F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber / Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie – labour disputes / controversie di lavoro (2017-2018) – fifa.com – atto non ufficiale – Decision 19 January 2017

Decision of the

Dispute Resolution Chamber

passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 19 January 2017,

in the following composition:

Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman

Johan van Gaalen (South Africa), member Wouter Lambrecht (Belgium), member

on the claim presented by the player,

Player A, Country B

as Claimant

against the club,

Club C, Country D

as Respondent

regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties

I. Facts of the case

Facts related to the competence:

1. On 1 February 2015, the Player of Country B, Player A, (hereinafter: the Claimant) and the Club of Country D, Club C, (hereinafter: the Respondent), signed an employment contract (hereinafter: the contract) valid from the date of signature until 31 May 2015.

2. Clause O. of the contract reads:

“O. LITIGATIONS

The parties agree not to submit any litigation to the courts of justice before exhausting all the means of the Football Federation of Country D, Professional Football League and FIFA.”.

3. Furthermore, Clause P. par. 3 of the contract stipulated that: “The parties understand that this agreement is completed properly with the regulations of the Football Federation of Country D and the Professional Football League”.

4. In its reply to the claim, the Respondent contested that FIFA is competent to deal with the case, stating that the Football Federation of Country D and the Professional Football League of Country D are “functioning independent jurisdictional commissions”, and held that according to the applicable regulations, said bodies have “fully and exclusive competence to hear any dispute or litigation between clubs in Country D and the players under contract with them”. In addition, the Respondent held that “as far as committees of the Football Federation of Country D are concerned, they meet all the requests established by FIFA with regard to the national sportive courts”.

5. Moreover, the Respondent also argued that, in reference to clause P. par. 3 of the contract, if FIFA’s Dispute Resolution Chamber would declare itself competent, it would need to apply the Law of Country D. Moreover, the Respondent sustained that as the contract was signed in Country D, “it is unjust that a party conduct to be analysed through the provisions of a foreign law”.

6. Despite being requested by FIFA, the Respondent did not provide documentation in order to support its argumentation that the deciding body of the Football Federation of Country D and/or Professional Football League of Country D meets the requirements established in art. 22 lit b) of the Regulations.

7. The Claimant on his part, insisted on the competence of FIFA to deal with the matter at hand and pointed out that, according to clause O. of the contract, “the own club recognizes the FIFA as competent organization to resolve the emerging conflicts of the contract” and that the parties “only agreed that the appeal to the courts of justice would only be possible after exhausted the jurisdiction of sports courts in which FIFA is included”.

Facts related to the substance of the case:

8. According to the contract, the Claimant is entitled, inter alia, to EUR 7,000, “after receiving the international transfer certificate”, as well as a monthly salary of EUR 7,000 net, for the period between 1 February 2015 and 31 May 2015. Moreover, the contract established that the Claimant is entitled to “Bonuses according the Interior Regulation”.

9. According to the contract, “the sums shall be paid in the Currency of Country D at the exchange rate of the National Bank of Country D on the 9th of the next month”.

10. On 24 May 2015, the Claimant and the Respondent signed a document titled “Convention” (hereinafter: the first agreement), by means of which the parties agreed that “because a better place in the ranking represents an additional amount that will be charged with the title of TV rights, and the other point of view, to have better performance, as well as to the game with Club E in round 33 National Football League…,…. If the above mentioned game, the Club will have a positive result”, the Claimant was entitled to receive EUR 3,500 net, payable at the latest on 15 July 2015.

11. Furthermore, on 24 May 2015, the parties signed a document also titled “Convention” (hereinafter: the second agreement), by means of which the parties agreed that “because a better place in the ranking represents an additional amount that will be charged with the title of TV rights, and the other point of view, to have better performance, as well as to the game with Club F in round 34 National Football League…,…if the above mentioned game, the Club will have a positive result”, the Claimant is entitled to receive EUR 2,000 net, payable at the latest on 15 July 2015.

12. By means of correspondence dated 16 June 2015, the legal representative of the Claimant put the Respondent in default of payment of EUR 31,500, setting a time limit of 5 days in order to remedy the default.

