F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber / Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie – labour disputes / controversie di lavoro (2017-2018) – fifa.com – atto non ufficiale – Decision 21 September 2017

Decision of the

Dispute Resolution Chamber

passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 21 September 2017,

in the following composition:

Thomas Grimm (Switzerland), Deputy Chairman

John Bramhall (England), member

Johan van Gaalen (South Africa), member

Pavel Pivovarov (Russia), member

Mohamed Al-Saikhan (Saudi Arabia), member

on the claim presented by the player,

Player A, from country A

as Claimant

against the club,

Club B, from country B

as Respondent

regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties

I. Facts of the case

1. On 15 October 2009, the Player A, from country A (hereinafter: Claimant), the Club B, from country B (hereinafter: Respondent), and Company X (hereinafter: company X), signed a document titled “Employment contract” (hereinafter: contract) valid as from 1 January 2010 until 31 December 2010.

2. The first paragraph of the contract refers to the parties as follows: “Club B, based in country B … hereinafter simply CLUB, X, with headquarters located in country X, … , hereafter referred to as COMPANY X, CONTRACTOR; Player A, country A citizen, … , hereafter referred to as EMPLOYEE:”.

3. Article 1.1 of the contract determines that “The EMPLOYEE Player A will provide services as a football player, playing in competitions by the employer that he is participating”.

4. According to article 4.1 and 4.2 of the contract, “For the services, the EMPLOYEE Player A will receive the first year of work the importance of” USD 1,300,000, payable as follows:

- USD 300,000, due on 30 January 2010;

- USD 300,000, due on 30 April 2010;

- USD 300,000, due on 30 July 2010; and

- USD 400,000, due on 30 October 2010.

5. Article 6.2 of the contract determines that “In case will be terminated this present Agreement and the EMPLOYEE Player A has already received value greater than the proportion of time worked, the EMPLOYER shall return the excess amount.”

6. On 20 January 2010, the Claimant and the Respondent signed a document named “The Contract” (hereinafter: additional contract), valid as from 15 January 2010 until 31 December 2010, according to which the Claimant was entitled to a remuneration “according to the list of staff Club”.

7. The additional contract establishes in its article 1.1 that “Club undertakes to employ the Football Player as a professional football player (non-amateur football player) of soccer team Club B, to pay wages and to provide with the working conditions necessary to performance of such work and stipulated by the legislation of country B, and the Football Player undertakes to perform work as the football player of Club, using thus all professional skills with the purpose of achievement by Club high sports results”.

8. On 9 August 2010, the Claimant notified the Respondent and the company that he considered the contract as terminated considering the outstanding remuneration and the fact that on that date no response was received from the Respondent to the email dated 7 August 2010 “sent by email in care of Ms Z, Office of the President of the club, over a communication informing the situation and establishing another new term to contact us”.

9. On 9 August 2010, the Respondent notified the Football Federation of country B and the league that four of its players, including the Claimant, had left the Respondent in spite of ongoing negotiations between the parties. In particular, the Respondent stated that the Claimant had left and “orally having warned a club management”.

10. On 10 August 2010, the Claimant contacted the Debt Collection Office of country X, to verify the financial situation of the company.

11. On 11 August 2010, the Claimant initiated a debt collection request against the company before the Debt Collection Office of country X.

12. On 13 August 2010, the company was declared bankrupt.

13. On 2 December 2010, the Claimant lodged a claim before FIFA against the Respondent for breach of contract, asking to be awarded USD 700,000 as outstanding remuneration and USD 400,000 as compensation for breach of contract.

14. According to the Claimant, the Respondent failed to pay the remuneration as established in the contract, having only paid the total amount of USD 200,000 in two payments of USD 100,000 on 30 January 2010 and on 2 August 2010, respectively.

15. Moreover, the Claimant explained that after several meetings with the Respondent who promised to pay the outstanding remuneration, in July 2010, the Respondent proposed the termination of the contract, which was refused by the Claimant.

