F.I.F.A. – Dispute Resolution Chamber / Camera di Risoluzione delle Controversie – labour disputes / controversie di lavoro (2017-2018) – fifa.com – atto non ufficiale – Decision 25 January 2018

Decision of the

Dispute Resolution Chamber

passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 25 January 2018,

in the following composition:

Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman

Roy Vermeer (The Netherlands), member

Tomislav Kasalo (Croatia), member

Pavel Pivovarov (Russia), member

Daan de Jong (The Netherlands), member

on the claim presented by the player,

Player A, Country B

as Claimant

against the club,

Club C, Country D

as Respondent

regarding an employment-related dispute

arisen between the parties

I. Facts of the case

1. On an unspecified date, the player of Country B, Player A (hereinafter; the Claimant or the player) and the club of Country D, Club C (hereinafter; the Respondent or the club) (hereinafter jointly referred to as the parties) concluded an employment contract (hereinafter; the contract) valid as of 15 June 2016 until 31 May 2018.

2. According to the contract, the Claimant was entitled to receive from the Respondent the following “net” monies:

a. For the season 2016/2017:

i. EUR 475,000 payable in 5 equal instalments of EUR 45,000 on the 30th day of each month as of August until December 2016, one instalment of EUR 70,000 payable on 30 January 2017 as well as 4 further instalments of EUR 45,000 on 28 February, 30 March, 30 April and 30 May 2017;

b. For the season 2017-2018:

i. EUR 475,000 payable in 5 equal instalments of EUR 45,000 on the 30th day of each month as of August until December 2017, one instalment of EUR 70,000 payable on 30 January 2018 as well as 4 further instalments of EUR 45,000 on 28 February, 30 March, 30 April and 30 May 2018.

3. Clause 9 of the contract reads as follows: “Dispute Resolution Chamber of the Football Federation of Country D shall have jurisdiction over any dispute arising out of or in connection with this contract. The parties may appeal to the Football Federation of Country D’s Arbitration Board within the specified period of time against the decisions of the Dispute Resolution Chamber of the Football Federation of Country D”.

4. On 19 April 2017, the Claimant lodged a claim against the Respondent in front of FIFA for outstanding remuneration only. In particular, the Claimant explained that, by that date, he was owed the total amount of EUR 320,000 for the season 2016/2017.

5. On 5 and 30 June 2017, the Respondent replied to the claim, first challenging the competence of FIFA to adjudicate on the present matter in view of clause 9 of the contract. In particular, the club argued that the Dispute Resolution Chamber of the Football Federation of Country D (hereinafter; the DRC of the Football Federation of Country D) and, in appeal, the Football Federation of Country D’s Arbitration Board, were the only competent bodies to entertain the player’s claim.

6. Upon FIFA’s request, the Respondent submitted, inter alia, a copy of the DRC of the Football Federation of Country D Regulations and of the Arbitration Commission of the Football Federation of Country D Regulations.

7. Art. 3 of the DRC of the Football Federation of Country D Regulations provides as follows: “[the DRC of the Football Federation of Country D] is formed as five main members and five sub-members whose approved by Board of Presidents, offer of Football Federation of Country D President and Administrative Board of the Football Federation of Country D (…) a) Board of Presidents is formed by Administrative Board of the Football Federation of Country D as five members and, b) [Arbitrators] whose have to get the approval of Administrative Board of the Football Federation of Country D, will be chosen from list of [Arbitrators] announced by Association of Clubs Foundation, Association of Professional Football Players (…) A member from Board of Presidents presides to Arbitration Board…”.

8. For its part, art. 8 of the DRC of the Football Federation of Country D Regulations reads: “Arbitral Tribunal is formed by the [arbitrators] who are selected by the parties and a member of Board of Presidents. Member of Board of Presidents presides [the] Arbitral Tribunal”.

9. Equally, art. 20 states that “3% application fee must be paid in advance over the value of the case”.

10. As to the Regulations of the Arbitration Commission of the Football Federation of Country D, its art. 3 states that “Arbitration Commission shall be established by motion of the President of Federation and order of Administration Board, with six main members and six sub-members (…) At first gathering Board selects an Acting President and Judicial Clerk from the pool of main members”.

