. If Party B [player] want to hire accommodation by himself, party A [club] pay 20000 to party B [player] once. If Party B [player] is a foreign player, Party A [club] shall give due consideration based on the above said arrangement (in case the Party B [player] has higher requirements, supplementary agreement shall otherwise specify expressly and specify the expense responsibility with Party A’s [club] consent)”.

5. Clause 11.4 of the contract A stipulates that in case of termination of the contract upon expiration, both parties shall sign a new contract if both parties agree to extend the contract.

6. On an unknown date, the parties signed another contract (hereinafter: contract B) containing all clauses of Contract A, including the same validity and remuneration (cf. points I. 2. and 3.), but modifying clause 11.4, which reads as follows: “After season 2013 end, if Party A [club] want to extend the contract one more year with Party B [player], the contract will be extended automatically until the end of the season 2014, if Party A [club] do not want to extend the contract after season 2013, the contract will be finished.”

7. On 23 December 2013, the player received from the club a document entitled “Agreement on the Termination of the Employment contract” (hereinafter: termination proposal).

8. On 28 December 2013, the player addressed a letter to the club stating that he does not agree to terminate the contract and that he would not sign the termination proposal. In said letter, the player pointed out that he wants to fulfil his contract until 10 November 2014 and asked the club the date on which he was required to resume training in Country D.

9. On 3 January 2014, the player sent an email to the club reiterating his request to the club to confirm the date on which he was required to go back to Country D to restart the training.

10. By email dated 3 January 2014, the club answered the player’s request stating that: “In accordance with the relevant rules and the articles 11 about the termination of the contract in the Football Association of Country D League F Football Club Employment Contract for Players signed between Player A and the club, if Player A ability can not be accepted by the club in season 2013, the Club can cancel the contract with Player A at the end of the season 2013, and do not need to make any compensation. The Club now has the new coach staff, and Player A can not be accepted by the new coach staff. The club already send the termination of the Employment Contract letter to Player A’s Agent in Country D …”.

11. By letter dated 6 January 2014, the player replied to the club pointing out that the club terminated the contract without just cause and that he had not agreed with the termination proposal.

12. On 13 January 2014, the player signed an employment contract with Club E, valid as from 13 January 2014 until 7 May 2014, including a total salary of 63,013.70.

13. On 19 May 2014, the player signed another employment contract with the Club of Country B, Club E, valid as from 1 June 2014 until 31 May 2015, including an annual salary of 180,000.

14. On 22 August 2014, the player lodged a claim with FIFA against the club for breach of contract without just cause and requested payment of the following monies:

- USD 20,000 corresponding to the salary of November 2013;

- USD 32,723 corresponding to accommodation costs incurred for the period between August 2013 and August 2014;

- USD 184,866 as compensation for breach of contract.

In addition, the player requested interest of 5% p.a. as from the respective due dates and that a sporting sanction be imposed on the club.

15. In his arguments, the player stated that the salary of November 2013 remained outstanding.

16. Moreover, the player held that the club failed to comply with contract A and did not reimburse the accommodation costs incurred when renting accommodation between August 2013 and August 2014. The player stated he needed to pay the total amount of 200,000, allegedly corresponding to USD 32,723, in advance.

17. In this context, the player argued that the club sent him contract A while he was still in Country B and that contract B was only signed after his arrival in Country D. According to the player, the club told him that contract B would be identical with contract A. Therefore, the player signed contract B as well.

18. According to the player, in November 2013, and with the permission of the club, the player left Country D to spend his holidays in Country B, where he received the termination proposal of the club.

19. The player argued that that the club terminated the contract without just cause on 3 January 2014 even though he notified the club that he wished to remain under contract and that he would not agree to mutually terminate the contractual relationship.

20. Furthermore, the player held that the reasoning of the termination of the club, i.e. the player’s performance, is not a valid reason for a termination.

21. In this context, the player pointed out that the club did rely on a unilateral termination clause inserted without the player’s knowledge, i.e. clause 11.4 of contract B, and that such conduct should not be recognised.