13. In this respect, by means of a letter dated 23 June 2015, the Respondent informed the legal representative of the Claimant that “Club C will fulfil the obligation towards your client, Player A. Therefore, by 5 July 2015, we will pay the outstanding salaries of your client”.

14. In reply to the Respondent’s correspondence, on 25 June 2015, the legal representative of the Claimant informed the Respondent that he would wait for the payment only until 5 July 2015 and instructed it to perform the remittance to the following banking details of the Claimant:

“Account Holder. Player A

NIB: XXX

IBAN: XXX;

Swift Code: XXX;

Bank: XXX”.

15. On 6 July 2015, the legal representative of the Claimant sent further correspondence to the Respondent, in which he informed it that as the Respondent had failed to pay the amount on the day promised, i.e. 5 July 2015, but taking into account that this day fell on a Sunday, he would wait [for the payment] “until the end of tomorrow morning”, otherwise he would refer the case to FIFA.

16. On 24 July 2015, subsequently amended on 25 August 2015, the Claimant lodged a claim against the Respondent before FIFA, asking that the Respondent be ordered to pay to him outstanding remuneration in the amount of EUR 31,500, plus “other applicable charges, until full payment of all amounts due to player, calculated from 16 June 2015”. The Claimant further requested sporting sanctions to be imposed on the Respondent.

17. The Claimant broke down his request for outstanding remuneration as follows:

 EUR 5,500 corresponding to the partially unpaid amount the Claimant is entitled to after the reception of the ITC;

 EUR 1,000 corresponding to the partially unpaid salary for the month of February 2015, as the Claimant explained he received EUR 6,000 in May 2015, that according to him correspond to his salary of February 2015;

 EUR 21,000 corresponding to unpaid salaries for the months of March, April and May, all 2015;

 EUR 4,000 corresponding to unpaid bonuses for the games against Club E and Club F, in accordance with the first and second agreements.

18. In his claim, the Claimant explained that the Respondent has failed to pay the amounts requested, despite that it acknowledged the debt and promised to pay it, in accordance with the Respondent’s correspondence dated 23 June 2015.

19. In its reply as to the substance of the Claimant’s claim, the Respondent sustained that it paid the Claimant EUR 11,000, both in cash and via bank transfers, and not only EUR 6,000, as stated by the Claimant.

20. In this respect, the Respondent provided the following detailed breakdown, which according to it, proves the alleged payments to the Claimant:

Amount allegedly paid

Date of alleged payment

Exchange

Rate

EUR / Currency of Country D according to the Respondent on said date

Cash or bank transfer and documentation provided in this respect

Currency of Country D

8,854 which according to the Respondent corresponds to approx. EUR 2,000

18 February 2015

EUR 1 =

Currency of Country D 4.45

Cash Payment.

The Respondent provided

“payment dispositions“ number 76 and 77 in the amounts of Currency of Country D 4,432, and Currency of Country D 4,422, respectively, allegedly signed by the Claimant.

Currency of Country D 4,450 which according to the Respondent corresponds to approx. EUR 1,000

5 March 2015

EUR 1 =

Currency of Country D 4.44

Cash payment

The Respondent provided

“payment disposition“ number 107 in the amount of Currency of Country D 4,450, allegedly signed by the Claimant.

Currency of Country D 4,435 which according to

20 April 2015

EUR 1 =

Currency of Country

Bank transfer

The Respondent provided its account the Respondent corresponds to approx. EUR 1,000

D 4.43

statements as well as payment order no. 190 to the Claimant’s bank account opened at the Bank of Country D, for the amount of Currency of Country D 4,435, in which it is stated:

- Beneficiary’s name: Player A;

- IBAN:

XXX;

- Beneficiary’s bank: Bank of Country D

Currency of Country D 15,606 which according to the Respondent corresponds to approx. EUR 3,500

15 May 2015

EUR 1 =

Currency of Country D 4.44

Bank transfer

The Respondent provided its account statements as well as payment order no. 18 to the Claimant’s bank account opened at the Bank of Country D, for the amount of Currency of Country D 15,606, in which it is stated:

- Beneficiary’s name: Player A;

- IBAN:

XXX;

- Beneficiary’s bank: Bank of Country D

- Additional details: “Partial Salary of February” Currency of Country D 4,500 which according to the Respondent corresponds to approx. EUR 1,000

22 May 2015

EUR 1 =

Currency of Country D 4.45

Cash payment

The Respondent provided

“payment disposition“ number 419 in the amount of Currency of Country D 4,500, allegedly signed by the Claimant.