11. Regarding the substance of the matter, the Respondent alleged that the amounts payable to the Claimant were “gross” and that therefore a deduction of 15.79% should be applied in accordance with art. 72 of the Income Tax Code of Country D. Consequently, the Respondent argued that, at the moment the Claimant lodged his claim, he was entitled to EUR 324,208.5 only. In this regard, the Respondent argued having paid EUR 65,000 plus 16,000 in the currency of Country D equal to “EUR 4,453”. Therefore, the Respondent maintained that its debt towards the player amounted to EUR 254,755 only.

12. Finally, the Respondent explained that, at the end of the 2016/2017 season, it was relegated and therefore “deprived [of] most of its income”.

13. On 12 July 2017, the Claimant submitted his replica, first insisting that FIFA is competent to hear his claim.

14. Moreover, the Claimant rejected that the salaries provided in the contract were gross amounts as it is clearly established therein that his salary was net.

15. As to the payments allegedly made by the Respondent, the Claimant stressed that the amount paid in currency of Country D refers to “winning bonuses for particular matches” and not to his salary. In any case, the Claimant highlighted that even if this amount was to be taken into account, still the Respondent only paid him “14.62%” of the total amounts he was entitled to receive in the 2016/2017 season.

16. Consequently, and considering that at the moment of his replica, the payments due on 30 April and 30 May 2017 were already due (cf. point 2.b above), the Claimant amended his claim for outstanding salaries to EUR 410,000.

17. Furthermore, the player requested the amounts of EUR 525,000 as compensation for the 2017/2018 season and EUR 250,000 as moral damage.

18. In its duplica, the Respondent rejected the position of the player as to the amounts due to him being net. In this respect, the Respondent stressed that the reference to “net salaries” contained in the contract is a pure formality as it is established in the “mandatory contract” of the Football Federation of Country D. However, the Respondent underlined that “it should not be accepted that the amounts stipulated in the contract reflect net amounts only because this formality and the mandatory format of contract”.

19. To strengthen its position the Respondent submitted two decisions, one rendered by the DRC of the Football Federation of Country D and another by a the 6th Civil Court of city of Country D, whereby said bodies apparently concluded that, in spite of the contract containing a reference to “net salaries”, the amounts due to the players in question were actually gross amounts.

20. Finally, the Respondent maintained its challenge to the competence of FIFA.

21. On 6 October 2017, the Claimant submitted unsolicited correspondence whereby he wished to “make a few statements in order to clarify my position” and amended his claim as follows:

a. EUR 410,000 as outstanding salaries for the season 2016/2017;

b. EUR 475,000 as compensation for breach of contract;

c. 5% interest p.a. on each payment as of the due dates.

22. In its reply to the Claimant’s amended claim, the Respondent stated that the player left Country D by the end of the 2016/2017 season and did not inform the club about his departure. Therefore, according to the Respondent, the player breached the contract and shall therefore not be entitled to “the alleged allowances”.

23. The club further underlined that it is “in the last position of the second division” and “struggling with severe economic and administrative problems”.

24. Upon FIFA’s request, the player informed FIFA that he concluded a new employment contract with the club of Country B, Club E, on 4 September 2017. However, the Claimant pointed out that his registration with said club was not completed and therefore, said contract was “annulled”. According to the information contained in the Transfer Matching System (TMS), the player’s contract with Club E was valid as of 4 September 2017 until 30 November 2017 and provided a total remuneration for the player in the amount of EUR 4,443. Equally, the transfer of the player to Club E could not be completed as it was inserted outside the relevant registration period.

II. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber

1. First, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter also referred to as DRC or Chamber) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the case at hand. In this respect, the Chamber took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 19 April 2017. Consequently, the 2017 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules) is applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 of the Procedural Rules).

2. Subsequently, the DRC referred to art. 3 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed that in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 in combination with art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2018), the DRC would, in principle, be competent to deal with the matter at stake, which concerns an employment-related dispute with an international dimension between a player of Country B and a club of Country D.

3. Notwithstanding the above, the members of the Chamber acknowledged that the Respondent contested the competence of FIFA’s deciding bodies alleging that the Claimant should have addressed his claim to the DRC of the Football Federation of Country D, as per clause 9 of the contract.

4. On the other hand, the Chamber noted that the Claimant insisted on the competence of the FIFA DRC to adjudicate on his claim against the Respondent, and sustained that the DRC of the Football Federation of Country D is not an independent arbitration tribunal guaranteeing fair proceedings and respecting the principle of equal representation of players and clubs.