16. On 26 July 2010, the Claimant allegedly notified the Respondent and the company of the outstanding remuneration and the payment of the upcoming instalment on 30 July 2010, establishing a deadline of 10 days for payment. In this respect, the Claimant provided a copy of the default notice addressed to the Respondent and the company, dated 26 July 2010. In particular, the default notice establishes a deadline of 10 days for payment “under penalty on one side of termination of employment contract”.

17. Subsequently, according to the Claimant, on 1 August 2010, the Respondent and the company again proposed the mutual termination of the contract, which was rejected by him one more time considering the insufficient conditions.

18. According to the Claimant, on 2 August 2010, during a meeting with the president of the Respondent regarding the termination of the contract, he asked for payment of his receivables, since he was allegedly in financial difficulties. The Claimant held having received the amount of USD 100,000 on this occasion.

19. Notwithstanding the above, the Claimant informed having been open to an amicable solution, establishing a deadline until 9 August 2010, however to no avail, which was the reason why he terminated the contract in writing on 9 August 2010. In this respect, the Claimant held having been in contact with the company for the settlement of the dispute.

20. In conclusion, the Claimant considers that he had just cause to terminate the contract on 9 August 2010.

21. On 17 April 2011, the Claimant filed a claim against the company before the Bankruptcy office in country X, claiming a total amount of CHF 2,369,036.90 regarding wages, requesting the collocation of such amounts as a first class claim.

22. The Respondent replied to the claim stating, first of all, that it was not aware of the date on which the claim was lodged in front of FIFA, but affirmed that the claim is time-barred considering the date of the termination of the contract, i.e. 9 August 2010 and the date of the Respondent’s reply, i.e. 22 September 2015. In particular, the Respondent held that the claim is time-barred according to country B law, which general statute of limitations period for labour disputes may vary between one month and one year. The Respondent held that the claim is also time-barred according to Swiss law, since the DRC is neither an ordinary court nor an arbitration tribunal, and in accordance with the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players.

23. As to the substance of the matter, the Respondent preliminarily explained that the company was the principal shareholder in “Company W”, which was the Respondent's principal shareholder until 13 August 2010, date on which the company was declared bankrupt. In this respect, the Respondent submitted a witness statement of the Respondent’s sports director from 2007 until 2012, in which he states inter alia that the participation of the company in the Respondent’s business was limited to financial/sponsor support and the contracting and payment of services of foreign specialists (players and coach). Moreover, the Respondent added that the company was also the Respondent’s sponsor “at all relevant times”.

24. According to the Respondent, the Claimant was aware that the company was liable to pay his remuneration and not the Respondent and, in this respect, it refers to the above-mentioned bankruptcy documents.

25. In this regard, the Respondent highlighted that on different occasions in August 2010, the Claimant only contacted the company, thus clearly considering the company as the debtor, and even contacted the Debt Collection Office to verify the financial situation of the company and to request outstanding payments initiating a debt collection request against the company.

26. Moreover, the Respondent held that, only after being aware of the bankruptcy proceedings faced by the company, did the Claimant lodge a claim against the Respondent, including the amounts requested from the company in the first place, clearly demonstrating that the amounts established in the contract were payable by the company.

27. Furthermore, according to the Respondent, foreign players have a different labour status than national players and need to obtain a license to work from the Agency of Foreign Labor Migration Affairs of country B. For that purpose, the Respondent concluded bilateral agreements with foreign players, including the player A. In particular, the Respondent stated that “in the Club’s financial documents, foreign football players, including Player A, were named as employees paid in accordance with the bilateral contract between foreign players and the Club”.

28. In addition, the Respondent explained that the company would request the Respondent to accept a foreign player, after which the Respondent signed the “bilateral agreement”, but the company did not involve the Respondent in the legal and financial terms of the transfers.

29. Furthermore, the Respondent held that the contract is actually null and void because it was signed by an unauthorized person on behalf of the Respondent and because it foresaw the payments in USD, which is against the applicable national laws. In this regard, the Respondent further held that the contract was not registered before the Football Federation of country B. Furthermore, all negotiations with players and even visa proceedings were made by the company.