Currency of Country D 11,147 which according to the Respondent corresponds to approx. EUR 2,500

22 May 2015

EUR 1 =

Currency of Country D 4.45

Bank transfer

The Respondent provided its account statements as well as payment order no. 235 to the Claimant’s bank account opened at the Bank of Country D, for the amount of Currency of Country D 11,147, in which it is stated:

- Beneficiary’s name: Player A;

- IBAN:

XXX;

- Beneficiary’s bank: Bank of Country D

- Additional details: “Partial Salary of February”

21. The Respondent sustained that taking into account these payments, the claim of the Claimant must be partially accepted.

22. In an unsolicited correspondence dated 14 April 2016, the Respondent sustained that it paid the Claimant Currency of Country D 131,054 on 25 November 2015, which according to it is equivalent to EUR 29,526, via a bank transfer. The Respondent sustained that it “was erroneously not sent until this moment”.

23. In his replica, the Claimant insisted on his request for relief, reiterating his initial claim. The Claimant sustained that in accordance with the contract and the “record results” he was entitled to 4 salaries in the amount of EUR 7,000 each, the sign-on fee of EUR 7,000 and EUR 4,000 regarding the two match bonuses for the matches against Club E and Club F, which amounts to EUR 39,000, and as the club only paid EUR 7,500, there is outstanding remuneration in the total amount of EUR 31,500.

24. In respect, to the cash payments allegedly made by the Respondent, the Claimant held that “The documents attached by the respondent are mechanical reproductions, made by himself, not having the player signed any of them – MALITA HOMINUN INFINITA, and don’t received the values in question (except of course, the bank transfers).”.

25. The Claimant further held that he does not recognize the payment allegedly made on 25 November 2015. In this regard, he explained that by means of his letter dated 25 June 2015, he had already indicated the Respondent where to deposit the outstanding amounts, and held that he has not received any amounts there.

26. In its duplica, the Respondent reiterated the amounts allegedly paid by it, and upon request of FIFA, presented the alleged originals of the documents submitted as evidence to prove the cash payments.

27. Moreover, the Respondent submitted evidence of an alleged bank transfer made to the Claimant on 20 November 2015, which was not enclosed originally to its reply. Said payment is described as follows:

Amount allegedly paid

Date of alleged payment

Exchange

Rate

EUR / Currency of Country D according to the club on said date

Cash or bank transfer and documentation provided in this respect

Currency of Country D 131,054 which according to the Respondent

20 November 2015

EUR 1 =

Currency of Country D 4.44

Bank transfer

The Respondent provided its account statements as well as payment order no. 801 to the Claimant’s bank account opened at the corresponds to approx. EUR 29,500

Bank of Country D, for the amount of Currency of Country D 131,054, in which it is stated:

- Beneficiary’s name: Player A;

- IBAN:

XXX;

- Beneficiary’s bank: Bank of Country D

28. In respect to the payment allegedly made on 20 November 2015, the Claimant held that it is contradictory to what was initially sustained by the Respondent in its unsolicited correspondence, as it originally claimed that the payment was made on 25 November 2015. In consequence, the Claimant reiterated his request for relief in full, and sustained that the Respondent is trying to demonstrate that it paid amounts to him, when in fact it did not.

II. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber

1. First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: also referred to as Chamber or DRC) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the matter at hand. In this respect, it took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 24 July 2015. Consequently, the Chamber concluded that the 2015 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules) is applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 of the 2015 edition of the Procedural Rules).