5. Taking into account all the above, the Chamber emphasised that in accordance with art. 22 lit b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2018), it is, in principle, competent to deal with employment-related disputes of an international dimension; the parties may, however, explicitly opt in writing for any disputes arisen between them to be decided by an independent arbitration tribunal guaranteeing fair proceedings and respecting the principle of equal representation that has been established at national level within the framework of the association and/or a collective bargaining agreement. Any such arbitration clause must be included either directly in the contract or in a collective bargaining agreement applicable on the parties. With regard to the standards to be imposed on an independent arbitration tribunal existing at national level, the Chamber referred to the FIFA Circular no. 1010 dated 20 December 2005. Equally, the members of the Chamber referred to the principles contained in the FIFA National Dispute Resolution Chamber (NDRC) Standard Regulations, which came into force on 1 January 2008.

6. With the aforementioned in mind, the members of the Chamber first emphasised that, in the present matter, indeed it would appear that the parties agreed, by means of clause 9 of the contract, that the disputes arisen between them in relation to the employment contract would be resolved by the DRC of the Football Federation of Country D and, in appeal, by the Arbitration Commission of the Football Federation of Country D.

7. Nevertheless, and in accordance with said art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations, the DRC emphasised that it needed to analyse whether the entire dispute resolution system within the Football Federation of Country D, i.e. the DRC of the Football Federation of Country D and the Arbitration Commission of the Football Federation of Country D, actually complies with the requirements as mentioned in point II.5 above. In so doing, the members of the Chamber recalled that, in accordance with art. 12 par. 3 of the Regulations, it is for the Respondent to prove that both the DRC of the Football Federation of Country D and the Arbitration Commission of the Football Federation of Country D are independent tribunals guaranteeing fair proceedings and which respect the principle of equal representation of players and clubs.

8. The DRC further stressed that the principle of equal representation of players and clubs is one of the very fundamental elements to be fulfilled, in order for a national dispute resolution chamber to be recognised as such. Indeed, this prerequisite is mentioned in the Regulations, in the FIFA Circular no. 1010 as well as in art. 3 par. 1 of the NDRC Regulations, which illustrates the aforementioned principle as follows: “The NDRC shall be composed of the following members, who shall serve a four-year renewable mandate: a) a chairman and a deputy chairman chosen by consensus by the player and club representatives (…); b) between three and ten player representatives who are elected or appointed either on proposal of the players’ associations affiliated to FIFPro, or, where no such associations exist, on the basis of a selection process agreed by FIFA and FIFPro; c) between three and ten club representatives (…).” In the same vein, the FIFA Circular no. 1010 states the following: “The parties must have equal influence over the appointment of arbitrators. This means for example that every party shall have the right to appoint an arbitrator and the two appointed arbitrators appoint the chairman of the arbitration tribunal (…). Where arbitrators are to be selected from a predetermined list, every interest group that is represented must be able to exercise equal influence over the compilation of the arbitrator list”.

9. With the aforementioned considerations in mind, the Chamber focused its attention on art. 3 of the DRC of the Football Federation of Country D Regulations, which inter alia provides that the DRC of the Football Federation of Country D’s panels are always chaired by a member of the “Board of Presidents” which in turn is composed by the “Administrative Board of the Football Federation of Country D”. The aforesaid is corroborated by means of art. 8 of the said Regulations which states that “Arbitral Tribunal is formed by the [arbitrators] who are selected by the parties and a member of Board of Presidents. Member of Board of Presidents presides [the] Arbitral Tribunal” (emphasis added).

10. Along those lines, the members of the DRC, referring to art. 3 par. 1 of the NDRC Regulations as well as FIFA Circular 1010 (cf. point II.8 above), outlined that the Respondent failed to provide any evidence which would indicate how the members of the Administrative Board of the Football Federation of Country D were appointed. In particular, if both clubs’ as well as players’ representatives were involved at all in the appointment of the members of said Board or had any representation therein. As such, the Chamber considered that it lacked key information in order to determine if the DRC of the Football Federation of Country D complies with the requirement of equal representation of players and clubs. Specifically, if the Chairman (in casu the President of the Arbitration Panels) is chosen by consensus between the players’ and club’s representatives. In fact, the members of the administrative board of an association is usually mainly composed of representatives of clubs affiliated to the relevant association.