30. Therefore, the Respondent alleged that, in spite of the existence of two contracts, it only made payments in accordance with the “bilateral agreement”, i.e. the additional agreement, and was not involved in further payments from the company to the Claimant as “it was agreed and clear to everyone involved that all salaries other than agreed under the [additional contract] would be arranged for and paid by [the company]”. Due to currency restrictions, agreements under which the players were to be paid in foreign currency were made by the company, which was domiciled outside country B.

31. All in all, the Respondent sustained that it was neither obliged, nor in a position to make any payments under a different contract than the “bilateral agreement”, i.e. the additional contract, considering the following:

- The Respondent never made any payments under the contract;

- The Respondent never made a payment in USD to the Claimant;

- The Respondent could not assume obligations to pay in USD, since payments in foreign currency are forbidden in country B;

- The Respondent was never financially able to make the payments established in the contract;

- The Claimant had already claimed the payments established in the contract from the company and initiated debt enforcement proceedings against the company.

32. Moreover, according to the former director of the Respondent, after the company started facing financial problems, the foreign players, including the Claimant, left the Respondent without notifying or informing the Respondent, since the relationship was actually between the company and the players. As a consequence, the Respondent decided to terminate the additional agreement in August 2010 and cease to pay the remuneration, having afterwards informed the Football Federation of country B that the Claimant had left the Respondent.

33. Furthermore, the Respondent claimed having never received the default notice allegedly sent by the Claimant, since it was made to the company. The Respondent held that it only had access to the relevant documentation upon review of the company’s bankruptcy file.

34. The Respondent denied having proposed to amicably settle the matter and held not being aware of the alleged offer and highlighted that, anyway, the document was not signed and thus, not binding.

35. Finally, the Respondent held that the procedural and legal costs should be imposed on the Claimant.

36. In his replica, the Claimant insisted on his claim and rejected the argument that the Respondent has no liability regarding amounts due to him based on the contract. In this respect, first of all, the Claimant held that the contract does not establish that the company is the entity responsible to make the payments to the Claimant. However, even if that was the case, in case of failure, the Respondent is the only remaining liable party. In addition, the Claimant stated that the Respondent is the employer and thus, primarily liable to pay the employee and could not assign such obligation to a third party.

37. The Respondent submitted its final comments, stating, inter alia, that the Claimant did not reject the Respondent’s argument that the claim is time-barred, neither did he provide any evidence to the contrary. Therefore, the claim should be dismissed due to the statute of limitations.

38. The Claimant informed FIFA that he remained unemployed until the end of the relevant contractual period.

39. The Respondent submitted information regarding the status of the Claimant’s application to the Bankruptcy Office in country X regarding the company. In this respect, the Respondent explained the following:

- The insolvency proceedings were formally opened on 28 October 2010 and have been active since 2011.

- On 17 April 2011, the Claimant submitted a claim before the Bankruptcy Office in country X regarding the company, requesting amounts from the company, allegedly stating that these amounts covered salaries which remained unpaid by the company, and requesting the collocation in first class of the claim based on the employment relationship between him and the company.

- On 23 August 2011, a first creditors’ meeting was held in the company, which resulted in the election of an extraordinary liquidator and the appointment of the creditors’ committee.

- The final list of creditors’ claims is drawn up in a document called “Collocation Plan”, the issuance deadline of which can be expanded for years by the competent court.

- The liquidator is still about to scrutinize these claims to confirm that they are genuine and may be admitted to the insolvency. The Collocation Plan has not been issued and thus, it is not yet decided whether the claims of the Claimant are fully or partially admitted or rejected.

II. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber

1. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter also referred to as Chamber or DRC) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the case at hand. In this respect, it took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 2 December 2010. Consequently, the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (edition 2008; hereinafter: Procedural Rules) are applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 of the Procedural Rules).

2. Subsequently, the members of the Chamber referred to art. 3 par. 1 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed that in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 in combination with art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2016) the Dispute Resolution Chamber would, in principle, be competent to deal with the matter at stake, which concerns an employment-related dispute with an international dimension between a player and a club.