22. In addition, the player stated having complied with the contract and fulfilled all of his contractual obligations.

23. In light of the above, the player concluded that he is entitled to receive compensation corresponding to the residual value of the contract as follows:

USD 120,000 corresponding to the salaries of January to June 2014;

+ USD 50,000 corresponding to the payment due at the “second-half of season 2014”;

+ USD 100,000 corresponding to the salaries of July to November 2014;

- USD 38,061 corresponding to mitigation of the new contract dated 13 January 2014;

- USD 47,073 corresponding to mitigation of the new contract dated 19 May 2014;

= USD 184,866

24. In its answer to the claim, the club requested that the claim of the player be rejected since it is “untrue and unsubstantiated”.

25. In its arguments, the club held that the parties agreed upon the “initial draft of the contract” by fax and that the official contract would be signed upon the player’s arrival in Country D.

26. Subsequently, the club held that the player signed contract B after his arrival in Country D, including clause 11.4 and that due to this clause the contract expired at the end of the season 2013, namely on 3 November 2013, since the club did not want to extend it.

27. Furthermore, the club argued that the player signed contract B on every page and that he knew about the clause in question.

28. By means of a subsequent submission, the club lodged a counterclaim against the player and requested to be awarded the following monies from the player:

- USD 40,000 corresponding to overpaid salaries;

- USD 44,000 corresponding to “overspent commission” of the agent;

- USD 650,000 corresponding to compensation for breach of contract.

In addition, the club requested an “economic compensation to the club and according sanctions”.

29. In its arguments, the club held that the player breached the employment contract by entering into an employment relationship “with a Club of Country B” in January 2014.

30. The club stressed that the player failed to return to the club in December 2013 and that a termination proposal, which was never signed, was sent to him. In this context, the club argued that the employment contract remained valid.

31. According to the club, it paid the player a total amount of USD 160,000, even though the player’s entitlement for August until November 2013 was only USD 120,000. In support of this argument, the club submitted a club internal document entitled “Payment record Player A”, which lists the following payments:

- USD 100,000 as prepaid salary on 27 July 2013;

- USD 20,000 for “month 8”;

- USD 20,000 for “month 9”;

- USD 20,000 for “month 10”.

32. Furthermore, the club alleged that the player “faked” the contract submitted with his claim and argued that the club’s corporate seal was different from the real one and that the club’s representative’s signature does not appear on every page, but only on the last one. In addition, the club submitted the allegedly correct employment contract.

33. Moreover, the club stated that the alleged termination of the contract via email did not have “legal effect” since the email-address was “neither the club’s official email nor was authorized by the club”.

34. The club further argued having paid USD 60,000 as commission to an agent and deemed it appropriate to reclaim USD 44,000 from the player since he terminated the contract prematurely.

35. In addition, the club held that it needed to recruit a new foreign striker, which reportedly cost the club a total amount of USD 320,000.

36. Finally, the club claimed compensation for breach of contract in the amount of USD 650,000, i.e. USD 320,000 corresponding to the costs of the new striker and USD 330,000 corresponding to the residual value of the contract.

37. In his reply to the counterclaim, the player held that the club’s counterclaim, which amends the club’s arguments presented in reply to his claim, cannot be taken into account since the investigation phase was already closed.

38. Furthermore, the player reiterated his position and requested to reject the counterclaim.

39. In his arguments, the player denied having “faked” a contract and he pointed out that the club in its reply to the claim admitted having sent a contract to Country B before the player arrived in Country D.

40. The Club of Country B, Club E, endorsed in its position the player’s arguments and pointed out that the counterclaim of the club was only lodged after the closure of the investigation phase and shall be considered inadmissible.

41. Furthermore, Club E held that the Club of Country D unilaterally terminated the contract with the player with its correspondence on 3 January 2014. The Club of Country B refers to a TMS extract generated during the ITC process in January 2014, which shows that the player was “out of contract”. Club E concludes, that these facts proof that there was no inducement for breach of contract.

42. Moreover, the Club of Country B points out that the ITC was delivered on 29 January 2014, without objection of the Club of Country D.

43. In addition, the Club of Country B highlights that it obtained its licence to participate in the League of Country B, League G only in May 2015 and that “as part of the licence, Club E was granted the right to use the Club E brand, colours and trade marks owned by the Football Federation of Country B”.