11. What is more, the Chamber pointed out that there is no sufficient information on file to determine if the appeals body within the structure of the decision-making process of the Football Federation of Country D actually complies with the requirements described in the preceding paragraphs. Anyhow, from art. 3 of the Regulations of the Arbitration Commission of the Football Federation of Country D, it would appear that the entire Commission is appointed “by motion of the President of Federation and order of Administration Board”; making it thus also incompatible with the afore-described principle of equal representation.

12. On account of all the aforementioned circumstances, the members of the Chamber unanimously concluded that the Respondent failed to demonstrate, to the DRC’s satisfaction, that the DRC of the Football Federation of Country D and the Arbitration Commission of the Football Federation of Country D are indeed independent arbitration tribunals respecting the principle of equal representation of players and clubs, which is a fundamental prerequisite that an DRC must comply with. As such, the DRC concluded that the Respondent’s objection towards the competence of FIFA to deal with the present matter has to be rejected, and that the Dispute Resolution Chamber is competent, on the basis of art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, to entertain the claim of the player as to the substance.

13. In continuation, the Chamber analysed which edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, it confirmed that, in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2018), and considering that the present matter was submitted to FIFA on 19 April 2017, the 2016 edition of the aforementioned regulations (hereinafter: the Regulations) is applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance.

14. The competence of the Chamber and the applicable regulations having been established, and entering into the substance of the matter, the Chamber continued acknowledging the above-mentioned facts as well as the documentation contained in the file. However, the Chamber emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to the facts, arguments and documentary evidence which it considered pertinent for the assessment of the substance of the matter at hand.

15. First, the DRC acknowledged that the parties entered into an employment contract valid as of 15 June 2016 until 31 May 2018 whereby the Respondent undertook to pay to the Claimant EUR 475,000 payable in 5 equal instalments of EUR 45,000 in each of the seasons 2016/2017 and 2017/2018.

16. In continuation, the Chamber took note of the claim of the Claimant who argued that, for the season 2016/2017, the Respondent only paid him EUR 65,000. The Chamber noted that the Claimant requested EUR 410,000 as outstanding remuneration for said season. What is more, the DRC observed that the Claimant also requested, after amending his claim twice, the amount of EUR 475,000 as compensation for breach of contract.

17. The Chamber then observed that, conversely, the Respondent only recognised owing to the Claimant, for the season 2016/2017, the amount of EUR 254,755 as it considers that the amounts provided in the contract are gross. Regarding the Claimant’s claim for compensation, the Respondent deems that the player left Country D by the end of the 2016/2017 season without informing the club, thereby terminating the contract without just cause.

18. With the above in mind, the DRC wished to stress first that it appears that neither of the parties expressly terminated the employment relationship; at least, neither of the parties produced any document whereby it informed the other party that it was terminating the contract. However, the members of Chamber were of the unanimous opinion that, taking into consideration the facts of the case at their disposal in combination with the allegations of both parties as well as the date on which the Claimant first requested compensation for breach of contract (cf. point I./13. above), it could be concluded with a reasonable degree of certainty that the Claimant stopped executing the employment relationship at the end of the 2016/2017 season by leaving Country D and that thus the relevant contract was de facto terminated by said party at that point in time.

19. Having established the above, the Chamber deemed that the next issue which it needed to address was whether the relevant employment contract had been terminated by the Claimant with just cause and, in the affirmative, which would be the potential consequences of said termination.

20. In this context, the Chamber considered essential to point out that at the time of the termination of the contract, the Respondent had already received, and even replied to, the original claim of the player for outstanding remuneration, acknowledging a debt towards the player in the amount of at least EUR 254,755, which equals to more than 5 monthly salaries. What is more, the DRC also underlined that the Respondent expressly recognised that it was “struggling with severe economic and administrative problems”.

21. Consequently, and even without entering into the allegation of the Respondent as to whether the salary of the Claimant provided in the contract was gross or net, the Chamber came to the unanimous conclusion that the Respondent had seriously neglected its contractual obligations towards the Claimant in a continuous and constant manner. In other words, at the time of the termination, the Respondent had failed to honour its financial obligations towards the Claimant for a substantial period of time and regarding a significant part of the player’s remuneration.

22. The members of the Chamber further pointed out that the Respondent had ample time to remedy the default considering the time that elapsed between the reply of the Respondent acknowledging the debt towards the Claimant and the actual termination of the contract by the latter.