3. The Chamber then reverted to the argument of the Respondent, according to whom the present matter is barred by the statute of limitations. In this regard, the members of the Chamber referred to art. 25 par. 5 of the aforementioned Regulations, according to which, inter alia, the Dispute Resolution Chamber shall not hear any case subject to the said Regulations if more than two years have elapsed since the event giving rise to the dispute. The present claim having been lodged in front of the DRC on 2 December 2010 and the event giving rise to the dispute having occurred in August 2010, the members of the Chamber had to reject the respective argument of the Respondent and confirmed that the present petition was lodged in front of the DRC within said two years’ period of time and is, thus, not barred by the statute of limitations in accordance with art. 25 par. 5 of the aforementioned Regulations.

4. On account of the above, the Chamber confirmed that it is competent to enter into the substance of the present matter on the basis of art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2016).

5. In continuation, the Chamber analysed which regulations should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, it confirmed that in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and par. 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2016), and considering that the present claim was lodged on 2 December 2010, the 2010 edition of said regulations (hereinafter: Regulations) is applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance.

6. The competence of the Chamber and the applicable regulations having been established, the Chamber entered into the substance of the matter. In this respect, the Chamber started by acknowledging all the above-mentioned facts as well as the arguments and the documentation submitted by the parties. However, the Chamber emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to the facts, arguments and documentary evidence, which it considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand.

7. In continuation, the members of the DRC took note that the Claimant, the Respondent and the company concluded the contract, valid from 1 January 2010 until 31 December 2010, in accordance with which the Claimant was entitled to receive, inter alia, the amount of USD 1,300,000 in four instalments between 30 January 2010 and 30 October 2010. Moreover, the DRC noted that the Claimant and the Respondent also signed the additional contract, valid from 15 January 2010 until 31 December 2010.

8. The members of the Chamber noted that the Claimant lodged a claim against the Respondent for breach of contract requesting to be awarded outstanding remuneration and compensation for breach of contract.

9. In this respect, the Chamber acknowledged that the Claimant terminated the contract on 9 August 2010 in writing, invoking just cause on the basis that he was allegedly entitled to receive the total amount of USD 900,000 until 9 August 2010, whereas he had only received the amount of USD 200,000.

10. In continuation, the Chamber noted that the Respondent, for its part, rejected the Claimant’s claim arguing inter alia that it was not bound by the contract, which is at the basis of the Claimant’s claim. In particular, the Respondent held that the contract is null and void because it was signed by an unauthorized person on behalf of the Respondent as well as that it was not registered in the Football Federation of country B.

11. Moreover, the Chamber took note that the Respondent held that it only made payments to the Claimant under the additional contract, submitting a copy of pay sheets for the period as from January 2010 until March 2010 signed by the Claimant relating to payments made in country B currency, as well as that it could not assume obligations to pay in USD, since payments in foreign currency are forbidden under country B’s law.

12. Additionally, the Chamber noted the Respondent’s argument that the Claimant was aware that the company was the party liable to pay his remuneration, since the Claimant had already claimed the payments established in the contract from the company as well as initiated debt enforcement proceedings against the company.

13. The DRC acknowledged that the Claimant rejected such argumentation and insisted on his claim, stating that the Respondent is the employer and, thus, the party responsible for payment of his remuneration. The Claimant further highlighted that the contract does not establish that the company would be responsible for payment.

14. Considering the conflicting position of the parties with respect to their contractual rights and obligations, the members of the DRC proceeded with a more detailed examination of the contracts at the basis of the present dispute and the parties’ respective argumentation.

15. In this respect, the members of the DRC agreed that the Respondent’s argumentation that the contract was null and void because it was signed on behalf of the Respondent by a non-authorized person cannot be upheld, due to the fact that in accordance with the principle of good faith, bona fide, to be respected by the parties during the conclusion of contracts, the Claimant was in good faith authorized to believe that the person signing the relevant agreement on behalf of the Respondent was legally authorized to sign it on behalf of the Respondent. The Chamber further highlighted that the relevant signature is accompanied by the Respondent’s stamp. Equally and in accordance with the principle of the burden of proof, as set out in art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules, the DRC outlined that the Respondent did not provide documentary evidence demonstrating that the Claimant was or could have been aware of the alleged situation outlined by the Respondent at the moment of signing the pertinent contracts.