2. Subsequently, the members of the Chamber referred to art. 3 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed that in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 and par. 2 in combination with art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2016) the Dispute Resolution Chamber would, in principle, be competent to deal with the matter at stake, which concerns an employment-related dispute with an international dimension between a Player of Country B and a Club of Country D.

3. However, the Chamber acknowledged that the Respondent contested the competence of FIFA’s deciding bodies on the basis of the alleged fact that the Football Federation of Country D and the Professional Football League of Country D have “fully and exclusive competence to hear any dispute or litigation between clubs in Country D and the players under contract with them”. The DRC took note that the Respondent held that the Football Federation of Country D and the Professional Football League of Country D are “functioning independent jurisdictional commissions”, and that “as far as the Football Federation of Country D committees are concerned, they meet all the requests established by FIFA with regard to the national sportive courts”.

4. Moreover, it was further noted that the Respondent also argued that, in accordance with clause P. par. 3 of the contract and since the contract was signed in Country D, if FIFA’s Dispute Resolution Chamber would declare itself competent, it would need to apply the Law of Country D and that “it is unjust that a party conduct to be analysed through the provisions of a foreign law”.

5. In this regard, the members of the Chamber noted that the Claimant rejected such position and insisted that FIFA is competent to deal with the present matter highlighting, inter alia, that article O. of the contract provided, among other things, for FIFA’s competence in case of disputes arising out of the contract.

6. Taking into account all the above, the Chamber emphasised that in accordance with art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, it is competent to deal with a matter such as the one at hand, unless an independent arbitration tribunal, guaranteeing fair proceedings and respecting the principle of equal representation of players and clubs, has been established at national level within the framework of the association and/or a collective bargaining agreement. With regard to the standards to be imposed on an independent arbitration tribunal guaranteeing fair proceedings, the members of the Chamber referred to the FIFA Circular no. 1010 dated 20 December 2005. Equally, the Chamber referred to the principles contained in the FIFA National Dispute Resolution Chamber (NDRC) Standard Regulations, which came into force on 1 January 2008.

7. While analysing whether it was competent to hear the present matter, the Dispute Resolution Chamber considered that it should, first and foremost, analyse whether the employment contract at the basis of the present dispute actually contained a jurisdiction clause.

8. Having said this, the members of the Chamber turned their attention to art. O of the contract, which stipulates that “The parties agree not to submit any litigation to the courts of justice before exhausting all the means of the Football Federation of Country D, the Professional Football League and FIFA.”.

9. In view of the aforementioned clause, the members of the DRC were of the opinion that art. O of the employment contract does not make clear reference to one specific national dispute resolution chamber in the sense of art. 22 lit. b) of the aforementioned Regulations and even provides for the possibility of lodging a contractual dispute in front of FIFA. Therefore, the members of the Chamber deem that said clause can by no means be considered as a clear arbitration clause in favour either of the national deciding bodies, i.e. of the Football Federation of Country D and/or Professional Football League of Country D, and, therefore, cannot be applicable. In this regard, the Chamber pointed out that this lack of clarity is also reflected in the Respondent’s argumentation, since it did not specify which specific national body would be competent.

10. Having established that the first criterion for the recognition of the competence of a national decision-making body is not fulfilled in the present matter, the Chamber deemed unnecessary to examine any further points which would need to be assessed before concluding to the competence of a national deciding body.

11. Furthermore, with respect to the Respondent’s argument that FIFA’s DRC has to apply the Law of Country D in view of the content of clause P. par. 3 of the contract, the members of the DRC recalled that said clause stipulated “The parties understand that this agreement is completed properly with the regulations of the Football Federation of Country D and Professional Football League” and in consequence, wished to point out that said clause cannot be interpreted as a choice of law between the parties, particularly, it cannot be considered that the parties chose the Law of Country D to be applicable, since said clause does not contain any reference to it. Moreover, the DRC emphasised that when deciding a dispute before the DRC, FIFA’s regulations prevail over any national law chosen by the parties. In this regard, the Chamber emphasized that the main objective of the FIFA regulations is to create a standard set of rules which all the actors within the football community are subject to and can rely on. This objective would not be achievable if the DRC would have to apply the national law of a specific party on every dispute brought to it. Therefore, the Chamber deems that it is not appropriate to primarily apply the principles of a particular national law to a dispute brought to its analysis but rather the Regulations, general principles of law and, where existing, the Chamber’s well-established jurisprudence.