23. In light of all the above considerations, the Chamber came to the unanimous conclusion that, at the end of the 2016/2017 season, the Claimant had no reasons to believe that the Respondent would comply with its contractual obligations any longer. As such, for the members of the DRC, it was evident that the Claimant had just cause to terminate the employment contract binding it to the Respondent and that, consequently, the latter party is to be held liable for said early termination of the contract with just cause.

24. Bearing in mind the previous considerations, the Chamber went on to deal with the consequences of the early termination of the employment contract with just cause by the Claimant.

25. In so doing, the members of the Chamber concurred that the Respondent must fulfil its obligations as per the contract in accordance with the general legal principle of pacta sunt servanda. Consequently, the Chamber decided that the Respondent is liable to pay to the Claimant the remuneration that was outstanding at the time of the termination.

26. In this context, the members of the Chamber proceeded to analyse the argument of the Respondent in relation to the nature of the amounts due to the Claimant. Namely, whether the amounts due to the Claimant in accordance with the contract were either gross or net.

27. The DRC first emphasised that the contract is clear and leaves no room for interpretation when it establishes that the amounts due to the Claimant are net. Hence, the Chamber considered that it was the Respondent’s burden to prove, in accordance with art. 12 par. 3 of the Regulations, that the intention of the parties when concluding the relevant contract was to actually establish therein gross amounts.

28. Along those lines, the Chamber recalled that the main argument of the Respondent in relation to the nature of the amounts is that the parties used the “mandatory contract” of the Football Federation of Country D and that “it should not be accepted that the amounts stipulated in the contract reflect net amounts only because this formality and the mandatory format of contract”. In order to support its position, the Chamber recalled that the Respondent presented two decisions issued by the DRC of the Football Federation of Country D and the 6th Civil Court of city of Country D respectively.

29. Regarding said judgments, the Chamber concluded that these clearly do not help the case of the Respondent. First, both the decision of the DRC of the Football Federation of Country D and of the 6th Civil Court of city of Country D relate to cases based on different facts and involving different parties.

30. Moreover, the determination of the DRC of the Football Federation of Country D about the gross nature of the amounts in its aforementioned decision is due to a reportedly lack of evidence by the Claimant in said case and by no means concludes that, as a matter of principle, the amounts provided in the “mandatory contract” of the Football Federation of Country D are always gross.

31. As to the decision of the 6th Civil Court of city of Country D, the expert report, upon which said decision almost entirely relies, has as basis a contract which, contrary to the one at the basis of the present dispute, did not indicate whether the salaries were gross or net. Indeed, point 5 of the expert report states unambiguously that “In the contract signed between the parties, there is no gap, provision or regulation about the payments are net or gross”.

32. It follows from the foregoing considerations that the decisions described in the preceding paragraphs clearly fall short to demonstrate, to the Chamber’s satisfaction, that the parties’ intention in the present matter was to actually stipulate in the contract gross instead of net amounts; this in total contradiction with the clear wording of the contract. Consequently, the DRC dismissed the argument of the Respondent and concluded that the Claimant was entitled to receive from the Respondent net amounts.

33. Having established the above, the Chamber proceeded to address the issue of the payment of 16,000 in the currency of Country D made by the Respondent to the Claimant and stressed that the Claimant failed to clarify exactly under which provision of the contract this alleged “winning bonus for matches” was paid or in relation to which match. Therefore, the DRC was of the opinion that it had no other option than to conclude that this payment of 16,000 in the currency of Country D, which, as remained undisputed, equals to EUR 4,453, was to be considered as salary payment.

34. On account of all the aforementioned considerations, the members of the Chamber established that the Claimant was entitled to the 2016/2017 season to the total net amount of EUR 475,000 and that the Respondent only made payments in the amount of EUR 69,453. Consequently, the Chamber decided that the Respondent must pay to the Claimant the amount of EUR 405,547 as outstanding remuneration for the 2016/2017 season.

35. Equally, considering the claim of the Claimant as well as its well-established and long standing jurisprudence, the DRC granted to the Claimant 5% interest p.a. on the amount as of the relevant due dates.

36. In continuation, the Chamber decided that, taking into consideration art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the Claimant is entitled to receive from the Respondent compensation for breach of contract in addition to any outstanding salaries on the basis of the relevant employment contract.