44. Furthermore, Club E held that prior to May 2015, “an entity known as Club E Football Operations XXX (Old Club) participated in the League G competition as Club E”.

45. In view of the above, Club E argued that if the Dispute Resolution Chamber would decide that the player breached his contract, the “new club” in the sense of the FIFA Regulations would be Club E Football Operations XXX.

II. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber

1. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter also referred to as Chamber or DRC) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the matter at hand. In this respect, it took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 22 August 2014. Consequently, the Rules governing the procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (edition 2014; hereinafter: Procedural Rules) are applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 of the Procedural Rules).

2. Subsequently, the members of the Chamber referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed that in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 and par. 2 in combination with art. 22 lit. b of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2016) the Dispute Resolution Chamber is competent to deal with the matter at stake, which concerns an employment-related dispute with an international dimension between a Player of Country B, a Club of Country D and a Club of Country B.

3. Furthermore, the Chamber analysed which regulations should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, it confirmed that in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2016), and considering that the present claim was lodged on 22 August 2014, the 2014 edition of said regulations (hereinafter: Regulations) is applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance.

4. The competence of the Chamber and the applicable regulations having been established, the Chamber entered into the substance of the matter. In this respect, the Chamber started by acknowledging all the above-mentioned facts as well as the arguments and the documentation submitted by the parties. However, the Chamber emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to the facts, arguments and documentary evidence, which it considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand.

5. In this respect, the DRC recalled that, on unknown date, the parties signed contract A, valid as from 1 July 2013 until 10 November 2014 “unless earlier terminated pursuance to this contract, or to end of 2014 season”.

6. Furthermore, the Chamber acknowledged that, on an unknown date, the parties entered into contract B with the same duration as contract A. According to contract B, the Claimant/Counter-Respondent I was entitled to receive a monthly salary of USD 20,000 between August and November 2013 as well as between January 2014 and November 2014. Furthermore, the parties agreed upon a single payment of USD 50,000 “when begins the second-half of season 2014”.

7. In continuation, the members of the Chamber noted that the Claimant/Counter-Respondent I, on the one hand, lodged a claim against the Respondent/Counter-Claimant maintaining that the Respondent/Counter-Claimant had terminated the employment contract without just cause on 3 January 2014, since the player’s performance is not a valid reason to terminate the employment contract. In this respect, the Claimant/Counter-Respondent I submits that a total amount of USD 50,723, corresponding to the salary of November 2013 and accommodation costs between August 2013 and August 2014, remained outstanding at the time of the termination of the contract. Consequently, the Claimant/Counter-Respondent I asks to be awarded his outstanding dues as well as payment of compensation for breach of the employment contract.

8. The Chamber further noted that the Respondent/Counter-Claimant, for its part, rejected the player’s claim and argued that according to clause 11.4 of contract B the contractual relationship ended due to natural expiration at the end of the 2013 season, i.e. on 3 November 2013.

9. Moreover, the DRC took note that the Respondent/Counter-Claimant, at a later stage, with a separate submission, lodged a counterclaim against the Claimant/Counter-Respondent I and the Counter-Respondent II, arguing that the player had breached the employment contract by signing a contract with the Counter-Respondent II. In this regard, the Respondent/Counter-Claimant held that the initial employment contract remained valid since the termination proposal was never signed. Consequently, the Respondent/Counter-Claimant requested to be awarded with compensation for breach of the employment contract as well as with “overpaid” salaries and a commission for an agent.

10. Subsequently, the DRC observed that said counterclaim was rejected by the Claimant/Counter-Respondent I, who upheld his claim against the Respondent/Counter-Claimant.

11. Furthermore, the members of the Chamber took note of the position of the Counter-Respondent II, endorsing the player’s arguments and rejecting the counterclaim of the Respondent/Counter-Claimant.

12. On account of the above, the members of the Chamber highlighted that the underlying issue in this dispute, considering the diverging position of the parties, was to determine as to whether the applicable contract had been terminated by one of the parties, and, in the affirmative, as to whether such termination was with or without just cause. The Chamber also underlined that, subsequently, if it was found that the contract was terminated without just cause, it would be necessary to determine the consequences for the party responsible for the early termination of the contractual relation.