12. In view of all the aforementioned circumstances, the Chamber established that the Respondent’s objections to the competence of FIFA to deal with the present matter had to be rejected and that the DRC is competent, on the basis of art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, to consider the present matter as to the substance.

13. Subsequently, the Chamber analysed which regulations should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, it confirmed that in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (editions 2015 and 2016), and considering that the present claim was lodged on 24 July 2015, the 2015 edition of said regulations (hereinafter: the Regulations) is applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance.

14. The competence of the Chamber and the applicable regulations having been established, the Chamber entered into the substance of the matter. In this respect, the Chamber started by acknowledging all the above-mentioned facts as well as the arguments and the documentation submitted by the parties. However, the Chamber emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to the facts, arguments and documentary evidence, which it considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at hand.

15. In this respect, the Chamber acknowledged that on 1 February 2015, the parties signed an employment contract valid between the date of signature and 31 May 2015. In accordance with said contract, the player was entitled to receive, inter alia, EUR 7,000, “after receiving the international transfer certificate”, as well as a monthly salary of EUR 7,000. The DRC further noted that, on 24 May 2015, the parties signed two agreements, which established bonus payments of EUR 3,500 and EUR 2,000, respectively, both payable in the scenario that “If the above mentioned game, the Club will have a positive result” (cf. points I./10. and I./11. Above) to the Claimant at the latest on 15 July 2015.

16. In continuation, the members of the Chamber noted that the Claimant, on 16 June 2015, put the Respondent in default of payment of EUR 31,500. In this regard, the Chamber observed that, on 23 June 2015, the Respondent replied to the Claimant and informed him that it would proceed with such payment by 5 July 2015.

17. Furthermore, the DRC highlighted that it remained uncontested that, on 25 June 2015, the legal representative of the Claimant informed the Respondent about the Claimant’s banking details (cf. point I.14. above) and that it would wait until the date proposed by the Respondent for payment. Along this line, the Chamber took note that the Claimant held that as from this moment he did not receive any amounts from the Respondent.

18. In this context, the members of the DRC analysed the claim lodged by the Claimant, and underlined that the Claimant held that he only received EUR 7,500 from the Respondent, whereas, allegedly, he was entitled to receive EUR 39,000 from it for the duration of the contract. According to the Claimant, the amount he was allegedly entitled to is composed by a sign-on fee of EUR 7,000, four monthly salaries of EUR 7,000 and match bonuses of EUR 4,000.

19. In respect to the claimed bonuses, taking into account the documentation presented by the Claimant in support of his petition, the DRC concluded that the Claimant had not fully substantiated his claim with pertinent documentary evidence in accordance with art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules. That is, there is no supporting documentation relating to the Claimant’s claim pertaining to the scenarios stipulated i.e. “If the above mentioned game, the Club will have a positive result” in respect to the bonuses. Consequently, the DRC concluded that EUR 35,000 is the amount that the Claimant could prove he was entitled to.

20. Equally, the members of the Chamber took note of the reply of the Respondent, in which it first asserted that it had already paid the Claimant the total amount of EUR 11,000. In this respect, the Respondent submitted various payment receipts and bank statements (cf. point I./20. above).

21. With due consideration to the above, the members of the Chamber took into account that from the EUR 11,000 allegedly paid by the Respondent, the Claimant did not contest the bank transfers that add up to EUR 7,000, but contested and rejected the alleged cash payments that amount to EUR 4,000, as the Claimant held that he did not receive the cash payments and he did not sign the corresponding cash receipts.

22. It was further noted, that upon FIFA’s request, the Respondent provided the original versions of the contested payment receipts.

23. At this stage, the DRC considered it appropriate to remark that, as a general rule, FIFA's deciding bodies are not competent to decide upon matters of criminal law, such as the ones of alleged falsified signature or document, and that such affairs fall into the jurisdiction of the competent national criminal authority.