16. In continuation, the DRC equally rejected the Respondent’s argument that the contract would be null and void because it was not registered at the Football Federation of country B, making reference to its established jurisprudence that, as a general rule, the registration of an employment contract at a federation cannot constitute a condition for its validity. Indeed, as a general rule, the validity of an employment contract cannot be made conditional upon the execution of (administrative) formalities, such as, but not limited to, the registration procedure relating to a player, which falls within the responsibility of a club and/or association and on which a player has no influence.

17. Moreover, the DRC deemed that the Respondent’s argument that the contract would be null and void, since, in contradiction with national law, it included payments in USD, could not be upheld, considering that the Respondent duly signed and stamped the contract, thereby accepting its contractual terms.

18. Consequently, the DRC decided to reject the argumentation put forward by the Respondent and determined that the contract was valid and binding on both parties.

19. In continuation and considering the arguments of the parties, the Chamber proceeded to determine the party responsible to pay the Claimant’s remuneration.

20. At this point, the Chamber recalled that the Claimant and the Respondent had signed two different contracts:

(i) The contract dated 15 October 2009 concluded between the Claimant, the Respondent and the company, which established a remuneration for his services as a player in the amount of USD 1,300,000 in favour of the Claimant.

(ii) The additional contract dated 20 January 2010 concluded between the Claimant and the Respondent, which established that the Claimant was entitled to a remuneration “according to the list of staff Club”.

21. In this respect, the members of the Chamber agreed that taking into consideration both contracts, it could be established that the Claimant and the Respondent concluded an employment relationship and that the Claimant undertook to render his services as a player to the Respondent. In particular, the DRC considered that the parties’ employment relationship was governed by both contracts and that these contracts include a reciprocal exchange of obligations between the Claimant and the Respondent. In this regard, the Chamber was satisfied that, whereas the term “Employer” has not been further defined in the contract, the Claimant was to render his services as a player to the Respondent, a club affiliated to the Football Federation of country B, only.

22. In this context, the DRC further took note that the additional contract does not establish a remuneration for the Claimant’s services in clear and specific terms. On the other hand, the Chamber took note that the contract clearly establishes the remuneration that the Claimant was entitled to receive for his services as a player.

23. Furthermore, the members of the DRC recalled that art. 1.1 of the additional contract expressly establishes that the Respondent undertakes to employ the Claimant and to pay him wages.

24. On account of the above, the members of the DRC considered that, contrary to the Respondent’s argument, the Respondent is to be held liable for the payment of the Claimant’s remuneration for his services as a football player.

25. In this context, the DRC further recalled the aforementioned legal principle of the burden of proof and considered that the Respondent had not been able to corroborate its allegation that the company was the party liable to pay the remuneration to the Claimant with relevant and conclusive documentation.

26. On account of the above considerations, the members of the DRC decided to reject the arguments put forward by the Respondent and determined that the Respondent is the party liable to pay the Claimant his remuneration established in the contract.

27. Having established the above, the Chamber recalled that the Claimant terminated the contract in writing on 9 August 2010, alleging that the aggregate amount of USD 700,000 was still outstanding in spite of having put the Respondent in default.

28. In this regard, the members of the DRC took note that it has remained undisputed that the amount of USD 700,000 claimed by the Claimant on the basis of the contract was indeed outstanding on 9 August 2010.

29. Consequently, the DRC established that on the date of the termination of the contract by the Claimant, i.e. 9 August 2010, the aggregate amount of USD 700,000 was outstanding, corresponding to part of the first instalment of USD 300,000 as well as to the full second and third instalments of USD 300,000 each, which fell due in accordance with the contract on 30 January 2010, 30 April 2010, and 30 July 2010, respectively.

30. On account of the above, the Chamber established that the Respondent, without any valid reason, failed to remit to the Claimant the instalments that became due on 30 January, 30 April and 30 July 2010 in the total amount of USD 700,000. Consequently, the Chamber concurred that the Respondent had seriously neglected its financial contractual obligations towards the Claimant over a substantial amount of time. Bearing in mind the Respondent’s allegation that it had not received a default notice from the Claimant, in spite of the Claimant having submitted a copy of a default notice dated 26 July 2010, in light of said important delay in payment of such substantial part of the Claimant’s remuneration, the members of the Chamber deemed that the Claimant could in good faith believe that, in spite of a hypothetical notice informing about its default, the Respondent would have persisted in the non-compliance with the financial terms of the contract.