13. Subsequently, the Chamber proceeded with an analysis of the circumstances surrounding the present matter, the parties’ arguments as well the documentation on file, bearing in mind art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules, in accordance with which any party claiming a right on the basis of an alleged fact shall carry the burden of proof.

14. In this respect and due to the fact that two different versions of contracts were submitted by the parties, the DRC analysed first which contract should serve as basis of the present claim.

15. In this regard, the members of the Chamber took note of the Claimant/Counter-Respondent I’s argumentation that the Respondent/Counter-Claimant modified the previously signed contract A, inserted clause 11.4 and told him upon arrival in Country D that the contract B would only be a copy of contract A.

16. Furthermore, the DRC observed that the Respondent/Counter-Claimant held that the player duly signed contract B upon arrival in Country D after the parties agreed upon an “initial draft of the contract” by fax.

17. On account of the above and due to the lack of evidence provided, the argumentation of the Claimant/Counter-Respondent I must be rejected. In conclusion and given that contract B was undisputedly concluded at a later stage than contract A, it can be established that contract B supersedes contract A and that therefore it is the contract binding the parties.

18. Having concluded the above, the Chamber went on to analyse the content of the applicable contract, especially clause 11.4 of the contract B, which reads as follows: “After season 2013 end, if Party A [club] want to extend the contract one more year with Party B [player], the contract will be extended automatically until the end of the season 2014, if Party A [club] do not want to extend the contract after season 2013, the contract will be finished.”

19. The Chamber was of the unanimous opinion that any potential validity or invalidity of clause 11.4 of contract B as well as the calculation of any potential compensation would have to be assessed taking into consideration the Regulations, general principles of law as well as the Chamber’s well-established jurisprudence.

20. Bearing in mind the above, the Chamber focused its attention on clause 11.4 of contract B and deemed that, in view of the parties’ stance, the first question that it needed to address was the nature of clause 11.4 of contract B. In this respect, contrary to the position of the Respondent, the members of the DRC were of the unanimous opinion that said clause is evidently a clause granting the Respondent the right to unilaterally terminate the contract by the end of the season 2013. Indeed, it is clearly established in the contract that its period of validity would run until 10 November 2014.

21. Consequently, the Chamber’s conclusion in this disputed point was that, by means of its email of 3 January 2015, the Respondent did not refuse to extend the contract concluded between the parties but rather unilaterally terminated it.

22. In continuation, the Chamber went to analyse the validity of the aforementioned clause 11.4 of contract and, in this respect, unanimously decided that said clause is to be considered invalid in view of its potestative nature. In this context, the members of the Chamber wished to highlight that, in general, potestative clauses, i.e. clauses that contain obligations which fulfilment are conditional upon an event that one party entirely controls, cannot be considered since they limit the rights of the other contractual party in an excessive manner and lead to an unjustified disadvantage of the latter towards the other. In casu, the Respondent was the only party which could decide to terminate the contract depending on its wish to either continue until 10 November 2014 or terminate the contract after the season 2013.

23. What is more, the DRC considered that said clause is in direct opposition with the general legal principle of balance of rights of the parties since it provides benefits towards the Respondent/Counter-Claimant with no equivalent right in favour of the Claimant/Counter-Respondent I. In this respect, taking into account the duration of the contract as of 1 July 2013 until 10 November 2014, the Chamber underlined that it could not recognise said clause as it provides for a unilateral termination right to the club only. Therefore, the Chamber decided that the Respondent/Counter-Claimant could not legitimately terminate the contract with the Claimant/Counter-Respondent I making use of clause 11.4 of the contract.

24. On account of the above, the members of the Chamber concluded that clause 11.4 of contract B is to be deemed invalid and therefore, inapplicable. In this regard, the DRC rejected the Respondent/Counter-Claimant’s argument that the contract expired on 3 November 2013.

25. Subsequently, the DRC analysed the Respondent/Counter-Claimant’s counterclaim, where, in contradiction to its previous submission, alleged that the contract remained valid after 3 November 2013, that the alleged termination via email had “no legal effect” and that the player breached the contract by signing a new contract in Country B on 13 January 2014.