37. In this context, the Chamber outlined that, in accordance with said provision, the amount of compensation shall be calculated, in particular and unless otherwise provided for in the contract at the basis of the dispute, with due consideration for the law of the country concerned, the specificity of sport and further objective criteria, including, in particular, the remuneration and other benefits due to the player under the existing contract and/or the new contract, the time remaining on the existing contract up to a maximum of five years, and depending on whether the contractual breach falls within the protected period.

38. In application of the relevant provision, the Chamber held that it first of all had to clarify whether the pertinent employment contract contained any clause, by means of which the parties had beforehand agreed upon a compensation payable by the contractual parties in the event of breach of contract. In this regard, the Chamber established that no such compensation clause was included in the employment contract at the basis of the matter at stake.

39. Having recalled the aforementioned, and in order to evaluate the compensation to be paid by the Respondent, the members of the Chamber took into account the remuneration due to the Claimant in accordance with the employment contract, along with the professional situation of the Claimant after the early termination occurred. In this respect, the Chamber pointed out that at the time of the termination of the contract, the remaining value of the contract as from its early termination by the Claimant until its regular expiry amounted to EUR 475,000 for the season 2017/2018. The Chamber concluded that this amount which shall serve as the basis for the final determination of the amount of compensation for breach of contract.

40. In continuation, the Chamber recalled that the player had entered into a new employment with the club of Country B, Club E, valid as of 4 September 2017 until 30 November 2017, which according to the information on TMS, stipulated a total remuneration in favour of the player in the amount of EUR 4,443. Consequently, in accordance with the constant practice of the Dispute Resolution Chamber and the general obligation of the Claimant to mitigate his damages, the above-mentioned amounts shall be taken into account in the calculation of the amount of compensation for breach of contract. For the sake of completeness, the Chamber pointed out that even if it follows the argumentation of the player that the transfer of the player to Club E “could not be completed as it was inserted outside the relevant registration period”, this situation should not have any impact on the validity of said employment contract.

41. In view of all of the above, the Chamber decided that the Respondent must pay the amount of EUR 470,557 to the Claimant as compensation for breach of contract, which is considered by the Chamber to be a reasonable and justified amount, as well as 5% interest p.a. over said amount as from the date on which the Claimant’s final request for compensation, i.e. 7 October 2017, until the date of effective payment.

42. Finally, the Chamber concluded its deliberations by establishing that any further claim lodged by the Claimant is rejected.

III. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber

1. The claim of the Claimant, Player A, is admissible.

2. The claim of the Claimant is partially accepted.

3. The Respondent, Club C, is ordered to pay to the Claimant, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision, outstanding remuneration in the amount of EUR 405,547 plus 5% interest p.a. until the date of effective payment as follows:

a. 5% p.a. on the amount of EUR 20,547 as from 1 October 2016;

b. 5% p.a. on the amount of EUR 45,000 as from 31 October 2016;

c. 5% p.a. on the amount of EUR 45,000 as from 1 December 2016;

d. 5% p.a. on the amount of EUR 45,000 as from 31 December 2016;

e. 5% p.a. on the amount of EUR 70,000 as from 31 January 2017;

f. 5% p.a. on the amount of EUR 45,000 as from 1 March 2017;

g. 5% p.a. on the amount of EUR 45,000 as from 31 March 2017;

h. 5% p.a. on the amount of EUR 45,000 as from 1 May 2017;

i. 5% p.a. on the amount of EUR 45,000 as from 31 May 2017;

4. The Respondent is ordered to pay to the Claimant, within 30 days as from the date of notification of this decision, compensation for breach of contract in the amount of EUR 470,557 plus 5% interest p.a. as of 7 October 2017 until the date of effective payment.

5. In the event that the amounts plus interest due to the Claimant in accordance with the above-mentioned numbers 3. and 4. are not paid by the Respondent within the stated time limit, the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision.

6. Any further claim lodged by the Claimant is rejected.

7. The Claimant is directed to inform the Respondent, immediately and directly, of the account number to which the remittances are to be made and to notify the Dispute Resolution Chamber of every payment received.

*****

Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy):

According to art. 58 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives).

The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following:

Court of Arbitration for Sport

Avenue de Beaumont 2

1012 Lausanne

Switzerland

Tel: +41 21 613 50 00

Fax: +41 21 613 50 01

e-mail: info@tas-cas.org - www.tas-cas.org

For the Dispute Resolution Chamber:

Omar Ongaro

Football Regulatory Director

Encl. CAS Directives