31. On account of the above and taking into consideration the Chamber’s longstanding jurisprudence in this respect, the Chamber decided that the Claimant had just cause to unilaterally terminate the contract on 9 August 2010 and that the Respondent is to be held liable for the early termination of the contract with just cause by the Claimant.

32. As a consequence, and in accordance with the general legal principle of pacta sunt servanda, the Chamber decided that the Respondent is liable to pay to the Claimant the amount which was outstanding under the contract at the moment of the termination, i.e. USD 700,000, as established in point II./29. above.

33. In continuation, having established that the Respondent is to be held liable for the early termination of the employment contract with just cause by the Claimant, the Chamber decided that, in accordance with art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the Respondent is liable to pay compensation to the Claimant.

34. In this context, the Chamber outlined that, in accordance with said provision, the amount of compensation shall be calculated, in particular and unless otherwise provided for in the contract at the basis of the dispute, with due consideration for the law of the country concerned, the specificity of sport and further objective criteria, including, in particular, the remuneration and other benefits due to the Claimant under the existing contract and/or the new contract, the time remaining on the existing contract up to a maximum of five years.

35. In application of the relevant provision, the Chamber held that it first of all had to clarify as to whether the pertinent employment contract contained a provision by means of which the parties had beforehand agreed upon an amount of compensation payable by the contractual parties in the event of breach of contract. In this regard, the Chamber established that no such compensation clause was included in any of the contracts.

36. Subsequently, and in order to evaluate the compensation to be paid by the Respondent, the members of the Chamber took into account the remuneration due to the Claimant in accordance with the contract as well as the time remaining on the same contract, along with the professional situation of the Claimant after the early termination occurred. In this respect, the Chamber pointed out that at the time of the termination of the employment contract on 9 August 2010, the contract would still run until 31 December 2010. Consequently, taking into account the financial terms of the contract, the Chamber concluded that the remaining value of the contract as from its early termination by the Claimant until the regular expiry of the contract amounts to USD 400,000 and that such amount shall serve as the basis for the final determination of the amount of compensation for breach of contract.

37. In continuation, the Chamber took due note of the employment situation of the Claimant after the termination of the contract at the basis of the case at stake. Bearing in mind art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations and in accordance with the constant practice of the Dispute Resolution Chamber as well as the general obligation of the player to mitigate his damages, remuneration under a new employment contract(s) shall be taken into account in the calculation of the amount of compensation for breach of contract.

38. In this regard, the members of the Chamber noted that the Claimant had not signed any new employment contract within the period of time between the termination of the contract and its original date of expiry and, thus, had not been able to mitigate damages.

39. In view of all of the above, the Chamber decided that the Respondent must pay the amount of USD 400,000 to the Claimant as compensation for breach of contract.

III. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber

1. The claim of the Claimant, Player A, is admissible.

2. The claim of the Claimant is accepted.

3. The Respondent, Club B, has to pay to the Claimant outstanding remuneration in the amount of USD 700,000, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision.

4. The Respondent has to pay to the Claimant compensation for breach of contract in the amount of USD 400,000, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision.

5. In the event that the amounts due to the Claimant in accordance with the above-mentioned numbers 3. and 4. are not paid by the Respondent within the stated time limits, interest at the rate of 5% p.a. will fall due as of expiry of the aforementioned time limits and the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision.

6. The Claimant is directed to inform the Respondent immediately and directly of the account number to which the remittances are to be made and to notify the Dispute Resolution Chamber of every payment received.

*****

Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy):

According to article 58 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives).

The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following:

Court of Arbitration for Sport

Avenue de Beaumont 2

1012 Lausanne

Switzerland

Tel: +41 21 613 50 00

Fax: +41 21 613 50 01

e-mail: info@tas-cas.org

For the Dispute Resolution Chamber:

Omar Ongaro

Football Regulatory Director

Encl. CAS directives