24. In continuation, the DRC recalled that, according to art. 12 par. 6 of the Procedural Rules, all documentation remitted shall be considered with free discretion and, therefore, the Chamber focused its attention on the alleged original versions of the payment receipts provided as well as on the other documents containing the signature of the Claimant and submitted by the parties in the context of the present dispute.

25. After a thorough analysis of the aforementioned documents, in particular, comparing the relevant signatures of the Claimant in the original versions of the payment receipts and the signatures of the Claimant in the various documents provided in the present affair, the Chamber had no other option but to conclude that, for a layman, the signatures on such documents appear to be alike and genuine.

26. In view of the above, the DRC came to the conclusion that the cash payments amounting to EUR 4,000, as well as the EUR 7,000 corresponding to bank transfers are therefore to be taken into account as payments to the Claimant in the total amount of EUR 11,000.

27. Subsequently, the members of the DRC turned their attention to the Respondent’s assertion that it paid a further EUR 29,500 to the Claimant on 25 November 2015, via bank transfer. In this regard, the DRC took note that with its duplica, the Respondent submitted evidence of a bank transfer to the Claimant’s bank account in Country D allegedly executed on 20 November 2015 corresponding to the above mentioned amount (cf. point I./27. above).

28. In this respect, the Chamber highlighted that the Claimant sustained not having received said payment.

29. Along these lines, the Chamber wished to recall that it remains uncontested that in reply to the Respondent informing the Claimant that it would pay the outstanding amount by 5 July 2015, the Claimant duly notified the Respondent of his new banking details in Country B since 25 June 2015, explicitly requesting to be paid in this bank account.

30. Consequently, the DRC considered that the payment at stake was made to the Claimant’s former bank account in Country D, 5 months after the Respondent was duly instructed to pay the Claimant in his new bank account in Country B.

31. As a result, the members of the Chamber were of the opinion that the Respondent has to bear the consequences of the fact that it wrongfully used the Claimant’s former bank account details, without a contractual clause obliging it to pay in said former account.

32. In view of all the above, the members of the Chamber concluded that the Respondent could prove at the Chamber’s satisfaction, that it paid the Claimant the total amount of EUR 11,000.

33. As a result thereof, the Chamber established that the Respondent had failed to pay to the Claimant the amount of EUR 24,000, in relation to the sign-on fee and salary payments under the contract concluded between the parties for the period between 1 February 2015 and 31 May 2015.

34. Consequently, and in accordance with the general legal principle of pacta sunt servanda, the Respondent must fulfil its obligations as per the contract concluded with the Claimant and, therefore, is to be held liable to pay the outstanding amount of EUR 24,000 to the Claimant.

35. In addition, the Chamber analysed the Claimants request for “other applicable charges, until full payment of all amounts due to player, calculated from 16 June 2015” and decided that as said request cannot be construed as a request for interest, it therefore lacks legal basis.

36. Finally, the Chamber concluded its deliberations in the present matter by establishing that any further claim lodged by the player is rejected.

III. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber

1. The claim of the Claimant, Player A, is admissible.

2. The claim of the Claimant is partially accepted.

3. The Respondent, Club C, has to pay to the Claimant within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision, outstanding remuneration in the amount of EUR 24,000.

4. In the event that the aforementioned sum is not paid by the Respondent within the stated time limit, interest at the rate of 5% p.a. will fall due as of expiry of the aforementioned time limit and the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to FIFA’s Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision

5. Any further claim lodged by the Claimant is rejected.

6. The Claimant is directed to inform the Respondent immediately and directly of the account number to which the remittance is to be made and to notify the Dispute Resolution Chamber of every payment received.

*****

Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy):

According to art. 58 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives).

The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following:

Court of Arbitration for Sport

Avenue de Beaumont 2

1012 Lausanne

Switzerland

Tel: +41 21 613 50 00

Fax: +41 21 613 50 01

e-mail: info@tas-cas.org

For the Dispute Resolution Chamber:

_____________________________

Marco Villiger

Deputy Secretary General

Encl: CAS directives