26. In this regard, the members of the Chamber deemed that the club’s behaviour was completely contradictory since it submitted two different positions on the same matter stating the diametrically opposite arguments. In this respect, the members of the Chamber decided to reject the Respondent/Counter-Claimant’s arguments raised in its counterclaim.

27. Having taken into account the previous considerations, the Chamber recalled that clause 11.4 of the contract does not constitute a reason that can be validly invoked to unilaterally terminate the contract. As a result of the foregoing, the members of the Chamber came to the conclusion that, by means of its email dated 3 January 2014, the club terminated the contract with the player without just cause.

28. Subsequently, prior to establishing the consequences of the termination of the employment contract without just cause by the Respondent/Counter-Claimant in accordance with art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the Chamber held that it, in general, had to address the issue of unpaid remuneration at the moment when the contract was terminated by the Respondent/Counter-Claimant.

29. In this regard, the DRC noted that the Claimant/Counter-Respondent I alleged that the Respondent/Counter-Claimant had failed to pay the outstanding amount of USD 20,000, corresponding to the salary of November 2013 as well as USD 32,723, corresponding to accommodation costs.

30. In this context, the Chamber acknowledged that the contract foresees a payment of the Respondent/Counter-Claimant in the amount of 20,000 once, in case the Claimant/Counter-Respondent I decides to rent accommodation on his own.

31. In view of the above, recalling the basic principle of burden of proof, the DRC concluded that the Respondent has not provided corroborating evidence of payments corresponding to the salary of November 2013 or any accommodation costs. Therefore, it could be established that the Respondent/Counter-Claimant had failed to pay to the Claimant/Counter-Respondent I the salary of November 2013 as well as the payment of 20,000 as accommodation costs.

32. As a consequence, and in accordance with the general legal principle of pacta sunt servanda, the Respondent/Counter-Claimant must fulfil its obligations as per contract concluded with the Claimant/Counter-Respondent I and, consequently, is to be held liable to pay the outstanding amount of USD 20,000 and 20,000 to the Claimant/Counter-Respondent I.

33. In addition, taking into account the Claimant’s request, the Chamber decided that the Respondent/Counter-Claimant must pay to the Claimant/Counter-Respondent I interest of 5% p.a. on the amount of compensation as of the date on which the contract was terminated, i.e. 3 January 2014, until the date of effective payment.

34. Taking into consideration art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the Chamber decided that the Claimant/Counter-Respondent I is entitled to receive compensation for breach of contract from the Respondent.

35. In continuation, the Chamber focused its attention on the calculation of the amount of compensation for breach of contract in the case at stake. In doing so, the members of the Chamber firstly recapitulated that, in accordance with art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the amount of compensation shall be calculated, in particular and unless otherwise provided for in the contract at the basis of the dispute, with due consideration for the law of the country concerned, the specificity of sport and further objective criteria, including, in particular, the remuneration and other benefits due to the Claimant/Counter-Respondent I under the existing contract and/or the new contract, the time remaining on the existing contract up to a maximum of five years, and depending on whether the contractual breach falls within the protected period.

36. In application of the relevant provision, the Chamber held that it first of all had to clarify as to whether the pertinent employment contract contains a provision by means of which the parties had beforehand agreed upon an amount of compensation payable by the contractual parties in the event of breach of contract. In this regard, the Chamber established that no such compensation clause was included in the employment contract at the basis of the matter at stake.

37. As a consequence, the members of the Chamber determined that the amount of compensation payable by the Respondent to the Claimant had to be assessed in application of the other parameters set out in art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations. The Chamber recalled that said provision provides for a non-exhaustive enumeration of criteria to be taken into consideration when calculating the amount of compensation payable. Therefore, other objective criteria may be taken into account at the discretion of the deciding body. In this regard, the Dispute Resolution Chamber emphasised beforehand that each request for compensation for contractual breach has to be assessed by the Chamber on a case-by-case basis taking into account all specific circumstances of the respective matter.

38. The members of the Chamber then turned their attention to the remuneration and other benefits due to the Claimant/Counter-Respondent I under the existing contract and/or the new contract, which criterion was considered by the Chamber to be essential. The members of the Chamber deemed it important to emphasise that the wording of art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations allows the Chamber to take into account both the existing contract and the new contract, if any, in the calculation of the amount of compensation.

39. Bearing in mind the foregoing, the Chamber proceeded with the calculation of the monies payable to the player under the terms of the employment contract as from the date of termination without just cause by the Respondent/Counter-Claimant until its natural expiry, i.e. 10 November 2014. In this regard, the DRC determined that he would have received in total USD 250,000 as remuneration for the period as from 2 January 2014 until 10 November 2014. Consequently, the Chamber concluded that the amount of USD 250,000 serves as the basis for the final determination of the amount of compensation for breach of contract in the case at hand.

40. In continuation, the Chamber verified as to whether the Claimant had signed an employment contract with another club during the relevant period of time, by means of which he would have been enabled to reduce his loss of income. According to the constant practice of the DRC, such remuneration under a new employment contract shall be taken into account in the calculation of the amount of compensation for breach of contract in connection with the player’s general obligation to mitigate his damages.

41. In this respect, the Chamber recalled that the Claimant/Counter-Respondent I had found new employment with the Club of Country B, Club E, as from 13 January until 7 May 2014. In accordance with the employment contract signed between the player and Club E, the Claimant/Counter-Respondent I was entitled to a total salary of 63,013.70.

42. Furthermore, the DRC acknowledged that the Claimant/Counter-Respondent I signed a second contract with the Club of Country B, Club E, valid as from 1 June 2014 until 31 May 2015. In accordance with said employment contract, the Claimant/Counter-Respondent I was entitled to a total salary of 180,000.

43. Consequently, on account of the above-mentioned considerations and the specificities of the case at hand as well as the Claimant/Counter-Respondent I’s general obligation to mitigate his damage, the Chamber decided to partially accept the Claimant/Counter-Respondent I’s claim and that the Respondent/Counter-Claimant must pay the amount of USD 121,000 as compensation for breach of contract to the player, which is considered by the Chamber to be a fair and reasonable amount.

44. In addition, taking into account the Claimant/Counter-Respondent I’s request, the Chamber decided that the Respondent/Counter-Claimant must pay to the Claimant/Counter-Respondent I interest of 5% p.a. on the amount of compensation as of the date on which the claim was lodged, i.e. 22 August 2014, until the date of effective payment.

45. The members of the Chamber concluded their deliberations by rejecting any further claim of the Claimant/Counter-Respondent I.

46. The Dispute Resolution Chamber concluded its deliberations in the present matter by establishing that the claim lodged by the Respondent/Counter-Claimant is rejected.

III. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber

1. The claim of the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I, Player A, is partially accepted.

2. The counterclaim of the Respondent / Counter-Claimant, Club C, is rejected.

3. The Respondent / Counter-Claimant is ordered to pay to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision, outstanding remuneration in the amounts of USD 20,000 and 20,000 plus 5% interest p.a. as from 3 January 2014 until the date of effective payment.

4. The Respondent / Counter-Claimant is ordered to pay to the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision, compensation for breach of contract in the amount of USD 121,000 plus 5% interest p.a. as from 22 August 2014 until the date of effective payment.

5. In the event that the aforementioned sums are not paid by the Respondent / Counter-Claimant within the stated time limits, the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to FIFA’s Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision.

6. Any further claim lodged by the Claimant / Counter-Respondent I is rejected.

7. The Claimant / Counter-Respondent I is directed to inform the Respondent / Counter-Claimant immediately and directly of the account number to which the remittance is to be made and to notify the Dispute Resolution Chamber of every payment received.

*****

Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy):

According to article 58 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives).

The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following:

Court of Arbitration for Sport

Avenue de Beaumont 2

1012 Lausanne

Switzerland

Tel: +41 21 613 50 00

Fax: +41 21 613 50 01

e-mail: info@tas-cas.org

For the Dispute Resolution Chamber:

Marco Villiger

Deputy Secretary General

Encl: CAS directives